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THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE

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BOOK I.

THE EMPIRE OF NAPOLEON.

THE EMPIRE OF NAPOLEON.

CHAPTER I.

THE WORLD EMPIRE.

THERE is no one token to indicate that Napoleon, standing on the even now dizzy height of his power, ever gave ear to the warning voice of prudence; a demoniacal force drove him onward irresistibly in the pathway of violence to all the weak. Prussia was now that one among all the states who felt herself most immediately and sensibly concerned by this course of action. After having become involved in painful complications by the negotiations of the year 1805, the treaty of February (p. 334, Vol. XVI.), had made an alliance with Napoleon impossible. The king felt deeply the insult received; he regarded the present time as only a respite, in which to prepare himself, and to draw more closely the connection with Russia. While Haugwitz was still in Paris, the Duke of Brunswick was sent to St. Petersburg to explain to the czar the situation of Prussia and to use endeavors for a mediation between France and Russia, which might lead to a general peace. These negotiations, conducted afterward through Hardenberg, and in the profoundest secrecy, led to a treaty (July 24), in pursuance of which, notwithstanding Prussia's alliance with France, the Prusso-Russian treaty of 1800 should be maintained; Prussia bound herself not to apply the treaty of February against Russia; and the latter pledged all her forces in defence of the independence and integrity of Prussia. Prussia stood, therefore, as regards her two neighbors, who were in a state of war with each other, openly in alliance with one and secretly with the other. Untenable as this two-fold situation was in itself, it became more and more so every day through the want of consideration toward Prussia in which Napoleon appeared to take pleasure. Letters from the king's own hand to him remained unanswered; the transformation of Holland into a Bonaparte kingdom was known in Berlin only through the *Moniteur*. In open violation of his declaration that he would never extend the frontiers of France beyond the Rhine, Napoleon pushed forward work on the

fortifications of Mayence on the farther shore, added Wesel to the empire and occupied it with a strong garrison; and Murat took possession as a part of Cleves of the imperial abbeys of Elten, Essen, and Werden, which in 1803 had been secularized by Prussia.

These humiliations inflicted upon the king were in some degree mitigated by the invitation to establish as a companion to the Confederation of the Rhine a North German Confederation under the direction of Prussia—an empire of North Germany. It appeared to be for Prussia a duty of self-preservation to draw about her the neighboring remnants of the empire which was lying in ruins; but it was soon found that Napoleon was secretly placing difficulties in the way of the plan proposed by himself. The Hanseatic towns, at the same time that he offered them as indemnification for the King of Naples, were dissuaded from acceding, "since the emperor desired to take their independence into his special protection"; the Elector of Saxony was warned not to suffer himself to be hurried on by Prussia. The Elector of Hesse turned toward Prussia first, since, in his longing for the possessions of his cousin of Darmstadt, he found no sympathy from Napoleon, and he subscribed rather unwillingly on August 20. In the midst of these dragging negotiations there came suddenly on August 6 advices from Luchesini, the ambassador at Paris, that Napoleon had proffered the restoration of Hanover to the house of Guelf as the price of peace with England. Napoleon's denial increased the irritation, since not only was confirmation received from London, but also the intelligence that he had offered Prussian Poland to Russia. This unheard-of affront acted with the force of an electric shock. In order not to repeat the former mistake by a premature disarmament, Haugwitz ordered, on August 9, the mobilization of the army; in silence, however, he cherished the hope that the anxieties excited by the latest advices would be quickly dissipated, and thus the military precautionary measures that had been adopted be rendered superfluous.

Indeed it appeared to be so. Alexander refused his approval to the Oubril treaty (p. 335, Vol. XVI.), and the Franco-English peace was not accomplished. But the exasperation over the encroachments of Napoleon, which were increasing from day to day, had already acquired a strength which did not permit the king to remain any longer in the beaten path. The warlike sentiment which had seized upon the army showed itself no longer merely in the haughty demonstrations of individual officers of the garde-du-corps and gendarmes; the remembrance of the disappointed hopes of former years concerning a war, undertaken in the most favorable circumstances, which it was thought might have restored Prussia's lost consideration; the apprehension that all would end

once more as feebly as on the last occasion,—these doubts and fears called forth from the highest circles a manifestation, which proceeded from Stein (Fig. 1), the minister of finance, but was participated in by many



FIG. 1.—Baron vom Stein. From a lithograph by Heyne.

generals. A memorial prepared by them and delivered to the queen in May subjected the government to a cutting criticism, and also the persons of two of the privy counsellors of the cabinet, Beyme and Lombard, of Count Haugwitz, and of the king's personal friend, General von Köckeritz. This was the first instance of the formation of a political party in Prussia. And now a second paper of like purport, composed by J. von Müller, having the signatures of the princes, of the Duke of Brunswick, and of Baron Stein, was presented to the king himself on September 2, but with regard to a proceeding so unparalleled in Prussian history the king manifested lively displeasure, and very decidedly forbade similar intermeddling in the future.

Undoubtedly Prussia had just grounds for war, but Haugwitz and the king were greatly in error if they believed that it still depended simply on their choice to begin or to avoid the war. As soon as Napoleon

learned of the rejection of the Oubril treaty, he determined on war with the power which he considered the vanguard of Russia. He made use of only friendly words until he had all his forces in readiness for a destructive blow, and he succeeded so well that Hougwitz deferred sending Colonel Krusmark to St. Petersburg till September 18. The auxiliary force of 70,000 men promised by the czar could not, even under the most favorable circumstances, arrive in time to participate in the decisive action. Furthermore, Russia found herself threatened in the south by a war with the Porte; the Sultan Selim had been induced by Napoleon's ambassador, Sébastieni, to remove on his own account the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were appointed by him in conjunction with Russia, and the advance of a Russian army into the principalities had really opened the war. Austria, yet bleeding from fresh wounds, could easily be led to hold fast to her neutrality. With England the Prussian cabinet had indeed renewed its connection, but in the anxiety lest it might be obliged at some time to give up Hanover negotiations were purposely protracted. The advantage which Prussia possessed in the opportunity presented for invading the enemy's quarters passed by again unimproved, because Hougwitz declared any offensive movement inadmissible before October 8, the last day appointed for receiving the reply to the Prussian ultimatum. In this three demands were set forth: immediate evacuation of South Germany; acknowledgment of the Confederation of North Germany; and a peaceful understanding upon other contested points. These were of course rejected with disdain, and the war broke out.

The Prussian commander-in-chief, the Duke of Brunswick, seventy-one years old, was dominated by the desire to avoid the war; between him and his generals discord prevailed; and the worst was his relation toward Prince Hohenlohe, who was leader of the Silesian corps, to which Frederick Augustus of Saxony, although half-heartedly, had united his 22,000 men under General von Zezschwitz. On October 1, the Prussian army moved from the Saale toward the Thuringian forest. The original plan was based upon the supposition that, while Rüchel to the right was making a demonstration from Westphalia in the direction of Fulda, and on the left the small corps of Tauenzien was engaging the attention of the enemy by movements from Hof toward Nuremberg and Amberg, the main army with superior forces would be able to fall upon the enemy's centre and pierce it, before his forces should be fully collected. After much diverse counseling the headquarters at Erfurt reached a conclusion to occupy between Gotha, Erfurt, and the Saale a central position, from which they could easily cross over to the right bank of the river

and be able to prevent any attempt to turn their left flank. Rüehel, together with Blücher, was likewise to approach nearer to the main body. Hohenlohe, who from the first had disapproved of the advance movement, conformed to the new directions with evident opposition, and only after repeated orders. On the 9th, a manifesto by Lombard, very unskillfully composed, made its appearance; it was less a justification of the war than an explanation of the previous policy of Prussia, and only excited the anger of Napoleon.

The experiences of 1805 had been lost upon the Prussians. They acted as did Mack on the Iller; instead of awaiting in a strong defensive position the arrival of the Russians, the Prussians, in scattered parties, with inferior numbers, without guarding the numerous passes through which the enemy could come upon them, offered themselves to the blows of Napoleon. While he had no purpose of wholly uncovering the country between Bamberg and the Rhine, he had collected between Coburg and Müneberg a combined force of 200,000 men, so that his numbers exceeded the Prussians to the extent of at least 60,000 men. On October 8, these strong columns were put in motion, to pass through the valley of the Saale and come round on the left wing of the Prussians. Tauenzien, with his 8000 men, was by the pressure of Soult's superior force thrown back upon Schleiz, and on the following day, still farther, in the direction of Auma. Without proper concert with the movements of the main army, Hohenlohe collected his corps at Kahla and Orlamünde, in order to be prepared to cross the Saale; Prince Louis Ferdinand was directed to hold Rudolstadt and Blankenburg with the vanguard, consisting mainly of Saxons, until the coming up of the main body on its march from Erfurt; but while occupied with the execution of this command, he was attacked at Saalfeld, on the 10th, by Lannes. Though this point, which covered the right flank of Hohenlohe's position, was of the highest importance, yet the maintenance of it against a superior force proved to be impossible. The command to retreat was given, but Louis Ferdinand himself was hemmed in at Mölsdorf by the cavalry of the enemy and was killed in the mêlée.

At first much in doubt, Napoleon, who on the 11th had betaken himself to Auma, perceived in time that the Prussians had not yet passed the Saale, and decided to turn toward the river in order to prevent their retreat in the direction of the Elbe; meanwhile, he ordered the advance of Davout, Bernadotte, and Murat through Zeitz to Naumburg against the left Prussian flank, and determined to attack in front with the four corps of Lannes, Augereau, Soult and Ney, and with the Guard. On the side of the Prussians, the main army, to which Rüehel and Blücher

had drawn near, encamped on the plateau between Weimar and Jena, so that now both armies had completed their concentration. Since it appeared that the enemy was pressing through the valley of the Saale, and that already large masses were on the east of it, Brunswick came to the determination to draw off toward the Unstrut, with the view of resting afterward upon Magdeburg and of offering the enemy battle between the Saale and the Elbe. Hohenlohe was to remain at Jena provisionally, in order to cover the left of the main army on its march and then to follow it. But the length of time consumed in this allowed to Davout and Bernadotte sufficient time to seize the crossings of the Saale at Nammburg and Kösen, and to force the army to fight before it reached the Unstrut. In the early morning of the 13th, Tauenzien, who now formed the rearguard of Hohenlohe, being warmly pressed, withdrew from Jena to the heights on the left bank of the Saale, in the line of Lützerode-Closwitz. At the same time Lannes pressed forward vigorously, his skirmishers climbed the wooded slopes of Landgrafenberg, occupied only by a battalion of Saxon troops, and gained firm footing on the plateau. To this point the emperor repaired personally in the afternoon; in the belief that the main body of the enemy was before him, he immediately ordered Lannes's entire corps to pass through the Mühl valley and ascend the height, in order thus to hold and cover for his army the exit from the river crossings at Jena. He himself eagerly attacked, urged on the men, caused the ascent to be made practicable for artillery, and ordered the advancing troops to make all possible haste. Then, pressed together in a narrow space, the steep mountain-side behind them, the French stood directly in front of the Prussian lines, and if energetically assailed would have paid dear for their audacity. Hohenlohe conceived the purpose of leading an attack on Lannes, but at the decisive moment Massenbach brought from Brunswick orders for withdrawal, with the express injunction to engage in no conflict. Without the least suspicion that an attack from a force twofold greater than his own was awaiting him, Hohenlohe spent the night quietly sleeping at Kapellendorf. At four o'clock on the morning of the fateful 14th, Napoleon (Fig. 2) announced to his troops in fiery words a sure victory over the scattered Prussians. At six o'clock began the conflict between Tauenzien and Lannes. The Prussian battalions were exposed to the fire of the artillery, and also to the ever livelier and approaching fire of the dense skirmishers, who, hidden in the valleys, did not once become visible to them; after a destructive fight of three hours, Tauenzien was forced to yield his position; his right wing was thrown into disorder in its retreat to the forest of Isserstädt. In an engagement which was entirely isolated and preliminary one-fourth

of the army was already destroyed without advantage. The approach to the plateau was now open to the French army. Augereau came up through the Mühl valley on Lannes's left, Soult through the Rau valley on his right, and Ney followed as a reserve. Now first Hohenlohe, while summoning at the same moment Rüehel from Weimar, led forth the main body of his army. Eager for the fight, with drums beating, the troops moved up the ascent toward Vierzehnheiligen, and opposite Isserstädt the Saxons joined them. A thousand paces from the village the prince commanded a halt; he spoke to his men, reminded them of the ancient Prussian renown; everywhere he was received with shouts. Twelve battalions advanced as if on parade amid the hot fire of the skirmishers and of artillery; Isserstädt and a part of the adjoining forest were taken, and General Grawert approached the prince to congratulate him on the winning of the battle. But behind Vierzehnheiligen the enemy were constantly developing fresh masses of troops. For two hours the brave infantry held their ground tenaciously, expecting Rüehel to come up, while the French skirmishers in the bushes and buildings fired at the battalions standing before them like targets; then they began to waver. In vain Hohenlohe and his officers strove to bring the men to a stand; under the onset of Murat's cavalry their retreat was changed into a confused flight. Now, at two o'clock, Rüehel at last arrived at Kapellendorf. His eighteen weak battalions moved forward as if on parade, regardless of the murderous fire, toward the steep ascent of Grossanstädtd, still presenting for a while the splendid spectacle of the regular Prussian charge, but a half hour's conflict sufficed to annihilate this band of brave men. The greater part of their officers were striken down, Rüehel himself was wounded in the chest; the Saxon division of Niesemenschel, which continued to hold the Schnecke, was surrounded and captured.

The main army late in the evening of the 13th reached Auerstädt. Brunswick had as little suspicion of Davout's proximity as the latter thought of encountering the Prussian main body; he expected only to march with his 30,000 men to Apolda for the purpose of joining Bernadotte, and then falling upon the rear of the enemy defeated at Jena. But when he began his march on the 14th, at six o'clock in the morning, his advancee, which had been ordered to seizure the Kösen pass, fell in with the enemy at Hassenhausen. Around this village a fierce conflict arose; here also the brave but scattered attacks attempted by the Prussians were repulsed by Davout with immovable steadiness; Brunswick himself received a mortal wound from a ball which deprived him of sight; Generals Schmettau and Wartensteben fell. Davout seized




FIG. 2.—Napoleon in the battle of Jena. From an engraving by Friley; painting by Horace Vernet. (Versailles, Historical gallery.)

Napoleon.

Berthier

Murat.

by storm the heights of Eckartsberga and occupied them with artillery. It would still have been possible for the Prussians to force their way through the pass, but the king saw only the severe losses. He resolved, therefore, to unite himself with Hohenlohe, of whose fate he knew nothing, and then with stronger forces to renew the effort; he ordered a retreat to Weimar. Davout's victory was more important and more brilliant than that of Napoleon; but the emperor's bulletin reversed all this, and made Auerstädt a mere episode of the battle of Jena. But Davout, who had lost nearly half of his men, was too much exhausted to harass the retreat of the Prussian army. They therefore were able to come on in tolerable order, till, upon the heights of Apolda, they met Bernadotte hastening up from Dornburg and saw themselves ridden down and their ranks torn through by the flying squadrons of Hohenlohe closely pursued by the French cavalry.

More fatal for the Prussians than the defeat was the night of terror that followed it. Instead of going to Weimar, they turned aside to the north, and took their direction over the Ettersberg toward Sömmerda. But, hard pressed by the enemy, the remains of the army were driven around in a circle. Mocking all endeavors to establish order and coherence in the retreat, the wild coil of men, horses, artillery and vehicles was whirled about hither and thither. In the confusion it happened that the direct road to Magdeburg was not taken, but a circuitous route by Sondershausen. Here the king gave up the chief command to Hohenlohe.

The cause of this catastrophe lay, first of all, in the long-continued blunders of a policy, which, by its uncertain and temporizing character, had undermined confidence; and, moreover, in this fact, that the Prussian army, admirably trained as was ever that of Frederick the Great, had, for half a century, notwithstanding attempts at reform, remained essentially the same in its ways of living, its composition and its methods of fighting, and behind that complete transformation which the French army had experienced since the Revolution. At Jena the Prussians maintained all their old valor in the most brilliant manner, but, in weak, isolated divisions, first of 3000, then of 25,000, and then of 15,000 combatants, had engaged always in a petty conflict, and while exhibiting useless feats of bravery, were either exposed to the destructive fire of swarms of skirmishers, half unseen, or to the combined attack of superior numbers. With the leaders there still prevailed the "geographical-terrestrial" view, conformably to the example of the defensive system of warfare, necessarily pursued by Prince Henry and Ferdinand of Brunswick, which regarded as the main object not the annihilation of the

hostile forces, but skilful manoeuvring in order to secure certain points. A stupid devotion to tradition maintained rooted defects. This army, which was the boast of the state and its pillar of support, was yet treated as a step-child. From false economy the requisite increase of the number of the troops was not effected, promotion languished, the majority of the officers suffered from poverty, and the false sentimentality of the age of "enlightenment" diffused a certain disinclination toward a standing army, and brought with it the consequence that the soldiers were made less important than the civilians.

Gradually at first, Napoleon reached a clear perception of the extent of his victory; but he had scarcely apprehended it when he made the conquered feel unsparing insult and arrogance. The full rudeness of his unbridled nature overflowed in the vulgarities which in his bulletins he poured upon the unfortunate queen, whom he compared to Helen of Troy. The cessation of hostilities which the king solicited, with an appeal to former friendship, he proudly refused, since the advantages gained by war appeared too great not to be followed up to Dresden and Berlin. On the other hand, in presence of the quiet dignity and resolution with which the Duchess Louisa confronted him in Weimar, his rude haughtiness was so far softened, that he promised forgiveness to her husband, Charles Augustus, who had served as general in the Prussian army, on condition that he should leave it within twenty-four hours, return to Weimar, and recall his regiment. Far removed from the severity with which he treated the Prussians was his mildness toward the Saxons. From the first he had assumed in reference to Frederick Augustus, as to one misled, the appearance of indulgent compassion; besides, it was not unknown to him that it was unwillingly, and only by constraint of circumstances, that the elector had joined his troops to the Prussian forces. On the 15th the emperor declared to the Saxon officers who were his prisoners, that he had come only for the purpose of freeing their land from the Prussian yoke, and set them at liberty on their word of honor not to serve against him during the present war, and with them he dismissed also 7000 soldiers. Upon this the other Saxon divisions yet remaining in the Prussian army withdrew to their homes. This, however, did not prevent his treating Saxony to a degree as a conquered country; Leipsic, as the chief emporium of English merchandise, and, therefore, the especial enemy of France, was punished by the confiscation of all English goods and funds, and was forced to pay heavy contributions.

Meantime, nothing was neglected to follow up the victory with the greatest energy. Soult, Ney, and a large part of Murat's cavalry pur-

sued the defeated enemy very closely, in order to hasten its dissolution, and with the remainder of the army the emperor went forward, hastening his march to Berlin. Nowhere was there time for the fugitives to draw a breath and to rally. And now began the great general breaking up, which seemed about to entomb the entire kingdom in a few weeks. The capitulation of Erfurt, concluded on the first appearance of the enemy's horse, in the night of October 16, by Field-Marshal Möllendorf and the Prince of Orange—both severely wounded—surrendered into the hands of the enemy 10,000 men and a great quantity of supplies, and gave an example of unthinking discouragement which spread its contagious effects far and wide. Kalkreuth, who was in command of the rear-guard in the retreat toward Magdeburg, was only kept from surrender by the brave examples of Prince Augustus and General Blücher. After it was determined, in order to reach Magdeburg as soon as possible, to go through the Harz Mountains in detachments, Blücher brought the remainder of the artillery, forty-one pieces, entrusted to him by Quarter-master-General Scharnhorst, together with 600 horsemen and a few hundred infantry, over the mountains on foot, and on the 24th crossed the Elbe at Sandau, without leaving behind so much as one powder-wagon. The Duke of Weimar, also, who, notwithstanding Napoleon's wrath, could not decide to leave the army just then, succeeded, although he was already surrounded, in bringing his corps across the river, owing particularly to Colonel von York, who, on October 26, at Altenzaun, for a whole day held his pursuers at bay. But Magdeburg now afforded no resting-place; in the fortress the wildest confusion prevailed, and in consequence of the defeat which the reserve, 11,000 strong, under Duke Eugene of Würtemberg, had suffered at Halle on the 17th from Bernadotte, the road to Berlin now stood open to the pursuers; already, on the 24th, Lannes, Murat, and the Guard were near Potsdam. The capital was filled with unexampled dismay by the overthrow of the Prussian army. So potent had become the custom under the existing system of government of doing only that which was commanded by supreme authority, that the exercise of independent judgment was utterly lost even on the part of the highest officers. The governor of Berlin, Count Schulenburg-Kehmert, helplessly left his post. His stepson, Prince Hatzfeldt, whom he left as his deputy, would not permit the removal of the ordnance from the arsenal lest the victor might take it amiss! Only Stein, though ill, had sufficient courage and presence of mind to convey in safety to Königsberg the coffers of his department; with their help the war was carried on until peace. On the 25th, Davout, as a reward for the victory at Auerstädt, marched into Berlin

first, and on the same day, Spandau, without firing a shot, opened its gates to the French; Napoleon himself made his entry with great military display on the 27th, after he had previously, on a visit to the tomb of Frederick the Great, appropriated as booty his sword, sash, and insignia (PLATE I.).

In no way corresponding to this stormy haste of the pursuit was the prolonged deliberation with which Hohenlohe conducted his retreat. Yet it would not have been at all impossible for him, with the 51 battalions, 155 squadrons, and the remains of five brigades of fusileers, which he had under his command, to have reached the Oder and Stettin in advance of the enemy and thence to have attempted a junction with the East Prussian troops and the Russians, but his own irresolution and Massenbach's excitement, which bordered on delirium, suffered time and opportunity to be lost. Desertion thinned the ranks more and more; entire divisions cast their arms aside and hastened home. Fearing the bold attacks of Murat's cavalry, which spread over the country, Hohenlohe directed his course to Fürstenberg, and arrived there on the evening of the 26th. Sad as was the state of affairs, yet when he reached Prenzlau on the 28th, not simply was the situation desperate, but the moral strength of the leaders had sunk to the lowest point. A French flag of truce delivered the summons to capitulate; Massenbach fancied he saw enemies on all sides. Murat in his interview with Hohenlohe gave his word of honor that the Prussians were surrounded by 100,000 men, not one word of which was true. In the council of war that was convened no one of the staff officers could say anything further against capitulation. Though it was certainly known that peace negotiations were in progress, the prince himself fell into the weakness of conceiving it to be better to give up his reputation as a soldier than to make a needless sacrifice of the lives of his men, and thus he subscribed the capitulation, in pursuance of which his corps, still numbering 10,000 soldiers, with 1800 horses, laid down their arms. Only a few small divisions forced a passage. Prince Augustus, with his battalion of grenadiers, defended himself to the last extremity, on the road to Prenzlau, until he was finally obliged to surrender. The moral effect of the capitulation was more disastrous even than the loss of the troops. It planted despondency in all hearts, it scattered charges of treachery among the people, and gave the widest diffusion to the thought that everything was lost. On the 29th, in like manner, at Pasewalk, 4200 men with eight guns laid down their arms without pressing necessity; at Anklam, General von Bila gave himself up; another division surrendered at Wolgast; the artillery saved by Blücher

PLATE I.



Napoleon's entry into Berlin: October 27, 1806.

From the engraving by F. Jügel; original drawing by L. Wolf (1772-1832).

fell into the hands of the French on October 30, at the village of Boldekow.

Blücher now remained the star of heroic courage and unbroken constancy, illuminating this night of despondency and violated obligation. On arriving upon the right bank of the Elbe, he had assumed command of Hohenlohe's rear-guard. Notwithstanding the exhaustion of his men, he resisted the hussars of the enemy on the 27th, in the forest at Lychen; but at Boitzenburg intelligence of Hohenlohe's capitulation reached him, and he then turned his course toward Meeklenburg, where, his corps being joined by that of the Duke of Weimar, now commanded by Winning, his force was increased to 21,000. Here he conceived the bold plan of drawing off, possibly by a diversion across the Elbe, the greater part of the enemy's force from the eastern provinces upon himself, thereby to secure time for collecting troops beyond the Vistula, for provisioning the fortresses, and for the coming up of the Russians. Amid numerous engagements, of which that of York's rear-guard at Waren was specially brilliant, the march was continued, Bernadotte's repeated summons to capitulate were rejected with warmth, but the exhaustion of the troops forbade Blücher to think any longer of crossing the river in sight of the enemy. He thence directed himself upon Gadebusch, where York urgently advised to accept battle, but out of regard to the condition of the troops, the general passed on toward Lübeck, where he hoped to find a secure resting-place for several days. But Bernadotte, Murat, and Soult hastened after him, and on the following day, November 6, were already pressing into the town; a fierce conflict arose in the streets. Blücher's chief of staff was taken prisoner, and York severely wounded. The superiority of force was too great; after nearly all his guns were lost, and ammunition expended, Blücher (Fig. 3) was compelled to give up the town and withdraw to Ratkau, whence he hoped to reach the mouth of the Trave; but on the erroneous report that this also was in the hands of the enemy, he finally surrendered on the 7th.

From these days of misfortune shared together sprang the close friendship of Blücher for Seharnhorst, and from this originated, also, the confidence of the Prussian people in the brave general of hussars. The immediate object of his persistence was, however, frustrated by the shameful fall of the fortresses. General von Romberg opened the gates of Stettin in presence of 800 horsemen and two pieces of artillery; Küstrin, which was well provided with all requisite means of defense, was surrendered on November 1, by Colonel Ingersleben, without any attempt at resistance; even Magdeburg, the principal place on the Elbe,



FIG. 3. — Bronze statue of Blücher, at Berlin; by Christian Rauch (1777-1857).

fell with 24,000 men and 600 cannon on the news from Prenzlau, although it was but just invested by Ney; in like manner fell Plasenburg, Hameln, and Nienburg. Glogau capitulated on December 2, Schweidnitz followed on February 7, after a few days' cannonading. All Middle and North Germany now lay delivered over to requisitions, devastations, and every kind of ill-treatment on the part of a merciless victor. Up to October 16, war-contributions had been imposed on the conquered districts to the amount of 159,000,000 francs; all English goods were seized for the French army, in Berlin the arsenal was emptied, and from the castle the finest works of art were removed and from the Brandenburg gate the goddess of victory. Now the Elector of Hesse, also, was overtaken by his fate. Long before this he had excited the wrath of Napoleon, because in 1804 he did not attend with the other neighboring princes at Mayence, and because he had delayed dismissing the British envoy Brook Taylor, and recently he had hesitated in deciding whether it would be a better business for him to join the Confederation of the Rhine, or the North German Confederation. On November 1, Mortier and the King of Holland took possession of Hesse, since the elector had made preparations to aid Prussia and had granted leave to the troops of that state to pass through his territory. It was too late when he now offered to accede to the Confederation of the Rhine and to unite his troops with the French army; to avoid imprisonment he fled to Schleswig, and then to Prague. The twenty-seventh bulletin, of November 6, issued at Halle, announced his deposition and that of his house. The same fate was suffered by the aged Duke of Brunswick, who died of his wounds at Ottensen on November 10. With the Elector of Saxony, whose negotiator had not found the emperor at Berlin, peace was concluded at Posen on December 11. The elector took the title of king and joined the Confederation of the Rhine with a contingent of 20,000 men, of whom, however, but 6000 were to be furnished for the present war. Furthermore, the peace declared the equality of Catholics with Protestants in Saxony. Toward Prussia Napoleon continued to breathe out scorn and arrogance.

In such convulsions as these, the peace so long and so fondly shielded under the delusive screen of neutrality came to its end. The entire comfort of a serene existence was suddenly destroyed by the disaster which broke in like a flood. But it was not patriotic indignation, not a determined national sentiment, which succeeded the first stupor, but indifference, faint-hearted prostration before the irrevocable, even malicious joy at the punishment inflicted on the young military hierarchy and official arrogance, or absolute cringing to the new potentates. The

Prussian nation and the entire German people were yet to pass through a severer school of suffering before they learned what it means to have lost national independence.

On October 18, the King of Prussia had despatched Luechesini from Magdeburg with another letter to Napoleon for the purpose of obtaining, even on hard terms, a cessation of hostilities. But the emperor did not receive the marquis, and referred him to Duroc, who indicated at Wittenberg as indispensable conditions: the Elbe as a boundary, a war-contribution of 100,000,000 francs, Prussia's renunciation of all alliances with other German states, and the river Oder to constitute the line of demarcation between the two armies. When Luechesini hesitated, the demand to sacrifice the houses of Brunswick and Orange was superadded. The emperor, he was made to understand, did not desire peace so much as to obtain the opportunity of defeating the Russians. Among those surrounding the king opinions vacillated, but the necessity of the moment seemed to leave no choice. Luechesini and General von Zastrow, who had been associated with him, brought back submission to the Wittenberg conditions, and they soon received full powers engaging Prussia's accession to the Rhine Confederation in case of need. Difficult and painful as were these concessions, it was believed that thereby peace at least was secured. But after the surrender of Prenzlau and Ratkau, it appeared to Napoleon no longer sufficient to weaken Prussia; he wished to render it impossible for her soon to take up arms against him. His demands became increasingly greater; he now required Prussia to unite her troops with the French against the Russians. The despondency of both negotiators was so great that on November 16, at Charlottenburg, they signed a new agreement which made Napoleon master of Prussia; as payment for the truce the king should withdraw his troops behind the Vistula, all fortresses on this side of it to be delivered up, and the king to pledge himself to direct the Russians, if they should approach, to retire to their own territory. This experiment had at least the good result of putting an end to all wavering. In a great council held at Osterode opinions stood in direct opposition to this convention; the king decided in favor of ministers Stein and von Voss, and counsellor Beyme, who desired the rejection of these conditions.

This decision of the king indicated the turning-point from which the ascendancy was gradually won for resistance even to the utmost. To the heightening of this disposition the protestations of the Emperor Alexander contributed essentially: there was no effort which he would not put forth, no sacrifice which he would not make, in order to fulfil the cherished obligations which were imposed on him by his position as

friend and ally. Haugwitz, being disliked by the czar, received his dismissal, and Hardenberg took the position of minister of foreign affairs. But at the same time Stein, in connection with the latter and with Rüchel, addressed another memorial to the king, in which he urged the removal of the ruinous cabinet government in order to revive the confidence of foreign countries in reference to Prussian policy. Moreover, he made his participation in the ministry, thus transformed, dependent on the entrance of Hardenberg. The king received this presentation of conditions, in which he saw a lowering of his royal authority, with unconcealed displeasure. On December 19, he ordered the government to be reconstituted in such a manner that Rüchel was appointed to military affairs, Zastrow, the negotiator at Wittenberg and Charlottenburg, as minister of foreign affairs, Stein of the interior and finance and a member of the council, and the cabinet councillor Beyme as keeper of the rolls. But Stein remained firm in his refusal. On January 4, 1807, the king communicated to Stein laconically the desired dismissal. The new ministry was composed of von Zastrow, von Schrötter, and von Voss. The sorrow of patriots attended the man who departed, foreign allies were rendered lukewarm and distrustful, and even military measures suffered in consequence of the insecurity of the conduct of the highest administrative, but the need had to grow deeper still, in order completely to open the eyes of the king to the causes of his downfall and the means requisite for raising his state again.

Meanwhile Napoleon's columns had approached the Vistula. With the captured arms and horses he replaced the worn-out material; the troops by immense requisitions were abundantly provided with every necessary. He ordered the dépôts of new-levied recruits to be removed from the Rhine to places upon the Elbe and Oder; there these relieved the old soldiers who were of greater service on the battlefield. France no longer formed the base of his operations, but Prussia; the whole country was one huge encampment, and all its resources were applied to the benefit of the army. Napoleon was greeted by the Poles with shouts of joy as the restorer of their independence; they deserted in crowds from the Prussian army, and the Polish part of Prussia was in great commotion. Of the Prussian army there were as yet, on the other side of the Vistula, only fragments, which fell back on Dantzig and Graudenz, and consisted of scarcely 25,000 men under command of the brave veteran Lestocq. Since there was nothing to hope from Austria, and England manifested very little zeal, Prussia was thrown entirely upon the aid of Russia. Alexander's protestations of fidelity to the alliance and of constancy left nothing to be desired. The two combined armies on the

march under Bennigsen and Buxhövden amounted to only about 115,000 men. Their commissariat was so wretched that to procure the means of sustenance at the cost of their allies became almost a matter of necessity. The arrogant Russians looked down upon the Prussians of Jena with no less scorn than upon the Austrians of Ulm in the preceding year; in any peril to themselves they believed not at all, and hence entertained the greatest aversion for a war in behalf of a foreign cause. Bennigsen, a man of military talents and of experience in war, but, as a foreigner, intent above all else in maintaining his post, considered it his chief mission to cover the Russian frontier, and Lestocq might see to it how to hold the last province of the state, keep the French occupied for several weeks by a spirited resistance, and thereby give him time for collecting and arranging his troops. Wavering between advance and retreat, he fatigued them needlessly, until finally he took a position at Pultusk. To complete the confusion, the commander-in-chief appointed by Alexander, Field-Marshal Kamenskoi, a man of Russian stock and seventy-six years of age, became insane. It was fortunate for the Russians that Napoleon, in the swampy region of Poland, found it impossible to discover sufficiently the movements of his adversary. It thus occurred that on the erroneous supposition that the Russians were retiring upon Golymin, he directed his principal force to that place, while Lannes on December 26, with but 26,000 men, encountered at Pultusk Bennigsen's force of 40,000; his attack, although continued the whole day with great losses, met with no success; nevertheless Bennigsen effected a retreat on the following night. This was the first operation of Napoleon on a European theatre of war which ended without a great destructive battle. Bennigsen was at least right in judging that his Russians could more easily endure the hardships of the season than the French, and on this belief formed a plan for a blow at Ney and Bernadotte, who constituted, in East Prussia, the extreme left wing of the army. Ney owed his escape only to the circumstance that the emperor had already recalled him from his incautious movement against Königsberg, but his rear-guard was obliged, on January 22, at Heilsberg, to force its way through the enemy, and in consequence of the exhaustion of the Russians even Bernadotte made his escape to Strasburg-in-der-Uckermark. Napoleon believed that he was sure of a great success if he could throw himself in the rear of the enemy while they were engaged with his marshals, but an intercepted despatch informed Bennigsen of the threatened danger; while the Prussians at Waltersdorf maintained with Ney an unequal conflict, he rapidly withdrew from the net, and in order not to yield Königsberg without a struggle, he took a position for battle on February 7, at Eylau.

With the greatest obstinaey was the struggle maintained on the wintry field. Augereau's corps, which was attacked in the driving snow directly in front of the enemy's centre, was almost exterminated, and the remainder only saved by a charge of Murat's cavalry; a Russian detachment pressed very near to the place where Napoleon was standing. The French suffered fearfully, but Davout's arrival on the second day restored the balance. The ranks of the Russians that were melting away began to waver, when, at the last moment, Scharnhorst came up with 6000 Prussians at Sehmoditten, having gotten free from Ney, who was pursuing. Davout, who had ventured too far in advance, was driven back with the loss of his artillery, a complete overthrow was prevented only by the arrival of Ney. The exhaustion on both sides was so great that both began to retreat, Bennigsen to Königsberg, Napoleon behind the Passarge.

All the lies of the bulletin could not conceal from the Parisians the facts that the imperial eagles had remained without victory, that the army had suffered fearful losses, and that in a waste, thinly peopled, and inhospitable region, it found itself in a highly uncomfortable, even dangerous situation. The rate of exchange fell. Napoleon himself was not unmoved by the impression which these recent events produced. He had thought to celebrate a second Austerlitz and Jena beyond the Vistula, but the result had not corresponded. He despatched General Bertrand to the King of Prussia, and proffered him peace and alliance with the evacuation and restoration of the whole country as far as the Elbe. In Berlin he summoned Blücher, who had been exchanged for Vietor, to an audience for the purpose of making him understand that he honestly desired peace. But without hesitation, the king declined the crafty proposal which would separate Prussia from her last allies and make of her a Bonapartist creature like the states of the Confederation of the Rhine. Napoleon now sought even to excite Persia to fight Russia, and he was still more earnestly possessed by the desire to induce Austria to join him by the proffer of Silesia in exchange for Galicia. But Stadion, the successor of Cobenzl, who dreaded nothing more than the being drawn unwillingly into the struggle and thus being deprived of the quiet absolutely necessary in order to strengthen the state, withheld his solicitations. Like him, the Archduke Charles was impressed with the necessity of holding fast to their neutrality. Stadion hence replied to all proposals only with the proffer of Austrian mediation, and the determination gradually matured in Vienna to place Austria on the side of the allies. The participation of England was arrested by the change of ministry after the death of Fox, but the Portland ministry,

also, of which Canning and Castlereagh were members, strangely showed little zeal for the allies. Hesitatingly it concluded a peace with Prussia on January 28, 1807, by which the latter renounced Hanover. The Porte having refused the demands made upon it, Admiral Duckworth pressed through the Dardanelles and cast anchor in sight of Constantinople; but he then suffered himself to be trifled with by negotiations. Of these the Porte, at the instigation of Sébastiani, availed itself in order to prepare means of defence, and consequently the weak British squadron was compelled with severe losses to return to the open sea.

The lukewarmness of both these powers was evidently due in a great degree to the small confidence enjoyed by the managers of the Prussian state at that day. After the rejection of Napoleon's proposals, Hardenberg took courage, and once more set before the king the ruinous nature of cabinet rule, but the king granted only half of that which was asked; he retained his old counsellors, and Hardenberg was named along with them as minister without a portfolio. As foreseen, the impossibility presently appeared of men so fundamentally opposed being able to work together. The arrival of the czar at Memel decided between the two; he treated Zastrow very coolly; on the contrary, he distinguished Hardenberg. On April 10, the latter was appointed minister of foreign affairs and of the war department. A highly important change in the constitution was thus accomplished; the cabinet rule was set aside, and Hardenberg, as prime minister, embodied the unity of the government. On April 26, a new treaty with Russia was signed at Barfenstein for the purpose of restoring the independence and balance of European states and erecting strong barriers against the encroachments of Napoleon. Both powers pledged themselves not to lay down arms till Germany should be freed and France thrown back beyond the Rhine. Austria, in the event of her accession to the treaty, should obtain the Tyrol and the line of the Mincio; in place of the ancient constitution of the empire, a federative system of the German states should be established under the joint leadership of Austria and Prussia. The czar pledged himself to apply all his forces to restore the Prussian monarchy, and the possessions lost since 1805, or an equivalent therefor, and particularly to secure a rounding off of boundaries with reference to establishing better military frontiers; the German possessions of the King of England were to be enlarged, the house of Orange indemnified, and the independence and integrity of the Porte confirmed.

The alliance of Russia with Prussia was re-established and enlarged by the accession of England and Sweden. But while one half of Prussia sighed beneath the grievous oppression of the enemy, the other was

obliged to endure the barbarities of her Russian allies. As Bennigsen had no inclination to put to hazard the fame won at Eylau, of being the greatest commander-in-chief of the century, he remained immovable for nearly four months and did little or nothing for the safety of the endangered fortresses.

Notwithstanding all this, the old spirit began to prevail again among the Prussians. Blücher offered with 30,000 men to break the enemy's lines and drive them back over the Oder. Military men in Prussia and the electorate of Hesse labored in secret for an uprising of the people which should take place on the first appearance of the expected English force that was to land between the Elbe and Weser. In Silesia, against which Napoleon had sent his brother Jerome with 22,000 Bavarians and Würtembergers, patriotic men came forward in order to assure the king of the readiness of the province to sacrifice itself; Major von Götzen, who was assistant to the governor-general, the Prince of Anhalt-Pless, was ready to perform in military daring even the impossible, aroused self-confidence in the troops and in the population, began a guerilla war, and hastened in person to Vienna, where he maintained close relations with the war party. Yet the fall of Breslau (January 5), after two fruitless attempts at relief, could not be prevented. The small fortress of Kosel was defended under very difficult circumstances by the brave Colonel Neumann, and after his death by Colonel Puttkamer, until the peace saved it; Glatz also was held for the king, and Neisse maintained itself with honor until June 16. In Pomerania, after the fall of Stettin, the last support of Prussian power was Kolberg, small, but important, as the gateway through which the connection with Sweden and England must be kept up. At first unmolested by the French, the commandant, Colonel Lueadon, had had the time to complete in some degree its wholly defective preparations for defence; but the aid which the citizens, proud of that which had been endured in the Seven Years' War, had freely offered, the pedantic man of the old military school stiffly refused; still less did he have a good understanding with Ferdinand von Schill, lieutenant of dragoons, who, having escaped from the battle of Jena, had here formed a free corps with the king's approval: it appeared to him very unfit that this daring partisan, by the desultory warfare which he, resting upon the fortress, was conducting, should draw the attention of the enemy to the place. The matter went so far that he put von Schill under arrest. The skipper Joachim Nettelbeck, who had sailed in every sea, and notwithstanding his seventy years glowed with youthful fervor for the defence of his native town, saw this unseemly proceeding with inward disgust, and even with suspicion of treachery; he applied by

letter to the king, with urgent prayer, for another commandant. Then came, on April 29, Major von Gneisenau (Fig. 4), and immediately there sprang up the reviving power which issued from this man's spirit and character. To faithful Nettelbeck he committed the oversight of the chief defence of the place and the arrangements for inundation ; guns and ammunition came from England, but he was not content with resistance within the walls of the fortress, he also made the approaches to it as difficult as possible for the enemy. General Loison was obliged to employ his entire force for twenty-five days in order to take the entrenchment which had been erected on the Wolfsberg, in a few weeks, for the protection of the harbor ; when it fell finally on June 11, he allowed the brave garrison to depart unmolested. Now first began the proper investment of the fortress. In the attempt to repossess the Wolfsberg, the second commandant, the brave Captain von Waldenfels, was killed. The garrison and citizens of Kollberg persisted to hold out until intelligence was received of an armistice. Grandenz also remained unsubdued ; its commandant, the veteran l'Homme de Courbière, seventy-three years of age, to the pretence of the French that it was all past and gone with Prussia, made the famous answer : "Now, if there be no longer a King of Prussia, then am I King of Grandenz!" In a military sense, of incomparably greater importance was Dantzie, which had been invested by Lefebvre since March 12, mainly with troops of the Confederation of the Rhine. Its defence gave the Russians time to bring up reinforcements. Kalkreuth, who held it with 20,000 men, maintained himself bravely, but the appointments were defective, and unfortunately, on March 20, an important point, which had been overlooked, fell into the hands of the enemy. On the night of May 7, a surprise directed against the island of Holm in the Vistula rendered the beleaguered force masters of both sides of the river and threatened the connection of the place with the sea ; and when an attempt to repossess it, undertaken by Bennigsen from Pillau, after much persuasion, had been repulsed, the exhausted garrison were obliged to capitulate on May 25, free egress being granted them.

The fall of Dantzie restored to Napoleon the full use of his military force. He had employed the period of winter rest with all his energy in order to secure the position of his army, and to be able to enter upon a new campaign under more favorable conditions ; the commissariat was admirably arranged ; a levy of 80,000 men in anticipation of the year 1808 filled the frightful chasms made by the last battles. To this restless activity it was owing that at the reopening of the campaign he opposed the 120,000 men of the allies with 200,000. For a vigorous offensive warfare the former were by far too weak ; an isolated attempt



FIG. 4. Bronze statue of Gneisenau, at Berlin. By Christian Rauch.

against Ney's exposed situation at Gutstadt, on June 5 and 6, miscarried. Great expectations were cherished on the side of the Prussians of an expedition which Blücher, in conjunction with Swedes and English, was to have undertaken from Rügen against the rear of the enemy's left wing; but unfortunately the precious time was lost through the delay of these allies. Napoleon opened the campaign by crossing the Passarge; the French on June 10 attacked Bennigsen in his strong position at Heilsberg, and met with a bloody repulse. After this, deceived by a diversion of the enemy toward Königsberg, behind whose walls Lestocq was obliged to seek protection against his pursuers, Bennigsen in the night withdrew across the Alle to Bartenstein. He expected to give his thoroughly exhausted men a day's rest, on June 14, at Friedland (Fig. 5), but on account of the pressure of the French, yet without suspicion that he had to do with their principal force, he decided to discontinue his march across the Alle and to make a stand on the hither side. Ney had arrived near the town, and there met with a murderous fire and was thrown into confusion, but Victor hastened up to his support, and his artillery advancing directly upon the enemy's line caused a frightful carnage among the Russians, whose rear was wedged in by the river, and all who did not succeed in passing through the town and over the Alle were destroyed. During the night Bennigsen retreated to Wehlau; on the 19th he crossed the Niemen; in order not to be cut off, the Prussians were obliged to abandon Königsberg and join the retreat. The military situation of the allies was still in no respect desperate, but in the Russian camp opposition became more and more pronounced against a war, which, according to the general conception, was carried on mainly on account of the czar's friendship for the King of Prussia. Bennigsen purposely exaggerated the perils of the situation in order thus to prove the necessity of peace. The czar was probably the only one on the Russian side who had an honorable purpose with regard to the alliance of Bartenstein. But he found himself, by the voice of his army and his people, unwillingly brought to a change of policy; however, that he, without the slightest previous understanding with his allies, empowered Bennigsen to open negotiations in regard to a suspension of hostilities, and that he, on the 21st, signed a truce, from which Prussia was expressly excluded, has, with justice, subjected him to the reproach of weakness of character and breach of faith. His displeasure at the tardiness of the English in sustaining the war with money and men, as well as the renewal of the old dispute with them in regard to maritime rights, hastened the conversion, which was decided by the seductions of Napoleon, who offered, not simply peace, but alliance.

With this the fate of Prussia was settled. Abandoned by her




FIG. 5.—Episode from the battle of Friedland. From an engraving by Frémy; painting by Horace Vernet (1789-1863). Versailles, Historical gallery.

Ich schreibe Ihnen gestern für
 die mir wichtigsten Verhandlungen
 und Ihnen gesuchte Beweise
 Ihr gebliebene ist mir in allem klar,
 aber ohne mich einzufüllen sind
 sie von ungemeiner Wichtigkeit zu fassen.
 Aber ganz zweckmässige Politische Systeme
 kann keiner Tröste, ist mir Deutlich
 auf nicht ausgewiesen. Aber meine einzige
 Napoleon zu gewinnen fasse
 auf alle Partei, der wir mehr so gut
 vertraut haben als wir, die
 Verhandlungen führen Sie so gut an das
 den mindesten geblieben längst auf mir
 nicht unerreichbar. ohne Rücksicht auf mich
 wir sehr unzufrieden über sein Fehl
 nach dem ersten und dritten Aufstand
 geführt. Ich kann Ihnen nicht die Kündigung von
 mir, von meinem Zweck fasse ich
 keinen Raum als den verbreiteten zu
 Ihnen gestern bestimmt habe
 wegen unserer Tochter. Diese Hoffnung ist
 mir bestätigt worden so bald wie

dem König meine zunächst
Gefügschaft zu beweisen. Es ist versch
 die Kunde unter den Souveränen
 stets auf schwierigeren weissten —
 allein der Haushalt des Königl. am N.
 dem König dem König auf zu helfen
 hofft zu nehmen gern könne
 es nicht; allein eben hier bey habe
 dem Königl. der Königl. abgetragen an
 der Wiederholung ist keiner wie
 auf meinem Empfehlung und ihre
gehabt geblieben, so gleich ist dieser
aus meinem Gesetz ein fürst geworden, und
seiner dem Königl. und keinen dem
Leopold mit dem Elsterthal die dem
Königl. Ritterei gehört. Ihr Friede
Leben.

aus meinem aus meinem zurück
Meinem Sohn. Dieser ist aus
gewohnt durch Alexander als er ist
gekommen. P. Jerome ist als palmer
ausgeführt fallen.

FIG. 6.¹—Facsimile of a letter of Queen Louisa of Prussia to Lieutenant-General von Rüchel. Without date. (In the possession of Mr. Lessing, Landgerichtsdirektor, in Berlin.) The letter-sheet has margins made by creasing the paper, and the four corners are turned in, so that the lines at the beginning and the end of both sides are shorter.

¹ TRANSCRIPTION OF FIG. 6.

Ich danke Ihnen hertzlich für die mir mitgetheilten Nachrichten und Ihre geistreiche Bemerkungen. Ich pflichte ihnen in allem bey, aber aber mir deucht es sind schon grosse

allies, there remained nothing but unconditional subjection to the award of the conqueror. Even the last resource was destroyed by the thoughtlessness of Kalkreuth, who, in the truce subscribed on June 25, forgot to insert a term for the renewal of hostilities, but, on the other hand, consented that the fortresses should not be supplied with provisions during the interval! On the same day the two emperors met each other at Tilsit, in a pavilion erected upon a raft in the middle of the Niemen. It was flattering to the czar, disheartened by the failure of his former projects, that a Napoleon should solicit his friendship, that he, after having for six years attempted it in vain, should now be enabled in conjunction with such a genius to decide the destinies of Europe, and in a moment become, instead of a protector of international rights, the associate of the oppressor. For the second interview on the following day Napoleon granted to his new friend an invitation to the King of Prussia. But Frederick William did not understand the art of flattering his victor, and a second conference passed off as unsatisfactorily as the first. On the contrary, Alexander, who now lived altogether at Tilsit, entered further every day into the ideas of Napoleon. The belated landing of 8000 Englishmen at Rügen, the coming of General Stutterheim from Vienna with full powers to treat concerning Austria's accession, and at least to labor for a general pacification, were no longer able to effect any change. Napoleon insisted that the peace between France and Russia should be concluded before the peace with Prussia. And it was so done on July 7. Alexander therein recognized the royal crowns of Napoleon's brothers, as well as the Confederation of the Rhine; and although he scrupled to accept from the spoils of his former friend and ally the district extending to the Niemen, yet he suffered himself to take out of it, in exchange for the East Friesian seigniory of Jever, which he made over to

Missgriffe geschehen. Das ganz geänderte Politische System Russischer Seits, ist eine Sache die ich nicht begreife. Warum diesen Napoléon zu gewinnen suchen auf alle Art, da wo man so gut vorschreiben kann als er; die Ursachen haben Sie so gut an (? Hardenberg?) anseinandergesetzt dass ich sie nicht wiederhole. Der König schreibt mir sehr weitläufig über seinen Empfang, er war anständig u. N. äusserst höflich. Es war sehr viel die Rede von moi, von meinem Hass für ihn (lieben kann ich nur das Gute) wie sehr er hofft dass ich meinen Frieden machen würde &c. &c. Seine Höflichkeit an Tafel ging so weit dass er dem König meine verhasste Gesundheit zutrank. Es ist stark die Rede unter den Franzosen dass ich hinkommen möchte—allein so lange er selbst der N. den Wunsch dem König nicht sehr höflich zu erkennen giebt komme ich nicht; dann aber, kommt besonders der Wunsch des Königs dazu und die Überzeugung ich könnte nur durch meine Gegenwart etwas gutes stiften, so fliege ich dahin wo mein Hertz nie seyn wird, und trinke den Wermut und leere den Becher mit der Würde die der Preussen Königin zukommt. Ihre Freunadin

Luise.

Ernsthausen muss ein edler junger Mann seyn. Schlesien ist uns gerettet durch Alexander. Doch tiefes Geheimniss. Jerom hat es haben und behalten sollen.

Holland, at least the circle of Bialystok, 5000 square miles with 184,000 inhabitants. In separate articles he ceded the Ionian Islands and the Boeche di Cattaro to France, and recognized Joseph of Naples as king of Sicily, the latter on the condition that the Bourbons should be compensated by receiving the Balearic Isles or Crete. The specially important point, however, in these adjustments at Tilsit lay in the secret offensive and defensive treaty, concluded at the same time, whose text has not been made public up to this day. In pursuance of it every European war of the one state should be shared by the other; if England accepted the peaceful mediation with France tendered by Alexander by November 1, she should then receive Hanover in exchange for the return of the colonies conquered by her; if not, Russia would break with her, and both allies would then unitedly require, and, in case of necessity, compel Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal to declare war against England, and in the latter case Russia would be at liberty to take possession of Finland, and France of Portugal. If the Porte should refuse to accept Napoleon's mediation, both emperors would then withdraw from the yoke of the Turks the European provinces of the Ottoman empire, with the sole exception of Rumelia and Constantinople.

At Alexander's suggestion, Queen Louisa (Fig. 6) came to Tilsit on July 6, for the purpose of moving Napoleon's hard heart. The attempt was wholly vain. He even refused to receive Hardenberg as negotiator, and also insisted that the king dismiss him. It thus came about that negotiations remained in the incompetent hands of Kalkreuth. Alexander (Fig. 7) had interposed no objection to Napoleon's express desire that the words be incorporated in the treaty that, on account of his friendship for the Emperor of Russia, he consented that a part of his possessions should be restored to the king. Through Napoleon Prussia lost all her possessions on the left side of the Elbe; likewise the districts acquired by the second and third partition of Poland; all exertions to save at least Magdeburg were fruitless. Out of 137,000 square miles and a population of 9,750,000, Prussia retained only 68,500 square miles with 4,594,000 inhabitants. She engaged to break off all intercourse with England, and to free all prisoners of war. A special convention of July 12 appointed dates for the evacuation of the country and the restoration of the fortresses: October 1, and November 1, respectively. But these should be observed only in the event of the contributions—whose amount was not even specified—being paid at the proper time, or security, acknowledged by Intendant General Daru as sufficient, being furnished therefor; until the evacuation, all the French troops were to be subsisted at the cost of the country. Out of the former territory of




FIG. 7.—Alexander I. shows to Napoleon the Cossacks, Bashkirs, and Kalmyks, of the Russian army; July 8, 1807. After an engraving by Oudaloff; painted by P. Bergeret (born 1780). (Versailles, Historical Gallery.)

Prussian Poland, Napoleon created a duchy of Warsaw which he gave in fee to the King of Saxony; Napoleon retained for his marshals estates to the amount of 26,000,000 francs. He now endowed Jerome with a kingdom formed out of the Prussian departments on the left of the Elbe, the electorate of Hesse, Brunswick, and southern Hanover; this kingdom of Westphalia contained 16,500 square miles and nearly 2,000,000 inhabitants. The remainder of Hanover Napoleon retained, as a means of settlement in a future peace with England. Dantzig, with a circuit of two leagues, was made a free state under Prussian-Saxon protection.

History knows few examples of a policy so thoroughly immoral as that laid down in these arrangements. Napoleon had lost regard for his plighted word. Having assured the Porte of his protection in the most solemn manner, he now pledged himself to the hereditary enemy of Turkey to its partition, under the wretched pretence that the revolution in the palace, on May 31, by which the Sultan Selim III. was deposed, released him from his engagements. This stipulation abandoned the most ancient ally of France in the southeast for an alliance with Russia, the continuance of which, however, was rendered henceforth impossible by the creation of the duchy of Warsaw. Thus was it to be proved once more that that which was built up by Napoleon's genius was again and again destroyed by his immoral and insatiate nature.

An enthusiastic reception awaited in France the dictator of Europe on his return home. The clergy exhausted themselves in Biblical sentences, in order to show that the emperor was protected by the Lord of hosts. Blinded by military and national renown, the whole population, mute and wondering, bowed beneath the common yoke. Parties appeared to be extinguished. A scene hardly comprehensible, that this nation, still languishing for freedom, now threw itself at the feet of the emperor; unless one observed that it had only changed the object of its adulation:—once, the multitude; now, the despot. The army alone received actual benefit from these conquests; more and more it became the sole motive power in the entire state organism. To render it as independent as possible of the coffers of the state, to separate it from the rest of the population and to withdraw it from civil influence, Napoleon established a special military chest supplied by the Austrian indemnification of the war-expenses of 1805; the lion's share of all contributions levied in foreign countries fell to the army; for its glorification and that of its commanders triumphal arches were erected in Paris upon the Place du Carrousel and the Place de l'Étoile, the column of Vendôme was cast from captured cannon, and the Dôme des Invalides and other


splendid edifices were built ; of the domains which he acquired in Italy, Poland, and Hanover, he divided a sum of 150,000,000 francs in the form of estates to his chief commanders, some of whom received an income of a million. Disproportionately low were the gifts bestowed on civil officers. With increasing precision was indicated the difference between him and other men, and he surrounded his person with a ceremonial that became more and more rigid and elaborate (Figs. 8, 9 ; PLATE II.). On no occasion did he now brook the least appearance of a limitation of his power. Although the action of the senate, of the legislative body,



FIG. 8.—Seal of Napoleon as emperor of the French from 1804 to 1814. Obverse. From the impression in the British Museum, London.

and of the tribunate was nothing more than a continuous concert of admiration, affection, and gratitude toward the emperor, the tribunate, after having already suffered numberless prunings, was obliged to receive, on September 18, 1807, the notification that the senate had decreed its absolute suppression. The tribunes terminated their political existence with the assurance that they had discovered in this act a new occasion for laying on the steps of the throne the expression of their admiration and their gratitude. In the year 1808 a great purging of the

PLATE II.



The Morning Reception.

Drawn and engraved by L. P. Debucourt (1757-1832) in Ventoise (February 19 March 20 of the year XII of the Republic, 1805).

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judiciary was undertaken; two years later, the Bastille itself, with the detested *lettres de cachet*, was re-established in the shape of eight state prisons, to which any man could be consigned without judicial sentence upon a mere decision of the secret council. The censorship received an expansion which it had not had even under the old monarchy. A general director was appointed with supervision over all bookshops and printing-offices; the printing-offices were restricted to a fixed number, the printers were appointed and sworn as officers of government, and for every work put to press there was required a special



FIG. 9.—Seal of Napoleon as emperor of the French from 1804 to 1814. Reverse. From the impression in the British Museum, London.

permission from the Director-General, who examined it by designated censors, and indicated to the author the necessary alterations or suppressions; it was required that the booksellers be appointed or sworn; every book in the French or Latin language published in a foreign country paid an entrance tax of at least 50 per cent. The work on Germany by Madame de Staël, the first that afforded the French a conception of the rise of German intellectual life, was first mutilated by the censorship as a hostile publication, and then confiscated. The

periodical press, for a long time devoid of all value in consequence of the regulation that for the future in each department, except the Seine, only one daily paper should be allowed to appear, and that under the authority and with the approval of the prefect, was made utterly silent. The church itself had in Napoleon's eyes only the mission, by its spiritual influence, to support his supreme authority. The catechism of 1806 enforced the obligation toward the emperor with the same impressiveness as duty toward God, who had made the emperor His image on the earth.

Although France undeniably owed to the emperor numerous advantageous institutions, yet he was no longer, after having taken in hand the fate of all Europe, in a position to watch over the execution of his measures at home. The bringing forward of the budget in the legislative body was a mere formality; the actual revenue and expenditure of the year no one knew. In 1804 a considerable stringency of the finances had already occurred, but in the winter of 1805 and 1806 there was developed a great financial crisis, occasioned by the vast war-expenses and the interruption of the natural transactions of business. Since the costs of the war were to be covered subsequently by the victory without an increase of taxes, the emperor was compelled to anticipate the revenue, and this necessity had led to the establishment of a company managed by three great financiers, Ouvrard, Desprez, and Vanlerberghe, who discounted the obligations of the Receiver-General, thus adding, in anticipation, a tax to the taxes. The credit of the Bank of France on account of some doubtful ventures began to fluctuate; the public, having become distrustful, beleaguered the bank, to exchange its paper for gold; it was necessary to employ formalities that were equivalent to a suspension of payments, and it needed the victory over the Prussians to re-establish public confidence. The emperor, as usual, threw the blame upon those who had acted according to his instructions, and were victims far more than cheats; he, however, profited by the opportunity to banish certain persons belonging to the Faubourg St.-Germain, especially ladies, like Madame Récamier (PLATE III.) and Madame de Chevrense, in whose salons the imperial government had been wont to be criticised by sharp tongues; for they, it was alleged, by their gossiping, had caused the uneasiness of the public and had shaken the credit of the bank.

If the French people were disposed to console themselves for the loss of freedom with their military glory, yet for those conquered and subjugated it added poignancy to their lot that they were compelled even to pay the cost of their bondage. Wherever the iron arm of the

PLATE III.



Madame Récamier.

After a painting by François Gérard (1770-1837).

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


Fig. 10.—Arrival of a diligence : painting by Louis Boilly (1761-1845). Paris, Louvre.

emperor could reach, there he made himself felt by severe oppression and exaction. England alone still remained inaccessible to him, and, since the day of Trafalgar, yet more inaccessible. But Napoleon felt very plainly that the edifice of his dominion was neither firm nor complete so long as he had not broken in pieces the trident of the mistress of the seas. Since the victories over Austria and Prussia, the plan first formed under the Directory, of destroying England by excluding her business from the Continent, had assumed a more definite shape. The famous Berlin Decree, November 21, 1806, which prohibited all dealings with England and all intercourse, even by letter, subjected to confiscation all merchandise from English factories or colonies or belonging to an Englishman, prohibited all vessels that desired to enter a French harbor from touching on the British coast, and ordered the seizure of every Englishman as a prisoner of war, constituted the commencement of the continental embargo. The British government replied to this on January 7, 1807, by declaring every neutral vessel coming out of a French harbor, or the harbor of one of the allies of France, a lawful prize. Thus began a system of reprisals on both sides, which led so far, that England exercised a supremacy at sea not less oppressive and regardless of right than that of Napoleon on land. The Orders in Council of November 11 imposed on all neutral vessels doing business with France or her allies a tax to be paid in an English harbor; whereupon Napoleon, by the Milan Decrees of November 23 and December 7, declared every vessel that suffered itself to be visited by an English ship or had undertaken an entrance into an English harbor to be denationalized and a lawful prize.

Thus Napoleon took on himself the immense task of severing the natural intercommunication of nations (Fig. 10), and, under a misconception of the first conditions of its existence, arbitrarily sought to direct it into new paths. In the vastness of this attempt lay also the impossibility of its success. Instead of open business transactions with England, there was developed, notwithstanding all vigilance, chicanery and petty checks, a vast amount of smuggling that supplied the continent with English colonial wares and manufactured goods, but only at enormous prices. Napoleon himself riddled the system and made of it a mere source of gain, since he caused licenses to be given to special favorites for large sums, authorizing the introduction of designated quantities of British products, indispensable for home industries; finally, in order to turn the smuggler's gains into his own coffers, he fixed upon the plan of no longer plainly forbidding the introduction of colonial merchandise, but of admitting it in consideration of a high duty.




FIG. 11.—Fight between a French and two English frigates. From an engraving by Doherty; original painting by Gilbert. (Versailles, Historical Gallery.)

The customs tariff of Trianon, August 5, 1810, established the principle that all colonial merchandise imported by sea should undergo an average entrance duty of 50 per cent. With the promulgation of the new tariff there began at the same time in places the most remote from one another a search for colonial goods previously introduced; these when found became the legitimate booty of the French treasury, which in this manner made a profit of 150,000,000 francs. In order to intensify the war of destruction upon British manufactures, the Fontainebleau Decree, of October 19 of the same year, directed the seizure and burning of all such goods found in France or within reach of the French troops. The execution must take place immediately. And yet all these measures failed of their object. The real issue of the fierce struggle was that the loss, which it inflicted on the business and industry of England, was infinitely exceeded by the damage which continental countries experienced from it. Nothing rendered the pressure of Napoleonic despotism so painful as the Continental System, by means of which want and privation forced their way into every family, into the poorest cottages. The glorious aspect of the Revolution was now utterly transformed before the eyes of the nations into the scourge of despotism.

This war on commerce could be really successful only on the supposition that all continental states without exception should subject themselves to the embargo, that nowhere should a harbor remain through which English goods could be introduced. All that refused must be brought by force to accede; but if the embargo was never thoroughly carried into effect, it yet afforded its author the advantage of a pretext ever at hand for intermeddling in the affairs of foreign states, and thus corresponded altogether to the fundamental idea of the Tilsit alliance—the oppression of the weak by the strong.

Sweden became the first sacrifice. Inasmuch as King Gustavus IV. not only refused to "General Bonaparte" the title of emperor, and sent back to the czar as well as to the King of Prussia the insignia of their orders, because they had entered into negotiations with Napoleon, but also had determined to continue the war alone, he thus supplied the French with the desired occasion for seizing Stralsund, Rügen, and the other German possessions of Sweden, and enabled the czar to order Buxhövden to invade Finland with 24,000 men. Admiral Kronstedt delivered up Sveaborg, which was impregnable, together with the fleet, whereupon Alexander without delay proclaimed the union of the principality of Finland with Russia. In order to avoid carrying on the war in a waste region, as well as to shun the Swedish fleet, Bagration, at the beginning of the year 1809, led 15,000 men from Åbo over the ice of

the Gulf of Bothnia toward Stockholm, but at the island of Åland the intelligence of a revolution that had broken out there arrested his progress. A conspiracy of the nobility had imprisoned the king, Gustavus IV.; the diet, hastily convened, had declared him and his successors to have forfeited the throne; a new constitution was given to the kingdom, and the uncle of the deposed sovereign, the Duke of Södermanland, was chosen king with the title of Charles XIII. Gustavus received permission to retire to foreign countries, and after a wandering life died in 1837 at St. Gall in Switzerland. His successor, when he saw that he was unsupported by England, ceded, by the Peace of Fredrikshamn, September 17, 1809, Finland as far as the Torneo to Russia, joined the Franco-Russian alliance, and agreed to the Continental System.

Up to this time, Denmark, under the guidance of the Crown Prince Frederick, regent for his insane father, Christian VII., had endeavored to maintain neutrality, but its considerable fleet gave it high importance in Napoleon's eyes, and it was induced to conform to the adjustments made at Tilsit. Bernadotte stood ready to give emphasis to the demands of Napoleon. But the British government had too great an interest in not permitting a new Napoleonic maritime power to rise up in this way not to endeavor to anticipate this movement. Admiral Gambier stationed his ships (Fig. 11) before Copenhagen and laid down, as alternatives, either the closest alliance with England, or the delivering up of the entire Danish fleet to be kept until a general peace; and when the Danes rejected the demand as insulting and degrading, he compelled the delivery, by a three days' bombardment of the capital, September 2-4, 1807, and led away the fleet, consisting of 20 ships of the line, 16 frigates, 9 brigs, and numerous gunboats, together with the stores in the arsenal, now regarded as but spoils of war. Not till after this deed of violence, and after exasperated Denmark had concluded a treaty with Napoleon and was ready for the reception of French troops, did England declare war against Denmark, on November 4, and seize from her, in 1808, Heligoland, admirably adapted for smuggling. On November 6, Alexander issued his declaration of war against England.

The states of Italy experienced similar treatment. Venice was added to the kingdom of Italy; the sisters of the emperor received augmentations of their principalities; the kingdom of Etruria was, in November, 1807, incorporated into the empire. To Napoleon's eyes, the States of the Church constituted an unseemly government within his kingdom of Italy; he had, moreover, his special reasons for being angry with the pope. The lower in consideration the papacy stood in the modern world, the more easily he suffered himself to be led into the error of supposing that

he could treat the successor of Gregory VII. and Innocent III. as he had treated his vassals of the Rhenish Confederation ; but Pius VII. never forgot that he was the bearer of a universal dignity. Although hard pressed by the occupation of Ancona and Civitâ Vecchia, by the appropriation of ecclesiastical revenues, and the seizure of the principalities of Benevento and Pontecorvo, he remained steadfast in his refusal to extend the Italian concordat to Venice, to be present at the crowning of Napoleon with the Iron Crown, and to declare invalid the marriage in America of Jerome with Elizabeth Patterson. Napoleon's exasperation at this opposition was boundless. He threatened a schism ; he ordered the occupation of the provinces of Aneona, Urbino, and Camerino ; on February 2, General Miollis took possession of the city of Rome ; all cardinals that were not Roman were taken by gendarmes over the frontier ; the papal troops were enrolled among the French. But notwithstanding all, Pius VII. rejected the offensive and defensive alliance with the kingdoms of Italy and Naples which was required of him ; thereupon Napoleon forcibly occupied at once the provinces of Urbino, Ancona, Macerata, and Camerino, only Rome with the district immediately surrounding it being left to the pope. The mildness with which King Joseph of Naples sought to win the hearts of his subjects drew from his imperial brother only scornful language.

That which Napoleon aimed at in the Spanish peninsula was sufficiently in the direction of the ancient French policy, which, since the age of Louis XIV., had incessantly striven to draw Spain into the sphere of the interests of the house of Bourbon ; but it went far beyond that object. Since 1801 he had often stretched out his hand toward this country, but it was never laid upon it, whether because other plans had taken precedence or because he recoiled before the gigantic nature of the enterprise ; to become master of Spain meant either in addition to take possession of the Spanish colonial empire beyond the ocean, or to make this a prey to England. But the stronger his faith in his star became with every victory, the more inclined was he to neglect the cool and prudent weighing of means in reference to the proposed ends, and to reckon blindly upon success. A large part of his superiority hitherto had depended on this, that he himself saw the sober reality only, while to others he showed things as he desired that they should see them ; but this incessant labor to deceive his contemporaries and posterity with regard to his actions left traces in his own mind also, and gradually he began to deceive even himself. After Tilsit, affirms Marmont, one of those whom he most trusted, Napoleon believed the truth only when it was in agreement with his passions, his interests, and his humors. The

very ease with which he had brought about the removal of the old dynasties and the erection of Bonapartist thrones for his dependents in the peninsula of the Apennines led him into the mistake that the same thing might be done with equal ease in the Pyrenean peninsula. The instruments for the execution of this plan he discovered in the baseness of the Madrid court itself. At first, Ferdinand, the heir to the throne, seemed to him best suited to this purpose, since the general hatred of the all-powerful Godoy assembled all opponents of the government around Ferdinand. But when Prince Ferdinand by his marriage in 1802 with his cousin, Maria Antonia of Naples, had come under the influence of his passionate mother-in-law, the emperor in anger at their intrigues turned to Godoy, whom he had treated to kicks on a former day; with him, and the queen, who was filled with unnatural hatred toward her own son, secret negotiations were held with respect to the exclusion of the prince from the throne.

In truth, the disposition of the Spanish people was utterly different from this: they did not understand political questions, but they knew how to hate, and they lived in the recollections of a proud past; the loss of Trinidad, the sale of Louisiana, above all, the ill-fated day of Trafalgar, had caused them to hate profoundly the French alliance, and had rendered its author the object of heightened detestation. While Godoy sought protection and safety from Napoleon, the emperor desired to make use of the wretched man, not merely in Spain, but also against Portugal. True, that little state, since the treaty of December 19, 1803, had not given him the slightest occasion for complaint, but the purpose of removing England's influence from the coasts of the continent sentenced it to destruction, and although Carlotta, the wife of the heir to the Portuguese throne, was a daughter of the Spanish royal pair, yet Godoy, and through him also the queen, allowed themselves to be easily won over to the plan of dethroning the house of Braganza. After Jena, Spain was required to furnish a corps of 14,000 men under la Romana to guard the German coast against the English, and the stationing of Junot at Bayonne with 20,000 men supported the demands at Lisbon for an immediate declaration of war against England and for accession to the continental system. When the Crown Prince John, who held the regency for his insane mother, declined both, Junot crossed the Bidassoa; the *Moniteur* announced in the vigorous language which had become habitual with the emperor: "The house of Braganza has ceased to reign;" and on October 27, a confidant of the infatuated Godoy, named Izquierdo, signed at Fontainebleau, without the knowledge of the Spanish minister, an agreement relative to the division of Portugal. The dethroned king

of Etruria, Charles Louis, was to receive the North, the province of Entre-Minho-e-Douro; and Godoy, as prince of Algarve, the South, both under Spanish protection; the central portion was to remain sequestered till the general peace, as security for the restoration of Gibraltar and the colonies conquered by the English; Junot's corps was to be strengthened by a Spanish force of the same number; within three years, at furthest, the King of Spain was to take the title of Emperor of both Indies. Agreeably to the orders which he had received, Junot hastened forward, notwithstanding the wretched condition of his troops, in order, if possible, to seize the court at Lisbon and to get possession of the fleet; he came in time to see the last sail disappear. Being without confidence as to the result of resistance, the prince regent had declined the offer of aid from the British admiral, who was anchored at the mouth of the Tagus, and embarked with the treasures and jewels of the kingdom for Rio Janeiro; about 15,000 persons had taken part in the flight of the royal family. The country was obliged to support the corps of occupation, to pay it and to provision it abundantly; besides this Napoleon imposed on the people a contribution of 100,000,000 francs, and more than once rebuked Junot (who had been made Duke of Abrantes) on account of his gentleness.

Meanwhile, the intrigues which an adulterous wife, an unfeeling, treacherous, and shallow son, and a shameless favorite were weaving around the feeble-minded King Charles IV. led the Spanish court to a catastrophe. As Godoy disclosed with increasing clearness the object of his ambition, the Prince of Asturias believed that he could seek protection and help only where Godoy had formerly found them against him. At the instigation of his favorite and former tutor, the Canon Escoiquiz, who was goaded by a desire to play a political rôle, he addressed, on October 11, a letter to Napoleon, in which, amid bitter complaints against Godoy, he besought of the man, "appointed by Providence to be the saviour of Europe and the upholder of thrones," the honor of bestowing on him the hand of an imperial princess; at the same time, Ferdinand endeavored to open the eyes of his father to the shameful conduct of his mother and her favorite. But both were upon their guard; the queen knew how to arrange it so that her consort surprised the prince in his chamber and there found the treacherous papers. The prince was put in prison, a manifesto announced to the people his "monstrous and startling crimes;" before Napoleon, the father accused the son of an attempt against the life of his parents, and denounced the severest punishment on the criminal. Napoleon needed only this pretext for ordering the troops, already standing in readiness near the Pyrenees, to enter

the country as a reinforcement for Junot's corps, intending then, as arbiter between father and son, to act according to his pleasure concerning the monarchy. Godoy perceived the danger; to remove the pretext for intervention he contrived a reconciliation, and relieved the situation; the king himself now begged from Napoleon as a special favor the hand of a Bonaparte for his son. Public opinion, which the adherents of Ferdinand, after their hopes were placed on the emperor, labored to render favorable to the French, embraced that party, the people began to awake from their former dull indifference, and the advancing imperial troops were everywhere greeted as liberators.

It was not clear to Napoleon what he ought to do. On January 10, 1808, he answered the king's letter, assenting indeed, but assuming in it that the dishonored prince had cleared himself of all accusations. For the object which, since the declaration of war by Russia against England, he had prosecuted with redoubled zeal—the completion of the continental system, the exclusion of the British flag from the Mediterranean, and the renewal of the maritime war against England—the entire removal of the Bourbon race was a necessity; such wretched men as this Charles IV. and this Ferdinand he could not make use of at all as his instruments. But a kind of dark presentiment that he was now standing before the great crisis of his life caused him again and again to withhold and restrain his covetous hand. The evil demon that dwelt in his heart dragged him into the way of destruction; detachments of French soldiers by trick gained possession of the fortress of Pamplona and of the citadel of Barcelona. Murat, commander-in-chief of all the troops now stationed in Spain, pushed forward his columns incessantly, by different roads, toward Madrid; toward the court, Napoleon observed a sinister silence. Godoy, who was blamed for the invasion, fled to the neighborhood of Seville. But on intelligence of this, dense masses of people precipitated themselves on Aranjuez; a shot fired accidentally let loose their long-suppressed rage; Godoy's palace was ransacked (March 18); he himself was roughly handled, and in order to save his life the king announced the removal of the hated man from all dignities. On the following day, paralyzed by fear, the king himself abdicated in favor of the Prince of Asturias. The news of both events was received by the people with frenzied exultation.

Still unacquainted with the views of Napoleon, but full of the silent hope of gaining a more elevated throne than that of Berg, Murat, who was descending from the Sierra Guadarrama toward Madrid, was not a little struck by the rejoicing over Ferdinand's accession to the throne. On a message from the queen, who bitterly repented of what had been

done, he encouraged the king to recall his abdication, as having been enforced, and to invoke the emperor's judgment upon his son's shameful usurpation. Napoleon's calculations, also, were crossed by the insurrection at Aranjuez; directly upon the flight of the court, the commander of the French squadron at Cadiz was instructed, with great secrecy, to apprehend the fugitives on their appearance. The call for help on the part of the old king opened a new path to Napoleon. He sent Savary, a man ready for every dishonorable proposal, to Ferdinand, for the purpose of luring him first to Burgos and then further on to Bayonne with the prospect of an interview with the emperor and of his favorable decision. The deception succeeded beyond all expectation. Ferdinand was immediately persuaded that for him all depended on gaining the advantage over his parents in subserviency to Napoleon.

Without considering the sentiment of the people, whose friendship for the French had suddenly cooled, he made the journey with Savary, accompanied by his brother, Don Carlos; astonished not to meet the emperor in Burgos, he suffered himself to be drawn on to Vittoria, and then on to Bayonne. But here, instead of the expected festivities of reception, the brutal announcement awaited the prince that he must renounce the throne of his fathers. A few days later the king and queen, with Godoy, arrived, to pour out before Napoleon their hatred and their complaints against their own son; they both allowed themselves to be easily persuaded by their favorite to prefer the quiet of private life to the perilous return to the throne. But on this occasion the stubbornness of the prince protected him against a like degradation; he insisted upon giving back the crown to his father only on the condition that his father should return to Spain and again undertake the government. Now there occurred to Napoleon's aid the desired intervening incident. He had attempted to entice to Bayonne the other members of the royal family; but the governing junta, appointed by Ferdinand, would consent to the departure of the Infantes only on the approval of the king. Murat threatened; the people were in violent agitation in consequence of news secretly brought from Bayonne; an act of violence committed upon a French officer gave Murat the desired occasion for chastising the hostile populace; on May 2, his grape-shot put a frightful end to the rising and a court-martial continued the bloody work. Immediately, in pretended wrath, Napoleon hastened to the old king and demanded of him to bring his rebellious son to reason. On May 5, the last and most disgusting scene of this piecee was played. At last before Napoleon's threats Ferdinand's confidence broke down; he gave the desired renunciation; that of the father the emperor, with Godoy, had already drawn up. The

former obtained Valençay as his assigned residence; his parents and Godoy subsequently made choice of Rome for their abode.

Thus Napoleon became master of Spain. A whole century of bad administration had plunged the richly gifted people of this country into the darkest ignorance and the deepest poverty. In these circumstances, which were those of the Middle Ages, there was opened to Napoleon the widest field for creative energy. But not the welfare of men, not the feeling of his obligation as ruler to help this sunken people to arise and to make it a sharer in the blessings of modern culture, constituted the mainspring of his action; this was to be found in his perverse eagerness to seize upon the resources of Spain, and in one long stride to come nearer to his great object. Should he succeed in bringing under his control the vast regions beyond the ocean, there would be needed then only the expedition to India, and the edifice of the world empire would have received its cap-stone.

The council of Castile and the municipality of Madrid, after brief hesitation, communicated their assent to the emperor's purpose of placing his brother Joseph upon the vacant throne. An assembly of Spanish notables, summoned to Bayonne, received from his hand a new constitution, which indicated a great advance, but in truth really meant as little as the French constitution. On May 10, in accordance with a single intimation previously made, Napoleon informed his brother of his new determination. Joseph, who had begun to feel himself at home and satisfied in Naples, did not experience the least desire for such preferment; but the will of his brother was a command and required unconditional obedience. Of a moral bond between prince and people, Napoleon had no conception whatever; a throne was to him nothing "but a piece of wood covered with velvet." At Naples, Murat, husband of Napoleon's sister Caroline, became, as Joachim I., Joseph's successor.

CHAPTER II.

THE AWAKENING OF THE PEOPLES.

THE overthrow of venerable thrones and the erection of new ones for sons of fortune without ancestry, the destruction of anciently established states and the founding of others without any historical basis, the robbing of the strong who resisted him, the elevation of the small who bowed down before him,—such was the career of this master of the world, whose irresistible arms imposed on modern mankind at the height of its enlightenment the deadening dominion of force.

In the German empire Napoleon only completed that which collision with the French Revolution had produced. Prussia was now a state of the third rank, confined to the extreme corner of the northeast; in the remaining states of Germany which were united to the Confederation of the Rhine, a district embracing 132,000 square miles and 13,000,000 inhabitants, the despotic rule of Napoleon prevailed absolutely. The population reconciled itself not unwillingly to the new relations, not only because the earlier unfavorable conditions in the empire had largely produced that cosmopolitan sentiment which prepared the way for the propagandism of the Revolution and the conquests of Napoleon, but also for the reason that in these enlarged states a fresher atmosphere prevailed than in the confined life of the districts of the empire as these formerly existed; men acknowledged thankfully the disappearance of numerous evils and the excellency of many new regulations. All new institutions bore the French impress, and it was regarded everywhere, as the highest aim in the building up of the state, to secure a uniformity and mechanical completeness of administration akin to that which Napoleon had created in his empire.

In none of the states of the Rhenish Confederation, in South Germany, did the new state policy make its appearance with more energy and consistency than in the dominions of the Wittelsbachs. The creator of modern Bavaria was Baron Montgelas, born at Munich, but descended from a Savoyard family, and, from the year 1799, minister of Palatinate-Bavaria. A votary of the French Revolution, vigilant, active, and subtle, he served the policy of Napoleon, not from servility of spirit, but because the object of his ambition, the elevation of the

house of Wittelsbach, the aggrandizement of Bavaria and its rise to the position of a central power in Europe, could be attained only by leaning upon France; through her, out of the shipwreck of the empire, the most could be caught up and secured for his masters. The Elector Maximilian Joseph had received by inheritance a neglected country, for the government of his predecessor had possessed all the vices of a feeble and dishonorable administration conducted by courtiers and by mistresses, combined with monkish bigotry and ignorance; in a population of 1,500,000, there were 7544 ecclesiasties, including 3281 monks and 1238 nuns; the land was burdened with debts; the decision made by the imperial deputation and the Peace of Presburg had brought in a motley variety of new acquisitions. For a man such as Montgelas it possessed a great charm to establish order amid this confusion and desolation. Serfdom, the immunities of the nobles, all special constitutions, privileges, hereditary officers, and provincial corporations were abolished; in place of these, there entered bureaucratic uniformity, unconditional and inexorable centralization. A division of the country into fifteen circles corresponding to departments, with prefects, who here were styled commissaries-general, at their head; the ministry, which, properly speaking, was embodied only in Montgelas; the privy council; the officers of the communes appointed by the government; the equal system of taxation; the uniform administration of justice, for which the introduction of the *Code Napoléon* was taken into consideration; the emancipation of agriculture and trade from their shackles; the conscription; the phantom constitution, never carried into execution,—all these were imitations of French regulations. In all these novelties the result did not correspond to the plan conceived; the reckless haste with which they were undertaken often forgot to create the means for their accomplishment; and in the finances there prevailed a disorder which never allowed the regular payment of the salaries of office-holders. The new regulations met with opposition nowhere outside of the Tyrol; it was otherwise in the struggle which Montgelas opened against the rule of the clergy. The placing of all Christian confessions on the same footing was followed by the suppression of the greater part of the monasteries, a measure in which the reckless conduct of those who carried it into effect, their persecuting spirit and their vandalism toward images in the churches, went far beyond the views of the government, which subjected the nunneries that were still retained to yearly visitations on the part of provincial judges. The ecclesiastical council was dissolved; long pilgrimages, especially to foreign countries, were prohibited. The provincial university was by its removal from Ingolstadt to Landshut (1804) withdrawn from Jesuit

influence ; the system of education was improved by introducing compulsory attendance at school and a rational course of study, in order to bring the people out of their intellectual stupor and the new state into closer connection with the intellectual life of the remainder of Germany. By inviting foreign men of learning, and by establishing an academy of sciences, Montgelas purposed to open a path for humanitarian and philosophical studies, and to create an entrance for the new jurisprudence, but here indolence and clerical fanaticism combined with narrow hatred of foreigners to form an opposition against which he could not prevail even with Bonapartist prefects and decrees.

This transformation in Bavaria at least grew out of a conviction of its utility. But in Würtemberg the new sovereign, King Frederick, simply allowed himself to ape the part of a great despot. Born and reared abroad, educated on French lines, employed first in Prussian, then in Russian service, he was a stranger to the poetic, religious, and morally serious nature of his people. When he became king he wished to equal in splendor and pomp the great monarchs of Europe, surrounded himself with a ceremonial after Napoleon's manner, undertook the erection of grand buildings, abrogated the constitution, and took pleasure in the degradation of the ancient imperial nobility, from whom he withdrew their peculiar privileges, and whose personal freedom he restrained more than that of his other subjects. The established church he deprived not only of its independence, but of property to the amount of 30,000,000 marks, the officers of government were sacrificed to the impious caprices of the sovereign, the schools declined under a senseless, enforced course of study, since the king, not satisfied with reserving to himself the grant or the refusal of permission to study, prescribed to the petitioner the department to be chosen, or, if he pleased, transferred him to the barracks. The taxes which the king, regardless of the war-burdens, had no hesitation in squandering for purposes of ostentation, were exacted with unpitying harshness ; conscription was conducted as one of the most cherished instruments of despotic caprice, and was extended not merely to soldiers, but also to artisans in the manufactories of arms, and even to servants of the court, to footmen and to postillions. The new civil laws were of Draconian rigor ; emigration was forbidden, and even for a journey of a few days it was necessary to obtain leave from a high official.

More humane and even liberal were political measures established in the larger number of the states of the Rhenish Confederation, for example in Baden. The special model state for them, according to Napoleon's plan, was to be the kingdom of Westphalia. The constitution

which he gave "Westphalia" (Nov. 15, 1807) introduced the *Code Napoléon*, divided the country into departments, with prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors, established four ministries, a state council of a hundred members, gave to all subjects equality before the law, the free exercise of their religion, a uniform system of taxation, French coinage, measures, and weights, redemption of liens on real estate, the suppression of all convents and ecclesiastical foundations, all privileges of the nobility and



FIG. 12.—Jerome Bonaparte. From an engraving by L. Buchhorn (born 1770); original painting by Franziskus Kinson (1771-1839).

other corporate bodies, abolition of every kind of serfdom, a new constitution of the courts of justice with public and oral pleadings, and, in criminal cases, trials by jury. But the imposition of an extraordinary war-tax of over 26,000,000 francs condemned the country from the first to bankruptcy. The author of the constitution scorned the rights of nationality in that he ordered the publication of all laws in the French language, a German translation of which should be adjoined. He made

his brother Jerome (Fig. 42) king of the new state. The discipline of a seaman's life ought to have cured this young man's inclination to extravagance and dissoluteness; the marriage which he had contracted with the daughter of a merchant in Baltimore (p. 378) was not recognized by the emperor, and as all attempts to get his consent proved vain, the unstable Jerome soon consoled himself for the loss of wife and child by his recognition as an imperial prince; in August, 1807, he contracted with Catharine, the excellent daughter of the King of Würtenberg, a new marriage, although the former was not dissolved by the church. Napoleon enjoined it on him never to forget that he was a Frenchman; and Jerome had no desire to become more than the satrap of his brother. He regarded the crown which had fallen to him only as furnishing a costly occasion for spending jovially his civil list of 5,000,000 francs in a mad carnival with his companions. An indelible blot rests upon the German name in the fact that many members of the German nobility also shamelessly thronged to this immoral and dissolute court, and humbly bowed themselves before these knights of fortune. Yet more than one honored man stepped forward in the service of the new government, not in a selfish spirit, but to ameliorate the fate of the people, and to the finance minister, von Bülow, especially belongs the merit of having made resistance in some degree to the flood of French extravagance. Less faithful to his German fatherland was Johann von Müller, the historian, who allowed himself to be won over by Napoleon. Appointed secretary of state of the kingdom of Westphalia, he vaingloriously declared himself the mediator between Germany and Napoleon; soon, however, he exchanged this office for that of state councillor and director-general of public instruction, and in this position he accomplished much good and prevented much evil.

Overwhelming as was the force with which those modern ideas operated which were first brought by Napoleon to be developed on German soil, equally great was the feeling of satisfaction at being freed from the political monstrosities of the eighteenth century. It was this that made it so easy for the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine to accomplish the great revolution, which here was not wrought out, as in France, from below upward, but, on the contrary, from above downward. These states felt themselves bound to France in the interest of their safety and self-preservation. In Baden, the issue of the campaign which destroyed the last remains of German independence was celebrated by splendid festivals. The youth were full of admiration for the greatest man of the century, and the German soldier, with the same pride as the French, wore the ribbon of the Legion of Honor. But even those among

the rulers who bowed the lowest before the potentate did it with hushed sighs, and they looked with longing for the day which, while leaving them the dominion acquired, should relieve them from the degrading yoke; but in the heart of the people, who had with such indifference yielded up their highest national possessions, aversion and anger were germinating in the same degree as the demands of the foreign ruler for property and blood were evermore increasing in amount and in severity. Since the French people so patiently endured the imperial despotism, and so willingly offered their sons for subjugating the same peoples with whom they shortly before had exchanged assurances of brotherhood, the earlier sympathies for France began to turn in the opposite direction; the idea of liberty, which, in the beginning, was introduced by the French masters, passed over now to the side of the adversaries of Napoleon. The old German warlike skill, which, here in the southwest, after the disgrace of Rossbach, was rapidly disappearing, was now revived, and, in the school of Napoleon's military discipline, trained to new efficiency.

Far less were the changes in inward or outward condition which were experienced by the states of Middle and North Germany belonging to the Confederation of the Rhine. Only Duke Augustus of Anhalt-Köthen organized his duchy of 28,000 inhabitants into a parody of the French empire, divided into two departments—later consolidated into one. By itself alone the tardy awakening of the popular consciousness would have been in no condition to consolidate into resistance the hostility to foreign rule, and to render this resistance feasible and successful, had it lacked two most active motive forces: the renovation of the Prussian state, and the regeneration, intellectual and moral, of the German people.

Never has an overthrow such as that which Prussia suffered been followed by results so marvelous. Under the burden of the unexampled ignominy which had fallen upon that state, an invigoration proceeding from within was accomplished, which was sufficiently strong and enduring, not merely to give back to it the consideration formerly enjoyed, but also to elevate it finally to pre-eminence in Germany. It is worthy of imperishable fame that the men upon whom the whole weight of responsibility for people and state rested at that time persevered with unfaltering courage. Blücher at that time wrote to Hardenberg: "I must say to you that courage does not fail me yet. Oh, surely there will yet arise wholly different and unexpected events. German courage only sleeps; its awakening will be terrible."

The place of Hardenberg, who was necessarily dismissed, was filled

provisionally by an "immediate commission," which, composed of the former councillors, Schön, Stügemann, Niebuhr, and Altenstein, conducted affairs in his spirit. For his successor Hardenberg proposed the man whom the voice of all the right-minded people designated as the only helper and saviour in their need, the Baron vom Stein, who, after his dismissal in disgrace, had withdrawn to Nassau. It was remarkable that Napoleon also approved this choice. "Take Baron vom Stein," said he; "he is a very intelligent man." He little knew Stein's power. Princess Louisa and Blücher united their entreaties to those of Hardenberg to induce Stein to forget the wrong which he had suffered, and not to deny his aid to his fatherland and his king; and magnanimously, and without hesitation, the deeply injured man yielded to the summons. "In this moment of universal misfortune it would be very immoral," Stein wrote to the king, "to bring one's own personality into the account, and the more, since your majesty has given so high an example of steadfastness." Rising hastily from his sick-bed, he repaired, on September 30, to Memel; he found "the king greatly cast down, convinced that he was pursued by an inexorable fate; the queen gentle, sad, full of cares and full of hopes." With his return to the service of the state there occurred a new epoch in the development of Prussia and of all Germany. In him arose over against Napoleon the great organizer of states, a second not less great, whose principles and methods, however, stood in direct opposition to those of the French emperor. Where the latter plucked up ruthlessly that which was historically venerable, the former sought, as soon as it showed but a germ of living force, to maintain it in its peculiarity and manifoldness; where the latter trod under foot the right of nationalities, the former discerned in the national consciousness the animating soul of the body politic; while Napoleon saw in the state but the ordination and utilization of certain mechanical powers, the state was for Stein an organism moved by moral forces and striving toward moral ends; and, therefore, he did not believe in the permanence of Napoleon's might, because its foundation was in contravention of moral laws. Not the depth of his knowledge, not the many-sidedness of his intellectual culture, not the experience in affairs acquired by a service of twenty years' duration, gained for him, at this moment, so peculiar an importance, but the exemplary personality, which found and used the instruments necessary for the attainment of great ends, the creative power of a character strong within itself. The pride of the former knight of the empire, the masterly and passionate energy of his will, which proclaimed itself at once in his compact form and clear-cut features, often gave to his appearance an unseemly roughness

in the view of those about him, but the iron age demanded a man of iron (PLATE V.).

The thought of the necessity of reform in the state was by no means new in Prussia; even before the year 1806 some of the highest officers of state had felt this keenly, but they despaired as to the possibility of its accomplishment. In order to open the eyes of those who afterward conducted the reforms, the catastrophe of 1806 was needed. For Stein as well as for Hardenberg, the leisure of their enforced retirement was requisite in order to draw the outlines of the transformation which they now clearly recognized as necessary. Common to both was the perception that liberation could only be attained through the active co-operation of the whole people; in other respects, while maintaining a good understanding with each other, they exhibited a wide contrast in their principles: the one made his point of departure the interests and circumstances of the community; the other, the rights and liberties of the individual. Hardenberg, a disciple of "enlightenment," considered it the highest mission to establish in Prussia the ideas of the French Revolution, whose power was so great that, to the state which did not willingly receive them, the only choice left was between destruction and enforced acceptance of them; the question, therefore, concerned a revolution in a good sense, a revolution from above, whereby the form best adapted to the spirit of the age should be reached—democratic principles in a monarchical government. Stein's memoir, "On the Proper Formation of the Highest Provincial, Financial, and Policed Authorities," had in view a twofold aim: first, to introduce energetic action, unity, and power into the state administration; and, secondly, to secure to the free citizens a part in the public administration, in order to restore the lost relations of the state to its own citizens, to awaken in subjects that devotion to the common welfare, the absence of which is so much to be regretted, and to contend against the mercenary spirit among salaried office-holders. To these fundamental maxims of his internal policy Stein at all times inviolably held fast; in the year 1828, he still expressed the thought: "What educational institutions are to the youth, a participation in state affairs is to adults." The extent of the failure in this regard was taught with fearful plainness by the cold indifference with which the great majority of the people saw the existing order beaten down, and the malicious scorn with which they accompanied the prostration and humiliation of the ruling classes.

The extraordinary circumstances in which the state was placed clothed Stein with powers extraordinarily great. He took the presidency in the "general department," which had the management of all

things pertaining to administration and finances, and the same office in the “conference for foreign affairs”; to him were subordinated the ministry of justice and the commission for the execution of the articles of peace, and in the councils of the military committee he also participated. He was the impelling intellectual and moral force. Under him an extraordinary activity pervaded the East Prussian provincial department, whose chief was the Minister von Schrötter; here were originated the greater part of the organic laws of those times. Beside Schrötter and his counsellors, Friese and Wilekens, Stein summoned many others to be co-workers. Stein’s continuance in office was too brief and he was engrossed by too much else to allow of the accomplishment of all his ideas; he may well have been “a great sketcher, stronger in project than in performance,” yet the spirit which he breathed into the Prussian state never again wholly departed from it.

That which occupied minds generally at the time was something different from the need of reform; it was the severe oppression with which the conqueror’s merciless conduct had afflicted the land. Stein was therefore obliged to regard it as the thing of first importance to fulfil as soon as possible the financial obligations toward Napoleon, in order to liberate the land from the French. The means for this he intended to obtain by a loan, for which the public domain should serve as security; for this object negotiation was had with the Elector of Hesse, who, fortunately, had saved his vast property by depositing it in the Bank of England. Stein could not then suspect what measure of abuse was still awaiting the broken Prussian state. The principal troubles in this matter arose not so much from the exactions by the French leaders, accustomed to robbery and plunder in a hostile country, nor even from the sufferings caused by the Peace of Tilsit, but from the systematic violation of this peace by Napoleon. Arbitrary interpretations of particular articles were quickly discovered; for the duchy of Warsaw, directly contrary to the terms of the peace, the Michelau circle and New Silesia were demanded; for Dantzie, a district with a radius of ten miles; the right of using the military road through Silesia was also demanded for the French troops, and the King of Saxony desired, besides, the free use of this road for all commercial intercourse between Saxony and Poland. But the special source of suffering was the wretched Convention of July 12, 1807. Since the sum of the contributions to be paid was not therein settled, it deprived Prussia of any certainty that the country would ever again be evacuated. In vain did the king endeavor to explain to his victor the enormity of the required amount of 100,000,000 francs, and asked that the 98,000,000 already collected by the French in the occu-

pied parts of the country, previous to July 12, should be brought into the account. There were set down in the account delivered, on August 28, by Daru, the intendant-general, the outstanding requisitions and land receipts, already brought up to 154,500,000 francs, and to this he added, only as a preliminary, yet 30,000,000 more to come from the liquidation of the transferred provinces; but he refused to allow in abatement the amount of supplies furnished in kind. Up to the beginning of October he had already wrung 42,000,000 from the exhausted land. The 30,000,000, which the peace commission, under Sack's presidency, professed instead of the 29,000,000 estimated by it, he rejected with a protest and with the declaration that he would remain in possession of the civil administration until the required sum was completely paid; he took control of the public coffers, prohibited to the authorities of the provinces any correspondence with the commission, and issued orders upon them at his pleasure. The king was indignant, but Napoleon informed him that under no circumstances could there be question of abating the amount belonging to the army. On September 21, Daru announced that if an agreement with regard to the canceling of the debt should not be completed by October 1, he would secure all the state revenues by an attachment. On the approach of the fateful day of termination, the peace commission so far yielded that they recognized provisionally the French demand, but they did this with the oppressive consciousness that Prussia would never be in a condition to liquidate the debt. The king, whose conscience revolted at undertaking engagements that could not be fulfilled, caused an offer to be made of immediate payment of 60,000,000 to 100,000,000 on condition that a definite terminus should be fixed for the evacuation, the civil administration be directly restored to the Prussian authorities, and all further claims relating to the peace be relinquished. But Napoleon's counter-demand declared the fixing of the war debt at 150,000,000 francs, and, as security for the same, the occupation of the fortresses of Stettin, Glogau, and Küstrin each by 6000 Frenchmen, whom Prussia should be required to feed, to pay, and to clothe; if this were not accepted, the article treating of evacuation would be abrogated; the means of payment Prussia could find if she would; the king needed to support no army, he was at war with nobody. For 50,000,000 of the sum, Daru required, instead of payment, the cession of public domains, as much as possible lying on the Westphalian frontier. On October 4, the threatened measure was carried into effect. Without considering it necessary to give information of it to the peace commission, Daru directed that subsequently all public revenues be made over to him without any deduction; in East and West Prussia, also, as far as the

Passarge, the French now seized possession of the civil administration. On October 24, Daru demanded, in addition to the three fortresses, Kolberg and Graudenz also, to be occupied each by 8000 men, and that Prussia, with a total revenue at the utmost of 60,000,000, should be burdened with a yearly payment of 40,000,000. New demands followed on November 6: the surrender of three military roads, the shortening of the term of payment to one year, etc. In the Prussian forests thousands of the noblest trees were cut down for the French navy; the Mark of Brandenburg had to supply more than a thousand horses at its own cost; the Poles also were encouraged to make demands utterly monstrous.

Napoleon's purpose in treating Prussia with such cruelty was solely, by setting up impossible demands, to prolong indefinitely the occupation of the country by French troops, and this was not aimed against Prussia itself, but against Russia. That division of supremacy over Europe upon which the two absolute rulers had agreed at Tilsit was, in Napoleon's eyes, nothing more than a merely temporary arrangement, to be exchanged for his exclusive rule at the first opportunity that offered; of fulfilling the stipulations of Tilsit he had never thought. At the basis of the ostensible league of friendship there concluded, lay Napoleon's fixed purpose to subjugate the last independent power of the continent, as he had subjugated Austria and Prussia; and on the part of Alexander was the unwilling humiliation under the compulsion of the moment.

The change in the Emperor Alexander's foreign policy had been accompanied by a similar alteration in the internal policy of his realm. The realization that, of all the eager fancies of his youth for the improvement of his subjects, none had been accomplished, had brought him to the conclusion that this failure had its ground in the personal qualities of his counsellors. The triumvirate, shortly before so powerful, Novosiltzoff, Kotshubey, and Stroganoff, were replaced by new men. Count Rumäntzoff, as chancellor, assumed direction of foreign affairs; Arakteheyeff stepped forth from the background, where his earlier friends succeeded in keeping him, and became war-minister, but saw himself in a manner wholly unexpected put in the shade by the young and gifted Count Speransky, a poor country pastor's son, who, as if heir of the triumvirate, represented an authority that predominated over all the ministers. In opposition to their predecessors, who favored the English, these men represented the French system, but this in a remarkable manner had at once against it the general opinion in Russia. Though the war was unpopular and the alliance with France for the joint mastership of Europe had been the wish of a numerous party, yet this alliance had

been regarded differently ; Russia was to be as the authoritative, commanding power in it, and now precisely the opposite was perceptible ; Russia must so far humble herself as to withdraw, at Napoleon's behest, hospitality from the Bourbons. The erection of the duchy of Warsaw was generally received as a menace aimed at Russia. That the first ambassador whom Napoleon accredited to St. Petersburg, and his successor, were both participants in the murder of d'Enghien, certainly appeared to be not without a purpose ; a more severe humiliation for Alexander was not conceivable than to be obliged to receive these men and treat them with distinction. But the icy coldness with which the society of St. Petersburg received them was not merely the expression of the sentiment of hostility to Napoleon's supremacy, but still more an act of opposition to the policy of their own government. It became more and more evident that the alliance had sacrificed Russia's natural course of political action and therewith her welfare. That his personal enemy, Gustavus IV. of Sweden, should be punished by the loss of Finland, was to Napoleon assuredly right ; yet how little would the acquisition of that desert land for Russia signify in comparison with the extension of the French dominions, if the partition of Turkey promised at Tilsit should not be effected. Napoleon had in truth, through his ambassador at the Porte, General Guilleminot, on August 24, 1807, at Slobosia, brought about the truce with Russia previously arranged at Tilsit, but the conditions were so unfavorable for Russia, that Alexander ratified the same only in part, and ordered his troops to remain in the Danubian principalities. Napoleon was not yet so absolutely master of the situation that he could venture to forbid the Russians remaining in the principalities, for he had need still of Alexander's friendship ; but he counted upon reaching the same end in another way. The continued occupation of the country between the Elbe and Vistula, the Damocles' sword of destruction which he caused to be constantly suspended over the heads of the Prussians, must extort from the czar the renunciation of the Danubian principalities. He had nothing to object, as he explained to Count Tolstoi, the Russian ambassador, to Russia's taking possession of the Danubian principalities, only he would then be obliged to take into his possession as indemnity some parts of Prussia, and indeed Silesia. The instructions sent with Caulaincourt to St. Petersburg declared that the evacuation of Prussia would not take place till the renunciation of the acquisition of the Danubian territory was accomplished by Alexander. Furthermore, the personal friendship between Alexander and Frederick William was not interrupted for a moment by the Peace of Tilsit. But it corresponded entirely with the reserve of his

nature that the former left the king in ignorance of these disagreements, so that the latter continued to believe in the existence of complete harmony between the czar and Napoleon, and was obliged to count upon the maintenance of the Franco-Russian friendship. The greatest misfortune for Prussia, he often said in those days, would be a serious dissension between Russia and France. Nothing remained for him, therefore, but to accommodate himself to the inevitable, and to yield to the conqueror's unjust claims.

The king decided to appeal once more to Napoleon, through his brother, Prince William; Alexander von Humboldt, versed in the world and at home in Parisian society, was assigned to be his companion. What the prince had to offer was 12,000,000 in cash, 50,000,000 in paper, and 50,000,000 mortgaged on the public domain, and, until the fulfilment of these conditions, the cession of three fortresses, and besides, as a guarantee which left no doubt of the king's uprightness, the closest accession to the political system of France and an alliance offensive and defensive. On January 3, 1808, the prince arrived in Paris. Napoleon received him, indeed, personally with merited distinction; but just at this time, as a reply to the Russian declaration of war, appeared the English manifesto which scoured with special severity the surrendering of Prussia by Alexander, and this served the emperor as a welcome pretext for giving vent to his anger and his distrust of Prussia. Magnanimously, but naturally in vain, the prince offered himself as hostage for the complete execution of the obligations to be assumed; with no better result, he sought to move Napoleon's heart by a representation of the hardships of his country. After this report of the prince, the court at Königsberg no longer indulged in illusions; in order to anticipate a new act of violence, and to deprive it of all appearance of justice, it was imperative to resume the Berlin negotiations. At Sack's desire Stein repaired personally to Berlin, clothed with wide plenipotentiary powers. Stein omitted nothing to render Darm well disposed; by his procurement Darm, as translator of Horace, was named honorary member of the Academy of Sciences. The result of his negotiations with Darm was the sketch of a treaty of March 9. The total amount of the war debt, deducting the revenues withheld since July 12, the partial payments and supplies furnished, was established at 101,000,000, until the canceling of which the fortresses of Stettin, Küstrin and Glogau should remain in possession of the French, but manned by a force of only 9000, the evacuation to follow successively, and with the ratification of the treaty the main army to quit the country. But Napoleon, when he reached Bayonne, though he had the ratification in view, constantly delayed it under various

pretexts, and when Alexander proposed to vacate the Danubian principalities, and as a counterpoise desired him to withdraw his troops from Prussia, he positively refused.

Such a situation would have brought another man than Stein to despair; it only spurred him to put forth every effort in order to relieve the land from the foe. Since, as a first measure, it was necessary to employ every means in order to assure the payment to be made to him, the treasury notes, according to the current exchange, were made legal payment in all public and private transactions; to the landed proprietors, prostrated by the war, upon whose support Stein laid great stress, he accorded a general indulgence, and in all branches of the administration he introduced the greatest frugality; the royal court limited its expenses to that which was most needful, the gold table-service, inherited from Frederick the Great, was sent to the mint. But all this did not reach far enough to create a thorough relief. Inasmuch as commerce was ruined since the closing of the sea, the price of necessary supplies had come to be exorbitant, many thousand dismissed civil and military officers were without bread, want and wretchedness entered every household, and it was utterly impossible to cultivate the fields in many provinces. In vain was Niebuhr sent to Holland in order to accomplish a loan. Then Stein resorted to the alienation of the public domains, but even this measure failed by reason of the exhaustion of the country and the want of ready money. But along with this task, Stein and those like-minded with him had placed before their minds the regeneration of the entire state.

Up to this time the highest authority of the administration was the state council, consisting of fifteen members, named also the privy state ministry; but the centre of gravity lay in the three separate departments of the same: for foreign affairs (or cabinet ministry), for finances and the interior (or General Directory), and for justice; yet the special power of determination belonged neither to the plenum nor to the departments, but to the cabinet, which, although without legally recognized existence, had gradually developed into a superior court, above the ministry, while to the ministers the person of the king was almost entirely unapproachable. In order, therefore, to re-establish the immediate connection between the king and the highest officers of state, and to unite possible unity and efficiency in the highest grades of office, the doing away with the cabinet followed, and the functions of the state administration were apportioned between the ministries of foreign affairs, of war, justice, finance, and of the interior. The highest magistrates for the provinces, which were intended to form great and active members



FIG. 13.—Prussia's administration, 1807, 1808. Bronze relief by Hagen on the Stein Memorial in Berlin.

of the state, were created by the decree of December 16, 1808, and designated chief-presidents. At their side Stein desired to place provincial diets (*Landtage*) (Figs. 13, 14), representative of the entire population in the three orders, of knights, cities, and peasants, which, beside the granting of taxes for provincial purposes, should also exercise an important influence upon the administration. From these provincial estates should finally come forth the estates of the realm. A universal agreement prevailed with respect to the necessity of the introduction of these reforms, not for the reason that they were demanded by the will of the people, or the spirit of the times, nor even as a counterpoise to the government, but as a firm prop to the throne.

But with a just conception Stein recognized the fact that the regeneration of the state's life presupposed that of the community, and that the best means for developing the common life and spirit of the

nation is self-government on the part of the communities. In this respect there had been complete failure. A participation of the citizens in the affairs of the towns had existed generally in some form, but it came to be without significance. The magistrates held office for life, and filled vacancies in their numbers by co-optation with the royal approval. The communal sphere of activity was everywhere narrow, education and care of the poor extremely neglected, public spirit and spontaneous activity were unknown. Now came Stein's ordinance relating to towns (November 19, 1808), a work so fruitful in blessings that it alone would suffice to secure to its author the gratitude of posterity (Fig. 15). It confined the previous tutelage within very narrow limits, set aside the division of the burgher class into guilds and orders, introduced common councils, with the right to prepare the budget, and to make




FIG. 11 Opening of the first Westphalian diet. Bronze relief by Hagen on the Stein Memorial in Berlin.

enactments beyond former municipal ability, and established the election of magistrates in lieu of co-optation. Upon the inferior classes of the population there still rested considerable remains of feudal bondage. The eastern portions of the country, acquired by conquest, had the worst experience of the inconveniences of this patriarchal relationship, but also in the Mark of Brandenburg, the open country was in the hands of scarcely three hundred knightly proprietors, to whom belonged the con-



FIG. 15.—The ordinance relating to towns, 1808. Bronze relief by Hagen on the Stein Memorial in Berlin.

rol of justice, the local police, the patronage of church and school, and the right of hunting small and large game, and whose tenants were accustomed to make payments in money and in kind, while the proprietors themselves enjoyed an exemption from all direct taxes. The dwellers in villages had been divided into full, three-fourths, half, and one-fourth peasants, into cottagers, whose farm-land amounted at the utmost

to one-fourth of a peasant's property, into stall- or booth-holders, who had but a small bit of land, and supported themselves mainly by manual labor, and, finally, into lodgers—that is, handcraftsmen, or day laborers, who lived for hire in houses of the seigneurs or peasants; along with these peasants, who were personally free, there were, however, tributary peasants or cottagers, who possessed no real property and had only the occupancy or enjoyment of their piece of land in return for fixed ser-



FIG. 16.—Abolition of hereditary servitude. Bronze relief by Hagen on the Stein Memorial in Berlin.

vices, and whose children underwent a three years' compulsory servitude; in a similar situation were the hereditary serfs among the peasants, or those bound to the soil. Without the seigneur's permission the vassal peasant could neither marry nor devote his children to any other calling; the Polish peasant had nothing which he could call his property. Want of energy, great uncertainty, tenacious adherence to custom, and gradually

increasing discontent were the natural results of such circumstances. There could be no question here of a rural self-government, of establishing an arrangement for local communities corresponding to the arrangements for cities; it was of moment, therefore, to create organs in order to strengthen and increase the efficiency of the state's power by means of the communal organization of the districts and their magistracy, and by an organization of the police. But the principal thing still remained—the removal of serfdom (Fig. 16). The edict of October 9, 1807, concerning the facilitation of the acquisition and free use of property in land, not only provided for the abolition of hereditary serfdom and all the burdens growing out of that relation, but also the liberation of commerce, and of the choice of a calling and profession. Henceforth every citizen of the state could acquire land, the nobleman could follow the trade of a citizen, the citizen at his pleasure could step into the position of a peasant, and the peasant into that of a citizen. In the supplementary cabinet order of October 28, the king extended to the entire state the abrogation of vassalage and of hereditary serfdom, and on July 27, 1808, he granted to all those dwelling on estates holding immediately of him in his domains of East Prussia, Lithuania, and West Prussia the full, unrestricted possession of their pieces of land; a noble measure, the blessings of which reached 47,000 peasant families.

All these measures were pervaded by the obvious contrast to the conditions which in France had proceeded from the overturnings of the Revolution and were confirmed by the imperial despotism. Whereas these destroyed all provincial and communal life, Stein sought everywhere to awaken this, to elevate it, and to draw it to co-operation; if in France the principle of equality had changed the citizens' fellowship into an "indiscriminate mass of sovereign, individual men," in Prussia he labored for the maintenance of the different orders, but in a new and juster organization. He did not, however, escape the reproach of being a revolutionist; the nobleman asked of the king protection for the rights of his order, and even the class of citizens accepted with indifference the rights conceded to them.

The reorganization of the army constituted an inseparable element in these reforms. Along with the immediate necessities, the thought was fundamental in all minds, how to prepare the state morally and materially for the great decisive contest against the foreign despot. The evils of the old military system, the preference shown the nobility, the arrogance of many officers before the war, had been bitterly avenged by the equanimity with which the population received the discomfiture of the army. The first impulse to reform came from the king himself. As

early as December 1, 1806, he issued at Ortelsburg a proclamation which condemned in the strongest language the unparalleled capitulations, and cashiered a number of superior officers, punished some with death, and threatened for all similar offences the same punishment. The penalty of death was affixed not only to insubordination and desertion, but also to pillaging of city- and country-folk. At the same time with allowing requisitions and limiting excess of baggage appeared the first step in the direction of transforming the army system in order to bring it nearer to the more rapid and efficacious arrangements of the enemy; during the continuance of the war, elevation to the rank of officer as a mark of distinction was opened to the sub-officer and common soldier. Scarcely was peace subscribed when the king convened, on July 25, a commission for military reorganization under the presidency of Major-General von Scharnhorst. Its labor would have been less prompt and successful but for the movement for reform long in progress within military circles, to which the king was no stranger and no enemy. That which was carried into effect in the army between 1808 and 1813 had already been the subject of memorials for two decades, report upon report had been made, but before the catastrophe all this remained without sufficient practical result. Now, under the compulsion of necessity, Scharnhorst found a hearing for that which formerly he had preached to deaf ears; he became the soul of the army reform. He and Stein, while differing very much in character, were united by the same great sentiment and a like clear conception respecting the common work.

Gerhard Johann David Scharnhorst, born November 12, 1755, at Bordenau, was the son of a moderately wealthy farmer, who returned home from the War of the Austrian Succession as sergeant-major. Following his inherited inclination for a soldier's life, he succeeded in finding admission into the military school founded at Wilhelmstein by Count William of Lippe-Schaumburg. As a Hanoverian officer he had ample opportunity during the campaign in the Netherlands to compare the advantages of the new, with the defects of the old, military system. In the year 1801, when lieutenant-colonel of artillery, he complied with a proposal to enter the Prussian service. In the campaign of 1806, he filled the place of quartermaster-general to the Duke of Brunswick; taken prisoner at Lübeck with Blücher, but soon exchanged, he had a prominent part in the famous acts by which, in the winter campaign of 1807, the small remnant of the Prussian army made amends for the days that preceded.

Corresponding to that which the public voice of the country desired, the first effort of the commission over which he presided was directed to

the purging of the corps of officers from all unworthy elements, and to the punishment of those who were compromised. It made a happy impression that, under the presidency of the Princes Henry and William, a commission for immediate investigation was appointed, before which all officers who had taken part in a capitulation, or had been made prisoners, or had been guilty of blunders, according to the enumeration made in the proclamation of December 1, were obliged to answer. On the basis of the inquiry, which was prosecuted up to the beginning of 1812, a number of severe sentences were issued, yet no sentence of death was executed. The laborious task of remodeling the army was completed, as to its principles, before the close of 1807. Infantry and cavalry were formed anew, the light infantry augmented, the clothing simplified and made more suitable, recruiting in foreign countries altogether abolished, and barbarous corporal punishments were suppressed. The exclusive privilege of the nobility to become officers was set aside, and education and merit came into its place. It seemed advisable that the army should be united to the people by inner, moral bonds, in order to render it national. But economical necessity made restriction to the absolutely needful a positive obligation. While, therefore, it was Scharnhorst's (Fig. 17) special aim to keep the army in a just relation to the resources of the exhausted country, he however sought also to render possible the increase of its fighting ability, and thus permit, at the right juncture, the conflict for honor and independence to be undertaken. His impressive memoir of July 31, 1807, which he followed up by other papers, proceeded upon the fundamental principle that all inhabitants of the state are its born defenders; that the universal arming of the country should have for its object, not only to augment, but also to improve, its defensive power. In order to increase the army, which by treaty should not exceed 70,000 men in time of peace, it would be necessary for the first three years to dismiss twenty men in every company, yearly afterward, ten men; the absentees were to be replaced by others, the dismissed to be reviewed every year in their cantonments; clothing and arms were to be kept ready for them in the dépôts. In this manner, within three years about 170,000 trained men would be provided with a sufficient number of officers. A provincial militia, which clothed and armed itself and every year was mustered and drilled, would, in the absence of the regulars, perform garrison duty and maintain peace in the interior. Thus was Scharnhorst, even at that time, filled with the thought of a people's war against Napoleon. At first, indeed, since the king did not conceive the time to have come for action, these suggestions were only in outline, but they contained the germ



FIG. 17. Marble statue of General Scharnhorst, by C. Rauch, in Berlin.

of that which came to life in 1813: the universal obligation to service and the militia (Fig. 18).

But while, among the men of the reform, neither Stein nor Hardenberg, neither Scharnhorst nor Blücher, neither Gneisenau nor Niebuhr, was Prussian by birth, yet did the Prussian state by its own native forces not merely raise itself from its deep prostration, but in such a manner that it appropriated to itself the fruits of the travail through which the German mind passed in the eighteenth century. Simultaneously with the French Revolution one not less powerful and far-reaching pervaded the German people. A German literature sprang up within the short space of two generations, which bore the sharp impress of a distinctly national character and infused into the German people once more the lost sentiment of inward union, and caused it, for the first time, to experience pride on account of its achievements. That in the works of a Goethe, a Lessing, and a Schiller, a precious treasure was acquired for all humanity, was felt by the rising generation, whose spiritual life awakened to a freshness that made a most glaring contrast with the decaying, withering forms of outward existence. While among the French literature first sank into an unexampled frivolity, and then amid the horrors of the Revolution stood wholly mute, there arose on the idyllic shores of the Hm the home in which was nourished the flame of ideality, and in which the worship of all that is beautiful, great, and lofty was cherished. But this phase, also, of German national development took a one-sided direction. The energy with which it proceeded absorbed so completely the entire force of the German intellect, that for the hard and sober demands of actuality nothing remained. Aesthetic self-sufficiency sought to avoid every disquieting influence, and after Lessing, in an unguarded moment, had styled patriotism unheroic weakness, German literature turned away with repugnance from all that is national, looked contemptuously from the pinnacles of cosmopolitanism upon the limits of nationality. Schiller demanded of his countrymen to flee with him out of the narrow, dull life into the ideal kingdom. That realm existed for him not in the present, but in the serene and beautiful regions of the ancient world of Greece and Rome. State and church were, for the cultivated German, non-existent. Goethe in his *Wilhelm Meister* had presented as his model a man without state, country, and calling, and striving only for a purely human culture. Intercourse with like-minded, susceptible souls seemed, for a time, to our great poets far more desirable than participation in public affairs.

But German idealism, which had so long been spinning its own fancies in elegant seclusion, again penetrated into the life of the people. It was

of great importance that at the same moment in which the last external bonds of co-existence between the branches of the German family were dissolved, a new spiritual union was established among them through German literature; that, over the ruins of the Holy Roman empire, a new ideal Germany arose; that, by means of it, in the midst of the universal confusion, faith in the indestructibility of the German spirit was saved. From this same idealism proceeded also the renovation of the moral life. The deep moral earnestness expressed in Schiller's ballads, his joyous faith in the nobleness of humanity, the great universal ideas, comprehensible to every man, which sounded forth in the pathos of his dramatic muse, strengthened and refreshed the soul. It was not long afterward that Goethe's (Fig. 19) "Faust," the magnificent poem of the redemption of man by action, of the triumph of the divine over the



FIG. 18.—Establishment of the militia. Bronze relief by Hagen on the Stein Memorial in Berlin.

spirit of denial, rang out like a gospel, at whose call the world, beaten down to the ground, arose once more. Philosophy took part with posey in effecting this moral nurture; after Kant (Fig. 20) had made the conception of duty the centre of his ethics, to his school henceforth belonged the thinking part of the nation. In literature in general a great transformation was accomplished. Out of the thick fog of cosmopolitanism there came forth with ever increasing clearness the knowledge that this



Figs. 19.—Goethe. After a drawing by Schwerdtgeburth in the year 1832. ("Goethe-Jahrbuch,")

sentiment and patriotism are not irreconcilable opposites, that man cannot dispense with country, that it is only while first standing upon the firm soil of national kindredship that he can rise to a true and genuine perception of his relationship to mankind.

Schiller (Fig. 21) praised as the dearest of bonds the impulse of love to the fatherland, he praised the hearts that beat for their country and for the laws of their grandsires; his mind, wholly directed to the historical, brought upon the stage the powerful forms of the Past, the wonderful deliverance of a people oppressed by foreign conquerors, and

his last bequest was the noble song of the people rising up against the tyrannical oppressor.

So powerful was the new impulse toward love of country, that to it the new tendency that was arising in literature was obedient. With the Romanticists, who owed their name to the romantic poems of Tieck, which appeared in 1799, the great object was originally to become



FIG. 20.—Kant.

aesthetic men, and persons not aesthetically cultivated they looked down upon as a lower species of humanity. In religion Schelling fought against the superficiality of Naturalism; although his philosophy was obscure, and, instead of seeking truth, contented itself with fantastic guesses, it became the introduction to a more living conception



FIG. 21.—Schiller. From a copper-plate engraving, 1794, by J. G. Müller (1717-1830); painting (begun 1786, finished 1791) by A. Graff (1736-1813).

of natural phenomena. A. W. Schlegel recognized the great truth that speech and poetry, art and religion are an outflowing of nationality, and the searching out and representation of this nationality became the occupation of the Romantic School. This again directed the minds of the German people to their own past. The dark night of the Middle Ages

was illumined with a splendor never anticipated ; over against the humiliating present there rose up the heroic forms of the Hohenstaufen emperors ; the song of the minstrel and the courtly epic sprang forth, and that which was thus presented in richness of form, in fancifulness and in legendary lore, constituted of itself the strongest imaginable contrast to the frigid and wholly utilitarian construction of the state despotism, which the new France had erected. The University of Heidelberg, which had fallen into utter decay under the sway of the Palatinate, became, after its restoration by Charles Frederick of Baden, the cradle of this new school ; here Achim von Arnim and Brentano sounded "The Boy's Wonder-Horn," here Eichendorff heard the lectures of Görres, here, in 1810, the brothers Boisserée established their collection of Old German pictures, and here was formed the ardent cult of the Rhine then fallen into the hands of strangers. It still needed only the foreign yoke to complete the transformation in thought and feeling of the German people. The same iron hand which presumed to make every nation indiscriminately bow down beneath its pressure, first waked the slumbering national spirit to an energy which cast off the oppressive hand with irresistible might. A fearful experience had taught the Germans what it is to be no nation, or, at least, a nation of poets and thinkers, which dispenses with the true body, the state. The thought of national unity, almost lost and gone amid their political piece-meal divisions, was powerfully impressed upon the German people ; hatred of the tyrant produced love of country.

But the special, the inmost, impelling force, out of which the German people was to be new-born, was not hate, but the consciousness of their own faults. Far more impressively than by any others has this been proclaimed to the German people by Fichte and Schleiermacher ; but no one so truly as they has known how to revive the joyous hope of a better future. Not in his speculative system lies the true significance of Fichte, but in the might of his personality, in the strength verging on bitterness, with which, like one of the prophets, he declared war against the corrupt sentimentality and the thoughtless frivolity of his age. After a conflict with the Saxon church-government (the so-called Atheistic Controversy) had driven him from Jena in 1799, he developed during the winter of 1804-1805, to a circle of thoughtful hearers at Berlin, where he had settled, the "Characteristics of the Present Age." This he followed up in 1807-1808 by "Discourses to the German Nation." He sat in relentless judgment upon the universal, fundamental evil—selfishness ; but while he laid bare the wrong, he also pointed out the pathway to the forces by means of which it could be removed—

morality, religion, and love of country. To such an extent had he cast away from him the cosmopolitan dreams of his earlier years. He inculcated it upon his hearers, not without extravagance, that only the German nation could possess true patriotism, for only those who possessed the power to originate knowledge could, by means of this power, discover the true aim of humanity. Not for a moment did he believe in the permanence of Napoleon's supremacy : a statecraft so profoundly immoral could, indeed, plunder and lay waste the earth, but never could it attain universal dominion. A religious awakening went hand in hand with this moral movement. German theology and German faith alike refound in Schleiermacher the fatherland lost to them through foreign rule and notions of world-citizenship. In his "Discourses concerning Religion" he had already, in 1799, shown to the cultivated among its contemners that religion consists not in maintaining certain propositions, but is grounded in the feelings and is a moral power. Not merely the church but also the state he regarded as among the holiest and most important orders in the house of God ; every people he considered as if appointed to represent a special side of the divine image ; all whom God has called to something great would become such, if they clung with the whole heart to the fatherland and the people. From the height of this moral consciousness he had a clearer perception of the present than most politicians. "Believe me," he predicted in June, 1806, "there stands before us, sooner or later, a universal conflict, the subject of which will be our civilization, our religion, our intellectual cultivation, no less than our external freedom and external good." And after the fight at Jena he wrote to his friend Reimer : "A universal regeneration is necessary and will be developed from these occurrences ; how, one cannot as yet perceive, but we shall be in it and have part in it as soon as the course of events summons us or carries us along with it." This powerful, fresh, always joyous, spirit was, as a contemporary says, to be considered in the gloomiest time as equal to an army.

A preacher of like sentiment but of a different stamp stood forth to the German people in E. M. Arndt, the peasant's son of Rügen. Vigorous, powerful, solid in body as in mind, in his youth happy to pass for a Swede, "because German nationality was too much despised," his was, however, the genuine German spirit, filled with the deepest devotion, and just in its deepest degradation did he discover his true fatherland. Not like a sharpsighted politician, he looked upon men and their relationships always from the moral side, and thus he ever struck upon the right in a manner which men generally could comprehend. In the first part of his "Spirit of the Time" (1806) he poured forth the vessels of a

fearful wrath upon his contemporaries, who were drunken with sleep, and lashed the musty learning, the fine aesthetics, the cosmopolitan rubbish. Proscribed on account of the second part of the "Spirit of the Age," he went to Berlin, and there learned to recognize in downtrodden Prussia the state from which deliverance must come to the German people.

It is to be expected that the first practical experiments of these idealists aiming at the highest objects should exhibit all the defects of well-intentioned awkwardness. This fate befell an organization, formed in April, 1808, composed of members of the Königsberg Masonic lodge, of scholars and teachers, and of military officers and civil functionaries; it was authorized by the king on June 30, and called a "Society for the Praetice of Public Virtues; or a Moral-Scientific Union;" commonly styled the *Tugendbund* (League of Virtue). Its object was represented to be the amelioration of the moral condition of the Prussian and German people by means of unity of effort on the part of worthy men. The members were well-meaning patriots but of small influence, and numbered in all not more than 350. At their head stood Prince von Hohenzollern-Hechingen. Stein, who perceived its unpractical character, was in decided opposition to the union, objected to it as intermeddling arrogantly with the administration, and presently proposed its dissolution.

Of incomparably greater importance was the conviction that the state must through intellectual forces gain compensation for that which it had lost in material power. This conviction the king expressed to a deputation of Halle professors, who, in the summer of 1807, came to Memel in order to ask that the University of Halle might be transferred to Berlin. There a circle of men had been gathered which represented the germ of the future university. In company with Fichte, Schleiermacher, Niebuhr, F. A. Wolf, and others, Beyme especially pursued the object with zeal, but it was not till W. von Humboldt took it in hand that it came into the right current and the founding of a new university in the capital of Prussia was determined upon. Its opening followed later in 1810; the first rector, elected by itself, was Fichte.

It was inevitable that a transformation which disturbed so many anciently rooted relationships should also encounter here and there warm opposition. This was not merely on the part of poltroons, whom fear and self-interest made subservient to the French, for a warrior so brave, so strong a hater of the French, and so true a Prussian, as General York, belonged to the most passionate opponents of the reform. These were found in greatest number in the ranks of the old Prussian nobility and of the corps of officers. They censured the government for having begun a

war of the poor against property, of materialism against the order appointed by God. Beside York there belonged to the heads of this party Generals von Kalkreuth and von Zastrow and von der Marwitz; the narrow and good-natured General von Köckeritz served them as a mouth-piece, through which they conveyed their warnings to the king. It was, however, in general a holy earnestness aiming at a great object, which had seized upon minds both high and low. But the French, notwithstanding their acumen, had not the most superficial comprehension of this change.

In Austria the effects of the misfortune endured did not strike so deep as in Prussia. The oppression exercised by the victor was not so intolerably tormenting, nor was the population, which was composed of different nationalities, capable of so earnest and uniform a sensibility as that of North Germany. Yet here also a significant transformation occurred in connection with the Peace of Presburg. The urgent representations of Archduke Charles succeeded in obtaining the removal of the men whose incapacity had contributed so largely to the misfortunes of the state. On December 24, 1805, Cobenzl and Colleredo received the dismissal which had been sought, and were replaced by Count Johann Philipp Stadion. It was a proof of uncommon daring on the part of the Emperor Francis that at this moment he summoned the man to be his first counsellor who had shown himself the irreconcilable foe of France, and recently, as ambassador at St. Petersburg, had been a chief originator of the Third Coalition. The exclusive, aristocratic pride of the Swabian knight of the empire hated in Napoleon not merely the conqueror who had inflicted the severest losses on the Austrian monarchy, but also the destroyer of the imperial constitution. In this deep wrath against the Revolution and its advocates he found support in the entire nobility and also in the Emperor Francis. First of all, indeed, one must do that which was matter of necessity. Not without reason did Stadion, after the Peace of Tilsit, in the feeling of Austria's defenceless condition, prepare himself for new demands on the part of Napoleon. In the Treaty of Fontainebleau (October 10, 1807) it was necessary to concede to him the coveted boundary of the Isonzo, for which Brauna was received in exchange. But scarcely was this treaty concluded, when Napoleon had in readiness new and offensive demands: to recognize the new kings of Holland, Westphalia, and Naples, and to urge upon England the giving up of the Danish fleet; if not, he refused ratification and threatened to break off diplomatic relations. In truth, war against Napoleon was from the beginning in the mind of Stadion; it was with him an immovable conviction that Napoleon had the fixed purpose of subju-

gating Austria and of hurling the house of Lorraine from the throne, since the continuance of both was incompatible with the universal dominion for which he was striving. But departing widely from the wonted procedure of Austrian statesmen, who, in their foreign policy, so often pursued far-reaching plans without considering in connection with them whether the internal resources of the state sufficed for their accomplishment, he was himself well aware of the interdependence of the two. The carrying into effect of pressingly needed internal reforms ought to be the preparation for the new war. As is easily conceived, he found the chief opponents of his policy in the court of exchequer, who were not willing to allow the plan proposed for the restoration of disordered monetary concerns to be disturbed by warlike measures. For a long time he vainly strove against the customary sluggishness and indolence, until he finally succeeded in gaining the support of the emperor. With enthusiasm, common sense, and self-denial, he addressed himself to the work. For so thorough a transformation as Stein undertook in Prussia there was here no room, but under Stadion's guidance a freer and milder spirit entered into the administration. German literature, hitherto outlawed, obtained free admission, the deadening oppression of the censorship was modified. In the administration centralization was relaxed. Stadion's purpose, however, to bring to life again the earlier order was frustrated by the opposition of the emperor to every, if even only seeming, limitation of his prerogatives as supreme ruler. The convening of the Hungarian diet, on April 9, 1807, was however required, against his will, by severe financial necessity; and in this sharp conflicts were occasioned alike by the allowances for army and fleet, which were expected from the Hungarians, and by the rights demanded by that people. Archduke Charles entered into Stadion's ideas with zeal and with intelligence; he made use of every opportunity of rendering evident the defects of the machinery of state, and of enforcing its salvation through fundamental reforms, but on the other hand he discerned the ruin of Austria in a new war with France. So great were his apprehensions on this score that after the Peace of Presburg he became the advocate of an alliance with France. Now once more the leader of the army, he began to put thoroughly in order all military affairs; not less than twenty-five generals were dismissed after the Peace of Presburg. The infantry was augmented; in the discipline of the troops suitable changes were introduced. This appeared the more indispensable since Napoleon was openly endeavoring to involve Austria in the political concerns of the East. It was the period when Napoleon was cherishing chimerical plans of attacking England in India, of persuading the Emperor Alexander to undertake an expedition thither, and, in connection with

this, of engaging in the partition of Turkey. These were schemes that struck at the vital nerve of Austria; it was resolved at Vienna not to leave France and Russia to decide alone with regard to Turkey, but at least to make a third in the league. Only Stadion concealed his plans with very great prudence. But then came the announcement of the proceedings at Bayonne (p. 62). For the time the oriental question was thrust one side. Napoleon's perfidy toward the Bourbons showed the abyss to which Austria was approaching. In this, as Stadion pointed out, the Emperor Francis might discern the fate which awaited every dynasty which did not prepare itself for resistance at the right time; through Austria lay the road to Turkey, as through Spain that to Portugal. Under the impression of this transaction he succeeded in persuading the emperor to sign the patent of May 12, for the establishment of a provincial militia, which, being organized in advance, should be used to fill up the regiments. There was at court a party that urged speedy decision, and at the head of this party stood the empress, with her brothers and the younger archdukes.

It was impossible that these purposes and military preparations of Austria could escape Napoleon's piercing eye; then occurred a noticeable tension of the relations between him and the cabinet of Vienna, but so long as his affairs in Spain were not entirely settled, a war with Austria would be undesirable. Agreeably to his favorite method of intimidation, he caused it to be made known in Vienna, that he should regard any mobilization as directed against him; that if Austria desired war he should be ready at any moment to accept the initiative; should he receive an ambiguous decision, his ambassador would immediately demand his passports. On the Silesian-Bohemian frontiers were stationed the corps of Davout and Mortier, which, with Poles and Saxons 120,000 strong, could at any time fall upon Austria. But beyond the Pyrenees events were occurring which in their further progress were destined to change the face of the world. It happened that in this transaction Napoleon met with resistance on the part of that one among European nations, which, under the pressure of both political and ecclesiastical tyranny, had remained far behind the others. This resistance he was unable to overcome, and by means of it the signal was given for the great rising of the peoples, which broke and overthrew his power.

Before King Joseph had set foot on the soil of his new kingdom, the Spanish people, on receiving the intelligence from Bayonne, had risen with the suddenness of an explosion of the elements. On May 24, 1808, the province of Asturias rose up under the lead of its priests and appointed a junta clothed with royal powers, which declared war against France

and turned to England with a prayer for help. In less than a week the land was in flames from the Pyrenees to Cadiz, from the Mediterranean to the Bay of Biscay. Whoever sought to curb the rage of the people was a traitor, and was put to death. The multitude's credulity constituted a favorable soil for the insurrection; their deep poverty caused no solicitude to visit their hearths; the sacredness of the struggle for throne and altar banished all thought as to the hazard of rebellion. Above all, priests and monks preached against the foreign intruders as enemies of religion, accursed by God; with one mind the entire population threw themselves upon their invaders, broke up their communications, seized upon their couriers and transports. Where remained, then, the hopes with which Joseph had come to his new subjects? He had intended to win their hearts by gentleness, and the fact that distinguished and patriotic men, like Urquijo, Cevallos, and O'Farril, who paid homage to modern opinions with a view to salutary reforms, decided to become his ministers, confirmed him in this hope. On the whole way to the capital he saw nothing but dark countenances; his entrance to Madrid was very sorrowful, the streets were deserted, doors and windows closed, nowhere a greeting of welcome. The council of Castile condescended, after long hesitation, to proclaim the new constitution, but nothing could induce them to take the oath of fidelity to the king.

Napoleon was completely surprised by this opposition, the strength of which he also greatly underestimated. A contemner of popular forces, especially in the domain of military affairs, he expected soon to settle with these herds of scarcely armed peasants, led by monks and smugglers or by officers who had never seen war. With his wonted keenness he had concentrated his troops on the most important points, from which they could overpower every separate province. But this unchaining of the elements set at naught every description of military art. Saragossa, wretchedly fortified, seemed utterly defenseless, after young Jóse Palafax, who was summoned to the captain-generalship, had been obliged to escape to the mountains; but in blind fury the population rushed upon the storming columns of Lefebvre and drove them back. Intoxicated by the news from Saragossa, Generals Cuesta and Blake descended from the mountains of Galicia, but in spite of all their valor, their inexperienced squadrons were utterly routed by Bessières on July 14, at Riosecu near Palencia. Napoleon concluded that the rising was beaten to the ground by this victory, when suddenly at another point, and in truth by his own fault, the military situation was rendered much worse. He had sought to direct operations from a distance, and the insignificance of the adversary had misled him into sending to Spain hardly any but

newly levied and untrained troops, whose discipline did not withstand the annoyances and the fearful character of this war. Moneey, who, with inadequate forces, had pressed forward to Valencia, was compelled to turn about without having effected his connection with Dupont, who was marching in high spirits toward Andalusia in order to earn a marshal's baton by taking Cadiz and saving the remains of the French fleet that was lying there. He stormed the bridges over the Guadalquivir at Alcolea, but the cruel chastisement which he inflicted on the city of Cordova on account of its resistance, instead of impressing the Andalusians with a salutary terror, only let loose the wildest vengeance. Behind him the population, who had risen, obstructed the gorges of the Sierra Morena; too weak to pursue his march, he retreated to Andujar. Dupont himself and his troops were exhausted by the tropical heat, and, being attacked by Castaños with a superior force, he capitulated at Baylen, on July 21, with 18,000 men. The six French ships in the harbor of Cadiz had been obliged previously to surrender.

The impression produced by this catastrophe far and wide was immense. On the part of the Spaniards it created an unbounded assurance of victory, but it filled the French with dismay. King Joseph precipitately evacuated Madrid, and the siege of Saragossa was raised, the artillery being abandoned; all Spain as far as the Basque provinces and parts of Catalonia came into the hands of the insurgents. In Portugal the insurrection, after the example of Oporto, broke out along the banks of the Minho and Douro as well as in Algarve; Junot, finding himself surrounded, was constrained to disarm his Spanish regiments and to confine himself to the defence of Lisbon. But by far the most important fact to be considered is that now the English government began to attach greater importance to the insurrection of the Spaniards; here was the point where the Napoleonic world could be unhinged, and all classes of the population in England rejoiced enthusiastically over the nation which shone with the ideal grandeur of the patriotism of Numantia. There prevailed, however, in the measures of the government the same confusion that characterized the greater part of its foreign enterprises, and there was little harmony with the Spaniards, who thought that they had scarcely any further need of English aid. At Cadiz an English corps was repulsed through fear of the fate of Gibraltar, and to the landing of Arthur Wellesley at Corunna the junta of Galicia opposed such difficulties that he turned his course to the mouth of the Mondego. On August 21, he defeated Junot in the battle of Vimeiro; the French corps was lost, but the commander-in-chief, Lord Dalrymple, who had arrived meantime, granted the capitulation of Cintra, in pursuance of

which the corps was transferred to France in British ships. A regency was established at Lisbon.

Napoleon felt this to be the first shaking of the supports of his power. More severely than by the defeat of his armies was he troubled by the appearance of the English on Spanish soil. But according to his invariable custom, he threw upon others the blame of the disaster. "My army," he wrote to Joseph, "appears to be commanded not by generals skilled in war, but by postmasters." He was unable to conceal from himself the inevitable revulsion of opinion which the occurrences in Spain must produce throughout Europe, and especially their effect upon the three Eastern powers which he had conquered. The princes of the Confederation of the Rhine were summoned by a circular of the Protector (August 25) to prepare their contingents. In Austria the intelligence from Spain had aroused among all classes of the population an agitation scarcely ever known before. The decree of June 9, for creating a militia, which was composed of all men capable of bearing arms, between the ages of eighteen to forty-five, and not serving in the army, was everywhere received with applause and was carried into effect with patriotic zeal. The ambassador at Paris, Count Metternich, sent advice to proceed with the preparations and to be ready at any moment for a declaration of war, yet to avoid everything that could precipitate a collision. To the demand of Napoleon that the measures adopted should be revoked, Stadion returned an evasive reply and continued without interruption preparations for war.

The news respecting Baylen, Cintra, and the flight of la Romana from the Danish islands to join his countrymen, was received in Prussia with still greater warmth. The conclusion had been long firmly fixed in the circles of the patriots, to break the yoke of foreign tyranny by an armed rising of the people. The French and their emperor did not suspect how quietly men were laboring to prepare for them a second Spain in North Germany. In spite of all vigilance the arming of the people had already commenced in many places; a net-work of secret communications extended from the parts of the country that remained Prussian into the provinces that had been rent off; emissaries went through the land and invited the people to expel the French. In the Mark of Brandenburg committees were formed, which, supported by provincial councillors and landed proprietors, were busied in distributing arms among the people. The chief place appointed for the junction of the former military was Silesia; it was estimated that there 50,000 well-approved soldiers were prepared for any eventuality. These sentiments extended even into the higher classes. Blücher sent a confidant to the king,

in order to summon him to action. The danger appeared to be nearer and greater, because the adjustment with France, after a year of negotiations, had not advanced one step. Should it really come to a war between Napoleon and Austria, Prussia would inevitably be compelled to take part in it; in July, Götzen, under pretence of taking the baths, repaired to Cudowa, with the secret design in event of war of assuming the chief command of the troops in the Silesian fortresses. Even Stein, in these days (August 11) in a "Description of the Situation of Europe," expressed his opinion that Prussia needed the alliance with France only as a cloak to conceal its preparations for an entire separation, and then war should be waged by Germans for the freedom of Germany. Gneisenau pointed strongly to the superior wisdom of renewing the contest for honor and independence rather than to wait upon the decision of an infamous tyrant; Scharnhorst, Boyen, and Grolman agreed with him that the hour had come when all should be put at stake. These were sentiments to which King Frederick William was not insensible, yet he was too much dominated by recollections of the last war to share the faith of hot-blooded patriots in the willingness of the people for self-sacrifice; there remained in his mind as the indispensable condition for incurring the risk of a conflict with Napoleon, the assurance that he should undertake it in league with Russia, and of this condition the very opposite appeared.

When Napoleon now saw himself compelled to withdraw his troops from the Oder in order to be able to suppress the rising of the people beyond the Pyrenees, the double game with which he had hitherto deceived the Emperor Alexander could no longer be continued. For Napoleon had need of him in order to hold the sword of Austria in the scabbard until the Spanish affair could be so far arranged as to enable him to do justice upon this state also. He invited his ally to a new interview and at the same time made his evacuation of Prussia, which was rendered necessary by circumstances, of use at St. Petersburg as a proof of his desire to please Alexander. Thus the czar held the destiny of Europe in his hand. But he believed that he could not yet dispense with the friendship of Napoleon, if he wished to secure the possession of Finland and of the Danubian principalities. He besought the Emperor Francis not to press matters to the extremity of a war with France; he protested to Major Schöler that nothing was further from him than a separation from Napoleon; since for years to come war with France had no probability of success, nothing remained but to connect himself wholly with her and to deprive Napoleon of all ground of complaint. Together with this, there was indicated to the King of Prussia the line

to be pursued by him. Blücher was urged, for every reason in the world, to remain quiet; the critical moment had not yet arrived, and Prince William received the counsel, in view of the evacuation of the Prussian territory, to propose a treaty offensive and defensive, and an auxiliary corps of 40,000 men. Napoleon wished indeed to come to terms with Prussia before he should meet with Alexander, but the evacuation was to be dearly paid for. The draft of the treaty laid before the prince simply annulled once more the agreement with Daru, which Stein had secured with such labor. The same sum of 154,000,000 was demanded as the year before, together with the since accruing revenues of the state, and the grant of longer terms of payment were most emphatically refused; the extreme limit of the Prussian army for the next ten years was placed at 42,000 men, and the formation of a militia or the arming of the population prohibited. The fortresses of Glogau, Stettin, and Küstrin were to remain as security, garrisoned by 10,000 Frenchmen, until the discharge of the debt; Prussian troops were not to venture to approach the same within a day's march; to the French were given up seven military and commercial roads through the Prussian territory; in the event of a war with Austria, Prussia was to furnish 8000, later 12,000, auxiliary troops. Oppressive as were these conditions, yet Prince William believed that he had now at least reached a conclusion, when suddenly Napoleon again rejected all these arrangements. An incident had occurred which paralyzed all opposition and placed Napoleon in a position simply to dictate the treaty. Stein had entrusted a letter addressed to Prince Wittgenstein to the Assessor Koppe, who was repairing to the sea-baths at Dobberan by the way of Berlin. It was betrayed to the French military authorities at Berlin, by whom is not known, that the traveler was bearing important papers about him; he was seized on the road to Tegel by order of Soult, robbed of his despatches, and taken prisoner. A few days afterward the *Moniteur* published Stein's letter, accompanied with the severest comments. On September 8, Prince William signed the proposed treaty with the modified sum of 140,000,000; on the other hand, he was required to accept an additional clause which obligated the king to dismiss from his service all subjects of the provinces ceded by the Treaty of Tilsit. Napoleon believed that he had thereby struck at Stein, whom he supposed to be a Westphalian.

Thus a new treaty came in place of that made at Tilsit, as if Prussia had been beaten in a new war. At the first glance, the king thought it impossible to confirm such a treaty; he refused to accept the resignation of Stein, which the minister desired in order not to increase embar-

rassments by remaining longer in office. When, however, the Emperor Alexander, on his journey through Königsberg, had again counselled him the utmost possible submission and adhesion to the French interests, to which he himself was willing to continue faithful, he subscribed on September 29, but at the same time invited the interposition of the czar for the purpose of obtaining a modification of the treaty. It was by no means a matter of indifference to Alexander that Napoleon should longer occupy the Oder, and possess the right to push forward his troops at his pleasure over Prussian territory up to the frontiers of Russia.

The meeting of the two emperors (Fig. 22) took place at Erfurt between September 27 and October 14 (1808); on October 6 and 7 the scene of the festivities was transferred to Weimar. All the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine were obliged either to be present in person or to be represented by their heirs. Prussia was represented by Prince William; the Emperor Francis had refused the participation exacted of him, and sent only General Vincent, who was accounted one of themselves by the men of the rising in Germany. Napoleon played the host as if in his own house, and the great tragedian, Talma, was summoned by him "to play before a parterre of kings." The whole had an affected, theatrical coloring. In many of the arrangements there was betrayed a pervading desire for self-glorification and for the mockery of others, which even outweighed considerations of prudence. The review which he gave in honor of the regiments returning home from the East, and the marks of distinction in connection with it conferred for deeds of valor during the engagements with the Russians, were a great offence to Alexander, before whose eyes the review took place, and Prince William was insulted by an invitation to a hare-hunt upon the battlefield of Jena. In remarkable contrast to the want of regard which he daily manifested to sovereign princes was the distinction with which he treated the heroes of German literature. On October 2, Goethe was invited to an audience; the emperor discoursed with him upon tragic poetry and criticised the sorrows of Werther; with the aged Wieland he spoke of Tacitus and Christ.

While the two emperors outwardly exhibited the greatest intimacy, and appeared to commit disagreeable affairs to their ministers, Alexander, in truth, was filled with the deepest distrust of his ally. The man who sought most eagerly to confirm him in his resistance to Napoleon's plans was none other than Talleyrand. This sharp-sighted politician perceived that a government which depended only upon success in hazardous foreign enterprises cannot last; he began to separate the cause of France from that of Napoleon; the interest of the former in his opinion demanded that




FIG. 22.—From the meeting of Napoleon and Alexander I, at Erfurt, September 27, October 11, 1808; reception of the Austrian ambassador, Baron von Vincent. (Versailles, Historical Gallery.)

the powers still capable of opposition should act together in order to establish a barrier to Napoleon's insatiable ambition. With the view of frustrating the arrangements which Alexander and Napoleon might devise with regard to a partition of Turkey, he had sought to induce the Emperor Francis to make his personal appearance at Erfurt. Meanwhile, not the partition of Turkey, but simply its postponement, was that which Napoleon endeavored to render agreeable to his ally; he desired the acquisition of the Danubian principalities by Russia to be delayed until having finished with Spain he could wrest from Alexander again the price of the Erfurt Treaty, and furthermore by means of noisy peace negotiations with England could shake the confidence of the Spaniards with regard to English assistance. But Alexander penetrated his purpose and thwarted the delay by his No. By the treaty concluded between them on October 12, the Tilsit alliance was renewed and confirmed; they pledged each other to make peace with their common enemies only in common, and joint negotiations were to be opened with England on the basis of the existing state of possession. An article to be kept secret, until the consent of this power, promised Russia the Danubian principalities, yet did not require France to bring any aid to secure the acquisition. The secret article in the Treaty of Tilsit concerning the partition of European Turkey was abrogated. On the same day the two sovereigns addressed a letter to the King of England inviting him to negotiations with a view to a general peace. If Napoleon hoped to secure, by associating the Emperor Alexander with himself, what he had not hitherto obtained, a personal reply from King George, this object was still unattained; there came only separate answers to the czar and to Champagny, the French minister, and the British demand that all of England's allies, the King of Naples, Portugal, Sweden, and even Spain must be invited to participate, was equivalent to an unconditional refusal.

The fresh confirmation of his alliance with Napoleon determined Alexander's course toward his German neighbors. To General Vincent he protested that Austria had no truer friend than himself, but he proceeded to hold her back from war until he should have secured his conquests on the Danube. To strengthen the inclination of the Vienna court to peace, Napoleon also gave to General Vincent a threatening letter for the Emperor Francis. In like manner Alexander wished to oblige Prussia to maintain peace as long as he remained Napoleon's ally. Hence the lukewarmness with which he had supported at Erfurt the interests of the Prussian king. Left by Alexander without support, it remained for Count Goltz, who had been summoned to take the place of Stein, to deliver the ratification of the September treaty (October 8).

The solitary modification which Alexander effected for Prussia consisted in a reduction of 20,000,000 francs in the contribution; these were the same 20,000,000 which Saxony had previously paid to Napoleon for permission to confiscate Prussian property in the duchy of Warsaw. Moreover, on account of this reduction, he released himself from the proviso contained in the Treaty of Tilsit, in pursuance of which Prussia, in the event of a union of Hanover with Westphalia, should receive an enlargement of territory on the left bank of the Elbe to the extent of three or four hundred thousand souls.


Until now the Prussian patriots had held fast to the hope of a conflict. Even on October 6, Götzen, hardly without the king's previous knowledge, had a secret meeting at the Otterdorf mill in Braunschweig with Count Bubna, adjutant-general of the Archduke Charles, to whom he gave the assurance that on the first successful issue of the Austrian arms against Napoleon Prussia would take part with the same. The certainty that Austria would remain quiet at once put an end to all thoughts of war in Prussia. With the September treaty also there was only a renewal of the experience that it was to be observed on the part of the Prussians but not by Napoleon. Davout was constantly raising new difficulties; he required the payment of interest on the remainder of the war debt, which was equivalent to increasing it to the amount of 10,000,000 francs; to free the land from the French Goltz consented to this also. After 120,000,000 francs had been delivered to them in exchange and obligations, finally, on December 5, the French army evacuated Prussian soil with the exception of the fortresses on the Oder; on the 10th, Schill, at the head of his regiment of hussars, was the first to make his entrance into the liberated capital. The amount really obtained by France was far greater than a billion of francs;¹ but even this sum was exceeded by the actual losses. For, in addition to them, Prussia had to pay out, apart from expenses for the French garrisons in the three fortresses, 130,000,000 francs for costs of the war together with interest, and the difficulty of making such payments was greater than the amount in itself would indicate, since the contributions had drained the country of cash, robbed the exchange and destroyed credit. The friendly relations now resumed rendered it impossible for Stein to remain in office. Davout had threatened that, notwithstanding the treaty, the evacuation of the country should not be carried into effect, if Stein had not retired by the end of November; the machinations of his feudal opponents,

¹ The proof of this fact was adduced by Dr. Max Duncker, in 1871, when the French protested that the war indemnity of five billions demanded by Germany at the close of the Franco-Prussian war of that year was an impossible sum.

which, moreover, were wholly without influence upon the decisions of the king, were not, therefore, needed in order to displace him. But in spite of his retirement he continued in a position to assist the king further with his counsels, and Goltz proposed that Stein remain somewhere in the vicinity of Königsberg, whence he might, subsequently as before, participate in managing affairs of state; and Stein also conceived Napoleon to be so tasked by the Spanish war that he would not further concern himself about him, and thought without any designated office to remain a member of the state council. But to the king it was evident at once that such an arrangement could only strengthen the suspicions of Napoleon; and Hardenberg, who, on a journey through Königsberg, as if casually, had an interview with the king and queen, emphasized the necessity of Stein's removal and also of the formation of a ministry in agreement with Stein's scheme, which had not yet been carried out. On November 24, Stein received the dismissal which he had asked, and on the same day the king completed the plan of organization outlined by Stein. The purpose of the minister, on his departure, formally to publish in a proclamation to the Prussian people the principles of his work of reform, remained unfulfilled on account of the opposition of Altenstein and others, who, however, befriended his measures. On the other hand, his last step before his departure (December 15) was the subscribing of a circular composed by Schön to the ministers and members of the state council, in which thoughts favoring the carrying out of the reform were once more brought together. The last hope that Stein, even without official position, could be made useful by counsel and act to the Prussian state was frustrated by the suspicion of Napoleon, who saw fit after the evacuation of the country was completed to affright the adherents of the fallen minister. In a decree issued in Madrid (December 16) he denounced "a certain Stein, who has sought to cause disorder in Germany," as an enemy of France and of the Confederation of the Rhine, and declared his property situated in French or Confederate territory as confiscated. It was a characteristic spectacle, the world's dictator entering into a contest, and with such weapons, with a solitary, defenceless man. "God guard your excellency," wrote Gneisenau to the outlaw, "and cause you to see happy days. All noble hearts are by your proscription still more firmly bound to you. Napoleon could do nothing more adapted to secure your wider celebrity. Formerly you belonged to our state only, now to the whole civilized world." Stein found a refuge in Bohemia. (PLATE IV.).

At the moment of Stein's dismissal the prospects were very doubt-

PLATE IV.



Bronze Monument of Baron vom Stein at Berlin.

By Friedrich Hermann Schievelbein (1817-1867) and Hugo Hagen (died 1871).

History of All Nations, Vol. XVII., page 109.

PLATE V.



Alessandro Primo
Imperatore di Russia



Elisabetta e Alessierna
Imperatrice di Russia

Emperor Alexander I. of Russia and his wife Elizabeth.

After a copper-plate engraving by Antoine Conte; original drawing by L. de Saint-Aubin.

History of All Nations, Vol. XVII., page 107.

ful of his work of reform, since as yet not one of his projects was matured; his adversaries rejoiced that, as General York expressed it, after a fool-head was trampled down, the rest of the viper brood were slain in their own poison. But this did not come to pass. The ministry which succeeded him consisted of friends of reform,—Altenstein for finance, Count Dohna-Schlobitten for the interior, Beyme instead of von Schrötter (proposed by Stein) for justice. The foreign policy of Prussia remained unchanged by Stein's departure. On the day of his leaving, Goltz imparted to Hrubi, representative of Austria, the Treaty of September 8, inclusive of the secret article in it, making full disclosures of the course to be followed on the part of Prussia: should the military condition of the state prevent the king at the beginning of the war from separating himself immediately from France, on the first favorable opportunity he would unite his forces to those of Austria.

On the return journey from Erfurt, Alexander had invited the King and Queen of Prussia to visit St. Petersburg. Stein, Scharnhorst, and others had counselled to decline the invitation, since it was presupposed that Alexander would bend every effort to hold the king to the paths of Russian policy. The king complied with a second invitation in January, 1809. With a view to the political negotiations to which this journey would necessarily give occasion, Goltz developed in writing the questions of Prussian policy. He declared himself with decision in favor of Prussia allying herself with whatever power should first begin war against Napoleon; the army was to be prepared for war, and negotiations with other powers were to be entered into. In order to obtain certainty with regard to the purposes of the court of Vienna, the king, of his own motion, sent Major von Goltz thither. Alexander, on the contrary, who, by a splendid reception, appeared desirous of compensating his guests for the want of faith at Erfurt, sought to prevent the junction of Prussia with Austria; he did not share at all the thoughts of the king against transferring his residence to Berlin; he also informed his friend that he was secretly pledged to support Napoleon with 150,000 men if attacked by Austria. Frederick William returned home greatly cast down, but resolved on no consideration to participate in a war against Austria; he rather gave orders to prepare secretly in order, if necessary, to bring aid to that state. Contrary to Napoleon's will, contrary to Alexander's (PLATE V.) advice, he purposed to await at Königsberg the further development of affairs.

When the day of deliverance should come, who could say? That it would come, must come, such was the unshaken hope of the truest and

best, which all friends of Germany cherished in common, however much they might otherwise be divided in opinion. They knew that the unnatural structure of Bonaparte's world-empire could not endure, but the trial was before them of seeing that dominion rise to a greatness yet more gigantic.

CHAPTER III.

NAPOLEON AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER.

FOR the moment, Napoleon's aim was reached by means of the interviews at Erfurt; the continued friendship of Alexander was a pledge of the peaceful action of Austria and Prussia, so that nothing detained him from hastening across the Pyrenees, in order to restore in that region the lost glory of the arms of France. The problem did not appear difficult to him; his military perception decided with entire justice that the united Spanish troops were not able to defeat 25,000 French placed in a judicious position. And now, instead of the fresh levies who had proved themselves so inadequate in that country, he threw into it 150,000 choice troops, who, under his personal leadership and that of his best marshals, would quickly crush out the insolent insurrection. People of Holland, of the Rhine Confederation, and Poles and Italians were summoned to join the great expedition which was to bring back King Joseph to his capital; the gap thus created was filled by an extraordinary conscription of 160,000 men, and this levy not only anticipated the year next succeeding, but also comprehended the past year.

The Spaniards opposed to this powerful activity of their enemy nothing but sullen quarrels, perverse regulations, pompous solemnities, and blind confidence of victory. The absolute want of any concern for popular welfare and development had removed far from this people alike the power which culture bestows and the weakness which it engenders. In them the moral motives of love of country, of the sentiment of nationality, of truth and joyous self-sacrifice, were not operative; but the dominant influences were hatred and revenge, fanaticism and avarice. These proud Spaniards, who still deemed themselves the dominant power of the age of Charles V., punished counsels of prudence as treason, and the personal interests which burst forth were everywhere in conflict with the common weal. The power, which by a violent blow from without was struck from the hand of the few, was caught up by the many. Favored by the proud particularism of the provinces and cities, numerous juntas were formed, and all were again split into two parties, of which the one, consisting of prelates, grandees, and magistrates, would have nothing but the restoration

of the old condition of things, while the other and younger party were striving for progress. The junta of Seville assumed the title of supreme governing junta of Spain and the Indies, but the internal wrangles, political and personal, with which it was consumed, prevented it from attaining general recognition. To the great horror of the Bourbon families, the thought emerged, in the universal confusion, of calling the Archduke Charles to the Spanish throne ; Prince Leopold of Sicily, and somewhat later, Duke Louis Philippe of Orleans, consort of a Neapolitan princess, and brother-in-law of Ferdinand, presented themselves with covetous wishes and proposals, but were immediately instructed by the English to withdraw. Then was effected, not till after protracted negotiations, the appointment of a central junta consisting of thirty-five members, but on account of its numbers this body soon became incompetent to exercise a uniform power of governing ; furthermore, it was split into two parties, an aristocratic-bureaucratie, led by the aged Florida-Blanca, and a party of progress, under Jovellanos. Since, moreover, the members were bound by the instructions of their juntas, and a hot rivalry broke out with the Council of Castile, the highest tribunal of the kingdom, it came to pass that very few of the commands and decrees of the central junta were executed. In such a condition did the Spanish people enter into a contest, which should have demanded the intensest effort and the strongest union of all their forces under an acknowledged authority. Instead of this, every one of the provincial juntas considered only in what way it might confirm and enlarge its power. To strengthen and form the army, nothing of moment was done. Since no army leader was willing to serve under another, there was no commander-in-chief, and the supreme command was entrusted to a council of war.

It thus happened that the Spaniards, to the 255,000 men whom Napoleon led against them, opposed a force far from equal to his, and by his masterly, well-considered operations they were completely overpowered in the open field. On November 10, the emperor opened the campaign by an attack upon the left wing of the Spaniards commanded by Blake, whose position extended from the sources of the Ebro into Aragon. In the mountains near Espinosa, on the frontier between Santander and Old Castile, the undisciplined squadrons were so badly beaten by Marshal Victor that after the loss of their baggage and artillery they completely disappeared. At the same time Soult threw himself upon a second army at Burgos, under Count Belveder, gained possession of the city and inflicted upon it a fearful chastisement. The Spanish left wing was annihilated before news of the assault was brought to Castaños and Palafox on the right ; their troops were on the 23d scattered to the winds by

Lannes at Tudela. Every day was marked by a new French victory; the plains of Old Castile and Leon were overrun by the imperial horsemen. While Soult undertook the reduction of Asturias, Monecy the investment of Saragossa, and Saint-Cyr the subjugation of Catalonia, Napoleon himself, at the head of 40,000 men, stormed the almost impregnable pass of Somosierra, and on December 4 made his entrance into Madrid. Less than four weeks had sufficed to disperse the Spanish army.

In the assistance of England alone there appeared now to be deliverance for the Spaniards. But the proceedings of the British cabinet in reference to the peninsula were scarcely wiser than those of the juntas. Without listening to Wellesley's counsels, they gave money and arms lavishly into the hands of bodies of so doubtful a character as the junta of Seville, and were niggardly in regard to it when the question came up as to sending an army to Spain. Not till public opinion in England was expressed with ever increasing severity against the incomprehensible capitulation at Cintra, was a new expedition of 10,000 men dispatched under General Sir John Moore. By union with the troops stationed in Portugal Moore had at his disposal a force of 35,000 men, but, deceived by the systematic falsehoods of the juntas, he had as little conception of the immense superiority of the French, as of the complete breaking up of the Spanish army. Only thus can be explained the change in his plan of turning to the south in order to accomplish, if possible, an effective reorganization of that army behind the Sierra Morena, for the bold decision to hasten to the assistance of the capital, of whose fall he as yet knew nothing. He was, indeed, informed by an intercepted dispatch, to some extent, with regard to the state of matters, but, instead of turning about, his own daring, as well as the entreaty of the Spaniards, induced him to move against Soult, who was marching upon Palencia, in order to fight him separately, and thus to strengthen the operations of the Spaniards, and draw the enemy from the south. In fact, Napoleon desisted from his plans against the south and against Portugal, but at the same time he concentrated an overwhelming force to resist this new adversary. Only a fearful storm that delayed his movements saved the British from being surrounded on all sides. On January 11, 1809, Moore fortunately reached the heights of Corunna, but in vain did he watch for the rescuing fleet; contrary winds had detained it in the harbor of Vigo. Fortunately for him, Soult, who was in pursuit, delayed his assault till the 16th. With masterly persistence Moore held his ground, repulsed successfully all the enemy's charges and completed the embarkation of his men upon the ships that had arrived in the interval; he himself was mortally wounded by a cannon-ball.

The whole of Spain as far as the Sierra Morena, with only the exception of Saragossa and a part of Galicia, was now lying at the feet of the victor. Napoleon soon saw that the obstacles that would hinder the establishment of his authority were the nobility and the clergy, and he at once took measures to reduce the power of both. After the capture of Madrid, he announced in a series of decrees the suppression of the Council of the Indies and of the Inquisition, the reduction of the number of cloisters to one-third, the abolition of feudal rights, and the removal of customs barriers between the provinces. Several of the grandees who had remained faithful to the national cause were deported to France, and he ordered his brother, as the most certain means of gaining the respect of his subjects, to hang a number of the disaffected. Joseph had long been weary of being obliged to play the part of a theatrical king without any authority of his own, and of being utterly dependent upon the assistance of his brother. His gentle and good-natured disposition revolted at a system of compulsion which rendered him an object of hatred and abhorrence to his people. He longed to go back to Naples. But to the command of the all-powerful no resistance could be offered; he must remain, so that Napoleon should not be constrained to acknowledge a mistake. Only he was not permitted to enter Madrid again until all the families and public corporations had sworn and subscribed fidelity to him, and all the other cities had transmitted to the emperor the protocol of their oaths of allegiance. A new victory gained at Tarancón, on January 13, by Marshal Victor, solemnized the restoration of Joseph. In truth, at this time, there was the glimmering of a hope of reconciliation between him and his people. Doubting with regard to the deliverance of their country by force of arms, many distinguished men prevailed upon themselves to yield to the fortune of France and to accept the foreign ruler, since only through him could peace be secured and their condition improved. With their aid the government was able to commence an orderly activity. Nevertheless, this hope also dwindled away. If these men connected themselves with Joseph, they remained as warmly devoted to their native land as any one of those who adhered to the "idolized" Ferdinand. Wherever the interests of Spain clashed with those of Napoleon, these patriots espoused the former, and thus a successful coöperation of the two became impossible.

This was also of necessity frustrated by the temper of the people, who passionately repelled all reconciliation. Since the clergy, menaced in their supremacy, had stamped the war against Napoleon as a crusade, the matter in question involved not merely the freedom of the Spanish

soil and the honor of the Spanish name, but also the maintenance of faith and of religion. So many defeats had no power to affect this fanaticism, and, even if hope had fallen, it raised itself up again upon the heroic resistance offered by Saragossa. Palafox had made good use of the time of rest. The entire city had been transformed into a network of defensive works, and in the public places gibbets were erected for any one who spoke of surrender. On December 26, Junot completed the investment of the city, but on this occasion also the French repeated the mistake of undertaking the siege with too weak forces. Not till Lannes took command was their failing confidence restored. On January 26, the storming began, but not even when the French, after a spirited conflict, had pressed into the city was the resistance impaired; every house, every story, every chamber, was obliged to be carried by mining and by assault. After fourteen days the French had taken but two or three streets. The city finally capitulated on February 20, after more than half of its 100,000 inhabitants had been killed by the sword, by hunger, and by pestilence. In this people the French encountered a resistance in presence of whose fearfulness all the hardships and horrors of earlier wars disappeared; in place of the contest in the open field, the guerilla appeared. The more pitilessly the French waged the war by devastation, the greater became the number of those who were driven by hunger and revenge among these *partidas*, or armed bands, and the oftener the Spanish armies were beaten, the more completely were the ranks of these men filled with dispersed soldiers, under the lead of a monk, a smuggler, a peasant, or an officer. For this desultory warfare the Spaniards developed an uncommon aptitude. The district between Tudela and Pamplona was rendered insecure by young Mina, "the student." After the central junta had conceived the happy thought of formally authorizing the organization of such guerillas, they became in the highest degree formidable to the invading troops. They cut off their communications, destroyed their depots, and fell upon small detachments. Woe to the tired soldiers, sick or wounded, who lagged behind; they were slain without mercy by the blows of these partisans. Moreover, the remaining population participated in this savage warfare; every cloister was a hiding-place, a scouting-post, a depot of arms; in every village assassination lurked about the sleepers, at the hands of women, old men, and children, and every well threatened poison. The impossibility of observing public law toward enemies who themselves grossly violated it, lent to the war a character of ferocity that constantly increased.

After the English escaped him, Napoleon very soon became weary

of a war in which no shining laurels were to be gathered and no deeds could be performed to astonish the world. The more readily did he resume plans of former years against Austria, which had been only postponed, her preparations meantime assuming a form that was more and more threatening. Austria must first be brought low before the last great decisive contest for supremacy on the continent, that with Russia, could be commenced. On January 17, 1809, he threw himself upon his horse at Valladolid, and was at Paris on the 22d. On the same day there went forth to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine a demand to get ready their contingents. Russia was reminded to perform her engagements and Prussia was warned that an immediate declaration of war would follow any attempt to augment her army above the prescribed number of 42,000 men. The official press labored to create a public opinion favorable to the new passage at arms, for the people, tired of the endlessly increasing requisitions, looked upon them with undisguised disapproval and with bitter sighs. Once more the levy anticipated the coming year and also comprehended the two last. In view of such sacrifices even warlike glory lost its charm. There was a decided falling off in the revenues of the state; the budget of 1808 showed, inclusive of previous arrearages, a deficit of 100,000,000. Persons, like Talleyrand and Fouché, who kept themselves so informed as not to be surprised by passing events, no longer feared the disfavor of the emperor, for they began to doubt the permanence of his power. But to a servitude so complete had this man of might subjugated the people, that thus far no indications of a diminution of his power had become visible.

That Napoleon would attempt an assault upon Austria, as soon as the favorable moment seemed to him to have arrived, Stadion was more firmly persuaded than ever, and for this reason was resolved to anticipate him. The two articles in the Erfurt treaty which concerned Austria were known at Vienna. Metternich had also come to the conclusion that it was not possible for any power, that stood in Napoleon's way, to escape by means of his friendship. Stadion summoned him to Vienna, and it was he, as it appears, who, in the beginning of December, 1808, gave to pending deliberations a decision in favor of war. From his representations, for which he was in part indebted to Talleyrand, it was made manifest that at Erfurt wide-reaching plans adverse to Austria had in fact been discussed, and only Talleyrand and Tolstoi had withheld the czar from entering more deeply into them. Of special weight was the assurance of Metternich that, as long as the war in Spain divided his forces, Napoleon would have not more than 200,000 men available

against Austria. In fact, he had more than twice this number. The effort was again made to detach the Emperor Alexander from the French alliance; in February, 1809, Prince Schwarzenberg went to St. Petersburg. On the part of the empress-mother, the Grand Duke Constantine, and other influential persons, he met with earnest support, but the emperor roundly declared to him that since, doubtless, Austria would be the assailing party, he should be obliged to fulfil his pledges. The real ground was doubtless different: his desire to obtain the Danubian principalities kept him attached to Napoleon. But he assured Schwarzenberg that all care should be taken not to deal heavy blows on Austria, the advance of the Russian troops should be delayed as long as practicable, and every act of hostility that was possible should be avoided.

With Prussia also secret negotiations were held. Since, however, the king had brought with him from St. Petersburg the certainty that Russia would not remain neutral, he renounced for the present all warlike designs. In vain did Altenstein remind him that the critical time was not distant when the contribution yet in arrears could not be obtained and then they must be subject to Napoleon at discretion, that it would be better to devote the money to be raised to a spirited increase of the means for the restoration of the throne than to extort the last farthing to support a war against their own people. Schamhorst vainly pledged himself that in six weeks 70,000 tried and serviceable troops would rise, were the king impelled by the spirit of his subjects to go forward. But the king replied, "Without Russia I can do nothing." When Stadion perceived this, he said he should be satisfied, if Prussia, instead of entering into action at the beginning of the struggle, were to stand in readiness to declare for Austria after the opening of the campaign. Little as that was, it yet signified a great advance, that the old division and jealousy, which so long had followed both states to their great loss, seemed to give place to an honorable, upright understanding. More fortunate were Stadion's efforts in two other places. At Constantinople the Austrian policy beat the French out of the field, and accomplished the reconciliation of the Porte with England; on January 5, the two made peace. Then a coalition was again formed with the latter, and it was to be expected that England would supply money and arms.

The allies, however, upon whom Stadion in the impending conflict counted the most, were not cabinets, but the patriotic sympathies of the peoples from the Alps to the sea and the universal hatred of the Napoleonic despotism. From the first, he saw in the war at hand a German war, and it was such indeed. Whatever in Germany, in the north as in

the Rhenish Confederation, had preserved an earnest feeling for the honor and independence of the nation, united itself in spirit to Austria and was prepared to act as the opportunity should offer. Support was found also in all lovers of the old order, in all who abhorred the Revolution, and in all faithful Catholics, who were indignant at the treatment to which the pope had been subjected by Napoleon. In the states of the Confederation of the Rhine, aversion to foreign rule was expressed more strongly than ever, and nowhere more strongly than in Bavaria. The Crown Prince Louis, who dreaded for himself the fate of the Prince of Asturias, carried on secret negotiations with Stadion, and promised, after the first successful battle, to go over to the Austrians. The same hatred of the French was manifested in a part of the Bavarian army, and the men would not suffer themselves to be led to the Spanish shambles; even in Bavaria, something of a national feeling was shown, and still more in Franconia and Swabia. The course of events since the Peace of Tilsit, the conviction of the instability of any condition that depended on Napoleon, and finally the rising of the Spaniards, had impelled men to energetic action. The idol had now become merely a bugbear, and all writers who had hitherto preached France, now became German. The longing to break the tyrant's yoke had become, since 1807, as general among the better elements of the nation as the conviction that the work of liberation could only succeed upon the patriotic mustering of all their united forces.

Moreover, for Austria itself, in Stadion's judgment, the war should become a war of the people. The army reform, which, under the lead of the Archduke Charles, had made important progress, had, above all, the purpose of elevating the spirit of the troops. All brutal treatment of soldiers was prohibited. National sentiment was stimulated by pamphlets and patriotic songs. The best effects resulted. Even here, where prince and people had so long stood estranged and opposed, both became earnestly conscious of the indissoluble character of their connection. The finest emulation and spirit of self-sacrifice were manifested in all classes. Volunteers thronged to the standards; individual private citizens of wealth offered large gifts; the Hungarian diet granted an increase of the army by 20,000 men and a renewed levy for the next three years; the brothers of the emperor exhibited unwearied activity, and a warlike disposition prevailed at court. But confusion and an indistinct, spasmodic management were present, as formerly, in the department of foreign affairs and in the conduct of the war. Austria, young Radetzky declared, in a memoir upon the causes of the continued ill-success of the Austrian arms, has never calculated her internal sys-

tem with reference to war, but always for peace; every outbreak of war appears to shake and menace all branches of the civil administration in their main foundations, since they all, the military department not excepted, seem to have been created to enjoy peace and not to maintain and preserve it. Not merely the political relations of Europe, but also the financial situation of the monarchy, the severe shock to public credit, the depreciation of paper money urged on a rupture. Nothing, said Stadion, impaired resources more surely than to protract indefinitely a defensive position, and since for months all the resources of the monarchy had been drawn upon in order to place the army upon a war footing, the sums available could not at the utmost suffice beyond the opening of the new year.

Everything sustained the hope that the blow could be dealt with the best expectation of success when Napoleon was held fast in Spain. Since pains were no longer taken to mislead the adversary, it was incumbent also to leave him no time. The activity displayed by Stadion was astonishing. The main army, brought up to 194,000 men, was assembled under Archduke Charles in the Danube valley and in Bohemia; to cover Galicia 30,000 men, under the Archduke Ferdinand, appeared to be sufficient in view of the known disposition of the Emperor Alexander; the third army in inner Austria, under the Archduke John, numbered 66,000 men. Yet nothing was ready at the right time; a singular want of cohesion and a lack of skill on the part of the supreme command, as well as of the administration, damaged everything from the very first. Of the due strength of the three armies, only a part was assembled; the Austrian and the Hungarian militia were yet in the first stages of their formation; uniforms and arms were needed, supplies for men and horses; the restoration of the fortifications—a matter of prime importance—was begun only at the last hour; a reorganization of the troops of the line was begun, but not carried through; and with the same zeal with which Stadion pressed forward to actual hostilities, the Archduke Charles was determined not to act till fully prepared. It proved, therefore, that they were not ready to take the offensive at the beginning of March, as originally intended, but had to wait till the end of the month,—a fateful delay, since thereby was lost the possibility of defeating Davout, who was stationed in South Germany, and of breaking up the preparations of the Confederation of the Rhine, then in progress, before the emperor crossed the Rhine with his main force. To this unreadiness as to preparations must be added, also, the lamentable want of harmony at headquarters between the archduke and his quartermaster-general, Meyer, a capable but obstinate soldier; Meyer was

removed, and in his place was put Major-General Prohaska, a man not equal to the position. With this was connected, as a second blunder, the alteration of the original plan of operations: instead of falling upon Davout, who was isolated, with a superior force from Bohemia and taking possession of Ratisbon and Ingolstadt, it was decided to advance into Germany with the main army almost in the same direction as in 1805.

Protracted delays, caused in part by wretched weather and the belated arrival of the columns, marked the first steps of the principal Austrian army. On March 20 it began to move, 110,000 strong, but not till April 10 did it cross the Inn. "The freedom of Europe has fled for shelter beneath your banners;" it was said in an army order of the archduke, "your victories will loosen its chains, and your German brethren, still in the ranks of the enemy, wait for their deliverance." A similar appeal, a brilliant production of Gentz's pen, was addressed by the Austrian commander-in-chief to "the German nation." These words of the archduke remained wholly without effect in South Germany. The King of Bavaria had no thought of placing himself on the side of Austria, and the discontent of the population was quickly suppressed by the progress of events. On April 15, the heads of the Austrian columns reached the Isar, forced the 10,000 Bavarians under Deroy at Landshut to retreat, and took possession of Munich, which was without defence. But this first project was an entire failure. Inadequate knowledge of the position of the enemy and the hereditary evil of an exaggerated system were, it is probable, chiefly to be blamed for the archduke's neglect to throw himself between Davout and Masséna, the former of whom, leaving the Saxons and Poles to cover the country upon the Oder and Vistula, had advanced southward from Thuringia by way of Würzburg and Bayreuth, in order, in conjunction with Oudinot, to hold the enemy in check until the arrival of the emperor, while Masséna was assembling his forces on the Iller. Charles rapidly took possession of the Danube between Ingolstadt and Neustadt, so that it was now still in his power to crush Davout, caught between himself and the corps of Kolowrat and Bellegarde advancing from Bohemia.

Napoleon very clearly apprehended the highly critical situation of his marshal; he consequently gave instructions, in the event of an attack, that the several divisions should be concentrated by retreating upon the Lech. Berthier, on the contrary, in utter opposition to these instructions and in spite of all counter-representations, directed Davout and Oudinot toward Ratisbon; instead, therefore, of uniting the army, he drew it apart in two masses at a considerable distance from each other; instead of

avoiding the conflict, he went forward to meet it. On April 17, Napoleon arrived at Donauwörth. Without delay, in urgent haste he took all measures to repair Berthier's mistakes. He exclaimed to his soldiers: "I come with the swiftness of the lightning. Soldiers, you were about me when the ruler of Austria came to my tent in Moravia. You heard how he besought my mercy, and swore eternal friendship. We conquered him in three wars; to our magnanimity he owes everything; thrice has he perjured himself. Up then! that at sight of us he may recognize his conquerors." The fundamental thought of his arrangements was to hold his left wing, while Masséna should advance with the right. For himself, he repaired to Ingolstadt. In what contrast with this energy were the proceedings of the archduke. On the 18th he had upon the river Abens only 30,000 Bavarian and Würtemberg troops opposed to him, but from fear of Davout he hazarded no attack, and concluded, in order to prevent the junction of the two, to assail the marshal on the road from Ratisbon to Neustadt. Thus, while Napoleon was concentrating his force at one point, Charles withdrew his men from Landshut and proceeded in five marching divisions toward Ratisbon, Kelheim, Neustadt, and Augsburg. At Hausen and Thann the corps of Hohenzollern was forced to retreat. At the same time, the attempt of the corps of Thierry to prevent the junction of the Bavarians with Davout was foiled at Abensberg and Arnshofen; at Pfaffenheim also, the Austrian advance was pressed back by the squadrons of Masséna and Oudinot, now coming forward in force.

This day became decisive for the fate of the whole war. Without an actual battle, by means of merely single engagements with their scattered divisions, the Austrians found themselves reduced from the offensive to the defensive; on the other hand, the French, after they succeeded in uniting their forces, were now able in an imposing manner to assume the offensive in their turn. For this Napoleon made his dispositions at Abensberg. His plan was to break through the thin line which connected the two halves of the Austrian army, extending from the Isar to Ratisbon, commanded by the Archduke Charles and Lieutenant Field-Marshal von Hiller. Should this succeed, the Austrians would be pressed into the angle between the Danube and Isar, and brought into an extremely dangerous position. The nucleus of the attacking column, led by Napoleon in person on the 20th, consisted of Bavarians and Würtembergers. His columns everywhere fell upon only scattered, inadequate divisions, which were driven back; at evening the whole left wing of the Austrians was separated from the main army and retreated to Landshut, against which Masséna, who had reached the Isar at Freising,

at once advanced with his light troops. Only with the greatest difficulty did Hiller succeed in effecting his retreat to the Inn. Napoleon now turned with the entire weight of his army against the archduke, who, still ignorant of the fate of his left wing, was, meantime, kept busy by Davout, and had suffered considerable losses. Finally he prepared to attack Davout at Eckmühl with 70–80,000 men (April 22), when Napoleon struck him on the flank. While the main body of the Austrian army did not even come to a close engagement, the corps of Rosenberg was, after an heroic resistance, overpowered by superior numbers. Fortunately the fleeing troops reached Ratisbon, which three days before had fallen into the hands of the Austrians. On the next morning Charles began the passage of the Danube at the very time when Napoleon was making his arrangements for pressing forward to Vienna; on the cavalry devolved the difficult task of covering the retreat over the bridge and through the town against the pressure of the pursuers, who were in superior force. In the town itself occurred a hot hand-to-hand fight, resulting in the capture of the greater part of the garrison.

The heroism of the troops had fallen a sacrifice to the perplexed indecision of headquarters. Of the 165,000 who had marched out a month before, only 109,000 were now at hand, and two-thirds of the artillery was lost. The situation was nearly the same as after Ulm. Apparently the consciousness of opposing Napoleon in person acted so oppressively upon the archduke that he utterly lost his presence of mind. Not until later was his fault concealed by an alleged epileptic stroke, which is said to have made him unfit for duty on the 23d.

The glory of Napoleon shone forth more brightly than ever. This unbroken success, which for years had attended his arms, lent him a moral ascendancy which doubled his material force. He himself regarded this campaign of five days as his masterpiece. But rarely has his disposition come to the light in such nakedness as here, when he covered the brave enemy with derision and scoffing, and heaped invectives upon their death-defying squadrons. An imperial decree at Ratisbon, dated April 24, inflicted the penalty of confiscation upon the mediatised persons remaining in the Austrian service; a second decree abolished the Teutonic Order within the Confederation of the Rhine and annexed to the crown of Würtemberg the principality of Mergentheim belonging to it.

While the Archduke Charles, in a faint-hearted manner, as in the previous part of the campaign, was making his way through Bohemia, Napoleon pressed forward toward Vienna, in order to thrust himself between the armies of the two archdukes, Charles and John, the union of which was

threatened. The latter, crossing the Alps in snow and tempest, surprised the Viceroy Eugene on the Tagliamento, forced him back, on April 15, at Pordenone, and, on the next day, completely defeated him and drove him toward the Piave and Adige. He was now compelled, by the misfortunes of his brother, to turn about and direct his march toward the Danube instead of Verona. Hiller, occupying an advantageous position at Ebelsberg on the Traun, endeavored, with his 30,000 men, to detain the enemy as long as possible, but Masséna and Bessières (May 3) gave him no time to pass all his forces over the river and burn the bridges. The French at a charging step burst into the town at the same time with the Austrians; only the presence of mind of a few officers and the heroic valor of the troops averted a serious crisis. In a spirited fight in the streets, the burning town was a second time taken by the French, then torn from them again, and in the evening Hiller withdrew with 1400 prisoners and three captured eagles. At Mautern he crossed the Danube on the 8th, so that now the entire body of the main Austrian army stood united on the left bank of the river in sight of Vienna. The evacuation of the capital became necessary; on the 13th the French occupied it, Napoleon himself taking up his headquarters at Schönbrunn. The previous course of the war had filled him with such contempt for his adversary, that he embraced the rash resolution of crossing the river in his sight. Since the Tabor bridge was burnt at this time, he selected the island of Lobau as the place for crossing, it being separated from the left shore only by a small arm. Charles observed from the Bisamberg the passage of the enemy over bridges of boats that had been thrown over both arms of the river, which was greatly swollen; his purpose was not to hinder this movement, but to compel the enemy to expiate his audacity. The archduke's position extended from Stammersdorf to Deutsch-Wagram: Hiller formed the right wing, Rosenberg and the cavalry of Prince Liechtenstein the left, Bellegarde and Hohenzollern the centre, and the grenadiers were stationed at Seiring as a reserve.

Opposite Lobau, about a half-hour distant from each other, the villages of Aspern and Essling are situated, two natural bastions, of which the French took possession on May 20. Before they had fully developed their forces, the attack of the Austrians commenced in the afternoon of the 21st. Aspern was defended by Masséna with great obstinacy against the onset, whose swelling strength was constantly increasing, and Essling by Lannes; a formidable charge by the French cavalry, which threatened to pierce through the Austrian centre between the two villages, was foiled by the cool valor of the infantry; in wild confusion the defeated squadrons rode down their own infantry in their

disconfiture; Hiller and Bellegarde gained possession of Aspern; six times was it taken and lost again, until, with nightfall, it remained in the hands of the Austrians. Against Essling, however, all the attempts of Prince Rosenberg were fruitless.

The Austrians had succeeded, by means of boats set on fire and heavily laden which they sent down the rushing and highly swollen river, in destroying the bridges of boats over its chief arm, but the genius of Napoleon had found means during the night to reduce the disproportion between the combatants; on the morning of the 22d the French were equal, if not superior, to the Austrians. The bloody game of the previous day was renewed: by furious attacks the Austrians strove to seize Essling, the French Aspern, without one or the other succeeding in maintaining complete and undisputed possession of these villages. However, on the second day Napoleon designed to deliver the decisive attack, not here, but against the enemy's centre; this Lannes endeavored to pierce by a formidable charge. Exhausted by the two days' fighting, the Austrian infantry threatened to succumb, when the archduke, banner in hand, placed himself at the head of the waverers, fresh battalions hastened up, and the assailants were repulsed. From this moment Napoleon gave up the battle as lost, and, contrary to his custom, summoned a council of war. The salvation of his army depended on maintaining Essling; the French consequently held fast to this with desperate persistence. Napoleon placed the fate of the army in the hand of Masséna; it was necessary, in order to quiet the growing confusion, to hold the enemy in check until evening, and then in the darkness to effect a retreat. Never was a commission of such difficulty executed with more coolness and perseverance. Masséna himself was among the last to cross over.

Napoleon had paid for his audacity by a loss of more than 7000 killed and 34,000 wounded, while the Austrians reported their loss at 4300 killed and 16,300 wounded. The situation of the French army was desperate. Cramped up as they were on the island of Lobau, without food or ammunition, an attack by the enemy, it seemed, must deliver them over inevitably to captivity. But the two attempts of the Archduke Charles to effect a crossing, first on May 24, and then on May 31, failed.

A powerful impression was produced far and wide by the news of the battle of Aspern and Essling. It was the first great blow that had prostrated the unconquered. All hopes hostile to him were revived anew. In England and in Spain, in Holland and at Rome, in all places, men connected with the day of Aspern the expectation of a

sudden change, and this was especially and immediately the impression in Germany.

As soon as war between France and Austria was no longer a matter of doubt, every effort was made from Königsberg once more to win over the Emperor Alexander to the cause of Germany and of Europe. Secret negotiations were carried on in London and Vienna, and troops placed upon a war footing; even payments of the French war-contribution were suspended. Stadion reckoned positively upon Prussia. The rapid advance of the Archduke Ferdinand through the duchy of Warsaw as far as Thorn had no other object than to prevail upon the king, and in case of need to hurry up Blücher and other commanders even against the king's will. After the taking of Warsaw the archduke communicated to the king that he was charged to deliver up the duchy to him, as soon as he made common cause with Austria. But the king had as yet come to no conclusion, and Ferdinand therefore made his retreat back to Cracow. By the middle of May a great change, however, had occurred at Königsberg. Frederick William had gradually become firmly convinced that Napoleon aimed at the destruction of all the old dynasties. He empowered Count Goltz to conclude a convention with Wessenberg, the Austrian envoy, under the double supposition that the Emperor Francis would guarantee to him the restoration of the lost provinces, and that by holding out he would secure to Prussia time for completing her preparations. Although he well knew that the victory at Aspern was in no way decisive, the Prince of Orange appeared at Charles's headquarters in the last days of May and represented the speedy junction of the Prussian army as a positive prospect. Contrary to expectation, and notwithstanding the pressing advice of the Archduke Charles to meet all the wishes of Prussia, in order to secure her co-operation as speedily as possible, Stadion replied evasively; he wished to avoid tying his hands in advance by inconvenient pledges. Instead of making these, he sent Colonel Steigentesch to Königsberg, to hasten the decision. That which Steigentesch saw, on the way, of warlike preparations, filled him with glad hopes; but he was less satisfied with the disposition of the king, who received him with the bitter inquiry if he was to consider him as an emissary sent to lead his troops, or as an ambassador under the protection of international law; and he showed himself little inclined to the honor of going to ruin with Austria.

The party in Prussia favorable to a rising was indescribably excited. Blücher, who was then stationed at Stargard, was in a state of feverish exaltation. He belonged to those who most clamorously and freely urged the speediest connection with Austria. Impatience and hatred at last

spurned all restraints of prudence and led to independent attempts to cause the popular insurrection. The beginning was made by Colonel von Dörnberg, a Hessian, recently in the Prussian service, who had shared Blücher's fate at Lübeck. After the reduction of the Prussian army he returned to Westphalia with the purpose of quietly fostering the German spirit under the foreign rule, and, in order not to awaken suspicion, took the commission of chief of battalion in the grenadier guards, and then became colonel of chasseurs. With the leaders in Silesia and Königsberg he also continued his connection from his garrison at Marburg. Pursuant to the agreement that was made, the former Prussian officers, von Katt and von Hirschfeld, were to seize by surprise the fortress of Magdeburg, Schill was to effect a rising in Eastern Westphalia, and Dörnberg with his chasseurs was to fall upon King Jerome and make prisoners of him and all the French generals. But Katt's enterprise miscarried. However, the venture was made, since at any hour the command to march out was expected, and since, too, the ferment was too hot to suffer longer delay. The outbreak was therefore set for two days earlier than the time previously appointed. On April 22, the bells in the villages along the Schwalm and Diemel sounded the onset, but the peasants were surprised on account of the time of the outbreak being anticipated. Dörnberg thought himself betrayed; he hastened to Homberg in order to lead the insurgents in person to Cassel, but a volley of grape-shot followed by a charge of cavalry threw the disorderly and partly unarmed men into a tumultuous flight. Dörnberg escaped to Bohemia, and there joined the Duke of Brunswick.

On the intelligence that papers compromising him had fallen into the hands of the Westphalian authorities, a hasty resolution seemed necessary to Major von Schill, if the same suspicion were not to strike him as had fallen upon Minister Stein. On April 28, apparently for ordinary purposes, he departed by the Halle gate at Berlin with his regiment; on the way to Potsdam he called a halt, and in a fiery address announced to his troops his determination to undertake the contest against the shameless conqueror. With loud rejoicings all declared their readiness to follow him, the greater part being persuaded that their leader was acting on a secret understanding with the king, and that they were but the vanguard of the main army. The appearance of an officer, whom the commandant, uneasy on account of Schill's staying out so long, had dispatched after him, only strengthened them in this belief. Thus they went forward to Wittenberg, whose commanding officer allowed them to pass, over the Elbe, through Dessau, Bernburg, and Köthen to Halle, where the small Westphalian garrison was disarmed; an appeal called on brethren lan-



FIG. 23.—Major von Schill. From a lithograph by J. C. Schall, painted by Max Berger.

guishing in the chains of a foreign nation to cast away their fetters. But the unfavorable news from the Danube and of Dörnberg's failure, the delay in the expected rising of the people, and the order, accompanied with severe reproofs, sent from Berlin for his immediate return, destroyed all illusions. A council of war summoned by Schill (Fig. 23) decided, however, although the desperate nature of the situation was not concealed

from it, to go forward, but the leader himself had become undecided with regard to the direction to be taken. He continued, however, to Stendal and then to Arneburg. Meantime, King Jerome had set a price of 10,000 francs on his head, and had sent forth troops to capture him; the King of Prussia also, in an order, condemned emphatically the conduct of Schill, and Napoleon described him as a daring brigand. On May 9 Napoleon announced the formation of an observation corps of 60,000 men under Kellermann, for the protection of the Elbe, toward which the Dutch general, Gratien, was also on the march, in order there to connect with 2000 Danes commanded by General Ewald. In consequence of this, Schill directed his course to the North Sea, seized upon the small fortress of Dömitz, and turned toward Stralsund. General Candras, who, with Mecklenburgers and Poles, blocked the Recknitz passes at Damgarten and Triebsees, was repulsed. With feverish haste Schill proceeded to fortify Stralsund, determined to make of it a second Saragossa. In vain his most trusted officers endeavored to show him the futility of this attempt, the necessity of throwing himself upon Rügen, whither 300 men had already escaped from Rostock, and thence seeking communication with the English fleet. The overtaxing of his powers had thrown him into a kind of intoxication, which hardened him against considerations of reason. On May 31, Gratien and Ewald were before the gates. While the defenders of the town were occupied by feints at other points, the Danes got possession of the Knieper gate. In a desperate struggle Schill sought to collect his men in order to lead them to the harbor, when shortly a shot in the head struck him to the ground. His squadron was overpowered, a part were made prisoners, the remainder, under Lieutenants von Rudorff and von Brünnow, made good their escape from the town.

The action of Schill caused the greatest astonishment among all judicious friends of the fatherland; Blücher now saw no other means of maintaining the royal authority, and of preventing the troops from becoming the sport of an excited populace, than to have the king place himself at the head. But whatever condemnation Schill might have brought upon himself by disobedience and rashness was greatly alleviated in consequence of the merciless severity of the victor. In Brunswick, of the 557 prisoners, 14, who were natives of Westphalia, were shot by order of court-martial; in the same manner eleven of Schill's officers ended their lives on July 17, at Wesel. Those among the prisoners who were in good physical condition were taken to the galleys at Cherbourg and Brest. Schill's severed head was given to Jerome as a trophy.

Frederick William, the son of the unfortunate Duke of Brunswick who fell at Auerstädt, undertook a war of vengeance of a wholly personal kind; he was a man of an irritable, indomitable, and haughty spirit, who hated, in Napoleon, the author at once of public calamities and of those of his own house. He had pledged himself to the Austrian government to raise a corps of 2000 men, at his own cost, with the purpose of enkindling an insurrection in North Germany. Those who survived of Katt's, Dörnberg's, and Schill's enterprises, entered his "legion of vengeance." On the day of the battle of Aspern the duke crossed the Bohemian-Saxon frontier, seized Zittau, and, in a proclamation, called upon all men of German stock to take up arms in the struggle for the independence of the fatherland. But, notwithstanding the hostile feeling toward the French that prevailed in Saxony also, there was as yet no ground here for a popular rising, and probably this country would have remained unmolested, had not the Saxon Colonel Thielmann not only provoked the Brunswickers by a sudden attack from Zittau, but also challenged the Austrians by imprudent railleries. He first brought it to pass that General Am Ende, with a corps consisting mostly of militia, in conjunction with the duke, invaded Saxony and took possession of Dresden. At the same time, a second Austrian corps, under General Radiwojewich, directed its march toward Bayreuth and Nuremberg; the former adjutant of Prince Louis Ferdinand, Major Karl von Nostitz, organized a Franconio-Austrian Legion; Mergentheim was attacked by peasants, the French garrison disarmed, and a committee of insurrection formed. But all these uprisings, begun without plan and independently, remained without issue. Napoleon, however, did not at all underestimate the danger which threatened him from these commotions. The available troops in North Germany he placed under Junot's supreme command; he was first, in conjunction with the Dutch and Westphalians led by Jerome, to press back Radiwojewich and then to put an end to the Austro-Brunswick invasion of Saxony. With the grand air of a conqueror, Jerome entered into ungarrisoned Leipsic, and in his order of the day parodied the bulletins of his brother. Into the sluggish course of Austrian operations, meanwhile, a fresher spirit had come with the arrival of the energetic and able Field-Marshal Kienmayer, who replaced Am Ende. He at once discontinued the retreat, and, on June 28, at Marbach drove back the Westphalians, under d'Albignac, and then hastened to the Bavarian frontier, in order to reinforce Radiwojewich, who was menaced by Junot with a superior force. But Jerome, instead of following up Kienmayer in force and getting him between himself and Junot, found it more comfortable to make a tri-

umphal entrance into Dresden. While Kienmayer had settled with Junot alone, and Jerome, recovering his wits, was moving forward to Schleiz, he there escaped the danger of being assailed rudely by the Brunswick force only by a rapid retreat to Erfurt, and then, on the first intelligence of the truce, he turned back to the enjoyment of his court at Cassel.

The Germans, as was made manifest by these unsuccessful insurrections, were no Spaniards; Germany was not the soil for guerillas. With entirely different power the war of the people was proclaimed, in which the Tyrolese arose against the rule of the foreigner. This population of peasants and shepherds, who, in their mountain-girt valleys, had preserved with tenacious constancy their ancient manners and constitution, formed the most decided contrast imaginable to the novelty-seeking Bavarian government, under which, by the Peace of Presburg, it had been placed. Beside all this, Montgelas made the blunder of putting magistrates in the country who were unacquainted with it, and to whom it seemed a prison. Hardly had the state begun to interfere with church affairs in the manner of the Emperor Joseph, when the cry of alarm resounded universally, that the wolf was coming down upon the altar and the community. The pastors, themselves peasants and ignorant as their class, but true and devoted to their office, became the warmest opposers of the new condition; in the year 1805 the Tyrol numbered not less than 4024 clergy. Aversion to a foreign government increased the pain caused by separation from Austria. Those who, in the year 1806, chose to depart thence, maintained, unobserved by Bavarian officials, an unbroken intercourse with the disaffected at home. Before all others, on the Archduke John, the favorite of the mountain-region, the hopes of the faithful were placed; in his apartments the plan for the liberation of the Tyrol was elaborated, and its execution committed to Baron Hor-mayr, confidant of the archduke. To the small number of the initiated belonged Andreas Hofer, inn-keeper at Sand in the Passeyr valley (born 1767). Being in his sturdy and simple personality nothing more than a man of the people, he acted immediately upon the people.

When the war with Austria appeared close at hand, the Bavarian government began to grow suspicious. Since its forces were otherwise employed, it preferred to give up the Tyrol; but Napoleon ordered the country to be held under all circumstances. As an Austrian corps, under General Chasteler (April 9), ascended the Puster valley, the valleys rang with joyous salutes and ringing of alarm-bells, fire-signals bore the news from mountain to mountain; from all the heights armed men appeared and poured into valleys where the detested Bavarians were encamped. Few countries are so favored by nature for defence as the

Tyrol. Only the broad valley of the Inn renders possible the orderly development of large masses of an army, but everywhere else the roads wind over steep heights, through narrow ravines, over rushing streams and wild waters. The shepherds and hunters of the country, familiar from childhood with the hardships and dangers of the mountain world and accustomed to go where there is no path, can disappear before a superior force into inaccessible haunts. There was no united command, but at the head of his men of the Passeyr valley appeared Andreas Hofer. The Bavarian troops, weak in numbers, were scattered about at small posts. Lieutenant-Colonel Wrede, who, with his 1300 men, was compelled to abandon Brixen before the uprising, on being reinforced by a French column endeavored to protect the Ladritsch bridge, but was compelled to retreat. A division of Bavarians was obliged at Sterzing to surrender to Hofer. While he was drawing at this time toward the south, in order to bring about the adhesion of Bozen and Meran, Speckbacher, "the Ulysses of the Tyrolese uprising," dealt a successful blow against Innsbruck, where the entire Bavarian garrison were made prisoners; 3000 French, advancing toward the capital, were surrounded and laid down their arms. Astonished at their good fortune, the peasants readily believed in the superhuman knight upon a white horse, who was to be seen at their head. In a few days all the Tyrol was free, and in place of the arms of Bavaria, the double eagle of Austria was again erected everywhere. The rejoicing was boundless. Martin Theiner, from Schlanders, as imperial commissioner, sought to establish some order amid the universal intoxication. Hormayr assumed the supreme direction.

Satisfied, but with no suspicion of the short duration of their victory, the Tyrolese went back to their daily affairs, when suddenly there arrived the prostrating intelligence of the defeats on the Danube. At once Chasteler hastened to cover the northern frontier, and thereby exposed Southern Tyrol, which the French occupied. Wrede, who had pressed the corps of Jellachich from Upper Bavaria to the Traun, was recalled thence by Marshal Lefebvre, and directed against the Strub pass; a second Bavarian corps forced its way through the Scharnitz road. On the side of Austria there was liberality in promises and concessions, but of little value was the aid actually supplied. In spite of all, however, the Tyrolese did not lose courage. On May 11, 300 Tyrolese, supported by only one company of Austrians with two six-pounders, kept up the defence of the Strub pass against Wrede's four battalions and twelve cannon. The obstinacy of this resistance, and still more the unheard-of manner of fighting, the constant peril of being shot

down by invisible foes, excited the animosity of the Bavarians to madness. They accompanied the most horrible outrages with the killing of the defenceless, with violation of churches, robbery and conflagration; all prisoners were put to death. Tardily Chasteler led 3000 men, mostly militia, against Wrede, but was completely defeated at Wörgl, on May 13. Chasteler, anxious in regard to his retreat and utterly disconcerted by the declaration of outlawry issued against him by Napoleon, determined to withdraw. On the 19th the Bavarians entered Innsbruck; northern Tyrol as far as the Brenner was in their power. Lefebvre regarded the matter as ended. But the atrocities perpetrated by the Bavarians had inflamed the wrath of the peasants to the utmost, and beyond the Brenner the insurrection burst forth afresh. Hofer, who ordered out his trusty men to meet at Sterzing, endeavored also to persuade Chasteler to remain, but to no purpose; on the 23d Chasteler took up his march through Carinthia to Styria, and only the Generals Buol and Leiningen, with some 2100 men, continued with the peasants. While Straub and Speckbacher organized the new uprising in the lower valley of the Inn, Hofer, now the centre and leader of the whole movement, advanced with a force of 6000 men to the Brenner. On May 29, a battle was fought at Iselberg, both sides putting forth their utmost efforts. Threatened with being surrounded, the Bavarian General Deroy made his retreat to Kufstein during the night. On the 30th, the joyful victors made their entrance into Innsbruck; the inn-keeper of Sand checked the anger of his comrades against the prisoners. For the second time, the land was cleared of all foes. Vorarlberg secured its freedom simultaneously. And now, amid these rejoicings over victory, came the news of Aspern. The Emperor Francis sent a letter from Holkersdorf (May 29), in which he promised his beloved Tyrolese to sign no peace that should not bind their country indissolubly to his monarchy. A fresh attack appeared not to be apprehended at once, for Napoleon had drawn to himself all his disposable troops.

The Archduke John, when compelled to retreat from Italy, had selected the natural mountain-fortresses of Carinthia, the Tyrol, and Styria, in order there to maintain himself against the Viceroy Eugene, who was in pursuit. After the loss of Vienna, however, the archduke was obliged to remove farther to the east; since the enemy was already on the march to the Semmering pass, he crossed the Hungarian frontier. Jellachich, who was endeavoring to unite with him, was overtaken at St. Michael by the viceroy and saved only 2000 of his 9000 men. Unfortunately there was no proper connection between the orders of the Archduke Charles and the actions of his brother; not till the evening

of June 7 did the latter conclude to comply with the reiterated commands of his brother, who summoned him to join the main army at the island of Schütt and at Presburg. But then John changed his decision again, and determined to receive the assault of the viceroy at Raab, on June 14, although his force was inferior in number. The battle was lost, and John retreated over the Danube, pursuing the road to Presburg.

Exehnsive of the heroic conduct of the Tyrolese in their own defence, in the six weeks that elapsed after the battle of Aspern nothing was done that could secure or complete the result then attained. Arms were entirely at rest on the plain of the Marchfeld. The expectation of diplomatic results, which finally were not accomplished, corresponded with the inclination, too prevalent at the headquarters of the Archduke Charles, to suffer the decision to come about of itself, instead of seeking for it and bringing it to pass. But even the use made on the part of the Austrians of the time gained appeared feeble and languid, in comparison with the untiring, all-embracing activity which was exhibited by Napoleon. The Lobau and other neighboring islands, connected with it and with one another by bridges, were converted into a powerful fortress, which was joined to the right bank by a bridge of piles, and another composed of boats. Abundantly provided with all things needful, there stood now at this point 180,000 men, supplied with 600 cannon, while at the same time the archduke's army was increased only to 137,000 men. Napoleon's chief aim was directed to this: to be able to throw the greatest possible number of troops, in the least time possible, upon the left bank. He did not contemplate crossing at the same place as formerly, but at the east end of the island of Lobau, near the little town of Enzersdorf; demonstrations against Aspern and Essling, in the evening of June 30, had for their sole object to turn the attention of the adversary in that direction. Radetzky, however, from reconnoitring the country, had gained the right conception of Napoleon's plan. Consequently, on July 3, the archduke made speial arrangements; he took a position further in the rear upon a broad plateau behind Deutsch-Wagram, Barbasdorf, and Markgrafneusiedel.

On the evening of July 4, after 8 o'clock, three cannon-shots gave the signal for the French army to cross. Notwithstanding a fearful storm, all arrangements were executed with exemplary precision. At five o'clock in the morning Masséna and Oudinot with 60,000 men stood upon the left bank; dense columns of the army followed them in an unbroken advance over the bridges. Before this vast onset the van under General Nordmann was compelled to abandon its position at Pisdorf, and Klenau, after holding Aspern and Essling till five o'clock in the

afternoon, retreated over the Russbach to the heights of Stammersdorf. In order, if possible, to secure a decision on this day, Napoleon resolved upon an attempt to pierce the Austrian centre. It was already seven o'clock when a fearful conflict arose in and around Baunersdorf, which, however, ended with the French being repulsed with great loss. Bernadotte now, of his own will, in the darkness of the night, undertook, together with the Saxons, to assault the village of Wagram, and indeed seized the main entrance, but was not able to hold it permanently. His first object, the securing of firm footing on the left bank, Napoleon had accomplished, but he needed a second battle in order to obtain the victory. For this purpose, he decided to await the movements of the enemy, in order, by then concentrating great masses on a given point, to watch for and profit by the exposed places in the enemy's situation.

The relatively favorable condition of affairs matured the archduke's decision, on the following day, to assume the offensive. At midnight he planned his arrangements for this end and sent to his brother John the order to hasten to Marchegg instantly, in order to take part in the battle which would decide the fate of their house. It was his plan, with the right wing, to press back the enemy from the Danube, and, if this succeeded, to crush him with the centre and left wing; but from the shortness of the time and the darkness of the night his dispositions could not be so carried into effect as was requisite for success. Instead of being simultaneous, the attack was made only by the left wing, where Rosenberg had accepted and executed the arrangements with more dispatch; but he encountered such strong masses of the enemy that he was compelled to pause. Rosenberg had already fallen back when Klenau, Kolowrat, and the grenadiers on the right put themselves in motion against Aspern and Essling. The enemy was driven from both villages with loss. But Napoleon had already perceived the weakness of the Austrian position, its wide extent, its division into two halves by a not inconsiderable intervening space; his eagle eye fastened upon the corps of Bellegarde, which, after it had occupied the village of Aderklaa, yielded by the French, found itself in a position somewhat isolated. Against this he directed a powerful attacking column, led by Masséna; the Austrians were falling into confusion when Charles hastened up in person and restored the shattered ranks to their former attitude; the assailants fled in disorder. The plan of Charles seemed to be near the point of success. But Napoleon's strength lay in the powerful reserves which he held at his disposal. A new column of attack toward midday advanced, accompanied by a hundred cannon, which poured a storm of iron upon the enemy's position, and at the same time Davout fell upon the left wing of the Austrians.

Indifferent to Masséna's hard-pressed condition at Aspern and to the danger of being cut off from Lobau, Napoleon concentrated all his forces on this point, but in spite of the utmost endeavor he did not succeed in breaking the Austrian line and thus completing their defeat. As long as there was still hope of the arrival of the Archduke John, Rosenberg maintained his position at Markgrafneusiedel; but at midday, he and Hohenzollern were obliged to resolve upon a retreat. The intelligence that dependence could no longer be placed upon John, determined Archduke Charles also to break off the battle, and this was accomplished in good order. His brother had spent eighteen hours before he left his camp; not till five o'clock in the afternoon did he arrive at Siebenbrunn with 12,000 or 13,000 men and thirty-six pieces of artillery.

No battle hitherto had been so poor as this in trophies for Napoleon; these consisted of nine cannon, whose draught-horses had been killed, and one standard. On the other hand the Austrians had captured eleven cannon, twelve eagles, and 7,000 prisoners; they estimated their loss at Wagram and in the following engagements at 24,000 men, that of the French was scarcely less. The Austrian army effected its retreat to Znaim and Iglau with unbroken ranks, and Napoleon's troops had suffered too much to be able to follow up the victory with the same persistent energy as after the battles of Austerlitz and Jena. At Znaim, on the 10th, there occurred an extremely obstinate fight with Marmont and Masséna, until, on the following day, the sudden announcement that a truce was concluded, separated the combatants.

Since the last disaster, uncertainty and confusion prevailed in the Austrian ruling circles; according as Stadion or Metternich had the upper hand, warlike or peaceful views were alternately in the ascendant. In a council with both, held at Ernstbrunn, it was decided to send Prince John Liechtenstein for the purpose of introducing negotiations for peace. Napoleon received ill-humoredly the proposals delivered by him. Already, however, on the day preceding (July 11), the Archduke Charles, at Znaim, had entered into a truce for one month, which left in the hands of the French one-third of the monarchy, a district of 96,000 square miles. The dismay of Emperor Francis and of those about his person was great when they learned the purport of this convention. At the first moment it was resolved to refuse ratification. Finally, they were obliged to accept the truce, but it was with the silent reservation of profiting by the interval to prepare for another battle. Archduke Charles, it is true, expressed himself decidedly in favor of the necessity of peace, but Stadion did not yet surrender all hope. In fact, even at this time, the Prussian ministry, notwithstanding the battle of

Wagram, favored taking part in the war, and King Frederick William wrote to Emperor Alexander, convinced that, after the turn which the war had taken, the interest of his realm must constrain him to part with Napoleon and to join Austria. He dispatched Major von Knesebeck to the Austrian headquarters in order to ascertain definitely whether they were then earnestly resolved to resume the struggle. But the Austrian statesmen at the time had no desire whatever to assume positive obligations in regard to the re-establishment of Prussia, as desired by Knesebeck. The reason why peace negotiations were protracted did not lie in the view entertained with regard to Prussian military aid, but in the expectation of the English landing on the Weser. The British cabinet, however, with the same shortsightedness that marked all the foreign transactions of the English at that time, took much less interest in supporting a rising in North Germany than in the destruction of the French fleet at Flushing, and of the new ship-yards at Antwerp. Not on the Weser, but on the Schelde, upon the island of Walcheren, landed at the end of July the 40,000 men who were intended to effect a diversion in Napoleon's rear. At the time when Spain, Germany, and Italy simultaneously made demands upon the military power of the French empire, the northeast was found by them unprotected. But the incapacity of the military and political leaders effected nothing there save the capture of Middelburg, Flushing, and a few other places, and the armed force sent thither was uselessly wasted away by marsh fevers.

The hopes of the Duke of Brunswick, also, were destroyed by the decree of July 11. In consequence of it the Austrians separated themselves from him and turned back to Bohemia. At Zwickau, on July 24, he announced to his assembled officers his determination to make his way to the coast and then to England. He released those who, for whatever reason, were not willing to share the danger with him; about 30 officers and 200 men declared in favor of leaving the service. With the remaining 1300 foot-soldiers, 650 cavalry, and 80 men serving the four pieces of artillery, he made for the north, and, on the 26th, forced an entrance into Leipsic after a hot skirmish with Saxon cavalry. At Halle the squadron met a cordial reception, the Westphalian arms were torn down, and many volunteers offered to join him. Halberstadt was taken by storm, on July 29. The exiled prince found an enthusiastic reception at Brunswick, his capital, where he was joined by 200 men. But his stay could not be here, since from both sides the enemy was advancing with superior forces. Only a half-hour from the city, at the village of Ölper, he encountered 5000 Westphalians under General Reubel; a severe engagement was fought, and the situation would have become

eritical had not the disheartened enemy yielded the ground during the night. But increasing difficulties continued and made their impression; sixteen officers desired their discharge. On August 2, the squadron departed for Hanover; everywhere received with hospitality, on the 4th, they reached the Weser at Nienburg, and thence proceeded to Elsfleth and Brake, where the ships were awaiting them, which Dörnberg, then in England, had provided for them. The next spring Brunswick's men went from England to the Spanish peninsula, and there, in numerous engagements, continued the struggle against the hated oppressor.

The special object of the duke's expedition had failed, but the example of the proud, firm, manly spirit, sank deep into many oppressed hearts. There went through the world a conviction that forces yet existed before which this Napoleonic power, internally weak, notwithstanding its terrible military strength, would not be able to stand.

Since the hopes that rested upon the landing of the English had failed so lamentably, it was impossible now for the Austrian cabinet to protract matters any further. Moreover, the Spanish war stood at the moment in a condition so favorable for Napoleon, that it demanded of him no consideration and no indulgence, and the hint, which he dropped to Prince Liechtenstein, that he would moderate his conditions for securing peace, if the Emperor Francis would relinquish the crown in favor of his brother, the Archduke of Würzburg, also produced its effects. Nevertheless, the negotiations which, since August 18, had been conducted at Deutsch-Altenburg by Metternich and Nugent for Austria, and by Champagny on the part of France, had made no progress. Stadion had retired to Prague, broken in spirit by the conviction that every attempt to arouse those about the emperor to heroic endeavor was fruitless; Metternich wavered, and was only resolved to hold himself in readiness to become Stadion's successor. To all this was added the wretched condition of the finances. On September 25, the decision was made in favor of peace. The negotiations at Deutsch-Altenburg were discontinued, and Count Bubna was sent with Prince Liechtenstein to Vienna, in order to prepare the way for an immediate understanding with Napoleon. At first he showed uncommon tenacity, but there came suddenly a warning, which reminded him to hasten to a conclusion. During a review of the troops at Schönbrunn, on October 12, a young man was apprehended, who, under the pretext of desiring to present a memorial, had repeatedly sought to press into the vicinity of Napoleon; a long kitchen knife was found on him; with cool frankness he declared that with it he had intended to kill the emperor. The prisoner was not yet eighteen years of age, a son of

the preacher Staps at Naumburg, a simple, earnest youth, with strong religious convictions. To Napoleon, who personally examined him, he frankly declared his purpose to slay him because he was the curse of his fatherland. The incident made a deep impression upon Napoleon. He sought to suppress the matter as far as possible. Staps was sentenced by a military tribunal, and, in all secrecy, shot.

In the night of October 13–14, 1809, peace was signed at Vienna. To France Austria ceded the county of Görz, the district of Montefalcone, Trieste, and Carniola, in Carinthia the Villach circle, and all land on the right of the Save; to Bavaria Salzburg and Berchtesgaden, together with the Innviertel and the circle of Hausruck; to the Swiss Confederation the enclave of Razün in the Grisons. Saxony had to be content with a few small Bohemian enclaves, while the grand duchy of Warsaw obtained West and New Galicia and some districts of East Galicia; the salt-works of Wilczka remained to both states in common. Of the Tarnowitz circle, a territory of 400,000 souls, Napoleon made the Emperor Alexander a wholly unexpected gift, only that the latter might appear before the world as Napoleon's serviceable and faithful helper and as the real enemy of Austria. Amnesty was stipulated for the Galicians who participated in the last national rising. France guaranteed the remaining possessions of Austria, and in return Austria recognized all the changes that had occurred or that should in the future occur in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, broke off all connection with England, and acceded to the Continental System. A secret article declared this peace as obligatory on Russia and bound Austria to reduce her army to 150,000 men, as well as to pay a war-contribution, which, although modified from the 100,000,000 francs originally demanded to 85,000,000, yet appeared to exceed the ability of an extremely exhausted state.

This peace sealed the sacrifice of the Tyrol. It occasioned, indeed, little anxiety to the Tyrolese, that the promises of the Emperor Francis's letter of May 29 were followed by no deeds. In childlike, loyal confidence in the emperor's word they went back to their labors in the field. In the upper circles in Austria there prevailed anything but a favorable feeling toward the Tyrolese, notwithstanding their loyalty and fidelity. The first thing that startled the Tyrolese out of their dreamlike confidence was the sudden intelligence of a truce, which declared the evacuation of their country on the part of the Austrians; but no one believed it, all regarded it as a stratagem of war. Hofer, in an appeal of July 22, proclaimed every one spreading this report an enemy of the country. An order from Archduke John to Buol to comply with no command to evacuate, not issued by himself, rendered the assurance complete. But

PLATE VI.



The rising of the Tyrolese under Andreas Hofer.

Relief on Hofer's monument in the Franciscan Church at Innsbruck by Johann Nepomuk Schaller (1777-1842).

History of All Nations, Vol. XVII., page 157.

actions soon left no doubt with regard to the correctness of the message of evil. From the north came the entire seventh army corps, under command of the stern Lefebvre; the Crown Prince of Würtemberg threw himself upon Vorarlberg, and other divisions marched up the valleys of the Drave and Adige, or approached through the Achen valley and the Scharnitz. On the part of the Tyrolese the uncertainty with regard to the actual state of things made any regular plan of action impossible. Thus it came to pass that at this time Deroy found the Lueg pass, and Lefebvre the Strub pass, unoccupied. Everywhere the scattered masses gave way before superior force. Then came finally, on July 27, the official announcement of the cessation of hostilities. The impression was indescribable; several of the leaders joined themselves to the departing Austrians. On the 31st, Lefebvre entered Innsbruck, ordered the disarming of the population, and promised amnesty to all who should have submitted up to August 10, with the particular and sole exception of Theimer. The Bavarians, on the contrary, paid no regard to the strict discipline enjoined by him; they marked their footsteps afterward as before by violence and desolation, and their officers renewed the senseless system of intimidation by means of terrorizing measures. They no longer counted upon resistance. In fact, Hofer had advised his faithful men that the treaty ought to be observed in case the enemy observed it. But, on account of the cruelty of the Bavarians, four days after Lefebvre's entrance into the capital, there flamed forth for the third time the rising of the people (PLATE VI.). At Bruneck Hofer was rejoined by Speckbacher, who had previously allowed himself to be persuaded to follow the Austrians. Straub, also, again took courage. When General Rouyer, on August 4, marched from Sterzing, he found the bridge at Oberau destroyed; the mountains began suddenly to roar and to quake; trunks of trees and rocks, held in readiness, rolled down into the abyss, burying the enemy or hurling them into the raging Eisack. The vanguard, being cut off, laid down their arms on August 5, and, to avoid the same fate, Rouyer turned back with the remainder to Sterzing. Thus fearfully roused from his dream of an easy victory, Lefebvre rapidly set out for the Brenner, to chastise the peasants. He scarcely reached Manls; here his assault was broken by the natural obstacles. General Rusca, also, was obliged at the Lienz bridge to turn back, having met with severe losses. A third column, which, proceeding from Landeck through Finstermünz, was to take the insurrection in the rear, was not able to press through at the Pontlatzer bridge; a part of it, under cover of the night, endeavored to return to Landeck, but at the first sound the riflemen began to fire and the women to let loose

trunks of trees and masses of rock upon the fugitives. The whole pass was blocked, and those not crushed, still some 800 men, fled back to Prutz, and, being cut off from every outlet, were there compelled to surrender. These two days cost the Bavarians 1089 men, including twenty-two officers, and three cannon. After three days of fruitless waiting in Sterzing, Lefebvre turned about to the Brenner; greatly reduced and in the saddest plight, his column came back to Innsbruck after a march of eighteen hours. But against this place, also, the peasants were pressing in swarms. Again there occurred on August 13, at the Iselberg, a decisive engagement, and, in order not entirely to lose communication with Bavaria, the marshal retreated on the following night. When the rising sun disclosed their victory to the peasants, Hofer threw himself upon his knees and all the people prayed aloud with him. As divinely chosen crusaders they went quietly and solemnly into the city. In the palace a patriarchal government by peasants was instituted, in whose name the inn-keeper of Sand, as chief commandant of the Tyrol, issued his orders.

For the third time, and more gloriously than twice before, had this brave mountain people expelled the foreign oppressors from the land. Through a captured Bavarian officer came the first news of the impending peace, in consequence of which the Tyrol would not again become Austrian. But on September 29, when already the acceptance of Napoleon's ultimatum was determined upon, two couriers from the emperor delivered to Andreas Hofer 3000 ducats together with a gold chain, apparently the solemn sanction of his office as chief commandant. A fortunate stroke of Speckbacher (Fig. 24) against the Bavarians at Lofer and Unken, and the taking of Hallein and Berchtesgaden by Haspinger, intoxicated the peasants with a boundless self-confidence. And yet the end was already at hand. Highly exasperated by the disgrace inflicted on his arms by peasants, Napoleon ordered out an army force of 50,000 men, under the command of his stepson, to avenge the dishonor and to defeat the obstinate people. The invasion followed upon three lines, through the valleys of the Puster, the Inn, and the Adige, and spread terror and dismay far and wide. Among the peasants there was a want of unity; instead of holding together, the militia separated to protect house and hearth; the enemy, now accustomed to the Tyrolese mode of fighting, broke the scattered resistance with little difficulty, and on October 25 marched into Innsbruck. A new letter from the Archduke John contained the advice to the Tyrolese not to sacrifice themselves uselessly, and the Crown Prince of Bavaria promised amnesty without exception to those freely returning to orderly obedience. Recognizing the impossibility of further resistance, Hofer sent out messages to discon-

tinue hostilities. He himself was on the point of repairing to the crown prince at Hall, when he allowed himself to be deluded by the news that peace was all an idle falsehood. On November 2 the peasants were completely routed at the Iselberg. Hofer now subscribed his submission. Everything now betokened a peaceful termination; but, after the retirement of the moderate leaders, wild passions came uppermost, and, full of shame to have remained behind the more courageous, the Sand innkeeper again called to arms, but immediately thereafter issued an exhortation to submit. Baragnay d' Hilliers, the French commander-in-chief at the time, generously proffered everything, in order to pacify their minds without employment of force; Hofer, also, turned back to

Von A. A. Speckbacher und Sohn
Rathaus Linz

Joseph Speckbacher
Oberstabsarzt
in Linz

FIG. 24.—Faesimile of the signatures of Hofer and Speckbacher on an order issued by them. In possession of Landgerichtsdirektor Lessing, Berlin.

his inn at Sand, but even now he was not able to withstand the urgency of fanatics; the distressing events caused him to lose his equipoise. The senseless insurrection to which, on November 12, he summoned the people, cost only needless blood. At Villach, Eugene proclaimed the penalty of death for every one who, after five days, should be found with arms in his hands or in his possession. Hofer, on whose head a price was set, had hidden himself at the Pfandlerhof at Brandach, and later in a cow-keeper's cottage at the entrance into the Fartleis. A man of evil repute, Raffl by name, availed himself of the offer of the reward, and on January 27, 1810, led to the place a division of Italian soldiers. Undoubtedly Hofer made himself known. He was bound, and, amid



FIG. 25. — Statue of Andreas Hofer over his grave in the Franciscan church at Innsbruck.
Executed by Professor Schaller in Vienna at the order of the Emperor Francis, 1834.

outrageous indignities, taken to Mantua. He was sentenced to die by a court-martial, and the sentencee, in pursuance of Napoleon's instructions, was executed within twenty-four hours, on February 20 (Fig. 25). Standing erect, with unblinking eyes, he himself ordered his executioners to fire. "Farewell, vile world," he wrote, a few days before his death, to a friend; "death is so welcome that my eyes are not wet."¹

That for which Hofer had contended was far different from the object of German patriots, yet the patriotic and heroic spirit, with whieh, in a time of universal submission and servitude, he had set himself in opposition to the insolent conqueror, made the deepest impression throughout Germany, and won for him the glorious halo of a German patriot. In Austria, for which he had poured out his blood, his name quickly fell into oblivion.

So long as an Austria had existed, never had that country concluded so disadvantageous a peace as was the last. Not merely was her extent diminished by 48,000 square miles, and nearly 3,500,000 of souls, but she was cut off from the sea; the Bavarian frontier was extended even into the neighborhood of her capital, and the connection with Germany was to such an extent loosened by cessions of territory, that then for the first time it was possible for the thought to arise that Hungary must become the principal country of the empire, and that the royal residence must be transferred from Vienna to Pesth. The disastrous struggle completely confirmed the Emperor Francis in his aversion to appeals to popular forces. He remained afterward more than ever under the sway of the mediocre men who composed his military circle, whose zealous endeavor was directed to the object of separating him from the influence of the empress and of his more energetic brothers. Among the latter disunion prevailed in consequence of the war. Metternich, minister after October 7, 1809, took pleasure in manifesting zeal against all excitement and enthusiasm, and in the population at large there grew more and more a faint-hearted pessimism, which could utter only words of mocking and jesting concerning the calamities of the nation. The chief interest was concentrated solely upon the hopeless financial condition. Under the leadership of Count Zichy (till 1808) there had risen, apart from the depreciation of money and the public debt, which, since 1792, had increased from 350,000,000 to 658,000,000 florins, a flood of 900,000,000 florins in bank-notes, which passed for but one-fourth their par value. The increase in the revenues, secured since 1806, had been swallowed up by necessary army expenses, and

¹ In 1823 Hofer's remains were transferred by some Tyrolean officers to Innsbruck, and now lie in the mausoleum near those of Emperor Maximilian.



FIG. 26.—Faesimile of a Vienna city bank-note of the year 1800.

nominal value, their suppression was to follow in exchange for redeemable paper to the amount of 212,000,000 florins, and, in order to give credit to this new paper, the "Vienna standard," a sinking-fund was to

two loans went the same way. When the war came to an end, Zichy's successor, Count O'Donnell, was also helpless. The patent of February 26, 1810, promised the desired relief by restricting the quantity of bank-notes (Fig. 26), and redeeming them under control of a board composed of deputies of the provinces and of chambers of commerce. To form a sinking-fund a tax of 10 per cent. was imposed on property. But in February, 1811, the amount of bank-notes had risen to 1,061,000,-000. On the one hand, want and poverty prevailed, and on the other, usury and stock-jobbing. The last advice of O'Donnell, when dying, to secularize church property, was frustrated by the influence of the clergy. The new finance minister, Count Wallis, tried a radical course. On March 15, 1811, the bank-notes were reduced to a fifth of their

be created out of the sale of the church property. The interest on the public debt was reduced one-half. Thereby national bankruptcy was declared. The five-fold increase of taxes, and the simultaneous lowering of the rate of interest, together with the failure to redeem the paper currency, produced a truly ruinous effect.

Numerous were the territorial changes that took place within the Confederation of the Rhine in consequence of the Peace of Vienna. To Bavaria came back only a diminished Tyrol. In order to render the country helpless for all time, Napoleon gave over the Puster valley to Illyria and the southern part to the kingdom of Italy. Besides, Bavaria had to make some concessions to Würtemberg and to the grand-duchy of Würzburg. As compensation, she received the principality of Bayreuth, which, since 1806, had groaned under French occupation, and also Ratisbon, which had belonged to the prince-primate Dalberg. This enlargement, amounting to 3400 square miles and 400,000 inhabitants, had, however, to be purchased by several burdensome obligations: a compensative annuity for Ratisbon, acknowledgement of considerable dotations to French officers, release of claims for damage on account of the French troops passing through Bavaria and for their subsistence, and the grant of a supplementary 30,000,000 francs toward the costs of the war. Würtemberg, which had obtained from Bavaria about 138,000 souls, indemnified Baden therefor by 40,000, which on its part ceded some districts to Hesse-Darmstadt. To Westphalia, by the treaty of January 14, 1810, Napoleon delivered over the severely afflicted Hanover, with the exception of Lauenburg, and more than 18,000 French troops were quartered on the land. The emperor reserved to himself the right of placing his own customs officers at the frontiers of the kingdom but approved the raising of the civil list to 6,000,000 francs. Greater humiliations followed. When the Westphalian government allowed the pay of the French troops to fall into arrears, he declared immediately the treaty of cession to be broken and reserved to himself the right to act with regard to Hanover according to need.

A new creation was the archduchy of Frankfort, to which was set off the remainder of the possessions belonging to the prince-primate, enlarged by Fulda and Hanau to 2100 square miles and 300,000 inhabitants. It was organized on February 16, 1810. This was not to favor Dalberg. On the contrary he suffered a considerable diminution of his revenues, since he lost half of the Rhine octrois belonging to him, and yet had to continue to pay the annuities assigned to them. Besides, his new domains were burdened with French dotations to the amount of 600,000 francs, and he had to pay about 3,500,000 francs to release the

remainder from Napoleon. But this pretended state was intended as a satisfaction to Prince Eugene, whose hopes of the throne of France and Italy were lost by the contemplated marriage of his stepfather. The appointment of Cardinal Fesch to be Dalberg's successor was therefore cancelled, and, in case of the death of Eugene's heirs, the grand duchy was to fall to France. Its entire organization was put upon a French footing. All political journals were suppressed; in their place was a single official sheet, whose editor was to be named by the minister of police. The archduchy of Berg, after holding it under his own government since Murat's transfer, Napoleon had already, on March 3, 1809, granted in appearance to the four-year-old Louis Napoleon, the eldest son of his brother Louis, but in reality it was a French prefecture.

Among the German patriots, who, till the last, held firmly to the hope of participating in the war for freedom, the Peace of Vienna produced a deep and painful disappointment. Now, it was foreseen, Napoleon would develop his despotism without limit. Especially with regard to the fate of Prussia, the weightiest apprehensions appeared to be justified. For now the time had come for Napoleon to reckon with Prussia for the disquietude caused him by this state during the war; already a great part of his troops were in motion toward North Germany. In Russia Frederick William did not venture to have the least hope; to his letter of July 24, Alexander, after the conclusion of peace, made a cool reply, in which he indicated unreserved adhesion to France as the principal condition for the success of his exertions in lessening and arranging the embarrassments created by the king's course during the war. Colonel Krusemark, who was appointed as bearer of the inevitable congratulations for a glorious conclusion of peace, was received by Napoleon with a flood of complaints and threats; peremptorily, the emperor demanded the prompt payment of the contribution. "Wherefore," said he, "40,000 men? A guard of 6000 would be sufficient." In case Prussia should not be able to pay in money, he hinted at a cession of territory in Silesia, although knowing right well that this was a burning coal, which he would not venture to take firmly in his hand. He desired only to see how much could be obtained by menace, without a direct demand, which would have violated the Peace of Tilsit, and brought on a war with Russia sooner than he wished. All was done to appease the angry man: resumption of the payments, the replacing of the unacceptable ambassador Brockhausen by Krusemark, the withdrawal of Scharnhorst from the war ministry, the dissolution of the Tugendbund (p. 93) on December 31, even the transfer of the royal residence to Berlin on December 23 (PLATE VII.). Still, nothing seemed left

PLATE VII.



The return of Frederick William III to Berlin on December 23, 1809; entrance through the Bernau Gate

After an engraving (1811) by F. W. Bollinger; original drawing by L. Wolf (1772-1832).

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FIG. 27. — Hardenberg. From an engraving by H. Sintzenich (1752-1812); original painting by F. G. Weitsch (1758-1828).

to the ministers, but to grant the desired cession of territory. In this perplexity the king turned to Hardenberg, and found him prepared to undertake the conduct of affairs, on condition that Napoleon should give his approval, that Altenstein, Beyme, and Nagler be dismissed, and that, in order to secure the necessary unity of administration, the control of the entire ministry be committed to him. Napoleon needed money; it was to be hoped that Hardenberg could procure the money, and therefore Napoleon consented to his entrance upon affairs. Of the former ministers only Goltz and Dohna remained. On October 29, the dignity of state chancellor was created for Hardenberg (Fig. 27); shortly afterward he undertook, together with the department of finances, that also of the interior.

It quickly appeared what it meant that the rudder of state again lay in the hand of a prudent and very able man. In what concerned foreign policy Hardenberg had a complete understanding with the king, that the combination and exertion of all powers, that the preparation of all means for the future contest for freedom, must be the guiding star of their action, but that, until this contest could be commenced, the fulfilment of all obligations entered into with Napoleon, and the avoiding of every provocation, should be the necessary course. For such a policy of waiting up to the right moment, Hardenberg's sagacious judgment was far more in place than Stein's flaming passion. With reference to internal reform, the retirement of Stein had rendered it doubtful whether the building up of that which was begun would be earnestly carried out, since his successors lacked not only the creative faculty, but also the just desire and love for the work. On the other hand, Hardenberg was far too thoroughly imbued with modern ideas not to apply himself zealously to internal reform, out of which was to result the renovation of the state in regard to its foreign relations. That which, in his administration, has impressed its stamp for all time, is the social legislation, which, while transcending in important respects the aims of Stein, completed the freedom of the individual and opened to him the freest employment of his powers and of his possessions. Its constituent parts hang together in the closest interdependence like the links of a chain. With the reorganization of the finances, for which the way was prepared by the union of the provincial and state debts, were connected arrangements for satisfying the creditors of the state. Along with the sale of public domains, there was the secularization of church property and the taking up of a loan in Holland. Before all else stood the restoration of the power of taxation, which was again accompanied by the removal of all privileged exemptions from taxation of land, of all proscriptive and compulsory rights of juris-

diction, of payments in kind. Soon after there followed an ordinance respecting servants, a stamp law, and the liberation of commercial intercourse. An ordinance of May, 1811, decreed the removal of all demesne taxes. The edicts touching the adjustment of the relations between landlords and peasants, and the measures for promoting the cultivation of the soil (September 19, 1811), dissolved the agricultural connection existing between lords of the manor and tenants, and thus withdrew the basis from the political subjection of the rustic to the former.

In contrast to this fundamental change in the condition of husbandry, the organic legislation of Stein experienced no essential advance during the years 1810-1812. The great work here planned was carried out at first in the edict of 1812 respecting the gendarmerie. Of the necessity of introducing a popular representation resting upon the three principles of property, intelligence, and morality, Hardenberg was not less convinced than Stein, yet here again he differed from him, inasmuch as he had much greater doubt than Stein with regard to a limitation of the power of government. He thought of such a representative body as an advisory assembly, and had in mind the establishment of an Upper House, on account of the relations of the Prussian nobility. The formation of this representation remained, however, reserved for the future. The convocation, on February 23, 1811, of an assembly of notables composed of noble proprietors, officials, citizens, and peasants, had at heart the aim of hearing their advice as well as the purpose of acquainting them with the new arrangements and of lessening their opposition. But instead of the hoped-for support, there arose from the majority of privileged persons only opposition and laments over violation of rights. The two assemblies of notables convened in June and September proceeded more peacefully. The king's language in the edict of October 27, 1810, and the chancellor's promise: "for the purpose of speedily constituting a judicious national representation," were, however, not forgotten.

The re-establishment of the army, also, could not be completely brought about according to Scharnhorst's noble scheme. According to his plan, in which we may recognize the principles of the organization of 1813, the standing army was always to begin an attack. The army of reserve, which was to comprise discharged and supernumerary soldiers, and volunteer chasseurs, should meantime undertake to serve on fortifications and act as besieging forces of places occupied by the enemy. When the reserve had thus been sufficiently instructed, it should follow the army and its place should be taken by the militia, a levy *en masse* (*Landsturm*) of all those capable of bearing arms. Scarcely, however, did Napoleon learn of this, when, with haughty menace, he put a stop to

it. The only thing that could be effected, without exciting his distrust, was the speedier training of the men who composed the standing army. The twenty years' period of service remained unaltered. Yet, without keeping too strictly the number in the army as prescribed by treaty, as many men as possible were levied, and those passably instructed were furloughed after a few months. By this system Scharnhorst gradually provided 150,000 soldiers. His final aim was to secure the universal liability to military service. But his conscription law (February, 1810) based on this principle met with warm opposition in the governmental circle, especially because injurious results were apprehended to the interests of agriculture. Apart from this, furthermore, the imposed limitation of the army to 42,000 men would have rendered the execution of this measure impossible.

Stein's great conception was maintained in its purity only in the domain of education. Altenstein had already regarded this as the "highest expression of humanity," and source of patriotism. W. von Humboldt's administration of education was penetrated by the same ideal spirit. He appointed a deputation composed of the first men of learning to keep continually before the eyes of the administration the pure principles of the highest universal cultivation. Supported by the excellent Süvern, he introduced the method of Pestalozzi into elementary instruction. He called his friend, F. A. Wolf, to give advice with regard to reform in the gymnasia, and, as the crown of the whole, the university, recently opened in the capital, and the art institutes, to be established in connection with it, were to throw their light over the whole land. To invigorate the youth physically, to accustom them to rigorous self-discipline and dread of all effeminaey and pampering, to fill them with hatred of the foreign oppressors and with love for the fatherland, Friedrich Jahn, teacher in the Plamann educational institute and the gymnasium of the Grey Friars, founded at Berlin the first German school of gymnastics.

The continent bowed down before Napoleon. With admiration, or with terror and hate, a whole world looked upon this one man, and recognized loudly or silently the power of his wonderful genius. He even seemed to himself by the vastness of his success transported to the very limits of mortality. With every day he became more imperious, immoderate, unbounded in his self-confidence, which neither brooked good counsel nor cared for affection. The least opposition was sufficient to throw him into a rage, and there did not occur to him at all the thought of reconciling men to his arbitrary might. A certain justification for the contempt of men, that was disclosed in his every word and act, was

the slavish submission which he perceived around him. Never and nowhere has so base a flattery prevailed as that which at that time in France deified the emperor. That which lends strength and permanence to a power—wisdom and justice, moderation and good will—more and more vanished from his view. He sought, rather, the support of his power in marriage with the daughter of an ancient princely house, who should give him the longed-for heir of his body.

Since the time of the emperor's coronation Josephine knew that the Damocles sword of divorce was suspended over her. With all the arts of womanly ingenuity she had endeavored to escape it, but was unable to hinder the decision from maturing in her consort, which to her and to him was to prove so full of disaster. At Erfurt Napoleon had caused Alexander to be sounded with regard to his sister Catharine, but an evasive reply was received. After Napoleon's return from the Austrian campaign the divorce was earnestly prosecuted, Josephine's consent was obtained, and on December 15, in the imperial family council, the dissolution of the marriage was determined upon; on the next day it was so pronounced by the senate, and the Paris ecclesiastical authority consented slavishly to declare the marriage canonically void. At the same time, a second inquiry was addressed to Alexander, now in reference to the younger sister Anna. Again the alliance was declined, in courteous language. But already, on February 7, 1810, the signing of the marriage contract with the Archduchess Maria Louisa of Austria had taken place (Fig. 28). Alexander congratulated Napoleon, and only indicated his surprise that negotiations should be had at Vienna, pending the wooing at St. Petersburg. But the wooing at St. Petersburg was not arranged in order to obtain an imperial princess, but an archduchess; it was intended only to render more impressive to the court of Vienna the danger of the Franco-Russian alliance becoming still closer, which, if permanent, might be completely ruinous to Austria. On this account the Lorraine pride of birth was so utterly silenced, that on the first inquiry (December, 1809), an assenting reply followed. Metternich presented to the soldier-emperor the daughter of the noble house; through this offering time would be gained and the infallible consequences of a Russian marriage be avoided. Moreover, he was aware, from the day when peace was made, that his activity must be limited exclusively to talking about, evasion, and flattery, in order to prolong the existence of Austria up to the day of universal deliverance. The Emperor Francis swallowed his animosity, his consort was the only one at court who could not so easily recover from the sudden change, and the bride herself, an extremely superficial nature, met the splendid humiliation to which she was des-




FIG. 28.—Embassy of Napoleon to ask the hand of the Archduchess Maria Louisa before the Empress of Austria. Water-color by Moreau the Younger (1741-1814).




FIG. 29.—Reception of the Archduchess Maria Louisa by Napoleon at Braunau. Water-color by Moreau the younger (1711-1814).

timed even with a degree of joyfulness. The public greeted the intelligence with delight as a pledge of peace and of deliverance from the financial straits. With great pomp, Berthier was received as representative of the bridegroom (Fig. 29), and the marriage by proxy was concluded. The brothers of the empress were obliged to be absent from the festivities, since the Prince of Nérehâtel (Berthier), without some prejudice to his sovereign's dignity, could not have yielded precedence to them; the imperial bridegroom was represented by the Archduke Charles, and the prince-archbishop of Vienna experienced no hesitation of conscience in blessing the marriage.

In Paris, the wedding pomp was renewed, but of the twenty-nine cardinals present in Paris only fourteen appeared at the marriage; the refractory, at their head Consalvi, were banished from the city. A lamentable accident occurred at the banquet given by the Austrian ambassador, Prince Schwarzenberg, where a wooden building caught fire and the Princess Pauline Schwarzenberg with twenty other persons met their death in the flames. This was interpreted as a portent of misfortune, in consequence of the unpopularity of this new Austrian marriage and the affection felt for the discarded Josephine.

Fortune fulfilled the last wish of her favorite; on March 20, 1811, Maria Louisa bore him a son. But this fresh gift of fate, like every new success, rocked him into a security increasingly deceptive. He felt himself now absolved from all consideration for others. As far as his arm reached there was no more scrutiny for justice, there were only force and arbitrary will. Unspeakable was the suffering of the populations of the Confederation of the Rhine. In Lower Saxony and the Hanseatic towns Davout behaved like a dictator and carried into full effect the embargo regulations against England. Hamburg, which was regarded as nothing else than an English colony, received the threat of becoming again a fishing village. It had to buy off the confiscation of all English goods by the payment of 16,000,000 francs, and Bonaparte, the representative of France, caused his pretended forbearance to be purchased with much money. Every act of resistance to the orders of the emperor and his officials was punished by death or imprisonment. The harmless writer, Zacharias Becker, was apprehended by Davout at Gotha, in 1811, on the utterly frivolous suspicion of secret conspiracy, dragged to the fortress of Magdeburg, and imprisoned there for seventeen months. The daily press was in the states of the Rhenish Confederation "centralized" after the model of France. The introduction of books from foreign parts was rendered difficult by severe regulations. Dalberg prohibited the gathering of his subjects on the streets for conversation on political

matters; letters were everywhere opened in the mails, and a shameless system of espionage prevailed, in which the French police were aided by German renegades. The French consuls in the Prussian harbors on the Baltic made it their business to destroy by their chicaneries the smallest remains of commercial intercourse. The governors of Stettin and Glogau confiscated as they pleased and levied continental customs at their liking.

As the life and property of the individual, so also the existence of states, was delivered over to the arbitrary will of the over-powerful ruler. The previous half-extorted good understanding with the pope had become, since the occupation of the States of the Church by the



FIG. 30.—Medal (by Bertrand Andrieux, 1765-1822) commemorating the baptism of the King of Rome. Copper. Original size. (Berlin, Royal Cabinet of Coins.) The inscription on the reverse side reads: “à l'empereur les bonnes villes de l'empire.” The list begins with Paris, Rome, Amsterdam, and includes Hamburg and Lübeck. (Friedländer.)

French, a separation that was continually growing more and more hostile. Mindful of his universal dignity, Pius VII, steadfastly refused to be obedient to the commands of Napoleon. Then the furious emperor hurled from Vienna the decree of May 17, 1809, which divested the pope of his temporal power and united the States of the Church with France. Since the happiness of his people, as the *Moniteur* explained, the dignity and integrity of his realm, are irreconcilable with the pretensions of a sovereign pope, he therefore withdrew the territories which his illustrious predecessor, Charlemagne, had conferred as a fief on the Bishop of Rome. Pius VII. replied with a decree of excommunication, which, however, did not designate Napoleon by name, and forbade the bishops

to swear allegiance to the French ruler. He was therefore arrested, conveyed to Savona, and the *senatus consultum* of February 17, 1810, declared all foreign sovereignty incompatible with the exercise of spiritual functions in the imperial realm. The heir to the imperial throne received at his birth the title of King of Rome (Fig. 30). The bishops of the empire, summoned to a national council, did not, indeed, show themselves unconditionally compliant. When Pius VII., although prepared for some concessions, rejected the decrees of the council which required him to acknowledge the articles of 1682, he was brought to Fontainebleau in June, 1812. Napoleon himself here belabored him with threats and promises, and, after some struggles of conscience, Pius finally subscribed the concordat of January 25, 1813, in which he consented to the reclamation of the States of the Church, agreed to reside at Avignon with an income of 2,000,000 francs, and accepted the decrees of the council (Fig. 31).

But already Napoleon made no discrimination between enemies, confederates, and relatives. He himself recognized the error of having created his crowned brothers and brothers-in-law shadowy kings, who rather needed help than afforded it. Whoever of these did not submit to the unworthy treatment which fell to his lot from Paris, found himself brought into an untenable double situation. Their natural wish to win the hearts of their subjects was more and more thrust aside by Napoleon's heartless selfishness. That regulations made by these rulers should be annulled without ceremony by orders from Paris was no rarity. Every new conflict confirmed Napoleon in the view that the only means of avoiding collisions was simple incorporation.

Of all these nepot states, Holland was punished the worst. Already ruined by the long war, the loss of her colonies and the disabling of her marine, her fishery, and her commercial connections, the last blow was given by the Continental System. King Louis, notwithstanding the icy reception accorded him, brought with him an honorable disposition to alleviate the sufferings of his subjects and to gain for himself their love, but his brother immediately threatened him with a public expression of his dissatisfaction. When Louis placed himself at the head of a national subscription for the benefit of Leyden, ruined by an explosion of powder, he was obliged to hear the reproof that he ruled more like a Capuchin than a prince. He had found an annual expenditure of 78,000,000 florins against 35,000,000 of receipts, while the amount paid by Holland to France for its liberation was estimated at 500,000,000; but all prayers for alleviation were rejected by Napoleon. To the contemplated savings in the army and navy he opposed the menace of a desire for the increase



FIG. 31.—Pope Pius VII giving his blessing. Drawn and engraved by Marie.

of both. When Louis proposed a law establishing a regency, he demanded that the appointment of the regent should belong to him. Louis was soon made aware that Napoleon did not regard his kingly crown as anything definitive. He had already, in 1806, caused it to be declared in London, that without the restoration of the Dutch colonies the country would of necessity become a French province. Rumors of the incorporation into France of individual parts of the territory were in circulation, but in vain Louis applied to his brother to tell him at least precisely what he had in mind. Finally the word was spoken: the cession of Brabant and Zealand, and when Louis ventured to object Napoleon closed the frontiers of France to Dutch trade. Evidently he desired to push his brother to a voluntary abdication. He invited his brother to Paris and there made known to him that the Walcheren expedition (July, 1809; see p. 134) had proved the incompetency of his rule, and hence the necessity of union with France. Louis finally consented to cede the entire left bank of the Rhine, and agreed that the guardianship of the coast should be assumed, at his expense, by 6000 Frenchmen. But speedily this "Dutch corps of observation" was increased to 20,000 men, and it advanced farther and farther into the country. Upon the proclamation of the impending occupation of Amsterdam, Louis abdicated on June 30, 1810. An imperial decree of July 9 united Holland, as being but "a deposit of French rivers," with France.

A second decree of November 12 announced the incorporation of the Swiss canton of Valais, because it had fulfilled none of the obligations assumed on the building of the Simplon road. The impression produced by this violent measure was not yet effaced, when Napoleon transcended it by a fresh and greater illegality. In an imperial message to the senate, of December 10, 1810, the German territories on the North Sea, as far as the Elbe, above the mouth of the Stecknitz, and the Trave, were declared integral parts of the empire. In the midst of peace a district of over 14,000 square miles and 1,200,000 inhabitants changed its masters: the three Hanseatic towns, Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck, the duchies of Oldenburg and Arenberg, the principalities of Salm, disappeared from the rank of independent states; the grand duchy of Berg lost some portions, and the kingdom of Westphalia alone over 7000 square miles. In these three new departments of the Upper Ems and of the mouths of the Weser and Elbe—of which Davout became governor-general—French administration, judiciary, taxation, legislation, conscription, and police were immediately introduced, but the German language was allowed in official transactions, together with the French.

A more rigorous guarding of the coast against English smugglers played in this incorporation only a subordinate part. It formed already the prelude of the campaign against Russia. When Napoleon entered upon this, he would have not only the coasts of the North Sea completely in his power, in order more safely to meet an English landing in his rear, but would also have a firm foothold on the Baltic, for the purpose of drawing nearer to Russia and of grasping Prussia more closely. A connection by canal between the Rhine, Ems, Weser, and Elbe was taken into consideration.

In outward appearance Sweden also entered into the ranks of Napoleonic vassal states, after the appointed successor of the childless King Charles XIII., the Prince Christian Augustus of Holstein, had suddenly died on May 8, 1810. An inconsiderable man, a Baron Mörner, took it upon him, in these circumstances, to go to Paris, for the purpose of offering the vacant place to Marshal Bernadotte, who was allied to the emperor by marriage. As commander of the French troops on the Danish islands, Bernadotte, by the military discipline maintained, and by his humane conduct, had made for himself a good name among the Swedes. He sought also the approval of the emperor, upon obtaining which the diet at Örebro, partly from anxiety on account of the covetous desires of the King of Denmark for the crown of Sweden, and partly because it desired the permanence of French friendship, elected the Prince of Pontecorvo crown prince of Sweden. Although Napoleon only with unwillingness acceded to this elevation of Bernadotte, whom he distrusted and whom he had formally censured during the last war, he did not for this reason the less anticipate that Bernadotte would serve him and his system with the same submission as all his other crowned creatures. Of this error, however, he was very soon to become conscious.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FALL OF NAPOLEON.

PROUDER and more powerful than ever, there stood before the eyes of the world the majestic edifice of the empire, erected and supported by the superhuman energy of one man. But the more its outward circumference enlarged, the less was one supporting column, had it been the very strongest, able to bear the tension of the gigantic superstructure. The allurements of military glory had lost their power with the people of France, since it had become evident that they must be continually paying more and more for it, by increasing losses of civil freedom and by exorbitant and ever-augmenting sacrifices of goods and of blood, and that these no longer promoted any national object, but served only the insatiable ambition of a despot. No precautions of policy had been able, after the battle of Aspern, to prevent the progress of sentiments of doubt and anxiety, and, although the landing at Walcheren had not dealt the fatal blow, yet every one saw that this was owing not to the ability of the empire to defend itself, but to unskilfulness on the part of the assailant. Even among Napoleon's comrades in war, the nearest partners of his fame and of his booty, there were heard, after the fearful contests in Spain and the Austrian war, voices of censure, of weariness, and of longing for peace. From the silence of the people on the entrance of the emperor with his "Austrian woman" and the undignified course of the wedding festivities, so sharpsighted an observer as Montgelas derived the conviction that in France a general transformation was not far distant. "We must save money," said Madame Mère; "there is no knowing how long the comedy will last." At court, men thought they saw in Napoleon a flagging of his personal strength; he began to grow stony, luxury and fondness for ease appeared to seize upon him, and he feared the hardships of a camp life.

A change far deeper still had taken place with regard to the subject-peoples. The feeling of a benefit received on account of being delivered from the distresses of the ancient conditions had vanished long since at the sight of the universal lack of justice. The frippery of transfers of land, which to-day created a state, in order the next day to dismember or destroy it, and which treated the people like merchandise, had so long

shaken the old, lazy indifference to country and nationality, that in sorrow and shame the hot desire for the restoration of the lost independence awoke. The princes of the Confederation of the Rhine were indeed obedient now as formerly, but only from compulsion. The sagacious among their statesmen, like Montgelas, held themselves in readiness for the day of general breaking-up. Whoever still bore in himself only a spark of honor must have been stirred in the depths of his heart at this contempt of divine and human ordinances, and whoever had not utterly lost faith in God and divine righteousness, to him the permanence of this rule, which rested only upon brute force, appeared to be a moral impossibility. The Bonapartist edifice, thought Stein, rests upon corrupt principles, upon force and the most common artifices of government; there is in it all not one trait of humanity, of greatness, of magnanimity. The hope which lay quietly hidden away in many thousand hearts, was lifted up by the stirring events of the last war, notwithstanding its unhappy issue, to a firmer confidence. In Prussia the death of the noble Queen Louisa, on July 19, 1810, imparted a peculiarly deep and inward consecration to the grief for the country, and to the assurance of its speedy restoration. The memory of the high-hearted sufferer called for expiation, and her glorified form shone like a guardian spirit over the country which must be regained. The entire machinery of Napoleonic policy was powerless when opposed to sentiments such as these. Sagacious and enterprising publishers, like Friedrich Perthes at Hamburg and G. A. Reimer in Berlin, cherished these feelings by their publications, without being reached by the French. Even the frivolous Jerome felt himself, "as the advanced sentinel of France," called upon to open the emperor's eyes as to the feeling abroad in Germany.

In order for these feelings to find expression in deeds, a still longer period of time would have been required, if Napoleon had not constantly involved himself more and more deeply in his fate, and, deaf to all warnings, followed in the way which should of necessity lead him to destruction. When he undertook the campaign against Russia, which had been planned long before for the completion of his universal rule, while in his heel the wound caused by the Spanish war was still festering, he courted the fate to which he was to succumb.

The hopes of the Spaniards, which had sunk in consequence of the re-embarkation of the English and the recent defeats, were immediately revived on Napoleon's departure. The insubordination and dissension, the jealousy and rapacity, which prevailed among the French commanders,

as soon as they ceased feeling the firm hand of the emperor, were the Spaniards' best allies. If of these marshals and generals some enriched themselves by smuggling, others by appropriating great flocks of Merino sheep for which the soldiers were required to care, others again by emptying the public coffers or by robbing cloisters, town-halls, and castles of costly pictures, such circumstances everywhere impeded military operations. While Sébastiani and Victor were preparing to join Soult, who had marched from Galicia, and on March 29, 1809, had stormed Oporto, and to unite with him from the south for the purpose of reconquering Portugal and completing the subjugation of the peninsula by the capture of Seville, Cadiz, and Lisbon, they were compelled by the guerillas, in spite of their victories at Ciudad Real and Medellin (March 27 and 28), to beat a retreat. Soult, on his side, preferred to refresh himself from hardships with the supplies of the rich commercial city, and was delighting himself with the vision of a royal throne in northern Portugal, without suspicion of the nearness of so formidable an adversary as Wellesley, who now held the chief command of 24,000 English at Lisbon. This general suddenly crossed the Duero, and completely surprised the French in the night of May 12. Only with such veteran troops as he had would it have been possible for Soult to execute a retreat through mountains swarming with guerillas. And now the French stood again where they had stood at the opening of the year.

A support of Wellesley (Fig. 32) by a united and orderly power in Spain at this time would presumably have prepared for the French the same fate which befell them after the capitulation at Baylen. But, although the Central Junta, since its removal to Seville, had under Jovellanos's leadership gained a firmer position, had put the provincial juntas within narrower limits, and had concluded a formal treaty with England (January 14), and although, owing to the liberality with which the colonies manifested their patriotism, it found itself unexpectedly in possession of abundant pecuniary resources, nevertheless the opposition in its own bosom, between the old absolutist and the reform parties, besides rendering its authority, which was assailed on many sides, more and more untenable, made it impossible also to secure an energetic prosecution of the war and any improvement of the indolent and corrupt administration. Thus the favorable occasion remained unimproved. While the junta boldly brought forward excessive demands on the liberality of the British cabinet, it still refused it that advantage—the relaxation of the monopoly of commerce—which would have opened in the Spanish colonies a new market to English manufactures,




FIG. 32.—Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington. From a copper-plate engraving by W. Bromley (1769-1842); painting by Sir Thomas Lawrence (1769-1830).

then excluded from the continent. The Spaniards refused also to allow the admission of an English garrison into Cadiz, lest this important place should be converted into a second Gibraltar. No wonder that in Eng-

land enthusiasm for the heroic Spaniards essentially abated, and that the Tory ministry in its opposition to the wild unchaining of popular forces ordered Wellesley to confine himself to the defence of Portugal. It is true he suffered himself to be moved by the prayer of the Central Junta to extend aid to General Cuesta in an expedition to Estremadura, from which they anticipated splendid results; but when the pompous Spaniard, notwithstanding all warnings of the experienced field-marshall, attacked Marshal Victor on July 25, he was shamefully beaten. Wellesley amply retrieved the defeat of the Spaniards, and, on the 27th and 28th, repulsed with great loss the attacks of Victor upon his strong position at Talavera. This victory elevated Wellesley to the rank of Duke of Wellington, but he was prevented from improving it by the outrageous incompetency shown by the Spanish administration at this moment of great promise. La Romana, who had now assumed the supreme direction of the war, intended to inaugurate his government by a splendid feat of arms, but the two armies appointed for the reduction of Madrid were utterly dispersed. By these transactions the friendship between the allies suffered a severe shock, and Wellington now determined to confine himself to the defence of Portugal.

At the very time when peace made with Austria permitted Napoleon to send across the Pyrenees fresh masses of troops, and when King Joseph at the head of nearly 70,000 choice soldiers was descending the valley of the Guadalquivir and entering Seville, the fiercest party hatred was raging in the bosom of the Spanish government. Upon flight to Cadiz the Central Junta found themselves more than once put in peril of life by the fury of the population, and a storm so resistless was let loose upon them that they, pursued by ignoble suspicions, were obliged to institute a regency whose most important member was General Castaños. Soult, revelling in Seville, left them time to draw the relies of their army to the Isla de Leon, on which Cadiz lies, and to secure the city against a surprise, so that Marshal Victor, when he came before it on February 5, 1810, was obliged to content himself with a formal investment.

The regency therefore saw itself occupying the last projecting point of Spanish land upon which it could still feel that it was in security. It resolved to shorten the period fixed for the summoning of the Cortes, in order that responsibility might be shared. Since the yellow fever had broken out in Cadiz, the opening of the Cortes occurred in the Isla de Leon upon September 24. The Cortes began their action by the declaration that the national sovereignty rested in them, that they recognized Ferdinand VII. as the only legitimate king, and thus the cession of the crown to Napoleon, since it was without consent of the nation, was null

and void. They attributed the title of Majesty to themselves, as defenders of the sovereignty of the people. Thus suddenly was here completed the leap from a condition of deathlike political stupor to the principles of an extreme democracy. The same people, which in 1808 had risen up with wild enthusiasm for the absolute king, two years later had apparently become ripe for re-establishing the being of the state upon the basis of revolutionary ideas. The declaration of the Cortes, on January 1, 1811, that every act or treaty, alliance or stipulation, which the king concluded while deprived of his freedom was invalid, imparted new confirmation to the principle of the sovereignty of the people. Since the regency could not resolve to take the oath to popular sovereignty, it therefore withdrew. To find for a new government well-qualified men caused great difficulty. The more incompetent the supporters of the old system showed themselves to satisfy the claims of this storm-beaten age, the more rapidly the state glided down the steep path of radical theories, until finally the solemnly sworn constitution of the monarchy (March 19, 1812) left nothing remaining but the obedient execution of the sovereign will of the people.

After his entry into Seville, King Joseph judged the time to have come to allow mildness and conciliation to rule instead of force of arms. He proclaimed an amnesty, divided honors and rewards, and made every exertion to win over Cadiz by friendly treatment. But even had his reception been less roughly repelled, yet Napoleon's conduct had already sufficed to frustrate this attempt. The increasing vexation over the course of the war, its reactive effect upon his entire policy, indiscreet speeches dropped at Joseph's court during the war with Austria, hastened his decision to put an end here as elsewhere to the system of vassal states. By a decree of February 8, 1810, the Spaniards learned that Napoleon had decided to place under French commanders the provinces lying nearest the Pyrenees, to make of them four separate civil and military governments, and to take their revenues to supply the needs of his army. This produced boundless exasperation. The newly imposed taxes drove the inhabitants in crowds into the ranks of the guerillas, who organized themselves into military bodies. But on the part of the French circumstances came to light which betrayed a serious loss of strength. The unexampled hardships of this war finally demoralized even the ablest. The worst, however, was that the emperor, full of ill-will and disgust toward this war, neglected the direction of operations and the care of his troops. Masséna, who had no faith in the result, did not undertake the supreme command without great hesitation; he was expected to conquer Portugal and cast Wellington into the sea. But the disasters to

the French arms at every point of the scene of warfare postponed until autumn the expedition against Portugal. Meanwhile, Napoleon's determination was maturing to incorporate the entire peninsula into his empire. Italy should have the same fate. The decrees were already prepared. To avoid needless publicity, Joseph, after giving audience to his council of state, was to abdicate.

Such delay, however, had given Wellington time to prepare for the reception of the assailant. He prudently withdrew before Masséna through the narrow valley of the Mondego, while he laid waste behind him the land that was already a wilderness. At the Carthusian monastery of Busaco he held his ground on September 27, in an advantageous position, until at last, his left wing being flanked, he was obliged to make a rapid retreat. But when the French in pursuit reached the Tagus, the English gear disappeared behind a chain of entrenchments, before which the enemy recoiled in surprise. On the projection of the coast north from Lisbon were constructed, at Torres Vedras, 150 forts in three rows, with 600 guns, covered on one side by the fleet lying in the Tagus, on the other by the sea, and defended by 30,000 Englishmen, as many Portuguese, and 8000 Spaniards. In these impregnable fortifications Wellington defied the army of Masséna. The latter desired reinforcements, but already the thoughts of Napoleon had taken an entirely different direction, and Joseph, who could have brought them to him, experienced little desire to sustain plans aimed at his removal. Constrained by the bitterest necessity, Masséna retreated in March, 1811. Napoleon now added the injustice of recalling the old marshal in the deepest disgrace and putting Soult in his place. In order to profit by the results achieved, Wellington desired at least a part of the Spanish force to be placed under his orders, but this prudent proposal was repelled by the prejudice and suspicion of the regency. Suchet stormed Tarragona, the last of the Catalonian fortresses, took Montserrat, Merviedro, and Valencia, so that Napoleon was ready to imagine that by the spring his marshals would have done with the peninsula, and he even drew 25,000 men from it for the war against Russia. But he was speedily undeceived. As soon as Wellington learned this, he again assumed the offensive; by the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo (January 19, 1812) he opened the way to Castile, and on April 6 stormed Badajoz. Being about to march to Russia, Napoleon now entrusted the supreme command of the forces stationed in Spain to his brother. But neither Soult nor Caffarelli would obey Joseph's orders, and it thus happened that, on July 22, Marmont was defeated with great loss at Salamanca. On August 12, Wellington, amid great rejoicings of the people, made his

festal entrance into Madrid, and on the 25th Vietor raised the siege of Cadiz. It was a transformation from the deepest wretchedness to the most joyous assurance of victory. Now, finally, Wellington received command over all the Spanish troops. But once again the French gathered together all their forces and compelled him to withdraw behind the Tormes, and even to Portugal, and once more Joseph entered Madrid as king (November 2); but the cause of the French was for this reason none the less lost in Spain after the great decisive events that had occurred in Russia. After his return from that expedition Napoleon persuaded himself to give back the Spanish throne to Ferdinand, but the provinces north of the Ebro were to remain with France, and Spain was to be compensated therefor by Portugal. In May, 1813, Wellington renewed the attack under the most favorable circumstances, and pressed the French back to the Pyrenees. His victory over King Joseph at Vittoria on June 21, the storming of San Sebastian, and the capture of Pamplona, cleared Spanish soil of the enemy. On October 7, when Wellington defeated Soult, the victors passed over the Bidassoa.

Through his own wrongdoing Napoleon had aroused an enemy in Spain, whose master he was not able to become. But so greatly did he underestimate the significance of this fact, that he undertook also to effect the overthrow of Russia. Since his meeting with Alexander on the Niemen he had not lost sight of this great object of his ambition. Advance was made in this direction by massing French troops at points upon the Oder and the Vistula, and by the creation of the duchy of Warsaw. Unsettled though Alexander was in many of his ideas, yet he was far from intending to offer himself as the instrument to be employed by Napoleon in advancing his own greatness. While at Erfurt the theatrical piece was played of personal friendship between the two potentates, who divided between them the supremacy over Europe, his heart was swelling with suspicion and anger against the ally, who readily granted him barren Finland, but refused the satisfaction of his eager desire for the possession of Constantinople. He hardly had returned home when he ascertained positively that the same friend and ally, who had accorded to him at least the acquisition of the Danubian principalities, had put every lever in motion in order to strengthen the Sublime Porte in resisting Russian demands. The secret papers which, in March, 1809, his ambassador, Prince Kurakin, had been able to procure for him from the Tuilleries, convinced him that the French court already began to consider the alliance with Russia as more a mistake than an advantage. The conquest of Austria and the marriage of an Austrian princess completed

Napoleon's line of attack against Russia. The brutal manner in which Napoleon first began and then broke off his wooing at St. Petersburg allowed scarcely any other interpretation than that he already saw in his ally the future foe. But even had Alexander been able to overlook all these indications, the fate of his father would have warned him not to neglect the sentiment of his people, which had expressed itself so warmly against the Tilsit policy, that he was constrained to assure Caulaincourt that he and Chancellor Rumäntzoff were the only persons in his realm who approved of the alliance with France. The poor support rendered by Russia against Austria gave new sustenance to this exasperation between the two countries.

Poland, however, remained the principal object of anxious concern to Alexander. When, during the war, the Poles of Galicia were called upon to take up arms, and Poniatowski was appointed "commander-in-chief of the Polish army," Alexander protested energetically; he declared that he was opposed to the rehabilitation of Poland. Notwithstanding this, in the Peace of Vienna there appeared, as established and settled, the union of West Galicia with the duchy of Warsaw, which was thus well-nigh doubled in extent and population. True, Napoleon protested that the thought of a restoration of Poland was far from him. He was prepared, on the contrary, to extinguish every recollection of Poland, and to blot out the name of Poland, not only from official papers but even from history, and to put an end to all dreams which were still more injurious to the Poles themselves than disquieting to the governments whose subjects they were. But when Caulaincourt, on January 5, 1810, concluded at St. Petersburg a formal, binding treaty of this purport, his master, after he had wrapped himself in silence for six months, declared that it was impossible, and contrary to his dignity, to assume such an obligation. The utmost to which he could pledge himself was to favor no enterprise that aimed at the restoration of Poland. The refusal to accept this treaty caused Alexander to reply, that to him it was equivalent to a proof that Napoleon contemplated the restoration of Poland.

Far more deeply than this affair of Poland, the Continental System ent into the flesh of Russia. This country, which had been wont to give its raw products, wheat, wood, hemp, etc., in exchange for the manufactured and colonial merchandise of England, found itself suddenly deprived of its whole market. Alexander was, therefore, not only formally in his right, but he acted under the pressure of urgent necessity, when he refused to recognize the decrees arbitrarily issued by Napoleon from Trianon and Fontainebleau as binding on his empire, and refused in

conformity with them and the decree of Rambonillet to confiscate American ships, through which alone indispensable colonial merchandise was obtained. On December 31, 1810, he proclaimed a new tariff, which really facilitated the traffic in colonial goods under neutral flags, and, on the other hand, imposed severe restrictions on the importation of French manufactures and wines. But Napoleon regarded this proceeding as directed against himself, especially as now Brody was made a mart from which forbidden merchandise penetrated into the rest of Europe.

While the situation was thus strained, there came Napoleon's "remonstrances" in North Germany (December 13, 1810), by which, among others, one of the nearest relatives of the Russian imperial house, the Duke of Oldenburg, was robbed of his land. His former protector did not conceive it to be necessary to cause any communication concerning it to reach St. Petersburg. This was but the drop which made the full vessel run over. Alexander manifested the liveliest indignation. Napoleon, indeed, assumed the air as if the matter in question were but a bagatelle and spoke of an indemnification of the duke by means of Erfurt and the county of Blankenhain; but the czar issued a formal protest, very earnestly expressed, and did not recall the same as Napoleon demanded, but dispatched it to all the courts. The alliance which, since Tilsit, had ruled the world, began to be dissolved. Caulaincourt, who defended it, was recalled and replaced by General Lauriston. That Russia now began to build fortresses at Bobruisk, Dünaburg, and Kieff, and to move her army toward the west, was used by Napoleon as a pretext for taking measures in opposition on the Oder and Vistula. But he had already begun warlike preparations on his side in July, 1810. In deepest secrecy he caused great supplies of arms to be purchased in the name of the King of Saxony, and to be stored in the duchy of Warsaw, the fortresses of Dantzig, Glogau, and Stettin to be strengthened, and arrangements to be adopted for increasing the army in Germany to 200,000 men, and even to 300,000, by adding the Poles and soldiers from the Confederation of the Rhine.

Like a tempest threatening harm and destruction, the signs of the approaching war ascended over poor, afflicted Prussia. It seemed that a collision of the two colossal nations must crush the weak intermediate state. It was a question of life for it that the war be averted, or at least postponed as long as possible, until the forces of Prussia should be in some degree combined again, and Russia be placed in a position to wage it with a prospect of success. To this purport the king wrote repeatedly and urgently to the Emperor Alexander. Should war come, neutrality for Prussia was an impossibility; she had then only the choice

between adherence to Napoleon or to Russia. For the latter spoke the voice of the people and the army, the wish of the king and of his chancellor of state, but the former was demanded by the dire compulsion of necessity. Since Prussia constituted for Napoleon the road by which he was to assail Russia, at the least show of resistance to him, she would incur the destruction which even without this was perhaps designed for her. Already (March, 1811) the marching of troops to Dantzig and the fortresses on the Oder began, without the previous notice prescribed in the Treaty of September. The emperor ordered the collecting of three siege trains for Spandau, Kolberg, and Neisse. Hitherto Hardenberg, by punctilious performance of treaty obligations, had striven to deprive the French of every pretence for violent action; but now, thoroughly decided, he, by the king's command, considered carefully, in conjunction with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the question of ways and means, so that in the event of a sudden assault the army might be at least rescued from the borders. But in order to obtain disclosures with regard to Napoleon's real designs, to allay his suspicions, and gain time for negotiations with Russia and Austria, he declared at the same time to the French envoy, Saint-Marsan, his inclination to an alliance with France. Upon his advice the king consented to send to Paris Prince Hatzfeld, the most outspoken of all the Prussian friends of France, with congratulations on the birth of the King of Rome. If the emperor should enter into the proposals, he hoped to obtain conditions that would at least secure the existence of the state, and afford some alleviation of its condition. On May 14, the formal proffer of an alliance, offensive and defensive, went to Paris, for which the king desired the guarantee of his present territory, the evacuation of Glogau, modification of the contribution, and the abrogation of the clause limiting the strength of the Prussian army.

These warlike preparations on the part of Prussia had not escaped the Emperor Napoleon, and he had at once instructed his ambassador to put a stop to them: until his conflict with Russia was ended Prussia must remain quiet, no recruiting was to be ventured upon, no movement to be made. Only after a silence of nearly two months, during which his troops were constantly gathering upon the Prussian frontiers in increasingly dense masses, did he communicate his answer to the king's proposal: the alliance was not expressly but tacitly declined, and the giving up of Glogau, according to treaty, was expressly refused. A doubt could now hardly be entertained that Napoleon desired to play with Prussia, to ensnare her completely, in order to give her, as he had given Sardinia and Spain, the finishing stroke when defenceless. This brought about the acceptance of the views of Scharnhorst, who urgently

insisted upon energetic military preparations. The erection of fortified encampments was begun at Kolberg and Neisse. Gneisenau was summoned to Berlin, Scharnhorst went secretly to St. Petersburg, and by the end of August 74,500 men were under arms. Hardenberg thought that the moment had come for an open breach between France and Russia, for at the great levee on the emperor's birthday (August 15) Napoleon had addressed a very warm apostrophe to Prince Kurakin, as was his wont immediately before letting loose the storm. The time seemed to him to have come for no longer concealing the preparations made; Hardenberg declared to Count Saint-Marsan that Prussia was arming because Napoleon had rejected the proposed alliance; she would arm in support of France if France would enter into an honorable alliance, otherwise the King of Prussia would prefer to go to destruction sword in hand.

To Napoleon these disclosures came not inopportune. Often as he recurred to the thought of utterly destroying Prussia, the present moment did not seem adapted to that object. In order to complete his preparations for the next spring in all quiet, to be beforehand with the Russians, and to carry the war directly into their territory after beginning it on the Niemen, it was for him of the highest importance fully to master the resources of Prussia; but should he drive her by a violent course to a desperate resistance, the subjugation of that country would not only delay his march eastward, but might also give the Russians the signal for advancing upon Warsaw. Russia once conquered, he needed not to regard himself as bound by any treaty, no matter how solemn, and could treat Prussia according to his pleasure. Yet both procedures could be combined, if he should indeed negotiate, but make use of negotiation for the purpose of completely ensnaring Prussia—not then to bind himself by conditions, but to subjugate her unconditionally. For this reason he detained Hatzfeld long in Paris by fine words, caused to be announced in Berlin the most friendly intentions and the fullest readiness to conclude an alliance, but, on the other hand, desired Prussia immediately to cease her preparations; should that not be done, Saint-Marsan was to leave Berlin and Davout to march into Prussia.

The situation of Prussia grew worse from day to day. Even the desperate struggle, which Gneisenau and the patriots passionately desired, had meaning only on the supposition that the Russians were ready to assist. But this hope was vanishing more and more. Alexander's determination was finally made to confine himself to the defence of the frontiers of his own country. He knew, moreover, since 1807,

that a foreign war was considered by his subjects as a foolish sacrifice for others and an unprofitable squandering of Russian blood. To the urgent letter of his friend, King Frederick William, he therefore coldly replied (May 28, 1811): that he wished at least to have the consolation of not being the aggressor; he would regard all that was done against Prussia as declaration of war against Russia, but he had no means of preventing the overrunning of that country by the French; he approved the construction of fortified camps at Kolberg and Pillau, which would draw off from him one part of the attacking force; he would himself, in the event of war, follow the system of avoiding great battles and of organizing long lines of operations for retrograde movements to entrenched camps, the same plan which had aided Wellington to obtain victory in Spain. An urgent demand of August 15 did not at all lead Alexander to depart from his policy of delay. Toward Prussia, he wrapped himself in silence. Hardenberg was in despair. Nothing therefore remained for him but to promise Napoleon that the preparations should be discontinued. But the dilatory manner in which this was done did not satisfy the suspicious Napoleon. While he was himself incessantly strengthening his army on the Elbe, he compelled the recall of Blücher from Kolberg, because he had continued the work upon the fortifications. Full power had to be given to a secretary of Saint-Marsan to convince himself by actual inspection whether labor on the entrenchments had ceased. On October 29 Saint-Marsan made public the conditions on which his emperor would be prepared for an alliance: either the entrance of Prussia into the Confederation of the Rhine, or the thorough carrying out of the Continental System, maintenance of the Treaty of September without restoration of Glogau, and, in case of a war with Russia, free transit through Prussian territory, and the furnishing of an auxiliary corps of 20,000 men, etc.

The decision was approaching. A few days later (November 3) Scharnhorst returned from St. Petersburg. He had made every effort to obtain Russian aid, but had only secured the promise that 12,000 Russians would co-operate in covering Königsberg, and the certainty that Alexander, notwithstanding his assurances of friendship, was determined under all circumstances to await Napoleon's attack, and to leave Prussia to her fate. In vain did Prussia look around for help in other directions. England, with whom secret negotiations had been held through the medium of Gneisenau and the Hanoverian Ompteda, proposed only a supply of arms, and for the rest reserved her strength for the war in Spain. Not even so much could be expected from Austria. The distinguished Wilhelm von Humboldt, who, since September, 1810,

had represented Prussia at Vienna, did indeed direct all his energies, by the removal of the ancient deep-rooted distrust that existed between Russia and Austria, to create a barrier against the all-powerful Napoleon, but without any visible result. Not that the Emperor Francis had changed his feeling with regard to Napoleon since becoming his father-in-law; in fact, on receiving a letter from his daughter in which she expressed her happiness as wife, he exclaimed: "She may say what she pleases, I cannot stand the fellow." Just as little had Metternich suffered himself to be drawn into the wake of the Napoleonic policy in consequence of that marriage. Although the Treaty of Vienna pledged Austria to break off all connection with England, yet one of his measures after its conclusion was secretly to renew that connection. He also made use of the French marriage in order to strike off the fetters which limited the Austrian army to 150,000 men. He was already placing steadily before the mind the time when Austria should have gathered together all her forces, in order to avert or resist the threatening peril of subjugation, but he dreaded nothing more than precipitating Austria, for the third time, without sufficient preparation, into war with such a formidable adversary. Prussia's power he rated low, and he consequently declared in reply to Hardenberg's disclosures that Austria found herself in no situation in case of a French attack for rendering any support and would restrict herself to neutrality.

Thus everywhere there was animosity to Napoleon and the purpose to throw off his yoke, but nowhere was there active timely aid for hard-pressed Prussia. Some, as Colonel Knesebeck and Ancillon, the instructor of the crown prince, favored unconditional adherence to France; Count Hatzfeld denounced "the fanatical sect of the *Tugendfreunde*" (p. 93) as German Jacobins, and suggested in order to gain fresh favor in the eyes of Napoleon the removal of its members, that is, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and the rest. Others thought the only course open was to go to destruction with honor and not with ignominy. The king reached his decision. He decided in favor of accepting the French proposals of alliance with certain modifications. But at the same time Knesebeck went to St. Petersburg. His ostensible business purported to be to prevail upon the Emperor Alexander to make some advances in order to avoid a breach with Napoleon, and thus spare humanity and his friend, the king, incalculable misfortune, but secretly he was to represent to the emperor the coerced situation of Prussia, so that in spite of the accession to France the connection with Russia might not be wholly lost.

To Napoleon Knesebeck's mission could be only desirable. His entire effort was still directed to gaining time in order to stand upon the

Vistula in spring with his full force prepared for war. The submission of Prussia gave him the control of the resources of that country. While he was negotiating with Krusemark, the division of Friant moved from Mecklenburg and marched into Pomerania, ostensibly to seize colonial merchandise and to enforce the inefficient embargo; from Magdeburg the division of Gudin entered the Prussian territory; Oudinot's advance severed the military connection between Brandenburg and Silesia; the Viceroy Eugene proceeded from Ratisbon toward Glogau with the Italian army and the Bavarian troops. All in Berlin were prepared for the worst, the king's traveling carriage stood in readiness, when intelligence came from Paris that, on February 24, Krusemark had subscribed the treaty of alliance. Without leaving him time to receive new instructions, Napoleon had sharply set before him the alternative of the advance of his army—already commenced—into Prussia being either friendly or hostile. Prussia accordingly concluded an alliance with France against all powers with whom France might be at war, with the exception, only, of Spain, Italy, and Turkey; to the war with Russia she would send 20,000 men with 60 cannon, and the whole country, except Potsdam and the three Silesian circles of Breslau, Öls, and Brieg, was opened to the passage of the emperor's troops. Prussia furthermore engaged to furnish immense supplies in vehicles, horses, oxen, and military stores of every description, and also bound herself to make no levy or gathering of troops, or movement of soldiers otherwise than in concert with Napoleon. It was the complete subjection of Prussia. Not everyone could prevail upon himself to bow the neck beneath the inevitable. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, unwilling to suffer themselves to be used as instruments of the subjugation, took their dismissal. Clausewitz, Boyen, Barner, Chasot, Count Dohna—Scharnhorst's son-in-law—and many others followed their example, some going to Russia and others to Spain to fight there against their country's enemy. Napoleon, on the other hand, had attained the object at which he aimed. However, he did not long continue to stand by the conditions, but found that it would be necessary that Spandau and Pillau also be occupied by the French, that Berlin have a French commandant, and that the magazines at Kolberg and the stores of arms at Pillau and Königsberg should be sequestered for his army.

Austria, also, found it impossible to maintain her neutrality. On March 4, 1812, at Paris, Schwarzenberg subscribed the treaty of alliance. Therein both states pledged to each other, in the event of hostile attack, mutual aid with 30,000 men and 60 pieces of artillery; they guaranteed possession of their respective territories, promised to maintain the integ-

rity of Turkey, and to carry out the policy of exclusion against England. In the war with Russia, the Austrians were to take part as a distinct and separate corps under an Austrian general and were to operate under Napoleon's immediate command, that is to say, not to be commanded by a French marshal. Should there be a restoration of Poland, Napoleon promised to consent to the exchange of Galicia for the Illyrian provinces, and in the event of a happy issue of the war he would secure to Austria indemnifications and enlargement of territory. Under shelter of this treaty Metternich hoped to render his state again capable of self-defence, and for this reason made no delay in pressing England to prosecute the Spanish war with the utmost possible energy. To the Russian envoy the Emperor Francis expressed the wish that Russia might not consider Austria as a party earnestly making war upon her, but in secret continue friendly relations. Between the two was made a mutual pledge, oral indeed, but formal, that on the Russian left flank Austria would carry on only a semblance of hostile operations.

A chief factor in Napoleon's calculation was his supposition that Russia, whom he intended to attack from the west, would need to employ a considerable part of her forces in the south against Turkey, and in the north against Sweden. In both particulars he was mistaken. With the former Alexander had carried on war on the basis of the Erfurt stipulations, although the powerful Grand Vizier Bairaktar, who had raised Mahmud II. to the throne, did everything to avoid furnishing occasion for hostilities. After he was overthrown by the Janizaries, and when he saw all was lost, blew himself up (November 16, 1808), the refusal of the demand by Russia to dismiss the English ambassador from Constantinople was made to serve as a motive for renewing the war. But the dreamed-of victorious advance of the Russians to the Golden Horn, which it was expected would compel the speedy cession of the Danubian principalities, failed to be realized. The assaults upon Giurgevo and Braila were beaten off, and the whole campaign miscarried. More favorably passed that of the following year (1810), which opened with the taking of Silistria, but the more plainly war with Napoleon was imminent the less could Alexander think of an energetic prosecution of the war against Turkey. But there occurred, toward the end of 1811, a wholly unexpected success through the imprudence of the grand vizier, who had crossed the Danube at Rustehuk, and suffering himself to be surrounded by Kutusoff, was obliged, on December 8, to lay down his arms. On May 28, 1812, the Peace of Bucharest with the Porte was signed, which gave the Pruth as a frontier to the Russian empire, and made the army of the Danube available for the war against Napoleon.

As far as concerns Sweden, it is true, on Napoleon's demand, she had acceded to the Continental System, and (November, 1810) had declared war against England. But this was done unwillingly, and she had conducted the embargo in such a lax manner that the enraged emperor ordered the military occupation of Swedish Pomerania. This act led the crown prince (Bernadotte) to lend an ear to the proposals of Russia, who promised him by the Treaty of St. Petersburg (April 5, 1812) Norway as compensation for Finland. A Russian army of 35,000 men, it was agreed, should aid Sweden, and this combined force under command of Bernadotte was to land upon the German coast in Napoleon's rear; but it proved to be impracticable to carry out this understanding. Peace between England and Russia was subscribed at St. Petersburg on July 18, and a formal offensive and defensive alliance concluded; Alexander even granted the delivering up of the Russian Baltic fleet, 18 ships of the line and 12 frigates, demanded by England in pledge.

Thus Napoleon's assault gave occasion to a fresh league of peoples who set themselves against his universal supremacy.

Since the summer of 1811 there was no longer any doubt in either St. Petersburg or Paris with regard to the war, which seemed to be portended by a great comet that nightly blazed in the heavens. If Alexander's adjutant Czernieff again and again traveled the road between the two capitals, and Lauriston continued to negotiate for peace, the intention on both side was only in this manner to delay and to deceive the adversary. Nothing further was aimed at, and the peace overtures which Napoleon caused to be made to the English government were rejected by it with cutting coldness. When to Alexander's declaration that before he could enter upon negotiations the French must evacuate Prussia and all Germany as far as the Rhine, no satisfactory answer was returned (April, 1812), his ambassador, Kurakin, demanded his passports and departed. Count Narbonne, whom Napoleon sent at the very last hour to his old ally, was rather a spy than an envoy of peace.

Napoleon was now standing before the most gigantic undertaking of his life, before that which cast into the shade everything which he had ever previously attempted or achieved. Already Moscow failed to content him as the aim of the expedition; a kind of intoxicated insatiableness drove him on to push forward toward distances more and more remote and fantastic; he dreamed of conquests in Asia, even as far as the Ganges. His attendants, however, were far removed from sharing in a confidence so extravagant. Much as the French were accustomed to silent obedience, yet some ventured to lay before him counter-representations. The people were tired of war and satiated with victories,

Even the army, which for a long time had been animated by no feeling for country or for freedom, and which from being a national army had become a variegated mixture of peoples, lacked the elation of spirit that characterized their earlier campaigns. Remembering the fearful hardships which, a few years ago, they had been compelled to undergo in those frightful northern latitudes, even the bravest were in terror in view of a peril that should drag them into a land still more remote and barbarous. It is one of the most astonishing proofs of the mastership which Napoleon possessed over the minds of men, that he knew how to remove all these doubts, to dissipate all gloomy forebodings, and to gainsay all warnings, so that alike his officers and his soldiers, if not joyfully, yet without murmuring, entered upon an expedition from which so few of them were to return.

Only a genius like Napoleon's could have undertaken the problem of preparing for a war of such dimensions in a suitable manner and in a manner that gave promise of success. It was already the end of the year 1811 when those who were the earliest to move in the remotest regions within the circuit of his power began their march, from Portugal, Spain, and Lower Italy. Their movements were veiled in profound secrecy; no journal dared to make mention of them. But fear and amazement seized on the inhabitants when they saw this endless army-flood upon all roads and ways, rolling eastward. At first regiments marched for the most part singly, and during the march reviews were held by the French generals from time to time. Not till arriving at the Elbe, Oder, or Vistula were the regiments combined into brigades, divisions, and army-corps. Of the auxiliary nations beside the Austrians only the Italians, Poles, Bavarians, Saxons, and Westphalians remained as a corps together; all others were mingled with the French troops. The Poles alone had a native leader, Prince Jozef Poniatowski (Fig. 33). In addition to 1372 pieces of artillery, and the ammunition columns pertaining thereto, six bridge equipments, a great siege train, tools and other materials for engineers, the army took with them all imaginable objects of which they might have need in the remote wilderness: glass, seeds of different kinds, farming implements and mills, fire-engines and ice-spurs, provisions and medicines—nothing was forgotten. Equally comprehensive were the arrangements made for the subsistence of these masses of men and animals. Berlin was required to furnish, from March 28 to September 1, quarters and food for 240,000 men and 130,000 horses. The total number of the "grand army" was estimated at a half-million infantry and 80,000 cavalry. Of the cavalry one-half was attached to the infantry corps, and the remainder, divided into four



LE PRINCE JOSEPH PONIATOWSKY
Se trouve à l'entrée de l'Academie Impériale des Beaux-Arts à Saint-Pétersbourg une statue de bronze de l'Empereur Napoléon au 1^{er} Siège de la ville de Crimée.

FIG. 33.—Prince Jozef Anton Poniatowski. From a copper-plate engraving by Johann Pichler (1765-1806); original painting by Joseph Grassi (1769-1838).

corps, was kept together as a great reserve, under the command of the King of Naples. Only half of these combatants consisted of Frenchmen.

As respects his own person, Napoleon delayed as long as possible in Paris, and, if his journals were to be believed, occupied only with hunting and court festivities. On May 9, the *Moniteur* suddenly announced that the emperor had departed, "in order to hold a review of the troops assembled on the Vistula." His journey, when his wife and a splendid court accompanied him, appeared to anticipate the triumph that awaited him. At Mayence, the border city of his immediate kingdom, the neighboring vassal princes waited upon him, and thence his reception was everywhere with triumphal arches, the thunder of cannon, the ringing of bells, and submissive greetings. On May 17, he made his entry into Dresden, which shone with all the bravery of springtime. Not as a guest of the King of Saxony, but as a host in his own house, the Emperor of the West here received his parents-in-law and the different princes of the Rhine. The King of Prussia, also, attended by his crown prince and chancellor of state, was obliged to complete this demonstration of Napoleonic omnipotence.

Externally considered, these days at Dresden formed the highest point in the life of Napoleon. The European review, which he held, and his unprecedented preparations for war, would, as he hoped, shake the purpose of Alexander. But on May 28, Narbonne returned, his business unaccomplished. On May 29, Napoleon left Dresden, and on June 22 announced to his army from his headquarters at Vilkovisk the beginning of the "second Polish war." In a mighty curve extending from the frontier of Galicia to the Baltic there stood his masses of armed men ready to fall upon the hostile territory. At the farthest point on the right were the Austrians under Schwarzenberg, joined on their left by King Jerome with 68,000 Westphalians, Saxons, and Poles; connected with these on the flank was the Viceroy Eugene, with 70,000 Italians, Bavarians, and French; the centre, under the emperor's immediate command, consisted of the Guards, the corps of Davout, Oudinot, and Ney, together with the greater part of Murat's cavalry, a total of 220,000 men. The extreme left wing was composed of the tenth army corps under Maedonald, to which belonged also the 21,000 Prussians, as the 27th division; these, at Napoleon's desire, were commanded by the aged and feeble General Grawert, but the king, by way of precaution, appointed General York to be second in command. Two regiments of Prussian cavalry were ordered to be placed under Murat. The communication between Maedonald and the centre was maintained by the corps of Saint-Cyr.

At Kovno, on June 23, 1812, under the eyes of the emperor, the army of the centre crossed the Niemen, the boundary river of the Russian em-

pire, and were astonished to discover no enemy on the further side but a few Cossacks. Impatient to come at the enemy, Napoleon pressed forward, but he reached Vilna (Fig. 31) on June 28 without having encountered any noteworthy opposition. Here he delayed until July 16. Vilna was the final point of connection between him and the remainder of Europe. With impetuous enthusiasm the Poles received, in the ancient capital of Lithuania, their liberator, the restorer of their independence. Their army already amounted to 75,000 men. The diet, which opened with great form at Warsaw on May 26, had invited all parts of the former kingdom of Poland to assist in the act of confederation that was to be adopted; an embassy conveyed to the emperor their request for its confirmation. But the word so earnestly desired remained unspoken. It is true, as far back as the beginning of 1811, the state counsellor Bignon had appeared at Warsaw with all manner of promises, but Napoleon was only playing his game with the Poles. The Archbishop of Mechlin, de Pradt, whom he had sent out from Dresden as his ambassador extraordinary, was instructed "to urge the Poles to enthusiasm, but to guard them against delirium." Should Poland be restored, all possibility of a reconciliation with Alexander would be destroyed, and this did not in the least correspond with Napoleon's interests. Undeceived, the Poles returned home from Vilna. Their enthusiasm grew cold, a rising of Russian Poland was to be thought of no more, and Napoleon had soon occasion to complain to Poniatowski of the wretched spirit that prevailed among his countrymen.

But of the arrangements on a great scale for the subsistence of the army, of which officially such boasts had been made, in reality hardly a trace appeared. It is true never did an army drag with it such a multitude of wagons, although in Napoleon's view the lessening of the quantity of baggage was regarded as a chief improvement in carrying on war; but all measures adopted had been baffled by the enormous dimensions of the expedition, by the embezzlements of officers, military and civil, and of contractors. On the Niemen the emperor had required "the kings, princes, marshals and generals" to take care that their corps should have with them provisions for twenty days, but in the rapidity of the advance the supply-columns, with their heavy teams of oxen sinking in the loose sand, found it impossible to keep up, so they parted from the troops to which they were attached and the latter never succeeded in seeing them again. It was strictly ordered that every soldier should provide himself with food for fourteen days, but the burden was too great for the troops, and as soon as possible they freed themselves from it. If they drew provisions at times, it was not bread or biscuit, but mouldy meal.




FIG. 34.—A post of Imperial Guards before Vilna. Sketched from life by A. Adam on July 3, 1812. Albert Adam went with Napoleon's expedition to Russia, and, from Willenberg in East Prussia to Moscow, made sketches of characteristic scenes in this war.

Soon no one concerned himself further with regard to subsistence. Thus men were from the beginning of the war thrown upon themselves. But it was little that was afforded by this desolate country, pathless and covered for a great distance with dreary forests of pine. To this was added the oppressive heat of the long days of a northern summer, which, after being suspended for five days by heavy showers, increased at the beginning of July until it was intolerable, so that the soldiers, especially those belonging to the last levies, who were too young and weak, sank down by hundreds from exhaustion. Hospital wagons were not in readiness, or they were not in sufficient numbers, so that a sick man was therefore a dead man. Amid such hardships the bands of discipline were loosened in the most perilous manner. Regiments were obliged to send out large detachments to forage, which often did not return to the corps till after many days. It became necessary to organize movable columns for the purpose of seizing and bringing back the numerous deserters. In vain did Napoleon issue orders to shoot all who lagged behind without valid cause, for it would have been necessary to shoot many thousands; in vain did Davout hold at Minsk a fearful criminal court which sentenced thirteen men to be shot and a colonel to be cashiered. The horses fared the worst. Ten thousand prostrate horses covered the roads of the country and infected the atmosphere.

It was not upon the retreat and by reason of the fierce winter that the Grand Army was sacrificed; these but completed that which on the advance had been commenced by the heat of summer, want of subsistence, lack of discipline, hardships, and fighting.

Alexander received news of the enemy's invasion at a ball which General Bennigsen had given him at one of his seats. Already in April he had repaired to Vilna, to assume, although destitute of any military experience, the supreme command of his army. Much to his indignation he found it far weaker than he expected, notwithstanding the entire year spent in preparation. The force which he was able to oppose to his adversary on the western frontier did not exceed 175,000 to 180,000 men. An underestimate of the rapidity and power of the enemy, corruption in Russia, want of correspondence between the means of transportation and the immense extent of the empire, all co-operated in bringing it to pass that the assailant could not be hindered from pressing his way into the interior. It is true, furthermore, that among the Russian commanders not one was found who could measure himself with Napoleon. The military oracle of the czar, since the year 1807, was General Phull, formerly a Prussian officer, a man of gifts, but an unpractical theorizer. The thought of weakening the enemy while avoiding regular




FIG. 35. — A regiment of Pino's division on the march : July 16, 1812. Sketched from life by A. Adam.

battles, by withdrawing into the interior, and then ruining him by superior numbers, was so obvious that it could not fail to occur to many minds simultaneously. Alexander had remarked in March that he was prepared for failures, but they would not discourage him, for while retreating he would leave both for himself and for the enemy a waste. Men, women, cattle, horses, all would be removed, and for that purpose the Russian light horse were peculiarly adapted. In the form of a complete, logical plan, however, this thought of "Parthian warfare" had arisen only in the heads of foreigners. Count Armfeldt, who had passed from the Swedish into the Russian service, elaborated such a plan, and a similar one was brought by Count Lieven from Berlin. Gneisenau, also, in a memorial addressed to the czar, advised the same tactics of retreat. On the contrary, upon the part of the Russians, army and nation were so thoroughly persuaded of the duty and necessity of waging an offensive war that whoever avowed publicly the plan of retreat would have been branded as traitor or coward. But in the imperial headquarters there was uncertainty with regard to what the enemy and what the Russians would have to do.

According to the system devised by Phull, an encampment, so fortified as to be impregnable, at Drissa on the Düna, and apparently modelled after the camp of Frederick the Great at Bunzelwitz, was to constitute the chief support of the defence, and, as a flanking position, cover the roads to St. Petersburg and Moscow. Since he conceived that Napoleon's principal army would cross near midway of the course of the Vistula, between Grodno and Bialystok, the war was to be carried on in the open country by two separate, independent armies. While the first western army, a little over 100,000 strong and commanded by the Livonian, Barclay de Tolly, should confine itself to the defence, as expected, the second army of the west under Prince Bagration was to execute a powerful diversion in the rear of the enemy; an army of reserve under Tormassoff was assigned to Volhynia and the southern part of the government of Minsk as the field of its operations. Phull was so thoroughly persuaded that events would take place precisely as he had conceived them, that he did not seriously consider any other possibilities. Napoleon's attack, however, was made from an entirely different direction, upon the roads leading from Kovno to Vilna. When this was found out, the greatest haste was rendered necessary. Resistance was not to be thought of; it was important to collect the widely scattered army and to save it behind the Düna in the encampment at Drissa. Vilna was evacuated after the magazines were burned. Alexander placed the supreme command in the hands of Barclay; he himself hastened to Moscow in order to urge forward the

increasing of his force. He made known by an appeal to his people the greatness of the danger, and demanded of them to incur the necessary sacrifices for the salvation of the country. It was the first time that a Russian ruler had turned to the nation in this manner, and his appeal met with an enthusiastic response. The aged Metropolitan Plato received Alexander as the Russian David, who was to overthrow the haughty Goliath of France. The nobles and merchants of the government of Moscow undertook to raise and equip 80,000 men; their example found imitators in the other provinces.

But before these re-enforcements could appear in the field, much time must elapse, and it was impossible to avoid suffering for the great fault of having actually left a door open for the entrance of the enemy between the two separated armies of the west. Under these circumstances Napoleon formed his plan to cut off by far superior forces Bagration with his 40,000 men, and to surround and destroy him. The Viceroy Eugene (Fig. 36) with 60,000 men prevented his union with Barclay; to his



FIG. 36.—Bivouac of the Viceroy Eugene in the night of July 8-9, 1812, in Vielkie Soleizniki. Sketched from life by A. Adam.

rear, beyond Minsk, Napoleon sent Davout with 40,000 of his best troops, while in front Jerome was to attack from Grodno with 80,000 men; however, in order to give Davout time for his march, Jerome

was to commence operations five days later, and not to press Bagration too warmly. The incapable Jerome so far misunderstood his duty that he remained entirely idle, and completely lost knowledge of Bagration's movements. When Davout, after forced marches, accomplished by great effort, reached Minsk on July 8, Jerome was nowhere to be seen, but Bagration had had time to enter the forests on the lower Beresina. Already Bagration was imagining that he had fortunately escaped, when the dreaded Davout hastened up to him on July 20, and threw himself in the way of the Russian commander. But half of Davout's army had become stragglers, and Bagration had now double his force, and might have vanquished Davout, but he broke off the bloody engagement that had begun at Mohileff, on the 23d, satisfied with being able to withdraw unmolested to Dashkoviezi. Just as little successful was the attempt to press apart from Barclay and surround the corps of Wittgenstein on the right wing of the Russians, by the co-operation of Oudinot, Ney, and Maedonald; disaster befell only Barclay's left wing under Dochturoff, to whom in the general confusion the order to retreat had not been given. Yet Napoleon did not abandon his plan; he purposed with a part of his army to keep Barelay in the encampment at Drissa, and with another part to march to Vitebsk, and thereby not only prevent the former from uniting with Bagration, but also cut him off from the road to Moscow. But when, after delaying twenty days at Vilna, he turned to the new enterprise, it was already too late. For meanwhile at the Russian headquarters the untenability of the encampment at Drissa had been perceived. It was Barelay's good fortune that Napoleon, wholly occupied in surrounding Bagration, had left him so long in quiet. Leaving behind him Wittgenstein, on the central and lower Düna, with 25,000 men, Barelay broke up from Drissa on July 14. In direct opposition to Phull's plans, the union of the two armies of the west became the object of all the movements, and the endeavor to reach each other led them at once far back into the interior of the country. Pahlen's cavalry corps and Ostermann's division were attacked with fury, on the 25th, at Ostrovo, by the King of Naples, and after a three days' engagement the Russians were driven from all their positions; but Barelay, nevertheless, reached Vitebsk first. Thus Napoleon's second plan had miscarried.

Now at the least it was the firm hope of the emperor to see, on the other side of the Lutchesa, which empties into the Düna at Vitebsk, the Russian army standing in battle array, and that on this spot would take place the decisive engagement which he so fervently desired; but when the morning came, the other shore was deserted.

Barelay had, indeed, by the departure of Alexander obtained a some-

what freer hand, but in order not to offend Bagration, his senior in rank, nothing was settled with regard to the supreme command of the entire army. Although a commander-in-chief of only moderate abilities, he yet possessed a certain quiet firmness that was not easily disconcerted;



FIG. 37.—A Russian prisoner of war in the headquarters at Kamen, July 21, 1812.
Sketched from life by A. Adam.

but his cold, formal nature had made him unbeloved. Yermoloff, his chief of staff, hated him because he was a foreigner and because of the Germans in his entourage; furthermore the czar had left his personal suite with him. Yielding to the pressure of the officers about him he

had embraced the decision to await the enemy where he stood; but when he received intelligence that Bagration, in consequence of the unfortunate fight at Mohileff, could not join him here, he began the retreat to Smolensk. Bagration also arrived there on August 3, and the union of the two armies of the west was completed (Fig. 37).

All that Napoleon had attained thus far was that he had pressed forward a distance of 300 miles into the enemy's country, and that with losses unparalleled on the part of a victorious army. Since leaving the Niemen the diminution had amounted to 100,000 men, and every additional step in advance must bring with it still greater losses. First of all, the utterly exhausted troops needed rest, especially as the heat had become intolerable. Under such circumstances the consideration impressed itself spontaneously on the emperor, whether it would not be prudent to extend this year's campaign no further than the Düna and Dnieper, deferring its completion to the next year. His position, reaching from Riga to the morasses of Volhynia, had an extent of three hundred and fifty miles, the wings still remained considerably behind the centre. On the left Macdonald was investing Riga. On the right Napoleon had intended only Reynier to oppose Tormassoff; Schwarzenberg was to be recalled to the Grand Army; but after the Saxon brigade of Klengel was assailed on July 27 at Kobryn by Tormassoff with nearly his entire army, and was compelled to lay down its arms, it became necessary for Schwarzenberg again to unite with Reynier, in order to make head against the enemy. With every step which the main army took forward, the angle formed by the front line became sharper, and the lengthening flanks were more and more exposed to the enemy's attacks. At Vitebsk, moreover, Napoleon received the unexpected news of the conclusion of peace between Russia and Turkey at Bucharest. But Napoleon had placed himself in a situation where to halt appeared scarcely less critical than to advance. Behind him were doubtful allies, the war in Spain, the danger of landings by the English and Swedes, and he felt the need of bringing his enterprise quickly to an end. He thought the entrance into the enemy's capital would intimidate the czar and throw him at his feet begging for peace. The power to weigh facts judiciously he had long since lost; impossibilities no longer existed for him. Unfortunately for him Davout, the most sensible and sharpsighted of his commanders, had fallen out with Berthier, and he himself also withdrew his confidence from the marshal, giving his preference to Murat, whose rashness was more flattering to his own passions. The advance was decided upon. Napoleon transferred his army to the left bank of the Dnieper and took the road to Smolensk (Fig. 38), and now the

Russians seemed about to offer the battle for which he had so eagerly longed. Murat and Ney celebrated the emperor's birthday (August 15) by a brilliant engagement with the rear-guard of the enemy at Inkovo.

The Russian army, although it likewise had suffered severely, had a strong feeling of confidence and a great desire for battle. Since the uniting of the two armies of the west, honor appeared to demand more imperiously than ever to cease retreating. Barclay finally adopted measures to fall upon the enemy with his entire force, but at the last he was overcome anew by anxiety at the thought of seeking the lion in his lair.



FIG. 38. — Before Smolensk on August 20, 1812. Sketched from life by A. Adam.

But the outbreaks of anger from his headquarters, the charges of incapacity, cowardice, treachery, that raged about him from the grand duke, Bagration, and others, brought him back to his first determination. Napoleon, after vainly waiting a half day expecting the Russians to sally forth from Smolensk and deliver battle, on his side advanced to the attack in the afternoon of August 17. No one at the Russian headquarters had thought of putting Smolensk in a condition of defence, since there was generally no plan conceived that extended beyond the encampment at Drissa. But to yield up the holy city, so rich in churches and cloisters, was repugnant to every Russian heart. Bar-

clay's purpose, however, was to hold it only long enough to make sure of the road to Moscow, and to render it impossible for the enemy to cut him off from it. After a hot and bloody conflict the assailants gained possession of the suburbs. Barclay gave orders to retreat. Then, however, the greatest indignation arose in the army, bursting through all restraints, resulting in open insubordination. The Grand Duke Constantine and Bennigsen, at the head of the furious generals, desired to compel the recall of the orders that had been issued. In this critical moment Barclay maintained his dignity in a worthy manner. Quietly he sent back the angry generals to their duties; to the grand duke he signified that he had papers of such importance to transmit to the czar as could be entrusted only to the brother of the sovereign. In order not to exhibit the appearance of having been beaten, he remained through the 18th on the further side of the Dnieper, as if ready for a fresh engagement. After the victors had made a triumphal entrance amid the ruins of Smolensk, Napoleon on the 19th marched out in pursuit of the departing foe. At Valutina and on the Stragan brook, Murat and Ney engaged the Russian rearguard with great fury and forced it to give way.

From the crossing of the Dnieper until the end of August, Napoleon's army had been diminished to the extent of 30,000 more men. Men and horses suffered excessive fatigue, dysentery and typhus fever caused fearful ravages, and from day to day the scarcity of necessary food for the healthy and the sick became greater and greater. The ablest of his generals regarded it as having now become indispensable to remain at Smolensk, postponing till the next year the expedition to Moscow. These views were reinforced by the unfavorable news from the right wing. For Tormassoff had there forced his way into the duchy of Warsaw, had spread terror far and wide, and was then indeed only by the united forces of Schwarzenberg and Reynier slowly forced back across the Styr. But there he stood beyond reach and awaited the approach of the army of the Danube. But Napoleon was blind to all suggestions of reason. He had still nearly 160,000 men under arms; in Pomerania Victor collecting an eleventh army corps, and in Prussia Augereau a twelfth; from his own country he demanded a supplementary conscription of 120,000 men; the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine must likewise fill up their contingents; and the evil influence of the news from the right was overbalanced by favorable intelligence from the left. It is true that Oudinot, while following Wittgenstein too eagerly, was repulsed by him at Polotsk on July 30 and 31, himself wounded, and compelled to give up the right bank of the Düna, but Saint-Cyr, who succeeded to

the command, by a victory over Wittgenstein on August 18 earned the marshal's baton, and subsequently quiet prevailed on the Düna. But the peculiar *ignis fatuus* which was ever alluring Napoleon more deeply into the bogs was the hope of a great battle. This, he conceived, must deliver Moscow into his hands, and end the war with an honorable peace.

Yet the Russians were always so far removed from the thought of drawing the enemy into the interior for his destruction, that all their efforts were directed to barring the way and seeking a battlefield on which they could await his attack with a prospect of success. This was also Barclay's purpose. After Miloradovitch had joined him with reinforcements to the amount of 15,000 men, he considered himself strong enough to confront the enemy in an excellent position which he had selected beyond Viäsmä at Zarevo-Zainiseze. But the execution of such a plan was no longer conceded to him. The loss of Smolensk had produced an immense impression throughout the empire. The nation suddenly awoke from its dreams of victory to see itself the prey of a foreign conqueror. The voice of the public united with the discontent of the army to support the intrigue which from the time of the junction of the two armies of the west was laboring to bring about the fall of Barclay. Alexander now appointed Kutusoff, the only man of Slavic blood and of Russian name who could generally be considered for the position, as commander-in-chief of all the armies engaged against Napoleon. On his accession to the command (August 29) Barclay retired to the head of the first army of the west and Bennigsen became chief of the general staff. The new commander-in-chief was received by the army with clamorous joy. Kutusoff, a pupil and imitator of Suvaroff, seemed also by his first arrangements to justify the idea that he would put a stop to retreat. But, never distinguished by a bold, enterprising spirit, and since Austerlitz overpowered by a paralyzing dread of Napoleon, he willingly lent an ear to the insinuations of men who envied Barclay, that if a victory were won in the position chosen by him, it would be in part ascribed to him. So he continued the retreat toward another position, selected by Bennigsen, half a day's march before Mošaisk. Here he assembled his troops on September 3. Napoleon had vainly hoped to find battle in front of Dorogobush; but on the 5th, two miles before Borodino, he came upon the main body of the enemy. Napoleon immediately hastened to the battle, which, as he hoped, was to put an end to the campaign and to all its hardships. Animated by the same feeling, his troops glowed with eager desire for the conflict.

The army with which Kutusoff took position for battle, numbered,




FIG. 39.—Near Borodino on September 6, 1812. Sketched from life by A. Adam.

not reckoning 7000 Cossacks and 16,000 militia, 104,000 men and 640 cannon. It was nearly equal in men to Napoleon's (about 123,000), in artillery it was superior to him (587). The position of Kutusoff's army, on both sides of the road from Smolensk to Moscow, rested with the right wing on the Moskwa, with the left on a thick wood. To the former, commanded by Barclay, the small river Kalotcha, flowing before the whole front, but in an acute angle to it, gave great strength, but it was too far distant from the wing led by Bagration to afford hindrance to the enemy's approach. Upon the hillock near the village of Shevardino a great redoubt was erected by the advice of the quartermaster-general, Colonel von Toll, which, however, if the enemy pressed upon it too strongly, was to be abandoned. As this cover to the left wing did not seem sufficient to Barclay, a second great redoubt, the Bagration, was erected on the left bank of the brook Semenefka, and a third, the Rajevski entrenchment, was erected on the hill south of Borodino (Fig. 39).

When the bright morning of September 5 showed to the eyes of Napoleon the army of the enemy ready for battle, he exclaimed joyfully : "It is the sun of Austerlitz." Immediately perceiving Kutusoff's vulnerable position on his left wing, Napoleon ordered the entrenched hillock of Shevardino to be taken, but the Russians defended it with extraordinary obstinacy, and not till after a third assault did it remain permanently in the possession of Davout. The following day Napoleon employed in obtaining more accurate acquaintance with the ground and the positions of the enemy ; late in the evening, he summoned the commanding generals to his tent in order to give them special oral instructions. At the earliest dawn on the morning of the 7th, all his battalions and squadrons stood in their assigned places. Kutusoff, on his side, held a great muster of his men ; to inflame the enthusiasm of his Russians, he ordered an image of the Virgin, rescued from the flames of Smolensk, to be borne in solemn procession before the army. Immediately after sunrise the firing of a cannon gave signal to begin the battle, which was to be the bloodiest since the invention of firearms. It was Napoleon's plan only to occupy the right wing and centre of the Russians, but to direct the main attack against their left wing, to crush this, and thereby to press the army of the enemy across the road to Moscow, into the angle between the Kalotcha and the Moskwa, and there compel them to surrender. Accordingly the main conflict raged around the entrenched position of the Russians before and at Semenovskoie. Disregarding the iron hail which the Russian batteries showered upon them, the storming columns of Davout and Ney, supported by

three corps of cavalry, pressed on against them. In a murderous struggle the Bagration entrenchments were taken and lost again; but finally, one after another, they fell into the hands of the assailants. From these the French inflicted immense losses with their artillery upon the Russians, whose lines were unusually deep. All the superior officers on the Russian side were killed or disabled. Bagration received a mortal wound. On his extreme right Napoleon had sent forward Poniatowski with the Poles, and he took the village of Utiza and kept it after the Westphalians had come to his help.

Kutusoff had taken his own position on the heights near Gorki. There he stayed until the end of the battle, so completely without active participation in the battle that his generals, altogether inadequately instructed as to the dispositions made by the commander-in-chief, acted each according to his own will in reference to despatching troops for the purpose of strengthening the hard-pressed left wing. Fortunately for this wing, Davout, Ney, and Murat, in taking the Bagration entrenchments, had exhausted their forces. In order to complete the overthrow of the Russians, they besought repeatedly and urgently additional reinforcements, but Napoleon hesitated and consulted with Berthier; he could not decide to bring into the conflict his Guard, the last reserve at his disposal. Never had his men seen him thus in battle; his accustomed elasticity seemed to have given place to a dull lassitude, and to this circumstance Kutusoff owed it that his army escaped utter destruction. Meanwhile, the assault of the Viceroy Eugene upon the Rajeyski entrenchments had been developed; attacked on all sides it fell into his hands, and the Russian line of battle was pierced. Barclay perceived the danger, and with heroic exposure of his person and the exertion of all his forces, he succeeded in resuming them from the enemy, while the struggle around Semenovskoie was renewed with the greatest warmth. For a short time only the viceroy allowed himself to be withheld from fresh attacks. At two o'clock in the afternoon he precipitated himself with all his power upon the Rajeyski trenches (Fig. 40); notwithstanding the exhaustion of the horses, the cavalry, and among them the Saxon cuirassiers, forced their way from the rear over the breastwork and entered in through the open bastion; the infantry following after kept possession. With the capture of this position, about three o'clock, the battle terminated from sheer exhaustion on both sides. It is true that Napoleon had the Guard, over 20,000 men, still untouched. His most distinguished commanders urged it upon him once more to give the Russians, who had brought up their last reserves, the finishing stroke with his Guard, but "he was no longer rich enough to venture them also at this time."



FIG. 40.—Taking of the great redoubt in the battle of Borodino on September 7, 1812. Sketched on the spot by A. Adam.

Both armies had in this murderous battle suffered to an extraordinary degree. Notwithstanding its physical exhaustion, that of Napoleon had shown a momentum, a fire in attack, equal to its most famous battlefields. On the side of the Russians, the obstinate valor and the patient endurance of the troops had largely compensated for mistakes in position and for the want of an efficient, united leadership. The Russians lost 50,000 dead and wounded; of prisoners the French had but a thousand. The latter estimated their loss—far too low—at 49 generals and 28,000 men. Unmolested, the Russian army conducted its retreat in great disorder beyond Moschansk, while the French continued their advance (Fig. 41). It may be that Kutusoff had no wholly exact information as to the ruinous condition of his army; otherwise, he would scarcely have carried assurance so far as not merely to deceive the people by false reports of victory, but even the czar himself, who at St. Petersburg and elsewhere ordered Te Deums to be celebrated, and appointed Kutusoff field-marshal. So completely was Alexander deceived, that on the presumption that Napoleon would be compelled to direct his retreat upon Smolensk, he caused a plan of operations to be drawn up, in pursuance of which Kutusoff and the two wings of the army were to unite on the Beresina, on October 22, in order there to surround and destroy the final remnants of the vanquished. Rostopshin, the governor of Moscow, was also among the deceived. Kutusoff confirmed him in the belief that he would deliver a second battle before Moscow, and with this Rostopshin in turn quieted the inhabitants. Only by way of precaution he caused the treasures of the Kremlin and the archives to be packed up. But when he had seen with his own eyes the condition of the troops that arrived before Moscow, and was convinced that they were no longer able to offer resistance, he cast all consideration behind him. A man who, under the most polished forms, concealed a passionate ambition, a burning hatred of the French, and the wild energy of a Tatar barbarian, he was resolved at once even to commit the capital to the flames in order that it should not be suffered to fall into the enemy's hands. Kutusoff had indeed announced to his troops another battle for the defence of Moscow, and he directed them to work zealously on entrenchments; but against the unanimous opinion of a council of war, which he called, that it was inevitable to give over the city to its fate, he had nothing to offer in the way of objection. However little Kutusoff excelled as commander in the field, yet to him belongs the merit of having perceived that even without his participation things must turn to the ruin of Napoleon. Terror and dismay seized upon the inhabitants when the army passed through the city. In great confusion



FIG. 41.—Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard on the march; on September 10, 1812. Sketched from life by A. Adam.

there ensued a universal migration; of 240,000 inhabitants, only some 14,000 of the lowest classes remained behind. The army took up a flanking position on the road to Kaluga, principally for the purpose of covering the stores collected in that city.

"We have it now truly, that famous city," cried Napoleon, when, on September 14, he saw the gilded domes of Moscow, but he added: "it was time." Transport and pride filled every one of his warriors at having reached, in this great and rich city, the object of all suffering and the sure pledge of peace. But the heads of Murat's advance were already entering the suburbs, and yet, to the emperor's great amazement, the advancing deputation did not appear to appeal to his mercy and to beg forbearance. No deception was possible—Moscow was empty. Deep depression and gloomy apprehension fell upon the army, though disposed to joy. During the following night flames broke out at different points. At first they were supposed to have arisen accidentally, but on the next day they extended in such a manner that it was no longer possible to believe the conflagration an accident. The terrible truth came gradually to light: Rostopshin himself had delivered up the holy city to the flames, and had set the example with his two palaces in Moscow and his splendid country-houſe. All means for extinguishing fires were destroyed, wells obstructed, and imprisoned malefactors were liberated on the condition that they would aid in spreading the fires. Some of these incendiaries were seized, were put to death and their bodies publicly exposed as a warning. But the flames devoured with ever increasing greediness. The fire raged incessantly for seven days and seven nights, and laid nine-tenths of the city in ashes. More than 10,000 Russians, who lay wounded or sick in the hospitals, perished miserably in the flames.

The effect of Rostopshin's frightful act, an act so frightful that its author found it expedient subsequently to deny it, was powerful and fatal. To the French the burning gave the signal for a general pillaging (Fig. 42), which not merely dissolved the already relaxed bonds of discipline, but also destroyed a great part of that which the flames had spared. But Napoleon was now compelled with fearful clearness to perceive that the greatest undertaking of his life had utterly failed. To take Moscow he had consumed the larger part of his combative force, on Moscow all his hopes had rested, and now Moscow was no more. Calm reflection must say to him that after such a sacrifice, less than ever could dependence be placed upon any inclination to peace on the part of the Russians; but he so much dreaded the first step backward, that he clung fast with convulsive obstinacy to the opinion that the taking of Moscow must bring peace, and this opinion completed the ruin of his army.




FIG. 42.—A scene of plundering in Moscow on September 20, 1812. Drawn from life by A. Adam.

For peace did not come. Intelligence of the loss of the holy city had produced, in the whole empire, such an immense impression that it could not be surpassed even by that of the conflagration ; the purposely cherished deception that the French had set Moscow on fire had aroused hatred and vengeance. In the Russian court there was a different feeling. Much alarm was experienced. Together with those specially well inclined to the French, at whose head stood Rumäntzoff, a numerous peace party lifted up its voice. Even the empress-mother, the warm enemy of Napoleon, now spoke of peace, and the Grand Duke Constantine declared it to be inevitable. Alexander's gentle nature seemed at first as if borne down by the weight of the blow. But by an unparalleled destiny there stood one man at his side whose intrepid soul knew neither fear nor wavering. Shortly before the outbreak of the war, the czar had summoned to his court the proscribed Baron vom Stein, that he might lend his counsel and co-operation to the great cause. With full conviction had the great patriot perceived that in Russia the fate of Germany also must be decided. He took Arndt with him to St. Petersburg as a supporter. A German legion was organized, with Dörnberg and Gneisenau attached to it, and appeals were circulated among the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine. More important than all these measures, which only in part reached their aim, was the unshaken confidence with which Stein expected the catastrophe. While Napoleon was pressing onward to Moscow, he was occupied already in outlining the main features of the future organization of Germany. Intelligence of the loss of Moscow found him undismayed. On his immovable conviction the wavering mind of St. Petersburg reposed ; Alexander threw far from him the thought of an unworthy peace. He dismissed Rumäntzoff and appointed Count Nesselrode minister of foreign affairs. To the nation he made known his decision by an appeal spread throughout the empire.

Meanwhile, Napoleon remained quietly in Moscow. As it was at once evident that his exhausted army, with its horses ruined, without magazines or adequate supplies of ammunition, could not possibly winter in its present situation, where it was like a sharp wedge projected for 600 miles into an enemy's country, and surrounded by superior forces, there could be only one way of deliverance : to retreat without delay, at least as far as Smolensk. But Napoleon remained as if spell-bound. When the messenger of peace, so positively expected, did not arrive, he even turned to address Alexander by letter on September 20. On October 4, Lauriston repaired to the encampment of Kutusoff at Tarutino to broach the subject of peace and to obtain passports for a

journey to St. Petersburg. But the wily Russian easily understood the enemy's embarrassment, which was betrayed by this step. The word peace, he replied, did not occur at all in his instructions. The proposed armistice he rejected. Meanwhile, every day of waiting made the situation of Napoleon's army worse. The neighborhood of Moscow was soon exhausted, and it became necessary to forage in more distant places. The pitiable condition of the cavalry permitted them neither to meet the vexatious partisan warfare, nor to put a stop to the outrageous acts of the peasants. But it was by far the most important occurrence, that on September 21, the army of the Danube under Admiral Tehitchakoff had become united on the Styr with Tormassoff, so that now a force of 65,000 combatants pressed upon the right flank and the rear of the Moscow army. Finally Napoleon could no longer conceal the necessity of effecting a retreat. On October 13, he came to this conclusion. But this was so difficult a matter for him, that he did not hesitate to despatch Lauriston once more to Kutusoff with the inquiry, whether an answer had arrived from St. Petersburg. In order to detain him still longer, the Russian field-marshall laid the blame of the continued delay upon the wretched condition of the roads. But on the 15th the first snow fell, and Kutusoff also, whose army had again been raised to 110,000 men, now awoke from his inactivity. It is true there was a failure in the attempt to surround and cut off the French advance, which was contemplated by the fight at Vinkovo (October 18), but the sudden attack cost the French thirty-eight cannon.

On the same day Napoleon decamped from Moscow, "to pursue the enemy," it was declared. He signalized his departure by an act of sheer barbarity and purposeless rage: Marshal Mortier, who remained behind in the city provisionally, had orders to blow up the principal buildings of the Kremlin. In spite of everything, the army, during its five weeks' abode in Moscow, had been essentially recruited. The number of men able to fight had again mounted to 107,000, and the feeling of the troops was one of confidence. Only the horses had not been able to recover. Of 4000 dismounted cavalrymen a brigade of infantry was formed, and of the rest, numbering 14,500 horse, there were only 4500 men of the guard really capable of service. For the 605 pieces of artillery there were not draught-horses in sufficient number. The army dragged behind it a long train of wagons of various kinds, laden with every imaginable description of booty. In order to gain a route, along which the country was not yet impoverished, Napoleon directed his course to Kaluga; thence he designed turning off to Smolensk. The weather was good, but, burdened with so much artillery

and transportation, the march was extremely tedious; not till the 23d did the corps of the Viceroy Eugene, which was leading, reach Malovaroslavetz, a distance of seventy miles, and here it encountered the Russian advance under Doehturoff. A spirited engagement occurred on the 24th, and the Russians were wavering when Kutusoff himself came up with the main army. But again he feared to measure himself with Napoleon, and withdrew in the night. Meanwhile Napoleon, who was of the erroneous opinion that the Russians were still holding their position, felt that he was no longer in a condition to open the road to Kaluga by force. A remarkably audacious onset by the Cossacks, in which he barely escaped being made prisoner, strengthened his conclusion to give up the attack and take the road to Moshaisk. It happened, therefore, that both adversaries did the same thing, each withdrawing from the other.

This decision threw Napoleon's army back upon the same road which in its advance it had exhausted and laid waste, and thus led to unavoidable injury, to nameless sufferings, and to complete destruction. Although uncommonly mild autumnal weather favored the French, yet already, in consequence of want, a frightful disorganization began to prevail. Like a continuous thunderstorm countless explosions announced the blowing up of powder wagons, which had to be sacrificed. On the stretch of 240 miles to Smolensk, 208 cannon, which had been abandoned, were found, mostly by Russian peasants. On October 27, the fearful spectacle was presented to the army of the battlefield of Borodino still strewn with 30,000 dead bodies. With mournful, heartrending cries the many wounded men lying in the neighboring cloister of Kolotskoi stretched out their hands to those desiling by, begging them not to suffer them to fall into the hands of the enemy. The temperature now sank, and whoever possessed a warm garment of any kind made use of it. At Viäisma, on November 3, the rearguard under Davout, which had remained somewhat behind, was attacked by Platoff and Miloradovitch, and was for a time in danger of being entirely cut off, but was saved owing to the wretched leadership on the part of the Russians and to Kutusoff's fear of venturing upon the road over which Napoleon was marching. From this time onward there occurred an incessant fall of snow; roads and paths became undiscernible, and with a cold of 15-18° Réaumur there was never a warm encampment. Of all foes, however, the most fearful was hunger. The provisions in the small magazines were reserved for the guards, the flesh of fallen horses constituted welcome nourishment, and whoever to seek subsistence wandered from the route of the army commonly found imprisonment or death. The Rus-

sian prisoners, mostly stragglers seized in Moscow, as soon as they were able to go no farther, were systematically put to death. A line of dead men and horses, that lengthened with every step, marked the path of the retreating army. The impulse of self-preservation was stronger than any command, and it was only by means of their example that the officers maintained anything of military order. When Napoleon with the Guard reached Smolensk (Fig. 43) on November 9, of every bat-



FIG. 43.—Before Smolensk on August 18, 1812. Drawn from life by A. Adam.

talion somewhat still remained, of a regiment two to three hundred men were under arms, and only a total of nearly 40,000 armed men, including 5000 cavalry, beside 30,000 stragglers; more than 350 cannon had been lost. The hope of finding supplies and rest there had kept up many as far as Smolensk, but the magazines did not suffice for so many famished people, and in apportioning the food disorder prevailed: the herds of cattle for the shambles that were at hand when the army marched into the country had fallen into the hands of the Russians, except 200 oxen. Stragglers and the sick obtained nothing whatever.

With the utter stubbornness of one spoiled by long-continued good fortune, Napoleon constantly repelled the consciousness of the entire dread reality, and lulled himself into the delusion that it was yet pos-



FIG. 44.—Wittgenstein. From an engraving by J. S. Klauber.

sible to go into winter quarters behind the Dnieper and Düna. But within a few days' march of Smolensk he learned that Wittgenstein (Fig. 44), after the arrival of reinforcements under Steinheil on the

Düna, had again assumed the offensive, and on October 18, had, in spite of a brave resistance, forced back across the river Saint-Cyr, to whose corps were attached the Bavarians under Wrede, and had compelled the evacuation of Polotsk. Soon followed the further disastrous news, that Vitebsk, also, was in the enemy's hands, that Czernicheff, with an army corps, had invaded the duchy of Warsaw, and that Tchitchakoff, advancing upon Minsk, was ready on the south to form a junction with Wittgenstein. There was truly no remaining in Smolensk. The five days during which he had there taken breath, Napoleon had employed in reorganizing the survivors. The brigades were consolidated into battalions, and the remains of the four cavalry corps, almost entirely Poles and Germans, were combined into one under the command of Latour-Maubourg. Thus staggered onward, after November 12, the wreck of the Grand Army; the several divisions were obliged to keep at great distances apart, notwithstanding the proximity of the enemy. Now at last Kutusoff came up. He could easily, especially in view of his great superiority in cavalry, have anticipated Napoleon at Smolensk, but notwithstanding the express demand of the czar to pursue with energy, he contented himself with simply accompanying the march of the enemy, falling upon them with his Cossacks, cutting off stragglers and baggage, and capturing supply trains. On November 15 the Westphalians, who formed the advance, were driven out of the little town of Krasnoi by Russian partisans, who also possessed themselves of the magazines at that point, and at Merlino the next division struck upon Miloradovitch with his 20,000 men; but the Russians avoided doing anything decisive. Kutusoff finally, on the urgent request of his generals, issued orders for surrounding the small force of the enemy, but Napoleon turned suddenly against him, and, with his 14,000 infantry, 2200 horsemen, and 30 pieces of artillery, prepared to attack, in order to relieve the pressure on Marshals Davout and Ney, who were still far behind; and the terror of Napoleon's name made good what was lacking in actual strength. His determined attitude imposed to such an extent on Kutusoff's excessive caution that he recalled the orders for attack, which, if executed, would have infallibly annihilated Napoleon. Davout was rescued, but Ney, who had marched out of Smolensk on the 17th with 6000 infantry, 300 cavalry, and about 7000 stragglers, was necessarily left to his fate. Ney soon found the way blocked by an immensely superior force, and a flag of truce brought him a summons to surrender. But then to their great astonishment the Russians saw the little band suddenly turn directly back at the beginning of twilight, and advance into the interior of Russia. Deflecting to the right across the

country, Ney reached the Dnieper, found a place where it was frozen over, at which he was able to cross the river, and, after three days and two nights of uninterrupted marching, he again joined the army which had believed him lost; but he had with him only 600 men, without a horse or a cannon, for 11,000 men had surrendered to their pursuers. Unmolested, but in lamentable plight, the army dragged itself on afterward as far as Orsza, losing more and more in stragglers, some of whom with desperate exertions struggled against deadly exhaustion, while others stupidly awaited their end amid the wastes of snow. The number of men under arms was only 15,000; battalion, regimental, and brigade commanders marched by themselves, since they no longer had soldiers under them. The imperial guard still formed the only shield of the army; but, although during the entire campaign it had not been in battle once, the ranks of these tried veterans were fearfully thinned. At Orsza the former army corps were combined into new independent divisions; from some 500 cavalry officers, who were still mounted, and had no commands, was constituted under Grouchy and Sébastiani a "sacred squadron," for the personal protection of the emperor; Latour-Maubourg had still 150 mounted men.

But even these wretched survivors seemed devoted to unavoidable destruction. For at the moment when they decamped from Orsza their retreat was already barred. On November 14 Marshal Victor, who was to have kept Wittgenstein at bay, was engaged in an unsuccessful conflict at Czasniki; on the 16th Tchitchakoff captured Minsk with all the stores collected there, and his Cossacks at once completed the junction with Wittgenstein. Saeken, whom he had left behind in order to detain Schwarzenberg, had on the 15th encountered Reynier, isolated at Volkovisk; but he was there foiled by Schwarzenberg, and was able to save himself only with great loss. On account of the pursuit it was too late for Schwarzenberg to repulse Tchitchakoff on his fatal march. The last desperate attempt to escape from the deadly embrace was to strike directly at the superior force, to join Oudinot and Victor, and with their aid to force a passage. Since Minsk was lost Napoleon was obliged to take the road to Vilna, which crosses the Beresina at Borisoff, the only place where there was a bridge over the river. Only 10,500 men still in the ranks reached the Beresina. Tchitchakoff's delays had enabled Napoleon, on November 20, to secure the important point of Borisoff by the Polish division of Dombrowski, but on the following day this was torn from them after a desperate resistance by the admiral, who arrived at last. Great was the confusion caused by the loss of this the only crossing. The bridgeless

Beresina lay directly before the line of retreat, and at Orsza the last bridge-train had been destroyed in order to apply the horses to drawing the artillery. On the other side stood 30,000 foes, a like number were threatening in the immediate vicinity from the north, and 70,000 in their rear. And yet Napoleon did not lose his self-command. But first of all another point for crossing must be obtained. A fortunate accident had led General Corbineau to the discovery of a suitable place, a ford some hundred paces wide at the village of Studienka. In order to keep the enemy in error, as if the crossing at Borisoff' was contemplated, Oudinot, who had come up in the greatest possible haste, received orders to attack Tehitehakoff' at that place. The determination with which Oudinot, on the 24th, carried out this plan, and drove the Russians from the village, completely succeeded in attaining the end proposed. Beside this, in order to divert the attention of the enemy, noisy preparations were made below Borisoff'. After the emperor with the Guard had taken possession of Borisoff on the 25th, Oudinot marched to Studienka to prepare for the passage of the troops. On the north was already audible the thunder of Victor's cannon, who was fighting and retreating before Wittgenstein. Upon these two depended the escape of the army. Victor's troops were amazed—the truth having been carefully concealed hitherto—at the sight of these hollow-cheeked, ghastly-looking forms which they now found instead of the Grand Army. Fortunately the foresight of d'Eblée, the general of engineers, had saved two traveling forges, two wagons with coal, and six with tools; by means of these, though under inexpressible difficulties, it was possible to construct two trestle bridges. The timber for this purpose was taken from the houses of the village of Studienka. The army commanders watched through the night amid cares and anxieties; for they could see the watchfires of the Russians burning on the heights of the further shore. But at dawn the Russians had disappeared; Tehitehakoff' had fortunately drawn off on the right to Beresino, and had even ordered off the division stationed before Studienka.

The building of bridges was now instantaneously prosecuted. The emperor animated the laborers by his constant presence and encouragement. In the afternoon Oudinot and the remainder of the division of Dombrowski were able to pass over the first bridge. Until midday of the 27th, when Napoleon with the guard crossed, order was tolerably maintained, but from then on it ceased. For two days and two nights the passage was not molested by the Russians. Not till the morning of the 28th did Tehitehakoff' venture up and attack Oudinot and Ney's newly-formed corps, but he lost 1500 prisoners in the obstinate engagement.

Wittgenstein, also, was oppressed with the apprehension of losing on the Beresina the fame which he had won on the Düna. A more powerful onset by this superior force would have sufficed to throw Napoleon with his whole army into the Beresina. But Wittgenstein, as well as the Russians in general, held the enemy to be much stronger than he was, and Napoleon in his extremest need was protected by the terror of his name. When Wittgenstein, on the 26th, finally ventured cautiously to advance as far as Borisoff, there fell into his hands at that place without further effort 10,000 prisoners. He waited, however, till the 28th before opening the attack upon Victor, who was covering the passage on the left shore. On hearing the first fire the wild agglomeration of stragglers, women and children, wagons and baggage, pressed on in frenzied haste toward the bridges. The approaches were choked, and when the Russian balls struck among the fugitives confusion reached its height. Many were crushed and trampled down, one of the bridges broke, and the fugitives in advancee were precipitated into the water by those who were pressing on behind them. Victor was obliged, in order to be able to cross over in the evening, absolutely to make a path through the heaped-up masses of dead bodies. As soon as the first Cossacks showed themselves on the following forenoon, the bridges were set on fire. Five thousand of every age and of both sexes on the other side fell into the hands of the Russians. The division of Partouneaux, left behind by Victor in Borisoff, was obliged to surrender.

However much the timorous holding back of the Russians may have contributed to Napoleon's escape, still this passage over the Beresina remains an achievement worthy of the highest admiration. It is true the remnant that was saved amounted only to 12,000 men under arms, some 2000 cavalry, over 20,000 stragglers, besides 200 cannon. But even this force on the march of 200 miles to the Niemen was almost exterminated by the frightful cold (as low as 30° Réaumur) which came upon them again. The last trace of military order ceased; all the artillery was abandoned. The corps of Victor and Oudinot rapidly succumbed to the infection caused by the universal loss of discipline. Two Neapolitan cavalry regiments perished from the cold, without having seen an enemy. The Guard still presented a small troop of 1000 men bearing arms. There was no longer a rearguard, for the Badenese and Polish brigade, which hitherto had constituted it, no longer existed. The Cossacks without hindrance fell upon the rear of the line of march, and when the terrible cry of "Cossaek!" rang out, there arose an indescribable confusion (Fig. 45),

From the perishing thousands there came no word of reproach



FIG. 45.—A fight with Cossacks. From a lithograph by A. Adam; painted by C. von Heideck (1788-1861).

against the author of their sufferings ; but Napoleon now felt that he was most needed at the centre of his power, that he might be able to meet, by the timely levy of new forces, the storms that would probably break upon him from all sides. The system of lying must now be suppressed with which he had hitherto entertained the world regarding victories and the welfare of the Grand Army. The 29th bulletin, issued at Malodeczno on December 3, although still very far removed from the truth, acknowledged the loss of the entire army. At Smorgony, on the 6th, he quietly left his army, accompanied only by Canlaineourt, Duroc, and Count Lobau. The Duke of Bassano joined him at Vilna. Unknown and unrecognizable he fled through Germany in his solitary sledge, and on the 18th was in Paris. He had committed the chief command to the King of Naples, who, however, dissatisfied with the impossible orders which his brother-in-law had left him, and solicitous with regard to his own interests, gave it over, on January 16, to the Viceroy Eugene, and hastened back to his states. At Vilna no one had any suspicion of the condition of the army, when suddenly 40,000 half-famished and half-frozen men filled the city with their lamentable outcries. There were here rich magazines, but the frenzied pressure and the incompetent administration rendered an orderly distribution impossible. Scarcely were the wretched fugitives hoping to be left in peace, when the thunder of Russian cannon frightened them into continuing their flight. On the 10th they were obliged to abandon the city ; on the next day, Tchitchakoff and Kutusoff marched in and made prisoners of 15,000 who were left behind. On December 21, the Emperor Alexander entered Vilna.

Not until they were behind the Vistula could those who were still living of Napoleon's army recover breath. There were still, not reckoning the 35,000 Austrians and Prussians on the wings, 23,000 men. Thus 552,000 men were lying dead in Russia, since imprisonment there was but a more lingering death. Of those who perished nearly 200,000 were Germans. But of those who escaped, the greater part bore within them the germs of death. There were lost, besides, 167,000 horses, 1200 cannon with all their appurtenances, the war-chest containing 12,500,000 francs, and all the baggage. This destruction far surpassed everything which the Russians had conceived to be possible. "It is the hand of God," exclaimed Alexander ; "not Wittgenstein, not Kutusoff, but God alone has accomplished this!" But the Russians, also, had suffered immense losses. When Kutusoff arrived on the Vistula, his army numbered only 40,000 men ; within 45 days it had experienced a loss of 62,000, of whom over 48,000 were in the hospitals. The Russian total

loss amounted to at least 300,000 men. The consumption of men in the campaign of 1812 therefore reached nearly a million.

Napoleon and his eulogists have sought to ascribe a principal part of the blame for this fearful result to the inactivity and the ill-will of the two flanking corps, and Schwarzenberg especially has been censured. In truth the emperor himself by his lying reports had destroyed the possibility of seasonable support from this side. Since Schwarzenberg from the communications of the Duke of Bassano had no other knowledge but that Napoleon had gained a complete victory on the Beresina, he made, therefore, less exertions to overtake Tchitchakoff. After, however, the first positive intelligence had arrived of the destruction of the Grand Army, he withdrew beyond Bialystok, Pultusk, and Warsaw, to the frontiers of Galicia, which he crossed on January 21. Consequently Reynier with the Saxons was forced to evacuate Warsaw.

Of incomparably greater importance was the fate of the Prussian corps, much smaller in numbers, which, placed on the opposite wing, formed, together with the French division of Grandjean, the 10th army corps. To this was assigned the purposeless investment of Riga. However much every Prussian heart rose against this alliance, and would have preferred to it war on the side of Russia against the French, yet military honor demanded entire submission to the inevitable and the most exact fulfilment of unwelcome obligations. At Eekau, on July 19, the Prussians engaged in a brilliant conflict with the Russians, and at Bauske they saved the siege-train (September 29), fighting against double their number of the enemy. The painful relation to the French was in some measure mitigated by the personality of Marshal Macdonald, a man of honor and of fine bearing, who manifested good-will to the Prussians on every occasion. York, Grawert's successor, was, however, too independent for the French, and it came to such a pass that the Prussian general offered his resignation. But in another direction, also, York saw himself involved in difficulties. On September 23 he had had an interview with General Essen, the governor of Riga, at the governor's request, but the proud personality of the Prussian general proved so imposing to the Russian that he omitted to explain himself further. Not until he had given to York information of the retreat of the Grand Army (November 1) from Moscow, and its commencing dissolution, did he propose that York should forsake the French. The same proffers were renewed on the 14th by Paulucci, Essen's successor. Wittgenstein, also, sent Prince Repnin with a letter to York (Fig. 46) near Riga, but Paulucci, who was not willing to see the issue of so important a matter snatched from him, became more urgent. In



FIG. 46.—Bronze statue of General York at Berlin; by Christian Rauch.

response to all these solicitations, York's course was elusive and protracting. When a trusted officer sent by him to Vilna confirmed the news of the destruction of the Grand Army, on December 5 he dispatched his adjtiant, Seydlitz, to Berlin to ask instructions from the king. But there also the situation was not such as to allow the adoption of independent decisions.

To shake off the French yoke at the first opportunity that offered was for King Frederick William and his chancellor of state the object ever held steadfastly in view, and Hardenberg had rightly presumed that the Russian campaign might prove such an opportunity. But it was also plain that this object was attainable only in league with Austria. Already, at the Dresden meeting of princes, had Hardenberg approached Count Metternich, and been received by him. On September 4, Hardenberg set before him in writing the necessity of their uniting with reference to all eventualities. When in October the first doubtful intelligence from the Grand Army arrived at Berlin by way of Copenhagen, and there came at the same time from the former Russian ambassador Lieven the demand that Prussia should join with Austria for this great object, the king caused it to be confidentially made known at Vienna that if Austria would support him he would not hesitate to devote all his strength to the regaining of independence. But then it was shown that any approximation to united action was as yet unattained. Austria, Metternich replied, with regard to France was in a position altogether different from that of Prussia. The destruction of his army would not absolutely prevent Napoleon from raising a second, and from finding the requisite support in the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine. Whoever desired to think of the liberation of Germany must be prepared to fight for more than one year, and Austria was not now in that condition. Her aim was the bringing about of a general pacification. Prussia he warned against hasty steps, and a restoration of Prussia to her former extent of territory lay wholly outside of his calculations. He also declined the proposals which the Czar Alexander directed should be made at Vienna; Austria would not break with France. Hardenberg was compelled to admit that he could not count upon Austria.

Meanwhile in Berlin the fate of the Grand Army had become certainly known. On November 13, Saint-Marsan demanded the making good of the two regiments of cavalry which Napoleon had added to the main army by new regiments, and the reinforcement of the auxiliary corps. The reply was made that without restitution of the money advanced, amounting to 90,000,000 francs, the exhaustion of the state rendered it impossible to comply with this application. On December 14,

there was received from the postmaster at Glogau the highly surprising information that Napoleon had passed through to Dresden ; on the 16th, the king received from him the demand to bring up the Prussian auxiliary corps to the strength of an army corps of 30,000 men. Count Narbonne, whom Napoleon had despatched from Smorgony to Berlin, added to this the further demand to prepare magazines and hospitals on the Oder for the new campaign that was impending, to supply the Prussian fortresses thoroughly with ammunition and provisions, and to establish a line of troops in Silesia. The impression produced by these blows, following one another in quick succession, determined the answer which Seydlitz was directed to deliver to General York : as soon as he should have returned within the Prussian boundary, he was as Governor-General to assume control of the province of Prussia. Orally Seydlitz was to apprise the general that negotiations were in progress with Austria and that the king was resolved to abrogate the alliance so often violated by Napoleon. A council, which Hardenberg held on the 25th with Knesebeck and Aneillon, came to the conclusion that there was not a moment to lose in order to break the chains fastened upon Europe ; Austria should be induced to attempt without delay an armed mediation, and in connection with Prussia draw up conditions. The king was in agreement with this, only he wished to protract diplomatic negotiations until spring, during which interval under cover of the French alliance preparations for war could be accomplished. With these proposals Knesebeck went secretly to Vienna, but events in York's corps had anticipated the king's precautions.

After being long without any direct information from the general headquarters, Marshal Maedonald had finally on December 18 received orders from the King of Naples to withdraw behind the Niemen. By reason of the cutting cold and the deep snow the march on the retreat with exhausted troops was one of great difficulty and hardship. The Russians were already barring the way, but in a very brilliant conflict the Prussian horse, on December 26, freed themselves, and on the 28th Maedonald, attended by the Prussian artillery and cavalry under General Massenbach, reached Tilsit. But communication with York, who formed the rear of the long extended line, was broken by the Cossacks. In order, therefore, to keep his hands free at least till the arrival of positive orders from Berlin, late in the evening of Christmas day York accorded to the Russian General Diebitsch the interview asked for. Diebitsch confirmed the entire destruction of the Grand Army, and, since the Russian generals were instructed not to treat the Prussians as actual enemies, he offered a treaty of neutrality. York hesitated, but on the next morning

Paulnee sent him new proposals and a letter from the Emperor Alexander, who authorized him to declare to General York, that in the event of the king's deciding to make common cause with him, the czar would assume the obligation not to lay down his arms until he should succeed in obtaining for Prussia an increase of territory sufficient to enable her to take the place among the powers of Europe which she had held before 1806. This important assurance contributed essentially to render York disposed to take the step to which the Russians were urging him. He had another interview with Diebitsch and the matter was settled so that the corps by an arrangement establishing neutrality should belong to the king. Joyfully the Prussians passed under the escort of the Russians. But on the 29th Seydlitz arrived from Berlin. The king's silence with regard to the Russian proffers was equivalent to a rejection of them. To make the misfortune complete, the Cossacks had suffered a messenger from Macdonald to slip through, who brought a note with the words: "General York is expected impatiently at Tilsit." He could not now allege that he was entirely cut off. Yet the next morning (December 30) York and Diebitsch met in the mill of Poscherun, at Tauroggen, and here the important convention was subscribed. In pursuance of this agreement the Prussian corps occupied the country between Memel, Tilsit, and the Haff, which was declared neutral. In case the king should order the corps to march back and rejoin the French army, it was agreed that until March 1 it should not serve against Russia.

York immediately communicated to the king what had occurred. Massenbach, on receiving intelligence of the convention, immediately sent his approval. He succeeded in joining York, the French being unable to prevent his departure. On January 1, 1813, York marched into Tilsit.

The uprising of Prussia against Napoleon had begun.

BOOK II.

THE FALL OF THE FIRST EMPIRE.

THE FALL OF THE FIRST EMPIRE.

CHAPTER V.

THE WAR OF LIBERATION OF 1813.

LIKE the avalanche which, impetuously advancing, and, from a small beginning, growing in bulk and power, finally sweeps along irresistibly whatever lies in its path, thus did the Convention of Taurogen unchain all the forces that were bound, bring to naught all plans, and put an end to prudent delays.

King Frederick William was not unprepared for the course adopted by General York. On January 2, 1813, Major Henckel had arrived at Potsdam with the communication that General York, in order to save his troops, purposed concluding with the Russians an armistice proposed by the Marquis Paulucci. This was accompanied by the letter of the Emperor Alexander, which contained the promise that in the event of the king making common cause with him he would never lay down his arms until Prussia should be restored to her territory as it existed before the year 1806. Besides, the king was the more easily persuaded that York had avoided a useless sacrifice, since for weeks he had held himself ready for a separation from the French as something that was near at hand. As a preparation for the coming event, he communicated to the king of Naples by letter, immediately after Henckel's arrival, his anxious thoughts with respect to the fate of York's corps: while Hardenberg wrote in a complaining style to the French envoy, St. Marsan, that Macdonald to all appearance had sacrificed General York, since he had left him two days' march behind, in order to effect his own escape. When now, on the 4th, an adjutant of Macdonald brought the convention itself to Berlin, and on the day following the confirmation of the transaction arrived by Major Thiele, who had been despatched by York, the chancellor of state was able to remind the ambassador in a sympathetic way that he had foretold the disaster. What, how-

ever, aroused the king's anger was not the fact that York had concluded the convention, but the manner, inasmuch as in justifying his step with regard to Macdonald he had not availed himself of the plea of military necessity, but had based his action on political considerations; for extreme necessity forced Frederick William as well as his counsellors to play a double game. Nearly the entire country and almost all the fortresses were still in the hands of the French, whose numbers were constantly increasing. Even the king's person was endangered, if the suspicion of the hated ally should be prematurely awakened.

Therefore not to suffer such suspicion to arise, and to quiet it as far as possible whenever excited, till the moment when the desired understanding with the two other Eastern powers and the augmentation of his own army should give permission 'to fight and to destroy,' appeared to Hardenberg the matter of most urgent necessity. With the show of great candor, he described to the French the indignation and astonishment of the king at York's action. On the 5th, Major Natzmer was despatched to Murat with a confidential letter from the king, which contained, besides the most decided disapproval of York's course, the announcement that General Kleist was appointed to assume immediate command of the auxiliary corps, and ordered to remove and arrest York. Furthermore, Prince Hatzfeldt was speedily sent as ambassador at Paris. He expressed to the emperor the pain felt by the king at the occurrence, with the greater sincerity because he had no suspicion of the real purposes of the chancellor of state. Upon Count St. Marsan, Hardenberg lavished protestations of his adherence with so much amiable warmth that the count suffered himself to be convinced of the king's loyalty to the treaty.

This game of deceit, however, was not in accord with the impatience of the people and the burning zeal of the friends of the fatherland. One of the most impatient was Blücher. "Every one of my fingers itches to grasp the sabre," he wrote (January 5) to his friend Scharnhorst. For the king, indeed, the point of time when he should be able to throw off the mask worn unwillingly depended mainly upon the shape to be assumed by his relations with the neighboring powers.

Together with the ostensible mission of delivering to General York the order for his removal, Natzmer had secret instructions not to go to Königsberg, but immediately to seek out the Emperor Alexander. The French had no suspicion of his object. But

as soon as he had left behind him their advance posts, he repaired in disguise to the Russian headquarters at Bobersk, and made known the king's offer of an alliance offensive and defensive, if Alexander were inclined to prosecute the war against Napoleon with all the means at his disposal, and without delay to cross the Vistula and Oder.

From the first moment Alexander had not doubted that with the repulse of the hostile attack no more than half of his work was accomplished, and that if time were given Napoleon to repair his losses, he must be prepared shortly to see his formidable adversary appearing anew upon the banks of the Vistula. To this consideration still a second was added that gave him a powerful impulse forward, namely, the reflection that he must profit by the great crisis that had arrived in the destinies of Europe in order to bring to pass the uniting of Poland with the Russian Empire. This could be executed only if the author of the new condition of Poland should be utterly prostrated. To secure such a result his own forces did not suffice. These were scarcely able to crush the attempt at resistance made by the Poles after the departure of their defenders. So great was the confusion into which the Russians had fallen in consequence of persistent efforts and losses sustained on Polish soil, that they were obliged to relinquish the stationing of troops in the city of Warsaw, in order not to suffer their own weakness to become evident. Thus for Alexander it became necessary to prosecute the war beyond the Russian and Polish frontiers, and, with this view, to induce the other powers, Prussia, Austria, and all Germany, to take up arms. He had already, from Vilna, given assurance to King Frederick William that, notwithstanding the painful occurrences of the last year, his designs were unchanged; he would not lay down his arms until Prussia had regained her former splendor and her former power. With great delight he gave Natzmer the desired promise.

The king was awaiting with cheerfulness the result of Knesebeck's mission to Vienna: but every day rendered it more doubtful whether longer delay was possible. While Berlin was overflowed with the stream of fragments of the army coming back from Russia, fresh troops were also moving up continually from the Elbe into Brandenburg. The Emperor Alexander caused information to be given through Natzmer of the plots of the French happily foiled, professed to have sure intelligence of an attempt against the person of the king, and conjured him to withdraw beyond the reach of the French.

On January 22 Hardenberg communicated to Count St. Marsan and the French marshals who were dining at his house, with the utmost ingenuousness, that early in the morning the king had set out for Silesia for the purpose of furnishing to the Emperor Napoleon the lacking contingent; in his company went the crown prince, aged eighteen, and the remainder of the royal family followed two days later. There remained behind in Berlin a high commission of government, with authority to decide in urgent circumstances.

In sharp contrast with this dallying of the government was the bold action with which the province of East Prussia, which had been entirely left to itself, now stepped forward. In this remote corner of German territory there now arose the call to act for the fatherland. There, also, that decisive occurrence at the mill in Poschernu was followed at once by days of painful suspense. Before the conclusion of the convention, Paulucci, on December 27, in an arbitrary manner had released the authorities of Memel from their oaths to the king, and bound them by oath to Russia, had seized all public treasure, and even laid an embargo upon ships in the harbor. These proceedings, to be sure, had been disowned by Alexander (PLATE VIII.); for it was not practicable to solicit the Prussian alliance, and at the same time rob the king of one of his best provinces; and the people of East Prussia were enabled to greet the advancing Russians as friends and liberators. But that upon which York had confidently depended did not take place; he had expected the Russians to cut off Macdonald between Memel and Pregel, and make him prisoner. The slowness of Wittgenstein, or his numerical weakness, suffered the small corps, half lost already, to slip away from him. The only result was that Czernicheff, with his Cossacks, ventured across the Vistula, and the moment in which it was perhaps possible by a bold onset to capture the scarcely defensible fortresses on the Vistula was neglected and lost.

As soon as York entered the province, he again assumed the office of governor-general. All awaited with burning impatience the call to arms, in order to form a union with the Russians, and destroy the detested French. York, indeed, was greatly embarrassed when he saw before his eyes the profound disorder of the new allies, which was in such glaring contrast to their pretensions. Consequently the more was he shocked by the news (January 10), contrary to all expectation, announcing that the king rejected the convention. He saw his action already stigmatized as cowardly

PLATE VIII.



ALEXANDRE I^{er}
DE TOUTES



EMPEREUR
DES RUSSIES.

Emperor Alexander I. of Russia.

From an engraving of Bourgeois de la Richardière; drawn by A. Desnoyers (1779-1857).

History of All Nations, Vol. XVII., page 220.

and infamous. He invited Kleist to take command in his place; but the latter at once positively refused, since he was at least equally liable to punishment. No one was found in the corps willing to accept the command; and not till then did York persuade himself to disregard the orders of the king. But the attitude of the governor so affected public opinion that dependence could not be placed upon it; and particularly the authorities, accustomed to the most implicit submission to the royal will, were unreliable. Attempts of single individuals, without royal authority, to bring together an assembly of the provincial estates, were treated by the highest magistrates as conspiracy.

At this time (January 22) Stein fortunately arrived in Königsberg. He was animated by the one thought, the overthrow of Napoleon; and he had but one object, the liberation of Germany. Before his far-reaching vision hovered the image of a newly constituted German fatherland. He came provided with full powers from Russia, which—up to the time when the czar should have made a definitive arrangement with the king—authorized him to discharge public offices, and to employ the resources of the country for the good cause, to set on foot the arming of the military and of the people in the speediest manner, to take measures to secure war supplies, to make use of needful instrumentalities, to suspend and remove officials, and to put suspected persons under supervision and in prison. In his fiery zeal he could not understand how, at this time, when every moment was precious and every delay dangerous, any one could cling to formal notions and small considerations. His arrival speedily changed the situation. The leaders of the province perceived in his comprehensive powers a summons to give added strength to their obligations as subjects to the king. The president of the East Prussian government, von Auerswald, gave direction that the diet of the province, created in the year 1808, should be convened for the twenty-third. But a counter-blow was dealt at once when on the twenty-fourth the “Berlin Gazette” arrived with the official announcement of York’s removal. Becoming anxious, Auerswald, with approval of the two presidents of the government, von Wissmann and von Schön, withdrew his first proclamation, and only invited a ‘meeting of the deputies of the Estates’ in order to examine and consider the proposals to be made by the plenipotentiary of the emperor of Russia. York also was staggered again, but encouraging messages came from Neustettin on the part of General

Bülow. From General Borstell, at Kolberg, encouraging news was also received; and on the twenty-sixth Major Thiele, besides other comforting tidings, brought news that the king had gone to Breslau, and the messenger was expressly directed to communicate his information to York. On the twenty-sixth Stein released the country from the Continental embargo, in return for which the Königsberg mercantile community immediately expressed to him their thanks by paying the advance of 300,000 thalers, which he had asked for in order to provide equipments for York's corps. He also effected the arrangement that the Russians should not make requisitions to supply their needs, but pay down, if only in paper money.

A new difficulty sprang up with the question, who should open the diet, and thus represent royal authority without a commission from the king. The chancellor, to whom this office appertained, was lying sick in bed; Schön, as well as York, refused to encroach upon the royal prerogative; and so finally it was agreed, with regard to the form, that the session should be opened on February 5, by von Brandt, the chancellor's representative. But then, after the reading of a communication from Stein, which submitted the choice of measures for the defence of the country to their deliberations, York appeared in the assembly on the invitation of the deputies. Since it was now impossible to obtain the king's orders, as the king's most loyal subject, and by virtue of the powers confided to him as governor-general of the province, York laid before them his plans for the effectual defence of the fatherland. Enthusiastic cheers followed his words. The former minister, Count Albrecht Dohna, was chosen president. The object of Stein's mission and of his full powers was now secured; and on the seventh, the same day on which the project for organizing the military was brought forward, Stein departed.

This project, the work of Scharnhorst's favorite pupil, Clausewitz, and based upon that approved by the king in the year 1808, aimed at the establishment of a militia, or landwehr, under the name of provincial troops, and at first only for the internal protection of the country. But they became urgently needed, in the event of York's departure, for defence against the numerous French forces in possession of the fortresses. The Estates, however, believed that they could not consent to the principle of the universal obligation of all able-bodied men between eighteen and forty to undergo military service, without great loss as respects the education of youth and business

pursuits. They, therefore, not only excepted ecclesiastics and teachers, but also allowed substitution. In this manner a landwehr of 20,000 men, together with a reserve of 10,000, was obtained. At York's request it was decided, moreover, to create a national regiment of cavalry one thousand strong. With such an example this province first illuminated the remainder of the country. Yet East Prussia for six years had been the chief seat of the war; its commerce had been annihilated by the Continental embargo; it had suffered from a bad harvest in 1811; in the following year had borne the burden of the passing of vast bodies of troops, and, last of all, the horrors of the return. Day after day came and passed, and still the instructions to York, so longed for, to unite his forces openly with the Russians, were not received.

The journey of the king to Breslau, away from the French and toward the Russians, was the first clear indication of the near approaching change for which the people were waiting with impatience. Not without reason had Hardenberg reckoned upon it that there the king would be different from the man he was in Potsdam. The first and most urgent matter was the preparation whereby Prussia should make herself respected by friend and foe. Immediately after his arrival at Breslau, the king named Scharnhorst quartermaster-general; at his desire, Gneisenau stepped to his side with the rank of major-general.

The time had at length arrived when the creative ideas of Scharnhorst, which, in consequence of the treaty of September, 1808, had remained as nothing more than projects, were to be converted into acts. From the provinces still held by the French the Prussian soldiers were directed either at once to Kolberg or to Silesia, which, to a great extent, was free from the enemy. Apart from supplementing and completing the bodies of troops already in existence, fifty-two battalions of reserves were organized on a war-footing, and thereby the line was brought up in a short time to 80,000 or 90,000 men. But the armed force of the state was not merely increased; it was also to be improved. It was still Scharnhorst's dominant thought to make the army a regular school for the nation, and by means of the obligation to military service resting upon all, to associate with the greater bodily strength of the lower classes the stronger moral force and the finer sentiments of honor of the more cultivated. The memorable ordinance of February 9 went no further than to abolish all hitherto existing immunities

during the continuance of the present war, since it was to be carried on to secure the greatest blessings. With an empty treasury, no other resource remained than to impose upon the country the duty of clothing all the troops that were recently raised; also to equip them, with the exception of arms, and to supply horses gratuitously. In order that money might be spared for the troops from the sergeant down, it was arranged that subsistence in kind should be provided through the innkeepers. There was, accordingly, every reason to stimulate patriotism, but not to destroy it. But to this was added the further consideration, that because of the differences, then far wider than now, which separated the higher classes from the lower, the cultivated from the uncultivated, it would have been a great hardship to the former to associate them indiscriminately with the latter, and subject them to the same treatment given to the lower grade of culture and to the common man. What on the latter was imposed as compulsory, ought to be attained with the cultivated by an appeal to their patriotism. To facilitate to those hitherto exempted from the duty of military service the accomplishment of this without violation of the principle of like obligation for all, was the meaning and aim of the proclamation already subscribed by Hardenberg on February 3, but first made public on the 8th. In pursuance of this, in every battalion and in every regiment of cavalry a detachment of 200 volunteer chasseurs should be formed, who were to clothe and mount themselves, and after two to three months were to be commanded by officers of their own selection. No young man between eighteen and twenty-four years of age was ever to obtain a position of dignity, or distinction, unless he had served for a year with troops of the line or in a detachment of chasseurs. Aside from the financial relief this procured to the state, the volunteer chasseurs would furthermore serve as a nursery for officers.

Thus arose the first German national army, which embraced the peasant as well as the nobleman, the burgher as well as the man of learning. In order to bring these measures into operation with the greatest possible despatch additional officials were created, clothed with ample powers, and the country was divided into four military governments, which directed the arming of the population. The summons issued on February 3 won the hearts of the people. At Breslau, instead of the customary lecture, Professor Steffens (Fig. 47) delivered a spirited address to his hearers, which closed with the declaration, that now, instead of books, he should take up arms, and

all his hearers followed his example. The halls of the universities, the higher classes of the gymnasia, were emptied. Boys and men, officials and landed proprietors, all flocked in troops to join the army: and even the discontent on account of a compulsory obligation to military service was drowned in this high and noble enthusiasm.



FIG. 47.—Henrich Steffens. From a drawing by O. P. Hansen, May 17, 1845.

Levies and volunteers slipped by the French, in spite of all hindrances; and sometimes whole divisions moved joyfully and proudly past their ranks. From Berlin and the Mark of Brandenburg a regular emigration to Silesia occurred. When Scharnhorst led the king to a window to point out to him the long line of volunteers, who, on foot, on horseback, in wagons, were rejoicingly entering

Breslau, tears started to his eyes; and from this day on Frederick William again had faith in his people.

Equally indispensable with his own preparations was a clear understanding with the neighboring powers, Austria and Russia. On January 4 Colonel Knesebeck, the negotiator of 1807 and 1809, had been despatched to Vienna to establish the connection with Austria. Austria should not proffer but proclaim to the Emperor Napoleon her intervention; and, on the other hand, the king promised to make no agreement with the Russians without Austrian consent. An immediate armed alliance with Austria, as it proved, was not to be thought of: that power, for the present, would only speak, not act. There was, indeed, a war party, at whose head stood the Empress Maria Ludovica, which was animated by aristocratic hate of the plebeian upstart; but for the mass the imperial matrimonial alliance was a pledge of peace. And Metternich was no Stadion; instead of elevation and enthusiasm he knew only the coolest calculation. The deep disorder in the public administration, and the needy condition of the army, forbade a bold, enterprising policy. Undoubtedly Metternich hailed the destruction of the Grand Army as the commencement of freedom from the French yoke. In return for the sacrifices which Napoleon must irretrievably suffer upon the Continent, he should be indemnified by England through the return of a part of the lost colonies. Napoleon's imperial dominion, in his opinion, should remain untouched between the Pyrenees, Alps, and Rhine: and the Confederation of the Rhine should be dissolved, and its provinces maintain their complete independence. Austria, with the extension of her frontiers as far as the Mincio, and re-established on the condition existing at the Peace of Lunéville, would become, in connection with restored Prussia, the tongue of the balance which would hold in peaceful equipoise the two scales of the European political system. In December he had already sent to Paris one of the ablest of Austrian diplomatists, Count Bubna, in order to ascertain clearly what could be hoped from Napoleon in regard to the establishment of peace. For this, Bubna gave assurance, the Emperor Francis would do everything, but for war would take not one step beyond the strict execution of the treaty of March 14, 1812. Napoleon's demands,—the passage of French troops through Austrian territory, the doubling of the Austrian auxiliary corps, and a stipulation of subsidies,—were roundly rejected. On the other hand, Bubna communicated the information that Schwarzen-


berg, by command of his emperor, had concluded a truce with the Russians, and had withdrawn his forces close to the Galician frontier. Napoleon was enraged; but, as he did not desire to push matters to a rupture, no choice remained for the moment but to declare his agreement with Austria's endeavors for peace.

In this condition of affairs Knesebeck had indeed acquired the certainty that Metternich would willingly see a connection of Prussia with Russia as increasing the pressure to be brought to bear upon Napoleon's decisions, and that he could consider no situation as permanent which did not restore independence to Germany, and establish in the centre of Europe a counterpoise to the western and eastern powers. But Austria would not go to war with France. Consequently, the more inevitable was Prussia's adherence to Russia. For the purpose of bringing this to pass, and, if possible, effecting an agreement between Russia and Austria, Knesebeck was forthwith sent to the Emperor Alexander, whom he found at Klodawa on February 16. But by the manner in which Knesebeck carried on this negotiation he soon created new difficulties regarding it. Although Hardenberg had authorized him to proffer to Russia an enlargement in Poland, he regarded himself bound to insist upon the restoration of all the original Prussian Poland, whereas Alexander had already agreed secretly with his friend Czartoryski upon the re-establishment of Poland under the Russian sceptre. Therefore the czar promised only the restoration of the provinces lost by Prussia in Germany, and, as indemnification for her Polish possessions, he proposed the kingdom of Saxony. Upon this the negotiation ceased. But the course of events pressed with such irresistible force to a decision, that longer delay was rendered impossible. To the immediate protests of St. Marsan against the appeal of February 3, Hardenberg replied that the king must arm the people in order that the people might not take arms against him. Even the direction of the army threatened in the event of longer delay to escape from the king's hand. Hardenberg now found courage openly to announce to the French envoy the mission of Knesebeck to the Russian headquarters; and when the envoy represented to him by way of warning that his emperor would finally come to an agreement even with Russia at the expense of Prussia, he quietly replied that then Napoleon would find a second Spain in Prussia, and his king surrounded by his faithful subjects would defend himself against the unrighteous invasion with the last drop of his blood.

On February 20, York was instructed to advance towards the Oder, since the king had decided to push his troops forward in conjunction with the Russians. It was not to be overlooked, furthermore, that, to the same extent to which the decision of Prussia and therewith the advance of the Russians were delayed, that advantage of circumstances would be lost upon which at the beginning of the year dependence had been placed. The deception of alleging that Prussia was still the ally of Napoleon could no longer be maintained.

With well-considered design Napoleon (PLATE IX.) had so arranged that his arrival in Paris fell upon the second day (December 19) after the publication in the "Moniteur" of the twenty-ninth bulletin. With him new life was poured into all the veins of the body politic. The giant's power and pride seemed scarcely touched by the immense loss he had suffered on so many Russian battle-fields. With astonishing elasticity he proceeded to create a new army in place of the lost; and already, on January 7, a fresh invasion of Russia was decided upon. After receiving intelligence of York's convention, he caused the senate to decree, in addition to the regular levy of 1813, an increase of the army to the extent of 250,000, partly to be supplied from previous years and partly from those immediately following. On January 20 he received the congratulations of the chief state functionaries on his return. They were constrained to pray for the crowning of the imperial prince, since the empire needed a fresh recognition of its hereditary character. On February 5 the senate adopted a law concerning the regency in case of Napoleon's death. The people sighed and longed for peace; thoughtful minds looked toward the future with gloomy forebodings. Talleyrand, especially, since the burning of Moscow, had given up the cause of Napoleon as lost; not that the emperor could not still by prudence have saved himself, but he knew that this was a quality the emperor did not possess. Napoleon continued to be controlled by the feeling that he could not venture to make peace after a defeat, if he would not destroy in the eyes of his people the halo upon which his sway reposed. The speech from the throne with which, on February 14, he opened the legislative body amid a specially pompous ceremonial, overflowed with confident and inflexible determination. First appeared the proposition that the empire could never suffer to be torn from it the territories that had been joined to France by decrees of the senate,—the States of the Church, Tuscany, Piedmont, Holland, and the thirty-second military division. The

PLATE IX.



Napoleon.

From a lithograph by Noel Bertrand; painting by Jacques Louis David 1748-1825.

History of All Nations, Vol. XVII., page 228.

subjects of these recently acquired countries, he assured them, vied with the inhabitants of old France in devotion to his person. For proof that the resources of France were more than sufficient to enable her to make head against every enemy, he sketched a picture of the condition of the country under the imperial administration, which was as absurd as it was arbitrary and deceptive.

In such a disposition the emperor was found by Krusemark when he delivered to him, on January 15, the king's reply to his Dresden letter. This showed, indeed, a willingness to hold fast to the French alliance, but desired, as an indispensable condition of further supplies, a payment on account of the money that had been advanced. The same demand was repeated by Hatzfeldt, with like assurances of loyalty to the alliance. That which both were now to hear consisted in little more than fine words, occasional assurances of his love of peace, which his acts falsified, and empty promises of future recompense, but of actual concessions, and of returning the money advanced, not one syllable. In the third campaign against Russia, which, according to his computation, would be opened the middle of August on the Niemen, Prussia was expected to bear her part. The warning as to the spirit active in the Prussian people had no effect upon him. So far was his arrogant mind removed from the slightest conciliatory step toward Prussia, that doubt with respect to the loyalty of his ally rendered him only the more reckless in his actions. The Viceroy Eugene received orders to make requisitions for the wood needed for the fortresses, and to fell and to remove timber wherever he might find it. The appeal of February 3 he answered by instructing Eugene to put a stop to recruiting in Prussia, and to be satisfied with Bülow's troops as they were. The contracts for supplies which General Damas had made for the fortresses on the Oder, he disposed of as a piece of foolishness, and annulled them, for he was not willing to throw away his money. Prussia must now as formerly furnish the daily supply; if not, requisitions must be issued, and in this event Prussia would impose on him the necessity of taking possession of the country. In execution of this order Eugene instructed commanders to seize by force all which they needed within a circumference of ten leagues around their respective fortresses. King Frederick William had declared that in order to withdraw from the French alliance with a good conscience they must first put themselves in the wrong toward him; consequently he had no further need to delay action.

The Emperor Alexander also began to lose patience. He sent State-Councillor Anstett to Breslau in company with Stein; and Hardenberg, on February 27, signed the treaty. The next day Kutusoff ratified it at Kalish. The treaty of alliance offensive and defensive concluded between the two powers indicated, as its object, the independence of Europe and the restoration of Prussia to conditions which should be pledges of her peace and safety. Russia promised to put 150,000 men in the field, and Prussia 80,000, not reckoning the garrisons in fortresses. In two secret articles the Emperor Alexander pledged himself never to lay down arms until Prussia was reinstated in the statistical, geographical, and financial conditions which she held before the war. For the indemnifications which might be demanded by circumstances, and for the enlargement of Prussia, he promised to devote all the acquisitions that should be obtained by arms or negotiations in North Germany, with the exception of the former possessions of the house of Hanover.

The holding back on the part of Metternich had compelled Prussia to confide in Russian friendship, even without proper confirmation of indemnities for Prussia, which for the time being was hardly possible. Satisfied with having attained the main point, that an alliance against Napoleon was concluded, and Prussia restored to her ancient rank among the powers, Hardenberg trusted that the strength which set the people free would also be able to maintain the state's just demands with friend and foe.

In order to give full authority to the new treaty of friendship, Alexander came in person to Breslau on March 15. Everything there at length breathed freely on being relieved from the hated mask of falsehood and dissimulation. While Scharnhorst hastened to Kalish to concert with the Russian commanders the first measures to be adopted in common, there now followed the decisive arrangements that removed the last obstacles to the rising of the people. This received its consecration on March 10, by the founding of the Order of the Iron Cross, the only order which in this war, and in truth in this exclusively, could be conferred upon the humblest as upon the highest. On March 16 the state-chancellor despatched the declaration of war to the French envoy. The following day the king turned directly to his people, speaking to them in fit words, the more impressive by their simplicity. The "Appeal to my People" declared that of necessity great sacrifices must be made. "But they do not outweigh the sacred blessings for which we offer

them, for which we must contend and conquer, if we would not cease being Prussians and Germans." The appeal was read in all the churches. An appeal of like strength the king addressed to his army. A third appeal, concluding with the words, "My cause is the cause of my people," accompanied the law signed by the king on the same March 17, regarding the organization of the *Landwehr*. All men from seventeen to forty able to bear arms were now subjected to being drafted into the landwehr. A number was assigned to each province and circle, which it was to provide; and if any were lacking after volunteers had been reported, this deficiency was to be supplied by lot. The higher-officers were appointed by the king, the lower by the local boards; arms and ammunition were furnished by the state; the simple uniform, a short blue coat (*Litewka*) and a blue cloth cap and other equipments to be supplied by the commune; pay to be given to the landwehr only when called to serve out of their home district. To the landwehr of East Prussia the organization originally adopted was confirmed, only they must come under obligation, likewise, to serve outside of the province. In all, 132 battalions of landwehr and 95 to 100 squadrons were enrolled; these, however, rose to 149 battalions and 124 squadrons by accessions from the districts across the Elbe. The keystone of the entire organization was laid a month later (April 21) by the creation of the *Landsturm*, to which all other able-bodied men were summoned, who were to be drilled every Sunday afternoon.

Instead of the 65,000 men which Napoleon had estimated as the extreme of what Prussia could put on foot, the Prussian army at the beginning of the campaign ran up to 96,700 troops of the line, infantry and cavalry, 10,000 volunteers, and 141,650 in landwehr, which included the regiments of national cavalry organized in the provinces of Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia; altogether 248,350 men.

The supreme command of all the troops stationed in Silesia the king committed to Blücher, now seventy-one years of age. It is Scharnhorst's great merit to have given the decision in his favor against Kalkreuth and Tauenzien, who were also brought into question for this position. Notwithstanding all lack on his part of theoretical cultivation, in spite even of trying defects in his school-learning, yet a peculiar combination of most important qualifications had made him the first commander-in-chief in this war,—the conception of relations on a great scale, the perception of the critical point,

an assurance of victory which was not to be shaken by any disaster, no shrinking from any personal responsibility, and freedom from all fear of men, and, added to this, vast hatred and wrath against Napoleon and every French tool. That which was wanting in Blücher (Fig. 48) found its admirable complement in the two counsellors at



FIG. 48.—Blücher. From the portrait painted and engraved by F. Fleischmann, in London, in June, 1814.

his side, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Under Blücher's command was placed the Russian corps of Wintzingerode; and for this reason York, to whom the king had, as proof of his satisfaction and unimpaired confidence, subordinated Bülow and Borstell, was himself put under the command of Wittgenstein.

Not in vain had the king issued the appeal to his people. It was a moving spectacle, the manner in which this Prussian population

not merely took on themselves all the severe burdens which the state in its poverty was obliged to impose on them, but also pressed forward to offer cheerfully on the altar of patriotism whatever they were able to give. He who could not bear arms himself, assisted, so far as his means went, in equipping volunteers; he who had no money offered his labor or other useful things. The appeal issued by the authorities established in Berlin for receiving patriotic gifts bore rich fruits: magistrates and officers relinquished a part of their salaries, and others lent their savings without interest, or bestowed them on the state. In this general zeal no distinction of age or rank appeared. Wives and maidens divested themselves of their most precious jewels, and thousands of wedding-rings were delivered up, and replaced by those of iron. Ferdinande of Schmettau, sixteen years of age, disconsolate that she had nothing at all to give, cut off her abundant fair hair, and sold it for two thalers; and an enterprising man, who was informed of her act, made rings and chains of the hair, and the proceeds yielded 1200 thalers. At the suggestion and under the direction of the Princess Marianne, and nine other princesses of the royal house, a 'Women's Union for the good of the Fatherland' was formed, in order to collect contributions for the expenses of the war; and in every district diligent hands bestirred themselves to prepare pieces of clothing for the army and bandages for the wounded. Every village was converted into a workshop, the whole country into a military encampment. In this activity of the people Stein's reforms, being now brought into execution, first acquired actual vitality. Individual, independent administration became in this mighty rising a necessity. And in it all, notwithstanding the unspeakable injuries and outrages to which every district and every person had been exposed, not one feature of ignoble vengeance, of fierce retaliation, stained this glorious rising. Patriotic enthusiasm was pervaded by a religious undertone; no troop marched out from home to the war without first having been solemnly blessed in the church. Nowhere did the enthusiasm of that period reach a grander expression than among the volunteer chasseurs. The noblest legacy which the new creators of the German spirit had handed down from their own to the younger generation, the best gift which acquaintance with the sciences could impart, namely, moral power, was devoted in this chosen troop of men and youth to the service of the fatherland.

By the Prussian declaration of war Napoleon's plan of a new

campaign against Russia became impracticable. Now first of all it was of moment to chastise this new enemy. With reference to this, it was of the greatest importance that the Viceroy Eugene, resting upon Küstrin, should retain the Oder, whereby Prussia would be held in check, and time gained for coming to his assistance with additional forces. But when Eugene received this order he was no longer there. And this was not occasioned simply by the daring advance of Wittgenstein's troops, and the boldness with which Czernicheff from Paukow demanded the evacuation of Berlin from the French governor of the city. Colonel Tettenborn, at the head of a squadron of Cossacks, after he had overthrown the horsemen sent out against him, forced his way in through the feebly garrisoned gates, and disarmed several French detachments, amid the rejoicings of the inhabitants; and furthermore, the scouts of Colonel Benkendorf advanced as far as Beeskow and Storkow, captured 700 horses at Tempelhof, at Münchenberg scattered an Italian regiment of cavalry, and took possession of Fürstenwalde. It was, however, especially the ferment of the population around him, and on the other hand the physical and moral exhaustion of his troops, that decided Eugene to give up the Oder, and to occupy a position at Köpenick, behind the river Spree (February 22). But there, too, he was not to remain. Almost destitute of cavalry and with insufficient artillery, he yielded the entire right bank of the Elbe, on learning that Wittgenstein had crossed over the Oder; and on March 9 he established his headquarters at Leipsie. With the exception of the fortresses, the land was delivered from the enemy. On the 4th Berlin was swelling with joy at being able to welcome the shaggy sons of the steppe as her deliverers. Now, also, Wittgenstein hastened his march, and on the 11th he made his joyous entry into the capital. York appeared there on the 17th with his corps. On the 24th the king himself again saw his freed capital.

Emboldened by their successes, these light troops and skirmishers meanwhile turned toward the lower Elbe, and inflicted much injury on the departing French. Tettenborn was the first who (March 13) surprised a city belonging to the French empire, Lauenburg; and the inhabitants at once tore down the hated arms of France. In vain did General Carra St. Cyr at Hamburg, with a feeble garrison, seek to intimidate by display of force the people, who were already in great commotion. The exasperation increasing before his eyes, he evacuated the city on the approach of the Russians; and General

Morand, who was on the march, having refrained, in consequence of the protest of the Danish general, Ewald, from reoccupying the place, retreated across the Elbe, his rear guard losing six cannon to the Cossacks. On the 18th Tettenborn, invited by the Hamburg authorities, entered the liberated city, and was received with boundless rejoicing. The imperial authorities were expelled from Lüneburg also, and on the 19th Lübeck declared itself free from French rule. In the meantime Morand and Carra St. Cyr had united their forces at Bremen, and felt themselves sufficiently strong to put down this rising. They drove out the *Landsturm* and took possession of Lüneburg. Dörnberg, Benkendorf, and Czernicheff, who were stationed upon the Elbe, in order to avert from this city the contemplated punishment, came one day too late: but in a fierce engagement in the streets, in which the inhabitants participated, Morand was defeated. Mortally wounded, he was captured with his men.

However great the impression made by the freeing of Hamburg and the fight at Lüneburg, they had no influence upon the great operations of the war as a whole.

The onward rushing enthusiasm of the Prussian people, who by a rapid onset thought they would be able to gain over all Germany to the common conflict, and transfer the theatre of the war to the Rhine, allowed the actual opening of the campaign to be delayed far too long. To such lofty plans corresponded neither the state of their own preparations nor the strength and disposition of allies. The Prussian line consisted, one-half at least, of new levies, to whom even the greatest patriotic zeal had not yet been able to impart the requisite discipline. The landwehr was only to a small extent provided with serviceable weapons, and many were armed only with pikes. The Russians for whole weeks remained stationed in Poland, being forced to this at first by their numerical weakness. King Frederick William was dismayed when he saw their 'main army' at Kalish. Since the Russians, in order, before everything else, to secure their Polish plunder, had devoted a considerable part of their force to the investment of the fortresses of Modlin, Zamosc, and Czenstochau, their numbers, after Wintzingerode's departure, amounted to not more than 17,000 men: and to Wittgenstein remained likewise for service in the open field only 15,000. Furthermore, the general disinclination to the further prosecution of the war was an obstacle in the way of all energetic operations. A very important party at court and in the army, at whose head stood the old, indolent, and

arrogant Kutusoff, considered that with the deliverance of the Russian territory enough had been done, and now the right time had arrived to conclude an advantageous peace with Napoleon.

Meanwhile, during Alexander's stay at Breslau, a very important agreement was subscribed (March 19) by Stein and Nesselrode on the one side, and Hardenberg and Scharnhorst on the other, for establishing a Central Administrative Council, for the government of all the North German territories which should be occupied and possessed in the course of the war, Hanover and the districts that were formerly Prussian being excepted. This authority should in especial render available for the common cause the resources of those countries that had lost their rulers. Of this council Stein assumed the presidency. South Germany, in order not to forestall Austria there, was quietly left out. It was, however, agreed to issue an appeal which should indicate, as the aim of the struggle, the liberation of Germany from the French yoke, and invite princes and people to work together for this object. Every German prince who should not comply within a prescribed time with this demand was threatened with the loss of his possessions. In this appeal, issued from Kalish, on March 25, the two powers demanded faithful co-operation, especially from every German prince, and were willing gladly to anticipate that no one would be found among them all, who, by being and continuing faithless to the cause of Germany, would show himself prepared to meet deserved punishment through the forces of public opinion and through the power of righteous arms. The Confederation of the Rhine, that product of foreign coercion, could no longer be endured. The czar's wishes, it was stated, stood in no other relation to regenerated Germany and to its constitution than that of extending a protecting hand over a work whose form should be entirely referred to the free action of the princes and peoples of Germany.

The impression upon the courts of the Rhenish Confederation produced by this appeal was directly opposite to that contemplated. Independence of Germany, re-establishment of a German empire, which implied the loss of sovereignty, and perhaps, also, of the increase of territory obtained by Napoleon's favor, the appeal to the power of the people, and, moreover, the menace of deserved destruction, and such language from the mouth of the little, humbled Prussian king, had for them not the least feature that was inviting. In Munich, it is true, there were noticeable indications of a change

of sentiment in preparation, the destruction of 30,000 Bavarians in Russia having deeply affected the court. The crown-prince had won from his father the promise to suffer the Bavarian troops under no circumstances to be marched out of the country. Only the fear of being obliged to give up the margraviate of Franconia constituted the chief stumbling-block. This difficulty, however, was removed by Hardenberg, who since January had been in secret negotiation with the court of Munich, by promising that Prussia would not ask that it be restored, but would accept in compensation the territory on the lower Rhine formerly belonging to the Bavarian Palatinate. He did not ask at that time an immediate public declaration, for the defenceless country was then surrounded by 40,000 Italians; and it sufficed if Bavaria would refuse all demands of Napoleon, and secretly make every preparation in order at a given moment to join the allies. There was every promise of the best result, when suddenly, on Napoleon's demand, the Prussian agent received his passports.

The cause of this change reached higher than the appeal of Kalish; on the one hand, the new and powerful warlike preparations of Napoleon, and on the other, the influence of Austria. In Vienna, also, that appeal had made bad blood. While Metternich was in agreement with Hardenberg thus far, that the French rule over Germany must be destroyed, and Prussia reinstated in its former condition, yet in all else their ways went far apart at that time. Before the mind of the latter there stood, if not very clearly, a Germany in some way united, over which, especially in military matters, Austria in the south and Prussia in the north should exert a preponderating influence: the former desired the full maintenance of the sovereignty of the Rhenish Confederation, the pushing of Prussia back toward the east and Poland; he had no thought of sharing with Prussia, as the chief power of North Germany, the hegemony over Germany. Schwarzenberg, who, at Napoleon's desire, again repaired to the post of ambassador at Paris, on his return journey left behind him at Munich and Stuttgart the positive assurance that the purposes of Austria were entirely pure, that she aimed at no enlargement at the expense of the Confederation, that the Emperor Francis, far from thinking of a restoration of the old order in Germany, would not even accept the imperial crown if offered to him. By these assurances Metternich endeavored to gain over the courts of the Rhenish Confederation to his plan of mediation.

Thus the efforts of Metternich, to remove from Austria the fet-

ters of the French alliance without tying her hands afresh by an alliance with Russia and Prussia, pursued their course without interruption. Napoleon persuaded himself that he could depend upon Austria; and that in case of her loyalty wavering, the first victory gained by him would strengthen it. So much the less, therefore, could he be induced to buy her adherence by any concessions. In order, however, to see more clearly into the by-ways of Austrian diplomacy, he replaced Otto, his too confiding envoy at Vienna, by Count Narbonne, a grand seigneur of the old court, who could reasonably expect to find easier access to the aristocratic circles of that city. He now made the direct demand that as soon as he should appear on the Elbe, in order to assail the allies in front, Austria should notify the Russians that the armistice was at an end, should commence hostilities from Cracow with 30,000 men, and invade Silesia with her Bohemian army. To secure this end, he proposed a partition of Prussia in such a manner that 1,000,000 subjects should be left to the king on the right bank of the Vistula, the fairest part with 2,000,000 inhabitants should be assigned to Austria, and the remainder to Saxony and Westphalia. But Metternich rejected this proposal unconditionally. Peace, he added, could only be attained through an armed neutrality; and Austria would take measures accordingly. On April 18 Narbonne appeared again with a fresh demand: Metternich should hold the Austrian auxiliary corps, now commanded by Frimont, in readiness to announce the termination of the armistice, and to manoeuvre in accordance with the order of the emperor to be subsequently given. Thus urged, Metternich made the formal declaration that the Austrian corps stood no longer at Napoleon's disposal, and that Austria could not be at the same time both a war-waging power and a mediator. It was a virtual renunciation of the French alliance. Austrian preparations were urged forward with redoubled zeal. To Narbonne's question as to what Austria would do if Napoleon won a battle, Metternich replied Austria would prosecute her preparations the more eagerly and speedily. He left no doubt remaining, as regards his understanding of mediation. Austria would propose conditions of peace, and then declare against the power that rejected them. But he also soothed the impatience of the allies, and the desire to see a decisive act on the part of Austria, by the assurance that the complete momentary failure which they might experience, far from diverting Austria from her course, would only the more determine the employ-

ment of the most effectual measures for arresting Napoleon in his career.

This loitering of Austria was decisive with regard to the bearing of Saxony. For the allies the choice to be made by this state was of the greatest moment. Her adherence to the common cause would not merely have devoted to it her own forces, but would also have made a breach in the Rhenish Confederation, which presumably would have caused further crumbling of the edifice on the first success of their arms in the field. Wittgenstein and Blücher issued cordial appeals to the Saxons, and many thousands would willingly have followed them, but everything awaited the word of permission from the king's mouth; and the court continued to be far removed from such a bold resolution. Frederick Augustus, the king, now sixty-two years of age, was personally a man of high honor, but stubborn by nature, and of incredible narrowness in his political views. Fear of Napoleon was a controlling influence with him and his advisers, and fear in an especial manner of Prussians. On the first appearance of the Cossacks in Lusatia, the king established a government commission, and, with the intimation that he would remain faithful to his duties as a prince of the Rhenish Confederation, he repaired with his family, the court, and the public treasury, under protection of two regiments of cuirassiers, to Plauen, in the most remote southwestern corner of his territory. Here the Austrian envoy, Esterhazy, delivered to him an invitation from his emperor to give expression on his part to Napoleon of his desire for peace. With regard to a proposal of this kind, which might exasperate Napoleon, the king was greatly dismayed. He desired from Austria at least the guaranty of his possessions, inclusive of Warsaw. The latter was refused by Esterhazy; but he promised the intervention of Austria in behalf of Saxony's claims for indemnification, and reassured him with regard to his independence and that of the other states of the Confederation of the Rhine. But while these promises were working effectually upon the Saxon court, the intelligence came that on March 19 Marshal Davout, by Eugene's command, had blown up the beautiful bridge across the Elbe at Dresden, and had burnt the bridge at Meissen. In his anger at this vandalism, which was entirely justifiable from a military point of view, the timorous prince hastily sent orders to General Lecoq, who was stationed at Dresden, to leave Durnitz, and conduct his troops to Torgau, and commanded Thielmann, the general in command of that

fortress, to open it to no one unless by special command from the king. To remove himself yet farther from the combatants, he departed to Ratisbon on the 30th. The determination to seek shelter under the wings of the double-eagle ripened here the more rapidly, as his indignation increased when Blücher, without delay, took full possession of the circle of Kottbus for Prussia. An autograph letter from the king of Prussia, with the urgent demand that he should join the allies, which was delivered by General Heister, was answered coldly, evasively, and indefinitely. On the other hand, at Ratisbon on April 17, and at Vienna on the 20th, a secret convention was signed with Austria, in virtue of which the king united with Austria in order to support her armed intervention. In return, Austria guaranteed the inviolability of his hereditary possessions, with the promise of indemnification for Warsaw.

Ignobly had King Frederick Augustus left his country to itself in the midst of the most afflicting embarrassment. General Thielmann, who, from having been an early and enthusiastic admirer of Napoleon, had, since the catastrophe in Russia, changed into a German patriot, perceived in advance that Saxony was lost if she did not embrace the party which the public voice demanded. From the forbearing conduct of the allies the positive hope was generally cherished that Saxony would yet be won over by friendly means; but if she continued to refuse their advances as steadfastly as hitherto, Saxony must of necessity be treated as a hostile country. In reference to the proposals of the Russians with respect to opening the fortress, he was as firm in refusal as towards the French commanders; but letters had been exchanged with the allies, and some interviews held with them, and he even complied with an invitation to the headquarters of the sovereigns near Dresden. Entertained there in the most obliging manner, and pacified by the assurances received, he sought, at a repast given on April 27, in honor of his birthday, to carry along his officers with him, and make an absolute transfer; but this was foiled by the opposition of General von Sahr.

The failure of Saxony to join the allies had for its momentous result that the Confederation of the Rhine held together; Mecklenburg alone declared itself free. That uprising of the German people with one mind, which Stein hoped for, was not attained. The greater the inability again to lift itself up from its deep decline by its own strength, the greater need, unfortunately for itself, of foreign aid to effect this object. The spirit of self-renunciation with

Minister Thiele

If only I might give you a moment in your leisure
to understand my view. In referring to our
battle, I consider it fit to oblige you, and let you
know my abhorrence, as far as my rank, in not more
eagerly supporting those who were, in the first
place in conflict, and of whom I particularly
gave you the right movement, the about
heatstroke & stroke about a fourth, and major
v. Blücher made up before the ardent
and ardent he found, I was left for myself,
upon near quantity 3 officers wounded, one
of whom is dead. On the 3rd the Duke is said
to have yesterda. It is itself a strong belief if yesterday
P. well held if being now in Hanover come
6th hour in the afternoon, during which
in his party were three officers and a number of
told accordingly, Hesse, Marquardt and the rest being
v. Blücher and with him morning before the

in Götg. nicht so sehr von uns geschaut
ist als sehr traurig, ob es tatsächlich der Druck
der politischen Verantwortung ist. Derober ist fij
nicht, wenn es offensichtlich bestand, ich red' aber
nur von mein. liebster Hocque & Drift
nach, ich verlasse Ihnen weiter.
Der Major & Höglund Hj. 1^o Kp. 1^o
Husaren Regiments ist mir bisher aber
ausser Partie sehr traurig & gefest, who has
been told by the quartermaster, Dr. P. Ljungqvist,
so i. Concerning my unexpectancy.

Habt Ihr in dieser Schlecht, blücher -
weimarer Fasch die vorigen nach Erfolge
verloren Gotz, Faroch von Hallstrand
den Herrn Ober-Kreatall in Dr. Ljungqvist

alsterburg
16 Aug 1863

Blücher

which the Prussians endured the arrogance of their Russian confederates, with which they subordinated themselves to Russian officers generally of superior rank, but commanding weaker detachments, and with which they were constrained to make the progress of military operations dependent upon the humors and the non-compliance of the allies, is a merit not inferior to the heroic courage with which they threw themselves upon the enemy.

In pursuance of Scharnhorst's plan, the advance of the allies was made in two principal directions. Blücher, who was followed by the Russian main army at the distance of three days' march, moved out of Silesia, through Lusatia, upon Dresden; and Wittgenstein marched from the Mark of Brandenburg towards the Elbe above Wittenberg, in order to join the former on the farther side of the river. The total strength amounted to 102,500 men, of whom 54,000 were Prussians. The attempt of Wittgenstein to take Wittenberg by a night attack (April 17) was a failure. On Wintzingerode's approach, Dresden was evacuated by Davout and Durutte. The Prussians were still flattering themselves constantly with the hope of gaining the co-operation of Saxony, but this hope was soon necessarily relinquished. When the Saxon government assumed a higher tone toward Blücher (PLATE X.¹), he also changed his language, but only so far as superior instructions gave him authority. On April 3 he marched over the temporary bridge onward to Freiberg, Chemnitz, and Altenburg.

Wittgenstein struck the enemy first. The Viceroy Eugene had advanced from Magdeburg upon the right bank of the Elbe, with the corps of Lauriston and Grenier, partly for the purpose of obtaining supplies and partly to cause anxiety to the enemy with regard to

¹ EXPLANATION OF PLATE X.

Faesimile of a Letter from Blücher to the Minister Thiele: written at Altenburg, April 16, 1813. Original size. (Original in the Grote Collection.)

TRANSCRIPTION.

Mein liber Thiele,

Ich habe es mich stets zum gesetz gemagt, ie grösser die entfernung vom Feinde, ie mehr dass von leichten Truppen zu sein beobachtung, und beunruhigung abgesanter¹, an ihm sein muss, damit man auch bey weitter Entfernung vom gegner, jede seiner bewegung erfährt, und ich spühre schon jetzt die guhlen vollgen dieses *manouvers*, der obrist Lieutenant v Ilube oberstl. v Laroch², und Major v Blücher machen gleichsahm die *avantgarde* und *ariergarde* des Feinds, und verlassen ihm nicht, wen vorgenante 3 officir mörbe werden, bestime ich dazu 3 andre dazu. Die sache ist hir so angetahn, dass vileyicht in 6 Tagen vills aufgelehr ist, als gebe ich drum wen die Russische *armee* 6 Tage früer um die Elbe wehre, da es nun nicht sein kan so müssen

Berlin. On April 5, at the villages of Danigkow, Vehlitz, and Zehdenik, three sharp engagements with his vanguard occurred, which were named from a place called Möckern. They were almost entirely Prussians who were in this conflict; and there was not one among them who did not, with General Hünerbein, look upon it as an affair of honor. The 'Mad' Platen with his two hundred dragoons dashed upon three cavalry regiments of the enemy, certainly one thousand strong, rolled them up, and drove them before him. The viceroy, after this repulse, retreated to the left bank: but the Russians began to acquire respect for such an ally. On the 8th Wittgenstein crossed the Elbe at Roslau, and, after leaving behind him a corps of observation before Magdeburg, reached Wittenberg and Torgau, and on the 26th, Leipsic. Finally the Russian main army also arrived, having broken up from Kalish on the 4th, and with it were the two sovereigns. The wearied and incapable Kutusoff (Fig. 49) was left behind sick at Bunzlau, where, fortunately for the common cause, he died on April 26.

To these dilatory proceedings of the allies, the rapidity with which their opponent urged on his preparation for the new war formed the greatest conceivable contrast. It bordered upon the miraculous, the manner in which the mighty master of the art of war, stamping upon the ground, produced an entirely new army. In order to obtain the necessary resources in money, the property of corporations, to the amount of 240,000,000 francs, was seized by a decree of the senate. The marine artillery, not now available at sea, was turned over to the land forces, whose guns for the most part were lying in Russia. Confiding in the aptitude of his Frenchmen, the emperor ordered no small part of the new levies to march into Germany unarmed. The distribution of arms, which were sent after

wihr schon sehen wie wihr fertig werden, Ney, Mormont und der Vice König von Itahien sind mit ihrer voreinung bescheftigt in dessen müssen wihr wo es nohtwendig wird das sellbe tuhn. ich uhrteille dass der Feind sein erstes unternehmen uf Dresden ussführen will, wen er *offensive* beginnt. ich werde aber auch vor meine linke Flanque bedacht nehmen, und er soll einen schwerehn stand kriegen. der Major v Hellwig des 1st Schlesischen Husaren Regiments hat einen kühnen aber wahren *Partiesahn* Streich ussgeführt, überhaupt rechtfertigen die genannten *officir*, und *Regimenter* so sie *Comendiren* meine erwahrtung.

Höhe ist in und um Schleitz, Blücher in Weimar (wahr die vergangen nacht Erfuht vorbey) in Gota, Laroch in Heldrungen der Russische oberst Brendell³ in und bey Eisleben.

alltenburg

d 16 April 1813

Blücher

¹ that is, the detached divisions. — ² = Laroche. — ³ Brendel.

them, and the necessarily limited drilling of the men, were effected on the way. Assuredly even to a Napoleon the new creation of an army in so short a time would have been impossible, unless a disproportionate number of officers and sub-officers, being better provided than others with means of protection against hunger and



FIG. 49.—Prince Kutusov Smolenskoi. From a copper-plate engraving by F. Bollinger (1777–1825); original painting by Rosentreter (painted in Bucharest).

cold, had escaped in the destruction of the Grand Army. But after all, there was such a want of veteran soldiers, that in many regiments it was necessary to select two-thirds of the sub-officers from the newly levied conscripts. The least success was in replacing the lost cavalry.

The result of this giant's toil was that, in mockery of all antici-

pation, Napoleon, instead of being assailed, was the first to open the attack with superior forces. As one principal rendezvous for his troops he appointed the valley of the Main, to which also the corps formed by Bertrand at Verona directed its course; as another point, Magdeburg was designated, where Eugene's force, by the arrival of successive re-enforcements, was gradually increased to a total of 80,000 men. He contemplated, furthermore, the transferral of the centre of the defence thence to the Lower Elbe, and an advance with all his forces toward Stettin, in order to secure the Oder before the enemy, and thus inflict on him a startling surprise. More than upon the immediate advantage of such a success, he counted on the moral impression that would be produced throughout Europe by his reappearance upon the banks of the Vistula. But just at this moment of time, Prussia, so little valued by friend and foe, rose up to exhibit a strength which made the execution of this offensive plan an impossibility. Napoleon received the Prussian declaration of war with proud coldness. To the vassals of the Confederation of the Rhine were sent stringent commands with regard to the renewal of their contingents.

The first blow from the paw of the aroused lion struck the thirty-second military division, declared by a decree of the senate to be outlawed. The transports of recovered freedom were there destined to be of short duration. They were exchanged for the most painful apprehensions when Vandamme, to execute the decree of outlawry, marched with 24,000 men from Wesel toward the Weser. Before such superiority of force, the rising, begun without forecast and without needful reserve of strength, and left by the English and Swedes without support, succumbed unresistingly, and the judgment of vengeance and terror had free course. On April 10, ten persons were shot in Bremen, and others were sentenced to the galleys or thrown into prison. The chastisement of rebels experienced no mitigation when Davout arrived, clothed with unlimited military authority over those districts. Soon, however, eyes were turned toward the country upon the Saale, where was being prepared the first encounter of the main armies.

On April 17 Napoleon entered Frankfort. Although his forces were by no means complete for duty, he nevertheless determined, in order that popular feeling in Germany might not have time for more forcible expression, to open the assault without delay. His squadrons entered upon the march, passing through Franconia and the

Thuringian forest. On the 25th he was himself in Erfurt, and his troops in the advancee were approaching the Saale, of which he availed himself with great skill as a screen behind which to accomplish his junction with Eugene. On the 28th he mounted his horse at Weimar. "I shall make this campaign," he said, "as General Bonaparte, not as emperor." The day after, he came to Naumburg. With his force of combatants of about 150,000 men, he was greatly superior in numbers to the 98,000 of the allies; on the other hand, to the 25,000 cavalry of the latter he could oppose only 8000, and to their 650 cannon only 350. In what concerned the quality of the troops, the advantage was by far on the side of the allies. The Russians, while weak as to number, consisted of nothing but tried warriors, without any recruits, and their horses were in the best condition. Of the Prussians, a part had gained valuable experience in war during the last year's campaign, the remainder had been undergoing military discipline for years, and the spirit of them all could not be surpassed. On the side of the French, only the old guard, commanded by Marshal Mortier, and the sub-officers, were veteran soldiers, while the young guard, under Marshal Bessières, and the men of the other four corps, led by Ney, Bertrand, Marmont, and Oudinot, were almost entirely recruits. At the head of these corps, and in the higher grades of command, was still to be seen the splendor of those names which the emperor's victories had rendered famous throughout the world: but even on these men, the work of time, the enjoyment of pleasure, and the impress of the Napoleonic power, had begun to make themselves perceptibly felt. The enthusiasm of former years was far from predominating in the army, but the men followed the emperor with the spirit of hirelings. Had he had with him on the Saale the choice troops that were in Spain, and those that had been sent off to north-western Germany, he could, even at the beginning of the campaign, have fallen upon the enemy with crushing weight.

The honorable conflict which the Prussian major, von Lobethal, on April 29, at Merseburg, sustained with Macdonald, could not longer delay the union of the two hostile armies. The sovereigns, on May 1, had committed the chief command to Wittgenstein, the hero of the war of 1812. The main force of the allies, deducting the detachments which were far in advance, in all 74,000 men, was stationed on the bank of the White Elster, facing towards the great road whieh leads to Leipsie from Naumburg by Weissenfels and Lützen: Blücher on the left wing at Borna: York and the Russians, under

Berg, in and near Zwenkau; in the rear were the Russian guards. Although the recently formed French cavalry, on account of the superiority of the allies, had not ventured upon a direct attack, nevertheless, Napoleon had ascertained correctly their point of junction, and determined, as soon as he had fully accomplished his connection with the viceroy, to go round the allies with his left wing, and throw them into the angle between the Elbe and the Erzgebirge, perhaps towards the Fichtel range, and thus by one battle put an end to the war. On May 1, Ney, who formed the head of the advance, encountered, at Rippach, Wintzingerode, forced the passage across the Rippach, and pressed the enemy in the direction of Lützen. Although on this day as formerly the defective co-operation of the fresh levies had made itself severely felt, he yet ventured on the next day (May 2), almost without cavalry, to commence his advance to the level country beyond. Three hours afterwards his army became separated into rroups, moving along detached and distant from one another. The central group, composed of the corps of Ney, encamped in the vicinity of Lützen as a pivot for the manoeuvre to be performed by wheeling the other corps: to this the corps that were not far in the rear moved up from the river Saale, and the third group, comprising the corps of Eugene and the guards, advancing toward Leipsic, was expected to complete the surrounding of the enemy's right flank. But before this movement could be fully executed, he was struck by the unexpected onset of the allies.

That the latter still believed, on April 30, that it was impracticable for Napoleon, on account of his want of cavalry, to choose any other direction than the hilly country from Naumburg by Zeitz to Altenburg, and that even on the following day the presence of Ney, only a league from their front, was wholly undetected by them, is the plainest proof how little they understood in what manner to make use of their numerous cavalry. When, however, the actual circumstances were perceived, Wittgenstein, in pursuance of a plan proposed by Diebitsch, his quartermaster-general, immediately decided to throw himself from his position at Pegau upon the right flank of the enemy, whose forces were not developed, and were marching in separate detachments, and cut it in two. But at the very first step he discovered that, impeded alike by the novelty of his position and by the presence of his emperor, he was anything else rather than an independent commander-in-chief. Thus it came about that the plan boldly and skilfully conceived was very imperfectly

executed. Dispositions for the attack were announced too late. Blücher's and York's corps crossed each other in consequence of confused marching orders; so that, instead of six o'clock in the morning, it was not till five hours later that they stood in battle array, extending from Flossgraben to Domsen. Their first attack struck Ney's corps when wholly isolated, and when the marshal himself was not on the ground. But this delay had allowed the French generals time in which to collect their thoughts, and to seize the four villages, Kaja, Rahna, Klein- and Grossgörschen, lying south of Lützen, and constituting a kind of natural fortification, and in them to oppose an obstinate resistance to the assailants. Advancing at a rapid, charging step, the Prussians did indeed gain possession of Grossgörschen, and for several hours the fierce fight swayed this way and that. Blücher and Scharnhorst were in the thickest of the whirling crowd, both were wounded, and for a long time York was obliged to assume the chief command of the Prussians. Well knowing that on his position the fate of the army hung, Ney maintained himself with the greatest resolution; but Kleingörschen and Rahna were lost, and finally Kaja also, at least in part. The emperor now made his appearance to support his marshal, who was hard pressed. At the outset his attention had been principally directed to the conflict in which his vanguard under Lauriston were engaged with Kleist at Lindenau, one hour from Leipsic. Scarcely had he heard, about twelve o'clock, the report of cannon in the rear and at his right, when at once he opposed to the assailants his whole army then on the march, with the exception of Lauriston's division. He rode himself at full speed to the point that was endangered. His arrival imparted new strength to Ney's exhausted soldiers, and to encourage his young troops he flew from place to place amid the thickest showers of balls. On this day, more than at any time in Napoleon's entire career, he incurred the greatest personal danger. Re-enforcements were coming up on all sides; Kaja was successfully defended, Rahna and Kleingörschen retaken. Still at one time the scales of victory were inclined in favor of the Prussians, while they wrested the burning villages a second time from the enemy. But now, having advanced towards Starsiedel and Eisdorf, they encountered the far superior masses of the viceroy of Italy; and he, pressing on against their right flank, overwhelmed them with a fearful iron hail-storm from the mouths of sixty cannon. At this juncture, knowing that the critical moment of the battle had come,

Napoleon put in his reserve, the young guard under Lobau, for the decisive attack upon Kaja. It was captured, and the other villages were taken one after another; but in one part of Grossgörschen the Prussians still maintained their position. The Russian guards and grenadiers, whom Wittgenstein, with Alexander's permission, had ordered to proceed to the support of York, came too late, and the approach of darkness prevented a renewed attack.

This battle, named by Napoleon, Lützen, by the Prussians, Grossgörschen, cost the Prussians 8000 men, and the Russians 2000; but they lost no artillery, and captured five pieces and 800 prisoners. Napoleon's loss of men exceeded theirs by one-half. With unimpaired courage the troops awaited the continuation of the struggle on the following day, but Wittgenstein regarded his situation as too precarious. The final decision was given when the Russian commandant of artillery announced that his ammunition was exhausted, and could only be supplied on the banks of the Elbe.

The allies chose to direct their line of retreat upon Dresden; and thus they not only kept themselves in the neighborhood of Austria, and were able to leave their left wing upon neutral territory, but they also by that course approached the Russian re-enforcements by the shortest route. Prussians and Russians followed different roads; the former proceeding by Borna, Colditz, Döbeln, and Meissen, the latter by Frohburg, Rochlitz, Nossen, and Wilsdruff. The genius of Napoleon, with a hastily gathered army, consisting largely of troops utterly without experience, had accomplished the incredible exploit of gaining a victory over an enemy far superior to him in tried and veteran soldiers, in cavalry and artillery, and thereby imparting to his fresh levies that self-confidence which only the army he had lost in Russia had ever possessed. It was fruitless pains for the two monarchs to announce from the balcony of Dresden Castle to the people below that they had gained a victory, for the spectacle before their eyes taught them the contrary. But the special strategic object of the battle Napoleon had not yet attained. He would gladly have completed the victory, at least by a vigorous pursuit; but his deficiency in cavalry, and the firm, unchanged attitude of the troops as they withdrew before him, did not allow this. On the 8th the allies effected their passage across the Elbe. Napoleon, however, in his bulletin sought to make people believe almost in the destruction of the armies of the enemy, and lavished praise on his soldiers for having brought to naught, in a single day, the plots of the hordes of

barbarians who had broken in upon civilized Europe, led by the vilest subjects and deserters of Germany, France, and Italy, intent on preaching there insurrection and anarchy. The notorious Stein, who desired to stir up the rabble against people of property, the *Moniteur* declared, was thoroughly despised by all honorable men.

The result of the battle of Lützen decided immediately the fate of Saxony and of her king. He was remaining at Prague in anxious suspense, when, on May 3, he received a letter from the Duke of Weimar, written by Napoleon's command, which made him dread the worst in case of a French victory. Yet Frederick Augustus maintained his ground, and instructions were renewed to Thielmann to surrender the fortress to no one except by order from the king in conjunction with the Emperor of Austria. But then came intelligence of the battle, and this caused unbounded dismay to the fugitive court. Although still without reports from Vienna, the king decided to return under the French yoke, and dismissed in disgrace his minister Senfft von Pilsach. There was no longer need, therefore, of the menace that arrived from Napoleon on the following day, that if his demands were not fulfilled within six hours, he would declare the king a felon, and deprive him of his protection, and that consequently he would cease to reign. Instantly the king departed; and on the 12th Napoleon procured for his army the spectacle of a king, whom his mere appearance had saved from attempted defection, and brought back humbled to his feet. Thielmann received orders to open Torgau to the French. The Saxons, jointly with the division of Durutte, again composed the 7th army corps under Reynier, and their cavalry strengthened the corps of Latour-Maubourg.

As soon as the Dresden bridge had been rendered passable by a temporary wooden structure erected under Napoleon's eyes, the imperial army began to cross to the right bank of the Elbe. Ney could now, without hindrance, cross over at Torgau and simultaneously at Wittenberg, with his 70,000 men, for the purpose of undertaking the movement toward Berlin intrusted to him. For a moment this threatening accumulation of hostile forces in the direction of the capital suggested the thought at Prussian headquarters of separating entirely from the Russians, with whose supreme command they had so many reasons to be dissatisfied. Berlin was covered in a manner utterly inadequate by Bülow's small corps, and he was ordered in an emergency to defend the city to the utmost. The Prussians, on May 9, turned from Meissen towards Grossenhain. It

was a perilous moment. Should they march farther northward, it would be in the power of Napoleon to interpose between them and the Russians. This apprehension was also the reason that even Wittgenstein yielded so far as to deflect a little from the natural and direct line to Bautzen, and stationed himself behind the Röder at Radeberg. But the danger continued only a moment. The Prussians gave up country and capital, and by a rapid march through Königsbrück and Kamenz renewed their connection with the Russians. Kneesebeck, now the king's counsellor in military matters, and Gneisenau also, at first advised a retreat along the foot of the mountains as far as Silesia, and meanwhile to make every effort to bring the negotiations with Austria to a conclusion; but the Emperor Alexander insisted upon a battle. But it should not be, as at Lützen, a battle of attack, but one of defence; and thus was subsequently forfeited the advantage for assuming the offensive which was offered by Ney's separation from the main army. On May 13 the allied army occupied a position one league east from the Spree, well adapted to defence. On the left flank they were covered by the mountains and the Bohemian frontier, and were further strengthened by intrenchments, behind which they enjoyed a whole week of rest.

In the belief that Ney had forced the Prussians far north, Napoleon quietly awaited in Dresden the arrival of his entire forces: only, in order to obtain more room for their subsistence, he pushed forward his troops in the shape of a fan as far as Königsbrück, Kamenz, and Bischofswerda. But he constantly kept Ney within reach of his arm, ready for all contingencies; and as soon as he was convinced that the enemy would make a stand at Bautzen, he recalled the marshal, who had gone as far as Dobrilugk, and directed him to turn by Hoyerswerda towards Dresda and to cross the Spree. To the allies the lack of unity in command was most disastrous. The Emperor Alexander permitted himself constantly to make invasions upon the command of the army, according to his good pleasure. The Prussians, both the king and his generals, possessed no decisive voice. In the ignorance with regard to the positions and movements of the enemy, half-measures were adopted. Barclay, who was in command of the right wing, was despatched with 24,000 men, including York's corps, which had dwindled away to 5670 men, in order to attack Lauriston, whom the emperor had recalled from Ney's army, and who was presumed to be still detached. The Russians under General Tchaplitz, who had taken the left and nearer road by Königswarthe, at this

plaee encountered the Italian division of Peri, which was appointed to maintain the communication between Napoleon and Ney, scattered it utterly, and captured ten cannon. At Weissig, York struck upon Lauriston; and, placed in the most unfortunate situation through Barclay's orders and counter-orders, he held his ground with admirable ability against nearly thrice his number for seven hours, until on the approach of night it became evident that Ney and Lauriston were both moving toward Bautzen on parallel roads and upon heights of the same elevation. Barclay then set out on his return-march, without having reached the object contemplated.

The main position to be defended was nearly ten miles in extent, and for that reason without firm connection between the several divisions. The front was toward the west, and the line extended from the last declivities of the Lusatian mountains down to the plain below. On the extreme left the Russians were posted under Prince Gortchakoff. In the centre were the Prussians under Blücher and York, upon a somewhat projecting range of hills belonging to the high ground of Kreckwitz. The right wing formed by Barclay was bent backward in the shape of a shortened hook across Gleina, as far as Gotta; and the crossings over the Spree were guarded by advanced troops led by Miloradovitch, Kleist, and Telaplitz. 96,000, according to others 85,000 men, awaited in this position the attack of the enemy, numbering 160,000 men. Had Napoleon known the determination of the allies to make a stand in any event, he would undoubtedly have postponed the attack for a day; but since he was obliged to presume that they intended to escape from their hazardous position by falling back, the attack with which he opened the two days' battle of Bautzen, on May 20, had for its sole object to hold them fast sufficiently long to give Ney time to come up, and, pushing forward in the direction of Wurschen and Weissenberg, cut off their retreat. After Miloradovitch had prematurely evacuated the city of Bautzen, the French by degrees forced at all points the passage of the Spree, with the exception of the crossing at Niedergurkau, below Bautzen, which Kleist steadily defended till evening. Napoleon's plan was by vigorous feint-attacks on the left wing of the allies to draw thither their main forces, and then, as soon as Ney was up, to fall upon their right wing with a superior force and crush it. The allies, entirely dominated by the thought of defensive operations, committed the mistake of allowing Napoleon's forces to be quietly developed on the right side of the Spree. Thus Oudinot's advance

toward the mountain completely accomplished its object in so deceiving them as to seek on this side the central point of the battle. The impetuosity with which this marshal on the 21st renewed his attacks on the Russian left wing confirmed the Emperor Alexander in his original error; and although Wittgenstein saw through it, he did not venture to undeceive his sovereign. One re-enforcement after another was drawn from the reserve to strengthen this point. Oudinot consequently was hard pressed and greatly perplexed; but his repeated requests for support remained unanswered, and finally Napoleon ordered him to be told that he must do the best in his power; in about three hours the battle would be gained. Having proposed to make the chief attack by Ney, the emperor quietly awaited the time, and even slept calmly for a length of time within range of the enemy's fire. Meanwhile Barclay was obliged to retire upon Baruth and Preititz, and the latter was lost to Ney. Blücher after a very fierce struggle succeeded in retaking the village: but now Napoleon moved up his centre under Soult, which had been withheld thus far, and assailed the Prussian position on the Kreckwitz heights. There followed for hours the fluctuations of a bloody fight. Blücher brought up York to his support; while Ney, having wrested Preititz a second time from the troops of Kleist, was now standing in Blücher's rear. Fortunately for Blücher, Ney advanced with a caution which he seldom practised; and the Prussians so far profited by this that they brought up against him all their disposable troops, and thus opened a way for the escape of Blücher.

The second capture of Preititz was conclusive proof of the inevitable necessity of breaking off the battle, if the allies were not to be exposed to a complete overthrow; for the greater part of the Russian reserve was wasted. Blücher encountered the greatest difficulty, since he was farthest in advance; but step by step only, with admirable bearing, the Prussians retired upon Kleinbautzen and Burschwitz.

The retreat was conducted partly upon Löbau and partly upon Weissenberg. But this way led through Silesia to Poland; and should this road be pursued, it was foreseen with certainty that the Russians would return to their homes altogether, and, as in 1807, would leave their allies to their fate. For this reason, in the council of war held at Lauban, Hardenberg and the Prussian generals urged the view that it was necessary, even should it cost the sacrifice of nearly the whole Prussian territory, on entering Silesia to bend

southward toward Schweidnitz, mainly in order to keep up the connection with Austria. Bitter was it, indeed, that when three months had not yet elapsed they should again find themselves in the same place from which they had set out, and this in great part because of faults for which they must blame themselves. The clashing sentiments among the leaders became more and more embittered. Between Gneisenau and York there passed very angry contradictions, and they were never reconciled. Wittgenstein, also, was at variance with Toll, his quartermaster-general. Wearyed with the continued intermeddling of the Russian emperor, and aware that after losing two battles he could not retain the supreme command over four generals, his seniors in rank, he asked to be superseded; and, on his suggestion, Barelay was invested with the supreme command,

Napoleon had expected decisive results from a two days' battle by which 25,000 of his soldiers had been put *hors de combat*; but on this occasion, also, he was compelled to be convinced that he had rather pressed back than beaten his adversary. He urged forward the pursuit in person with the greatest energy, but the want of cavalry and artillery did not permit him to reach any better result. The rear guard under Yermoloff, together with the Prussian horse brigade of Katzeler, contested obstinately every foot of ground with the pursuers. Exasperated by the obstinacy of this resistance, Napoleon here planned a severe chastisement for the beaten foe. He ordered Reichenbach to be taken by the Saxons, and the Töpferberg to be stormed: but the enemy were occupying the heights behind Markersdorf, were already again prepared for battle, and opened upon those pressing on behind them a brisk fire of artillery. The first discharge prostrated, close to the emperor, General Kirchener, and Duroc, grand marshal of the palace. The death of the latter, his inseparable attendant in almost every campaign, agitated the emperor profoundly. He was seen sitting before his tent, in a square formed by his guard, his head sunken, his arms crossed, plunged into gloomy thoughts. Among his soldiers also there prevailed anything but the mood of victors; and the appearance of a flag of truce caused a joyous commotion, for all longed for the end of the fearful and bloody toil, and were dismayed to find everywhere only evidences of a growing hostility among the people. In this affair, too, notwithstanding a struggle lasting fourteen hours, no decisive advantage was obtained.

This tenacious resistance by the rear guard secured to the allied

armies the advance needed in order to cross the many streams that descend from the Lusatian and Silesian Mountains, and to reach unmolested the plains of Silesia. The entrance upon this region excited Blücher to deal another sharp blow at the pursuers with his superior cavalry. On the proposal of Major Rühle von Lilienstern, one of the best officers of his general staff, he placed 6000 infantry and 4000 mounted men, all choice troops, under command of Zieten, to lie in ambush at Haynau. When the division of Maison inadvertently attacked, it was set upon (May 25) directly in front of Ney's headquarters, dispersed, 400 prisoners and 11 cannon captured, and only the impatience of the horsemen rushing out prematurely prevented a still more complete success. This affair had the twofold effect of decidedly restoring the self-confidence of the Prussians, and of imposing upon Napoleon's advance a circumspection which facilitated the flank movement toward Schweidnitz.

Along with this war of the great armies, there was also going forward a vigorous partisan warfare, which annoyed the French armies in a high degree, harassing their movements and interrupting their communications. From the beginning, it was Scharnhorst's opinion, in view of the rising of the Spanish people, that an insurrectionary warfare should accompany the struggle of the regular armies. In agreement with this view was the determination of the Lützow Free Corps to furnish a rallying-point for popular risings in the border districts of Prussian Germany. Especially did studious youth enthusiastically flock together to put on the black uniform of the 'squadron of vengeance ;' and the accession of F. L. Jahn drew after it many young men who adhered to him. Theodore Körner gave up a life adorned with garlands of love, of friendship, and of joy, and hastened to join (Fig. 50). This squadron had only the dubious fortune of being more extolled than circumstances allowed it to deserve. Ordered to join Blücher, it found itself, after reaching Leipsic, held back by the dilatory movements of the main army. Napoleon's rapid advance, and then the loss of two battles, made it necessary to give up entirely the thought of attempting an insurrection in western Germany ; and thus, on the whole, little was accomplished. At the end of April, Lützow joined an enterprise of Dörnberg for the deliverance of Hamburg. Both threw themselves upon Vandamme's right wing, and delivered battle, on May 12, at the Gehrde, a wood lying between Daneberg and Dalenberg; but the next day both were compelled, in presence of a superior force, to

retire across the Elbe. More opportunity to annoy the enemy, and inflict loss upon him, was discovered by partisans, who were peculiarly light and active, as especially Blücher's brother-in-law, the restless and shrewd captain of horse, von Colomb, who fought for seven weeks upon the left (Saxon) bank of the Elbe, made prisoners,



FIG. 50.—Theodore Körner as a member of Lützow's corps. From the crayon drawing of April, 1813, by Emma Körner. Original in the Körner Museum, at Dresden.

intercepted couriers and supply-wagons, captured at Zwickau a train of twenty-four cannon and twenty-seven vehicles, nearly made a prisoner of the Viceroy Eugene when travelling to Italy, and then established himself in the forest region at Neustadt upon the Oder. With great daring the Russian Czernicheff, on May 30, captured at Halberstadt the Westphalian General von Oehs, together with 1000 men, 14 cannon, 60 powder-wagons, and 800 horses, and destroyed

the army supplies at that place. In like manner, in Lusatia, General Kaisaroff and the Prussian partisans, von Helwig and von Blankenburg, were favored in their enterprises.

General Bülow meanwhile was not inactive, but after Ney had abandoned his expedition against Berlin advanced with 17,000 men as far as Baruth. He did not venture to remove farther from Berlin to assist the main army, and therefore his situation became hazardous, in consequence of the loss of the battle of Bautzen. Oudinot moved forward to drive him away; and an engagement at Hoyerswerda, on May 27, which he risked with undisciplined and badly armed troops against an enemy double his own strength, terminated to the disadvantage of the Prussians. In order that the enemy might at least not reach Luckau before him, and thereby the direct road to Berlin, Bülow hastened in that direction by a forced march, and on June 4 defended the little town in a spirited conflict that lasted the whole day, till Oudinot, after suffering considerable losses, withdrew in the night. This engagement formed the conclusion of the spring campaign; for on the same day an armistice was subscribed in Silesia.

Very different from the disposition of the Prussian army was the feeling of the Russians. Anxious with regard to his line of retreat, and doubtful as to the internal condition of the army that was suffering from the want of all supplies, Barclay desired the continuation of the retreat to Poland, and six weeks' rest in that country. This meant to abandon Prussia, to sacrifice the approaching alliance with Austria, and finally to incur the danger that the conqueror, after destroying Prussia, would throw himself with all his strength upon the Russians alone, and in like manner overcome them.

Fortunately Napoleon did not suspect how far the disposition of the Russians was in accord with his own wishes. Notwithstanding the battles he had won, his own situation appeared to him anything but satisfactory. For a long time the skilful leadership of the emperor had sufficed to compensate the deficiency of his forces, the physical feebleness of his boy-soldiers, the inadequateness of their training, and the small number and wretched condition of his cavalry. Nevertheless, he felt that his resources would be crippled by meeting a resistance so pertinacious, efforts so great, and by his own increasing losses. He saw his soldiers becoming more relaxed in discipline, and he perceived the flame of popular hate that was

burning around him. But what disturbed him most of all was the growing conviction that Austria was slipping out of the fetters of the French, and perhaps was already on the point of joining his enemies. The discontinuance of service in his army, the renunciation of treaty obligations, and finally the withdrawal of the Austrian corps, had irritated him extremely. At one and the same time Count Stadion was despatched to the headquarters of the allies, and Count Bubna to Napoleon at Dresden, for the purpose of announcing to both parties the beginning of the armed intervention in behalf of peace, and to procure admission for the behests of moderation and reason.

Up to this time Metternich had always avoided naming the conditions that were to constitute the basis of the Austrian peace intervention; for he desired only to be the 'father-confessor' of both contending parties, and to lead Napoleon as well as the allies to a declaration of the conditions on the ground of which they would be ready for peace. However, in consequence of England's refusal to accept Austrian mediation, the possibility had vanished of compensating Napoleon for the sacrifices he must make to promote a general pacification. As the minimum of Austria's demands, Bubna placed before the emperor, whom he met at Dresden, on May 16, the following proposals: For Austria, the restoration of Illyria and Dalmatia, the rectification of the frontier toward Bavaria, and the cession of the Duchy of Warsaw; moreover, the restoration to Prussia of the former Polish South Prussia, together with Dantzig, and Napoleon's relinquishment of his trans-Rhenish departments, at least of Lübeck and Hamburg with the districts appertaining; questions relating to Italy, Holland, and Spain should be provisionally held open. Furthermore, Bubna was not to leave the emperor in doubt, that, if these proposals should be rejected, Austria would maintain them by force. Napoleon listened to these overtures with suppressed rage, but the imperfect success of his campaign forbade their immediate rejection. While pouring forth passionate reproaches, he declared himself ready to negotiate for an armistice and for peace, but he avoided every definite promise as to the basis of peace. Bubna carried away with him the conviction that Napoleon regarded the Austrian demands as a humiliation, that only in the event of securing a maritime peace would he consent to make sacrifices, and that for Austria the only choice remaining was between an absolute alliance or an absolute rupture with him.

The certainty that Napoleon cherished vengeance against Austria, and would inflict it as soon as he possessed the power, was the chief consideration which pushed that state into the arms of the confederates. In consequence of the retreat of the allies, it was decided, upon the advice of Schwarzenberg and Radetzky, the chief of the general staff, not to place the army of Bohemia upon the Eger, as previously contemplated, but to station it on both sides of the Elbe, near the Saxon frontier. The plan elaborated by Prince Wolkonski and Generals Toll and Knesebeck for the joint campaign was at that time submitted: the central thought of it being an offensive for the allies, in order to guard against a sudden attack on the Austrians by Napoleon, and an offensive on the part of the Austrians in order to render them a like service. It is certain that the battle of Bautzen and the second retreat continued to be not without effect upon the Emperor Francis; and it was increased by the anxious thought that Napoleon, after pressing back the Russians behind the Vistula, might perhaps throw himself upon Austria. Alexander, however, sent the assurance that nothing could affect his perseverance; and that more strongly than ever he counted upon the co-operation of Austria. But Metternich had implicit confidence in the steadfastness of neither of the two emperors; and he therefore persuaded his master to repair with him to Gitschin, for the purpose of obtaining from that place greater despatch in the negotiations.

Meanwhile Napoleon had made an effort to cross the Austrian intervention, for which he entertained a deadly hatred, by a direct agreement with Alexander. On May 18 the Duke of Vicenza (Cancalcourt) appeared at the Russian outposts, in order to obtain an interview with the emperor, but he was not admitted; and Nesselrode signified to him that the czar would accept proposals only through the intervention of Austria. A like failure awaited a second attempt, made on the 26th. On the contrary, the Duke of Bassano (Maret) was persuaded, in an interview which he had with Bubna at Liegnitz, that the Austrian intervention was a more serious matter than he had imagined, and that the battle of Bautzen had not occasioned the slightest change in the programme. Napoleon determined to conclude an armistice, although it should be at the expense of some sacrifices. The confederates also had urgent need of it; and, at the request of the allies, Stadion took the first step towards an armistice (May 22), with the condition that they should not depart far from the Bohemian frontier, which would render it easier for Napoleon to

turn against Austria. It resulted from this that the allies bent their course toward Schweidnitz, and that they abandoned Breslau, which was occupied on June 1 by the French. On May 30 negotiations commenced at the monastery of Wahlstatt near Liegnitz, and on June 4 the armistice was signed at Poischwitz. In order to have ample time for the re-establishment of his army, and to surround Austria on the south and west with powerful masses of troops, Napoleon had asked for a truce of indeterminate duration, and then for at least three months, but was obliged to rest content with July 20 as the final termination, and a six days' notification. Between the two armies a broad neutral zone of fifteen to twenty-five miles was described; and the fortresses occupied by the French could be supplied with provisions every five days.

It was the first time in Napoleon's life when he had been compelled to yield. On the other hand, among the points which the allies could not carry was the saving of Hamburg. Even before the close of the negotiations the fate of the unfortunate city was accomplished. With restricted means the defence of Hamburg could only be accomplished if Danish neutrality should cover it on the land side; and all indications were in favor of this, since at the end of April there was the best prospect of Denmark's accession to the allies, and it was understood that she was in accord with Russia. The Danish generals already announced to the French that in case of necessity they would protect Hamburg by force. At Tettenborn's desire two battalions of Danes marched in on May 11, and took part in the attempt to drive the French from the island of Wilhelmsburg. Then a change followed at once in Copenhagen. As soon as King Frederick VI. was certainly informed that Russia was in agreement with England in favor of the union of Norway and Sweden, and at the same time had learned the actual result of the battle of Lützen, he decided to return to the French alliance, and ordered his troops not merely to evacuate Hamburg, but to unite with Davout and Vandamme. Tettenborn's last hope was now in the Swedes stationed in Pomerania and Mecklenburg, under General Döbeln, who immediately threw 2500 men into the city; but Bernadotte had hardly set foot, at Stralsund, on German soil, when he recalled this order. The brave Döbeln was ignominiously cashiered for disobedience. After the withdrawal of the Swedes the senate began to take into consideration the question of surrendering the city; but of this Tettenborn would hear nothing, although, being

utterly without means of defending the place, during the night of April 30 he likewise withdrew. On the next day 5000 Danes occupied the city, but at once made it over to the French. Davout had absolutely refused to enter into negotiations with rebels, and he came only as executioner of his master's pitiless commands : imprisonment of the senators, confiscation of their property, imposition of a contribution of 48,000,000 francs, and the seizure of hostages until this sum was paid. Twelve days later Lübeck also returned under the French yoke.

Article 10 of the armistice stipulated that each army had until June 12 to occupy its new line, and that all corps or parties on the other side of the Elbe, or in Saxony, should turn back to Prussia. Although this stipulation could not possibly signify that a corps, which up to the 12th had not returned to Prussia, should be put outside of the armistice, yet Napoleon profited by the not entirely clear expression in order to wreak his vengeance in the most malicious manner upon the Lützow free corps. The first intelligence of the conclusion of the armistice had reached Major von Lützow at Planen on June 9; and as soon as confirmation arrived, he began, on the 15th, his return march. Accompanied by a Saxon commissioner, he was completely at ease as regards the safety of his corps; and at Gera the commander of a French detachment peacefully assigned him a village for quarters. On the 17th, having reached the village of Kitzen, he addressed to Arrighi, the duke of Padua, commandant of Leipzig, an application for supplies; but his officers, with a flag of truce, were detained as prisoners. Napoleon had ordered the duke to free Saxony from the 'brigands,' and to destroy them wherever he should find them. Meantime the free corps was followed from Zeitz by the Würtemberg cavalry, whose colonel, von Beeker, demanded of Lützow, in the name of General Arrighi, to halt until the arrival of the officers who should direct his farther advance. In this interval the number of the enemy under the French general, Fournier, and the Würtemberger, Norman, was constantly increasing, till the force amounted to 4000. They suffered Lützow to ask for an interview: but suddenly he saw the horseman with drawn sabres coming at a trot, and to his hurried question what that meant, he received the answer, "Armistice for every man, only not for you!" Lützow had the time still to wheel his horse about, and, with his adjutant, Körner, to gallop back to his men, when the attack was made on every side. Those thus assailed

Karlsbad, am 1^{ten} Juli, 1813.

Iff lebe und bin frei, das ist der Wunsch, und ich kann
nicht sagen fahr. Herr Parthey bin ich, ganz auf baldenau,
aber das genug für meines Klücks. die Kuffmünz,
heit, das kufffießt Cibau ist, den ich dir vergessen
wollte, wird Ihnen bekannt sein.

If f. Dr. P. ^{hier} bin ich zum zwey, & ich befieß
auf meine Freilicung andeck, - Berlin 2^{ten} J. P. Reiset
fahrt in Lust, & ist auf Berlin 2^{ten} wegen, rissig
sich aber nicht vollkommen können, & werden Rauschen
& dikt. dann mögl. Ewig jetzt wort lost, und
Rauschen fahrt ich & Miss mögl. aufzugeben können.
Ipp hat ich & de besterfach, & d' jects
Glockenbach gegenwärtig anfertigt, und wir in ein
Fest & feierlich in meine Opernzeit veranstaltet.

If duh i 14 zyan jyj has 2 vi, dann gott gelyf
z' minn plies sefen.

Jost, sondand fesliif, an't ganz Ld, an alle
vriende. Gott si mit und allen. Guit a.

Theodor.

were dispersed or cut down. Their guides ran off; Körner (PLATE XI.¹), severely wounded, owed his escape to peasants. From high political considerations the allies could not reply to this outrageous violation of the armistice by an immediate resumption of hostilities; but on Gneisenau's proposal they declared themselves released from the agreement relative to victualling the fortresses, whence resulted their speedier capture.

The first intelligence of the armistice had a truly prostrating effect upon the Prussian people. But this feeling was not of long continuance; for they again roused themselves when they heard the proud language in which the king announced to his people the acceptance of the armistice, which had only occurred so that the national power, which hitherto had shown itself so gloriously, might be able to reach its full development. Never had the moral earnestness which took possession of the Prussians become plainer than in these days of anxious waiting, and it was that which rendered their spirit joyous and strong. Pamphlets in abuse of the French and of their emperor, or in praise of the German race, came 'like flakes from heaven.' From the mouths of the people were poured forth a multitude of lively songs, which were sung on the march or beside the camp-fires. The literature of the time was filled with political passion. The poets, although the spiritual offspring of the classical aesthetic periods, spoke an entirely different language from their fathers, who, in the sinking empire's loss of nationality, had wholly parted with the

¹ EXPLANATION OF PLATE XI.

Facsimile of a letter from Theodor Körner to Court-Councillor Parthey at Berlin: written at Carlsbad, July 1, 1813. Original size. (In the collection of Herr Lessing, Berlin.)

TRANSCRIPTION.

Carlsbad, am 1^{ten} Juli, 1813.

Ich lebe und bin frei, das ist das beste, was ich von mir zu sagen habe. Verwundet bin ich, zwar nicht bedeutend, aber doch genug für meine Wünsche. Die Nichtswürdigkeit, das teuflische Bubenstück, dem ich dies Vergnügen verdanke, wird Ihnen bekannt sein.

Ich hoffe, Sie bei meiner Reise zum Corps, die ich sogleich nach meiner Heilung antrete, in Berlin zu sehn. Anfangs hatte ich Lust, die Reise nach Berlin zu wagen, ich hätte sie aber nicht vollenden können, die Schurken standen zu dick. Dann müssten Sie mich jetzt warten lassen, und Kohlrauschen hätt' ich die Mühe nicht ersparen können. Jetzt leb' ich bei ber trefflichen Reck, die die zarteste Mutterliebe gegen mich äussert, und mir wie ein Engel des Himmels in meine Schmerzen hineinstrahlt. Ich denke in 14 Tagen hergestellt zu sein, dann gehts sogleich zu meinen geliebten Fahnen.

Grüsse, tausend herzliche, an's ganze Haus, an alle Freunde. Gott sei mit uns allen. Glück auf.

THEODOR.

feeling that in their breasts a truly German heart was beating. No less did poetry cast from herself that dreamy absorption in the twilight of the past which had caused the raptures of the Romantic school. Ennobled as she was by the consecration of ill fortune, and exalted by the pure joyousness of the conflict for the highest blessings of all human existence, she uttered the rousing appeal for the present, and sounded the hope for the future. There are three poets in whom the spirit of the war of liberation found its most distin-



FIG. 51.—Ernst Moritz Arndt. From a copper-plate engraving by C. T. Riedel.

guishing and most beautiful expression.—Theodore Körner, Ernst Moritz Arndt (Fig. 51), and Max von Schenkendorf. No one, for the soldier's joy felt by the youth of the fatherland, has struck a note so full-sounding and transporting as Körner, in whom “the moral pathos of the muse of Schiller was changed into patriotic passion.” Whose heart was not pierced by his call. “Cheer up, my people, the fiery signals burn; brightly from the north breaks forth the light of freedom.” Who has not joined in his disdain for the “knave by the fireside whom no German maiden kisses”? A few weeks after

joining the Lützow free corps, he was able to inform his father that many of his songs were already generally sung in the camp. The knightly East Prussian Schenkendorf, the imperial herald, as Rückert styles him, combined in his moral being the fervent desire for the liberation of his country, and the longing for the restoration of emperor and realm to the ancient splendor. More easily understood by all, and going deeper than both, the pithy Arndt spoke to the people in his bold words and sincere piety. To him, who, by birth a German and yet a Swedish subject, had experienced personally the mongrel character of the old empire, it well beseemed to ask the question : “What is the German Fatherland ?” He brought with him from St. Petersburg a “Catechism for the German soldier and warrior, wherein is taught how a Christian warrior must be with God, and go with him into conflict ;” and this and his many other fugitive writings helped to strike the blows of the war of freedom. Born of the same spirit but appearing later (1814), and not recognized till later times, are the German poems of Friedrich Rückert, his satirical and laudatory songs, and his war-sonnets, in which he “sets down the shame and the victory of his people in glowing characters.”

Everywhere in Europe the armistice appeared, not as the forerunner of peace, but as preparation for a new and dreadful war. Of this a very essential element was the diplomatic negotiations, which were the means of extending further the league against Napoleon, and imparting to it greater consistency and vigor. At an early day, even before the battle of Lützen, Prussia had come to an understanding with Sweden. The promise of the eagerly coveted Norway, which Alexander had made at Åbo to the crown-prince Bernadotte (Fig. 52), was given on the presumption that Denmark would be persuaded willingly to resign her claim to that country for an indemnification in German territory, — Mecklenburg, Pomerania, and also even Hamburg and Lübeck. To the injury of Hamburg, but to the advantage of Germany, King Frederick VI. did not accede to the transaction, and finally imagined it a better and safer course to remain in alliance with Napoleon. When it now followed that Norway must be taken forcibly by the Swedes, great was Bernadotte’s dissatisfaction that Alexander was unable to furnish the promised assistance. In his anger he warned the king of Prussia never to intrust his assembled troops to a Russian commander-in-chief. Stein, indeed, had always deprecated the acceptance of Sweden into the alliance, saying that the



FIG. 52.—Bernadotte. From a copper-plate engraving by P. M. Alix; original painting by Hilaire le Dru.

Swedish nation was a soap-bubble and acted like one. The uprightness of King Frederick William was opposed to the robbing of Denmark no less than to sacrificing to Denmark German territory; but he erroneously thought that the assistance of a marshal of the Napoleonic school, and of so distinguished a commander as Bernadotte, was indispensable in order to overcome Napoleon. In a treaty concluded on April 22, Prussia engaged to add 27,000 men to the active force which the crown-prince should command in Germany, and England granted to him for his participation in the war a subsidy of one million pounds.

But the negotiations of Hardenberg with England were continued unprofitably in many respects. The chief adversary to be encountered was Count Münster, minister of the former electorate of Hanover, then loitering in London, who, with the utter obstinacy of the Hanoverian aristocracy, continued to impute all the misfortune of Germany to Prussia's desire of aggrandizement, and would have gladly seen her reduced to the position of a state of the third rank between the Elbe and the Vistula, in order that Hanover, on the west of the Elbe, with its own country and by means of the former Prussian territory, might be rounded off into a considerable kingdom. Furthermore, Prussia's need of aid was so great that it would not be safe to reject such claims. But although Münster could not wholly accomplish his desires, yet at least advantage was taken of the necessities of Prussia, in order to oblige her to pay as dearly as possible for indispensable support. The demand of Minden and Ravensberg, in addition to Hildesheim, which on Münster's suggestion had been presented by the English ambassadors, General Stewart and Lord Cathcart, as the price of the treaty for subsidies, was indignantly rejected by Hardenberg. On his side he proffered for Hanover an increase of territory to the extent of 250,000 souls, including Hildesheim, East Friesland, and a part of Münster, it being presupposed that for this Prussia would receive indemnification in other quarters. The subsidy treaty was thus signed on June 14. Prussia, which had hitherto received of the war supplies thus far sent to the Continent only 15,000 out of 105,000 complete equipments, was here also a loser; for she was to receive for the current year only 666,666 pounds, while Russia obtained a subsidy twice as large, and Sweden received a million.

The understanding with Austria still remained by far the most important matter to be determined. But the position which Metter-

nich accepted as the object of the war, and for which it should be entered upon, was very different from that of the allies, of Prussia especially; and there was needed all the compulsion exerted by fear of Napoleon to effect, provisionally at least, the subordination of the special separate interests that opposed each other, to the common necessity of defence. For Austria, the war into which she was about to enter was nothing but a cabinet war, like former wars, and with Metternich the purpose was always fixed never to suffer it to degenerate into a national warfare. For the holy wrath which glowed in Prussian hearts he had only compassionate ridicule. In the appeal to the German national sentiment, in the summons to rise against servitude, he perceived only the spirit of extravagance and insurrection, which the Jacobins of the German revolution, and, above all, their chief representatives, the Steins, Blüchers, and Gneisenaus, had made so hateful to him. Accordingly, he sought to make an impression upon Napoleon by referring to the demon of popular passion so heedlessly aroused by Prussia, and threatening danger alike to all rulers and thrones. His final object was, therefore, a speedy accommodation, which, on the one hand, should not afford space and time for development to these perilous forces, and, on the other hand, should re-establish the disturbed equilibrium by lessening the power of Napoleon and by a proportionate augmentation of Austria's. Only in so far as he had need of a strong Prussia as a barrier and an ally, as well against Russia as against France, did he favor the maintenance of Prussia, and even her restoration. At that time he had already in advance marked out the way to a new construction of Germany by a secret agreement made in March with the Emperor Alexander, in which the latter declared that he was ready to guarantee to the princes of the Rhenish Confederation all their possessions and their full sovereignty. With the Confederation the French compulsory supremacy over Germany would disappear; and in its place should come neither the old empire restored, nor a division of the pre-eminence between Austria and Prussia, but over these nominally sovereign individual states would stand the sole hegemony of Austria.

The immediate object of the armistice consisted, in Metternich's mind, in the assembling of a peace congress under the mediation of Austria. However little the four points of the Austrian minimum corresponded to the wishes of the Russian and Prussian statesmen who desired to subjoin, at least, the dissolution of the Confederation

of the Rhine and of the kingdom of Westphalia, the separation of Holland from France, the restoration of the Bourbons in Spain, and the deliverance of Italy from French influence, yet they felt themselves obliged to submit to have that minimum made the basis of the negotiations which were now to be carried on between their headquarters at Reichenbach and the old castle of Wallenstein at Gitschin. In personal interviews of Metternich, at Opotschna, with the Emperor Alexander, Nesselrode, and Stadion (June 18), and at Ratiborschitz, near Naehod, with Hardenberg and Humboldt, the still existing differences of opinion were accommodated, and an agreement secured with regard to the wording of the convention to be concluded. Metternich gained the point that the allies should decline to propose terms to Napoleon, and that he should rather be urged to name his own. In reference to the negotiations to be begun, it was understood that the allies were not to hold intercourse with Napoleon directly, but only through the medium of Austria; and the latter bound herself, in the event of Napoleon's rejection of these terms, to take up arms and compel their acceptance. On this basis these momentous negotiations, held in the greatest secrecy at Reichenbach, reached on June 27 this conclusion: Should Napoleon reject the minimum, Austria would then promptly take part in the war; the smallest number of combatants to be always maintained amounted for Austria as for Russia to 150,000, for Prussia to 80,000 men; and the three courts solemnly pledged themselves to enter into no accommodation and no negotiation except by common consent. The case of Napoleon's acceptance was not even anticipated. The neutrality of Austria had thus virtually come to an end.

The question for Metternich now was to induce Napoleon to accept the Austrian mediation. On the emperor's own invitation he had repaired to Dresden, even before the formal signing of the treaty. On June 26 he was received by the emperor at the Mareolini Palace, where the latter had taken up his residence. Respecting that which was spoken and treated of in this lengthy audience, continuing for eight hours and without witnesses, representations dressed up in dramatic style later by Metternich himself, and on the French side by Fain, Napoleon's secretary, were put in circulation, which, although spread abroad widely, possess small claims to credibility. The actual, sober details may be derived from Metternich's reports, now published, which he despatched the same evening to the Emperor Francis. "His majesty," he writes, "received me, and in

a very pleasant manner inquired after the health of the emperor. After some time I opened the conference. . . . 'Upon your majesty it depends,' said I, 'to give peace to the world . . . ; if your majesty shall suffer this moment to pass away, when, then, will revolutionary movements find their limits and their end?' The emperor assured me that he was ready to make peace, but rather would he perish than conclude a dishonorable peace. . . . I replied to him that dishonorable proposals would never find entrance into the calculations of the Emperor Francis. 'Well, then,' the emperor interrupted me, 'what do you understand by peace? What are your conditions? Would you plunder me? Do you wish for Italy, Brabant, Lorraine? I will not yield an inch of land; I conclude peace on the *status quo ante bellum*. I will even give a part of the Duchy of Warsaw to Russia; to you I will give nothing, for you have not beaten me; to Prussia, also, I give nothing, for she has betrayed me.' . . . After this first pass, I rejoined that I am no way called upon to discuss here the terms of a future peace, but simply to urge that the negotiators come together as soon as possible under the mediation of Austria, or that the emperor expressly decline to negotiate under this mediation. Were the negotiators once assembled, nothing would stand in the way of a discussion of the bases of peace." It follows indisputably from this that Metternich in no way hurt Napoleon's self-respect by exorbitant demands. At all events, on the following day Napoleon empowered the Duke of Bassano to negotiate; and of this the result was the Convention of Dresden of June 30, the renunciation of the treaty of March 14, 1812, and the formal acceptance of Austrian mediation, with the condition, however, that the armistice should be prolonged to August 12; until July 5 the plenipotentiaries of France, Russia, and Prussia were to meet together at Prague to negotiate, with Austria as mediator, respecting the preliminaries of peace, whose conclusion would be followed up by a peace congress composed, also, of delegates from England, North America, and Spain. In prolonging the armistice Metternich had made a concession to Napoleon which ran counter to the obligations he had entered into at Reichenbach. This caused a very excited discussion, the allies contending against this extension which secured to the enemy the great advantage of longer time for completing his preparations. But Metternich's suggestion with regard to the longer delay, that Austria also had need of it in order to become really ready for war, and needed it so urgently that he thought fit to insist upon

it, finally overcame this opposition. In consequence of this it became necessary to postpone the opening of the congress to July 12.

The omens under which this meeting took place were of little promise. The allies brought to it the assurance that in the event of the negotiations proving fruitless Austria would be bound, and could not turn back; and the fact that their leading ministers remained away from the congress showed already that success in negotiation was not considered important by them. Russia was represented by von Anstett, an Alsatian emigrant; Prussia, by one of her best patriots, Wilhelm von Humboldt, who feared nothing more than a corrupt peace. More plainly still did Napoleon's bearing show that honorable and upright purposes of peace were far from him. Of his two plenipotentiaries at first only the second, Count Narbonne, made his appearance; and as he was without full powers to treat, the whole congress was obliged to wait upon the coming of the first, Caulaincourt. At his pressing request, in order that negotiations might be commenced, Narbonne did indeed obtain from the Duke of Bassano something in the nature of instructions. Napoleon himself made a show, designed as a mark of his confidence, of the most perfect indifference with respect to the congress. While the conviction was generally gaining ground that Napoleon's empire in its world-méning extent could not be maintained, Napoleon was alone in thrusting this thought from him.

Finally, on July 28, Caulaincourt also arrived at Prague; but his evil star had decreed that his coming should fall upon a point of time unfavorable to his mission. Just then had arrived intelligence of Wellington's great victory at Vittoria (June 21), which was a most formidable menace to the rear of the emperor's realm, and had raised to an extraordinary degree the spirits of the allies. This event specially impressed the Emperor Francis, who, longer than others, had clung to the possibility of maintaining peace, and recently had instructed his ministers to meet Napoleon's wishes so far as at all possible, and even not to insist upon Illyria, if the work of peace were to be wrecked by this demand. Added to this, the sight of his splendid army now ready for war, the example of the two other sovereigns, and the controlling position secured for him by the sagacious policy of Metternich, all filled him with a confidence which he had never felt before. Therefore Metternich received Caulaincourt with the frank declaration that nothing could prevent Austria's declaration of war, if the preliminary peace were not signed by

August 10; if Napoleon wished to ruin himself absolutely he had only to follow his own disposition in contrariety to palpable facts. Presentations of the same purport had more than once been made to the emperor by those about him; for France needed peace, and with like ardor people and soldiers longed for it. But Napoleon declared it to be impossible. For him to suffer conditions to be prescribed to him was contrary to his honor. But even apart from this view, the Austrian conditions were not adapted to establish a real and durable peace, since they afforded no security that Russia and Prussia would bind themselves thereby; and a general peace could be attained only with the participation of England, and he must be prepared for further demands on the part of those three powers. He felt that the universal dominion achieved by him, unnatural as it was, threatened to fall prostrate if one stone should be removed. It resulted from this course of thought that Caulaincourt was required to continue to demand, as a basis of peace, the status which each possessed before the war. Napoleon still constantly flattered himself that the Austrian mediation could be circumvented by coming to a direct understanding with Russia; and to this Caulaincourt was to direct all his efforts, to treat Austria roughly, and by quibbling over matters of form endeavor to gain time. But against such cunning the allies had armed themselves. Caulaincourt, already angry at not finding the leading ministers of the allies at Prague, was greatly enraged when Anstett and Humboldt did not at all accede to his request for an audience. His attempt to approach the person of the Emperor Alexander was again utterly foiled.

A fresh delay arose over the exchange of credentials; since, for the purpose of ignoring the mediation of Austria, the French plenipotentiaries had been instructed to exchange directly with the Russian and Prussian envoys. This course being rejected, they were obliged to be supplied anew. On August 6 these credentials finally arrived, accompanied by the direction to hold fast unconditionally to the doctrine of *status quo ante bellum*. Once more Caulaincourt desired the plenipotentiaries to meet in conference; but the demand was roundly refused. But, nevertheless, the same evening he came secretly to Metternich to learn the conditions under which Austria would unite with France, or at least remain neutral. Metternich harshly repulsed him, and immediately brought the inquiry to the knowledge of the other plenipotentiaries. On the 7th he placed before Caulaincourt the Austrian ultimatum.

Although the positive character of this language excluded further delay and evasion, Napoleon made no haste with his reply. In anxious suspense the diplomatists at Prague counted the minutes on the 10th of August; and, on the stroke of the clock at midnight, Anstett and Humboldt signified that their powers had expired. From the mountains the prepared signals made announcement, by fires, to the armies that the decision belonged to the sword instead of the pen. Not till the next morning was Napoleon's answer received by a courier: instead of simple acceptance, there came a remarkably singular and indefinite counter proposition, according to which nothing was to be said of the Confederation of the Rhine, Hanover, and the Hanseatic towns: but Metternich declared, briefly, that his rôle as mediator was ended. The congress dissolved without having commenced. The Russian troops appointed to unite with the Austrian put themselves in motion without delay to advance into Bohemia.

Thus the forming of the coalition was accomplished. That want of union among the eastern powers which, more than anything else, had furthered the victory of the Revolution over Old Europe, was at an end: and, aside from a few ill-disposed commanders, they stood together like brothers until the compulsory rule of foreigners over Germany was broken forever.

During the entire period of the armistice, Napoleon had labored with solicitude and without interruption to complete his armies, and had even drawn a considerable number of veteran soldiers from Spain to aid in training his recruits. But the consumption of men during the last two decades, and especially the last year, was still so severely felt as to render it impossible to meet his enemies with an equal numerical force. All, however, that he, or on the opposite side, the Russians and Austrians, accomplished, bore no comparison with the manner in which the Prussians had made use of the armistice. The king, who from his headquarters at Reichenbach had guided all this activity, now had at his disposal a military force composed of 271,641 men, and 355 cannon, forming the guard, and four army corps, led by York, Kleist, Bülow, and Tauenzien. There were 86,600 troops of the line, 7000 volunteer chasseurs, 4700 free squadrons, and 73,600 landwehr for field duty. Beside these, there were 100,000 reserves and landwehr for garrison duty, and to blockade the fortresses held by the French. During the armistice the disciplining of the landwehr was so far finished, that they could now

appear upon the scene of conflict, and take the field in larger masses. It was not always possible as yet to provide them with cloaks and knapsacks, a part had only linen trousers, and the supply of shoes was insufficient, so that a large part of the infantry went through the campaign barefoot. Arms were furnished by the factories at Potsdam and Spandau, and the 9000 equipments that came from England were an important assistance; yet a part of the landwehr were obliged to be satisfied with pikes, until in the course of the campaign they equipped themselves with guns captured on the battlefield.

To Scharnhorst, the 'weapon forger' of this war, it was no longer granted to see the splendid result of his life-labor. Without considering his wounds received at Lützen, he had risen in order personally to urge the accession of Austria; but becoming worse, he was compelled to return to Prague, and there the glorious man died on June 28. His successor as quartermaster-general was Gneisenau, who was the happiest complement to Blücher. To the faithful friendship of these two men, founded on mutual high esteem and a recognition devoid of envy, and to an agreement in their views and their acts springing from the same love of country, is to be attributed the largest share of the favorable issue of this war.

In comparison with the magnitude of these achievements of Prussia, those of the other allies, while considerable in themselves, were decidedly inferior. Of the 240,000 men, the total number furnished by Russia, there remained, after deducting those engaged in investing Polish fortresses as well as the reserves yet under training, 174,000 available men, specially admirable as cavalry, but among them Bashkirs, Kalmucks, and other semi-barbarians. Notwithstanding the long space of time, Austria had placed on foot only 110,500 men in Bohemia, to which were to be added 50,000 to operate against Italy, and 24,000 against Bavaria. The Swedish auxiliary corps which the crown-prince Charles John (Bernadotte) led to Germany numbered, instead of the 30,000 promised by treaty, only 18,000; but even of those only a very small part were actually employed.

It agreed with the position which Austria had assumed from the beginning of the negotiations, that to Austria also be given the direction of the war; and since, too, the Austrian troops, strengthened by Russians and Prussians, constituted the principal army, her commander-in-chief received a certain general authority over the others. The one commander of pre-eminent reputation whom Austria possessed, the Archduke Charles, was excluded by his avowed

hostility to Metternich and by the dissension, dating from the year 1809, with his imperial brother. Since, however, the splendor of a



FIG. 53.—Prince Schwarzenberg. From a drawing, 1798, by Pichler; original painting by August Friedrich Oelenhainz (1749-1804).

princely birth seemed indispensable for this position, the choice fell upon Prince Schwarzenberg (Fig. 53). In all that pertained to his

military life, he had shown himself a brave and honorable soldier, and manifested many admirable qualities of character, but a commander he was not. For this he lacked the self-confidence and the personal ambition which are essential to every great deed. Moreover, he had never, as yet, commanded a great army.

Napoleon's position rested upon the Elbe as the string of the bow upon which his adversaries stood, stretching from the Baltic Sea to Bohemia. This position was covered by the five fortresses, Hamburg, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau, and Dresden, of which the first and the last were the most important to him. Hamburg was held by Davout; and Dresden, including the surrounding country up the Elbe as far as Stolpen, Lilienstein and Königstein, had been transferred into an encampment with a regular garrison. A road was constructed from Stolpen to Lilienstein in order, in case of necessity, to move troops rapidly from Lusatia to the upper Elbe. It followed naturally, from this disposition of his forces, that the allied troops were arranged in three principal groups, and to this conformed the plan according to which they were to be brought into action. Since Bohemia was of most importance as the point chiefly threatened, and since from it, also, operations could be best directed against the flanks and rear of the enemy, the strongest army was stationed there, and was composed of the entire Austrian force, of the Russian corps of Wittgenstein, of the Prussian commanded by Kleist, and of the Russian reserve, under the Grand Duke Constantine, in all 237,000 men; the Prussian and Russian corps were under the general command of Barclay de Tolly. The army of the North, which the crown-prince of Sweden commanded, comprised, besides the 18,000 Swedes, the two Russian corps of Wintzingerode and Woronzoff, and the two Prussian corps commanded by Bülow and Tauenzien, and numbered 127,000 men. The Anglo-Russian corps of Wallmoden, which also belonged to this division, occupied a separate position on the Lower Elbe, fronting toward Davout. Communication between these two was to be maintained by the army of Silesia under Blücher as commander-in-chief. It consisted of York's Prussian corps, and the two Russian corps commanded by Sacken and Langeron.

The plan of operations was prepared by Radetzky (Fig. 54), Schwarzenberg's chief of staff, and by the Russian Toll. The fundamental conception was: offensive action of those not attacked in order to relieve the troops attacked by Napoleon, in such a manner that the allied forces could always be turned to the quarter where the

strongest forces of the enemy were operating. As it was considered most probable that Napoleon would direct only a part of his forces against the Russians and Prussians, while he would hurl his main army upon the Austrians in Bohemia, it was concluded, to the great satisfaction of Schwarzenberg, that the Austrian army



FIG. 54.—Radetzky. From a lithograph by P. Bertotti.

in that quarter should be reinforced by 25,000 Russians and Prussians. If such a hostile advance toward Prague should occur, it would become a matter of the greatest importance to be assured of the co-operation of the crown-prince of Sweden, and he was induced to promise his support to the operations of the other armies. If Napoleon were to throw himself upon Bohemia, Bernadotte should then by forced marches cross the Elbe between Torgau

and Magdeburg, and fall upon his rear; and the main army would do the same if Napoleon should march against the crown-prince. This plan met with an important change, enfeebling it, and not in unison with the spirit of the original project. This change was occasioned by the Austrian leaders; their supplementary suggestion being that it should be enjoined on every army to avoid an assault, but to draw back every time, and in that event the two others should seize the offensive, and compel Napoleon to turn about. To the Silesian army, in consequence of its inferior strength and on account of the distrust inspired by the scanty foresight of its leader, the subordinate part of wholly avoiding a battle was assigned, unless there was some prospect of success. But when Blücher received these instructions he declared in anger that the business was hard for him, that he did not understand the art of a Fabius, that his concern was to drive at the enemy, and if this was not permitted, he must then give up being commander-in-chief. He was, however, appeased with the permission to attack if a good opportunity were to offer.

So unbounded was the respect felt at that time for the art of war as practised by the French, that the Emperor Alexander found it advisable to call to his side the exile Moreau, a general, who, for twelve years having had no experience as chief-commander, was unacquainted with the forms which warfare had meanwhile assumed, and with respect to the political condition of Europe was laboring under the strangest delusions. Great influence over Alexander was also acquired by the Swiss, Jomini, formerly the chief of Ney's general staff, who, regarding himself as personally wronged, had gone over to the allies during the armistice.

By Austria's accession to the coalition, Napoleon's position on the Elbe had become so far insecure that the expectation was general that he would not fail to seek a safer station behind the Saale. But he could not persuade himself to yield willingly the territory gained by his last victories. Yet he fully decided, for the first time since beginning his military career, to act upon the defensive, since the superiority of his enemies compelled him to this course. From his defensive position, however, he intended to make attacks on the enemy; and the first of these was to be made by his left wing against Berlin and the lower Oder, while the right in its position reaching from the Elbe to Görlitz would remain on the defensive, prepared for

- any assault, should it come by Peterswalde to Dresden, or by Zittau against Lusatia.

This assault followed earlier and from another side than he had anticipated. According to the terms of the armistice hostilities would have begun on the sixth day after its discontinuance, therefore on the morning of August 17. Since it was of the greatest importance to the Silesian army to take possession before the enemy of the neutral land between the two armies, Blücher had availed himself of a pretext furnished by the French going beyond the boundary line in foraging, to advance with his whole army on the 15th. The surprised French incurred great loss. Napoleon, on the other hand, upon receiving intelligence that a large part of the Russians had marched out of Silesia to the main army in Bohemia, was entirely wrong in thinking that the principal assault was to be expected behind Zittau, from the region between the Elbe and the Iser Mountains. On the 18th he reached Görlitz with his guard; and feeling around insecurely, the next day he went forward to Zittau, in order to obtain information personally. While there he learned that Schwarzenberg was lying quietly at Melnik; and the thought occurred to him of at once falling upon Blücher, whom he estimated at only 50,000 men, and punishing the daring assailant before the Bohemian army, against whom Victor, Poniatowski, and Vandamme had closed the passes of Gabel and Rumburg, could touch him at all on the flank. Very much dissatisfied by Ney's prompt retreat before Blücher's attack, he ordered at once a general movement in advance to cross the Bober. But Blücher did not wait for him. As soon as it became probable, from the bringing up of great masses of the enemy, that he had the emperor in person before him, he withdrew from the attack of the superior force with a caution that equalled his courage. Napoleon now designed by a circuitous movement to push Blücher across the Katzbach, and thus to remove him as far as possible from the Elbe. Langeron, the Russian commander under Blücher, presumed to urge upon Blücher that he order him to return with his corps across the Katzbach; and although Blücher refused, and ordered him to remain, yet at the first assault on his vanguard he retreated without awaiting further orders, and on his own motion proceeded to Goldberg, and then still farther in the direction of Jauer, evidently with the design of compelling Blücher also to retreat farther. In great wrath Blücher ordered him to turn about, whereupon, though unwillingly, he obeyed. To the great sur-

prise of the headquarters, the enemy, however, followed only in a languid manner. Napoleon was obliged to wheel about in consequence of the advance of the Bohemian army over the Erzgebirge. Before he encountered this force, the first blow had fallen upon his left wing.

For the enterprise against Berlin the emperor had assigned a total force of about 100,000 men. The main army was led by Marshal Oudinot; and Davout was directed to move forward to his support through Mecklenburg toward the Mark of Brandenburg, and thereby draw away from Berlin, and upon himself, as much as possible of the enemy's force, while Girard was to make a diversion with 12,000 men from Magdeburg in the direction of Belzig. Oudinot, — so calculated Napoleon, — after dispersing with little trouble the landwehr and many bodies of wretched troops, would, on the fourth day following the reopening of hostilities, strike Berlin, whence he would drive back the enemy beyond the Oder, occupy Stettin and Küstrin, invest Spandau, and thus force the Russians to separate from their allies. Unquestionably the plan, if successful, promised the most important results, but it was a fresh illustration of Napoleon's disposition to look at facts only as he wished them to be. He wilfully persuaded himself that the northern army, and especially the landwehr, consisted only of a mob, that was hardly to be considered at all in reference to the war. His calculation that on this side he would encounter no considerable resistance was just, if it had related merely to the crown-prince of Sweden. That Bernadotte throughout entertained no desire to sacrifice the undisciplined sons of his country upon German battle-fields and for German interests was the less to his reproach, because the allies, in their eagerness to win over to their side such a famous commander, had wholly neglected to make the promised union of Norway to Sweden depend on the amount of his efforts in war. The fault lay solely with those who had committed such an important part to a man of his stamp. He withdrew himself and the army which he commanded from any decisive engagement, got out of the enemy's way, turned himself in every direction where he was sure not to find him, and alleged dangers when to be bold was the thing needed. What should become of the Mark of Brandenburg, or of Berlin, was to him a matter of complete indifference. Notwithstanding his promises at Trahenberg, he began operations with the order to evacuate entirely the position southeast of Berlin, to take a station behind the Spree and

Havel, and to call back the divisions that had been pushed forward toward Magdeburg and the Elbe. The Prussian generals were conscious that on them rested the defence of the capital and of the fatherland. With the utmost determination Bülow (Fig. 55) declared against such an unprecedented sacrifice of Berlin, and he carried his point so far that he remained south of the city with his corps. Tauenzien also found himself soon constrained to cease recognizing the directions of his superior officer. They could not prevent the entire northern army from being thrown into separate detachments,—the Swedes and the headquarters of the prince at Charlottenburg, Wintzingerode at Spandau, one part of Bülow's corps in and about Berlin, another part south of the city upon the Nute and Notte; of Tauenzien's division of the army, General Hirzelfeld was stationed at Brandenburg, and still nearer to Magdeburg, Woronzoff, and most distant, toward the lower Elbe, was Wallmoden, who was watching Davout.

On August 19 Oudinot decamped from the country adjoining Luckau and Dahme, advancing toward Baruth in three columns: Bertrand on the right in the direction of Zossen, Reynier in the centre toward Christiansdorf, and he himself commanding the left wing from Luckenwalde to Trebbin. Nearly half of his army of 70,000 men were from the Confederation of the Rhine, besides many Italians, Illyrians, and Croats. On the 22d they were to pass through the swampy region north of Trebbin. Bertrand, passing by way of Glienecke and Jühnsdorf, was to reach Blankenfelde. Reynier, after taking Wietstock and crossing the Nute, was directed to turn toward Grossbeerden, in order thus to render the position of the Prussians at Thyrow untenable, and to clear the way for Oudinot. Arrived at the northern edge of the great forests, Oudinot would then combine his three corps for an assault upon the city. The circumstance, however, that the commander-in-chief, instead of being in the centre of his troops, was with the extreme left wing, was largely responsible for the defective execution of these arrangements. Reynier allowed himself to be thwarted to such extent by the intrenchments at Wendisch-Wilmersdorf, which were unfinished and held by only six companies, that his first troops, the division of Durutte and the Saxon division of von Sahr, did not reach Wietstock till midday. After a fierce conflict the brigade of Thümen was compelled to abandon the village; but on the arrival of re-enforcements it defended the Thyrow dam, until compelled by the loss of Kerzendorf to beat




FIG. 55. Marble statue of General Bülow von Dennewitz. By Christian Rauch.
(Berlin.)

a retreat through the forest to Grossbeeren. Thereupon Oudinot, advancing from Trebbin, also crossed the dam. Without serious effort Bertrand had effected a passage at Jühnsdorf. The most difficult part was, therefore, accomplished. Behind him Oudinot had the broad, swampy and waste tracts of the Nute, and the fortified position south of Berlin was forced. He now encamped fifteen miles from the city, and had still to cross only the broad and in part swampy Kiefern woods, in order to reach the dry and open plain on the other side. This gorge in the wood could, however, be passed only by the army moving in separate divisions.

The danger was urgent, the city full of apprehension, the Prussian generals beside themselves at the action of the crown-prince, who now, for the first time, announced his determination to give battle, but in case Napoleon himself was advancing against him, to retire to the north side of Berlin. Bülow was roused to anger; he and his troops would fall *before* Berlin with arms in their hands. The prince came round to their view; and with the instruction to hold themselves in readiness for battle, he dismissed the generals. But Bülow was convinced that he was not in earnest. The Prussians were in perplexity. A more favorable opportunity for attack could not even be imagined than upon the three widely separated columns of the enemy, of which none could aid the others: but suffer him once to come out from the wood, complete the junction of his troops, and develop his force, and then all advantages would be given away.

Reynier, whom Bertrand had asked to support his assault by a movement against Grossbeeren, obtained from Oudinot not merely assent to this demonstration, but also the promise that with his division and the cavalry of the duke of Parma he would keep pace with him. As soon, consequently, as he heard the report of Bertrand's cannon from Blankenfelde, he began his march at ten o'clock of the forenoon of the 23d. But his troops were exhausted by the engagement of the preceding day, the general rains of the country were now just beginning, and his advance was consequently very slow. To march five miles required five hours, and it was three o'clock in the afternoon when he came out from the edge of the wood at Grossbeeren. The division of Sahr, forming the advance, drove the Prussians from the village and occupied it. Every one sought shelter from the pouring rain, which was so thick that it was possible to see but a short distance. Reynier made his headquar-

ters there; and he and his troops, who were thoroughly drenched, were quartered as comfortably as possible, in complete unconcern and without the least suspicion that Oudinot, contrary to his promise, had halted at Ahrensdorf; that Bertrand had suffered himself to be held fast by Tauenzien at Jühnsdorf; and that he consequently, with his 20,000 men, wholly unsupported, had before him, close at hand, an enemy of twice his strength.

Bülow saw the moment had come for rushing upon the divided enemy. In spite of rain, exhaustion, and hunger, the troops greeted the order to advance with joyous and universal hurrahs. Reynier, however, believed still that no attack would be made; he considered the rush of the Prussians as a feint to cover their departure, and regarded his right as fully secured by Bertrand. But instead of Bertrand appearing, Bülow impetuously assailed Grossbeeren with artillery and the bayonet in front, and finally took it by storm. Borstell marching from Diedersdorf drove the Saxons out of Kleinbeeren: two battalions were destroyed in a furious hand-to-hand fight, and when guns missed fire men struck with clubbed muskets and bayonets. The division of Durutte, which should have gone forward to support the Saxons, was scattered asunder, and the wood and the darkness received the fugitives. Fournier's division of cavalry, which Oudinot had sent forward on perceiving the fire of artillery, came only as far as Neubéeren, and then in like manner was almost totally destroyed; 14 cannon, 60 ammunition wagons, and 1500 prisoners were the trophies of a conflict that lasted little more than one hour. Double was the rejoicing that the Prussians had gained this splendid victory with the small loss of 150 men, and that it was won by them unaided, apart from the intervention of a Swedish battery near Neubéeren at the close: for the crown-prince, notwithstanding Bülow's repeated demands, had not stirred from the place. Further, when Oudinot felt himself shattered to such a degree by Reynier's overthrow that he wholly abandoned the enterprise against Berlin, the pursuit, begun by the crown-prince late, and conducted in a very languid manner, permitted him to retreat unmolested through dangerous defiles and without additional loss until he came beneath the canons of Wittenberg.

Worse than his was the fate of General Girard, who on receiving the bad news concerning the main corps had halted at Belzig. At Hagelsberg he was attacked by General Hirschfeld, a veteran of the time of Frederick. The ardor for battle of the undisciplined land-

wehr, an ardor that could not be restrained, did indeed render the management of the engagement difficult, but it filled the enemy with terror. A fearful slaughter occurred in the village when taken by storm; an entire battalion of the enemy were pressed up against the garden walls, and clubbed to death man by man. Girard's troops threw their arms away and fled in wild confusion; his division was destroyed, and himself severely wounded. Davout also, who, notwithstanding his numerical superiority, had moved forward in a dilatory manner, and with a circumspection wholly unusual with him, on the intelligence from Grossbeeren and Hagelsberg, retired again behind the Recknitz, although, Wallmoden having been recalled by the crown-prince to the Mark, only Tettenborn was left to act against him. On August 26, the poet Körner fell in a skirmish with Davout's troops at Gadebusch.

In the headquarters of the Bohemian army at Melnik, opinions were much divided as to that which should be done. While all were completely in the dark as to Napoleon's position and purposes, yet the advance into Saxony was begun on August 22, upon the supposition that the main army of the enemy was to be sought on the plains of Leipsic. The ascent of the steep and pathless Erzgebirge was tedious and difficult; it was spread over a space of forty-five miles in width, and was made in four great columns: Wittgenstein, for the purpose of securing the passage of the Elbe, followed the great road from Teplitz by Peterswalde: Kleist marched from Brüx upon Freiberg: one column of the Austrians, under the hereditary prince of Hesse-Homburg, set out from Komotau: the other, under Giulay, from Kaaden for Marienberg: these were followed by a part of the Russian guard, and by the Austrian corps of Klenau, as a reserve. Not till reaching Zöblitz did they learn, by accident, that Napoleon, far from thinking of a retreat to the Saale, was in Lusatia and Silesia. Thus vanished the design of surprising Dresden, the support and pivot of Napoleon's position on the Elbe. But to wheel about such a vast body of men, who had now to cut through the valleys that furrowed the northern declivity of the mountain, was a matter of extreme difficulty: for Schwarzenberg, in order not to spread them out too far, had directed nearly all the lines of march upon Dippoldiswalde, so that these masses were there gathered into a coil difficult to unwind. The supreme direction of the army acted in a manner so irresolute and anxious, that it was not till midnight of the twenty-fifth that 60,000 men arrived at the upper

margin of the basin of the valley, on which, upon both sides of the Elbe, the Saxon capital is situated. Nevertheless, had an energetic assault been made immediately, it would in all probability have delivered the city into the hands of the allies. The inhabitants were already beginning to prepare for an attack by storm; for, overcome by the terror of the moment, they feared their liberators, and they longed for the coming of Napoleon as their saviour. But the allies, who now knew that Napoleon was pursuing Blücher, intended to take ample leisure for allowing their wearied troops to rest. In vain did Wittgenstein at a late hour in the evening entreat Barclay for permission to storm the city by a sudden attack at night. Paralyzed by this spirit of indecision, Schwarzenberg came to the conclusion that all attacks should be only demonstrations, merely trials, to see if peradventure by the fire of the artillery the city might be prevailed upon to capitulate. It was only the irresistible eagerness to fight on the part of the Prussians that shaped this meaningless attempt into a serious conflict. At early morning, followed by the Russians, they attacked the *Grosse Garten*; and the French, after an obstinate contest of several hours, were pushed back. But at noon came an order from Schwarzenberg to cease the forward moment, and to suspend the struggle till four o'clock, when a general assault should follow. The Austrians knew nothing from their main position of what had happened in the course of the forenoon, except that they had gained possession of the village of Plauen, had made some fruitless attempts upon the great lunette at Falkenschlag and on the left of the grounds about Plauen, and had taken Löbtau and the courtyards lying near Friedriehstadt. But after Schwarzenberg had waited so long, suddenly the scene changed. From the heights of Räcknitz there was plainly to be seen the advance of great masses of troops upon the Bautzen road beyond the Elbe. Now no doubt could exist; the emperor was hastening up to save Dresden.

On the evening of the twenty-second, Napoleon had received information from St. Cyr that the Bohemian army were on the point of breaking into Saxony, and that fears must be entertained for Dresden. He at once gave up Blücher, and with the main part of his army turned about toward the Elbe; he commanded St. Cyr by letter (PLATE XII.) to take every means for the defence of Dresden, and promised him speedy re-enforcements. A very skilful plan, promising the most decisive results, rose before his mind. From

leur forum, J'ai reçu votre lettre du 22 à 11 heures depuis
la veille journée En 21, j'ai battu l'armé russe défilées
hier 22, j'ai fait pour plusieurs jusqu'au si de Janvier; ~~Hier~~ fois
j'ai mis mes troupes en marche, et tout arriva aujourd'hui à
Gorlitz. — Les troupes qui font ici le tour à Dresde le 25; elles y
seront le 26 si cela est moins urgent. J'espérai que le général
Vandamme est le Dr. des Belles, pour une construction pour
en marche depuis cinq ans. Cependant j'avais leur message de ordre
faits faire depuis le plus qu'il était possible, car nous avons
bientôt 200,000 hommes à Dresde. = Le Dr. des Belles, qui
vous portera cette lettre arrivera avant minuit. = En
supposant que le mouvement de Dresde soit un grand
mouvement, il aurait fallu à l'ennemi la journée d'aujourd'hui
pour l'organiser et pour reconnaître. Je ne doute pas

à mes f^t Cyr

PLATE XII.—FACSIMILE OF A LETTER FROM NAPOLEON
TO MARSHAL ST. CYR, DATED GORLITZ AUGUST 23.
1813. (Original size.)

je vous n'aurai fait passer la plus grande partie de l'arriere
de la place des b. révolts et pris tout le temps pour faire
espionner les rév. s'ils voulaient cultiver l'amitié d'un
compatriote. - Je vous jure que je ne suis pas venu
pour la riv. gauche au contraire j'ai été porté pour la riv. droite,
et que la communication de Koenigstein avec Dresde fut
affirmée pour la riv. droite. - Si l'amitié affectueuse
opérée un grand mouvement d'amitié pour Dresde, je
considère comme un chef entièrement heureux, et
alors entraînerai à nouveau Dresde dans les deux jours qui
suivent la bataille qui décidera bien d', chef. - J'en
suis très sûr que vous ayez assaini ce siège
Garde. - Saarlef, le 23 aout 1873.



Stolpen, he planned to go with 100,000 men over the bridge to Königstein; by this movement to cut off the enemy stationed at Dresden, and if they should take the direction of Dresden, then to march upon Prague. But on the twenty-fifth he received, at Stolpen, news of Oudinot's defeat, and then the representation made by Gourgaud, an ordnance officer despatched by St. Cyr¹ of the situation at Dresden, informed him that immediate assistance was needed at that point. In order, however, to execute the original plan, at least in a modified degree, Vandamme was directed to cross over at Königstein with 40,000 men, occupy Pirna, and cut off whatever part of the allies should retire on the Teplitz road. All the remainder marched rapidly to Dresden. The Emperor arrived personally at noon; and his presence, as by a stroke of magic, revived sunken spirits. With Napoleon's arrival, the whole undertaking against Dresden had become hopeless. The Emperor Alexander was altogether right in agreeing with the advice of Moreau, Jomini, and Toll, to give up the affair and retreat to Dippoldiswalde; but likewise King Frederick William was right in thinking it disgraceful for an army of 150,000 men to withdraw without a serious struggle, merely

¹ EXPLANATION OF PLATE XII.

Facsimile of a letter of Napoleon to Marshal St. Cyr : written at Görlitz, August 23, 1813. Original size.

TRANSCRIPTION.

Mon cousin, J'ai reçu votre lettre du 22 à 11^{heures} du soir | Dans la journée du 21, j'ai battu l'armée ennemie de Silésie. | hier 22, je l'ai fait poursuivre jusqu'à près de Jauer : hier soir | y'ai mis mes troupes en marche et tout arrive aujourd'hui à | Goerlitz. — Les troupes qui sont ici seront à Dresden le 25 : elles y | seront le 26 si cela est moins urgent. Je suppose que le Gr^d Vandamme et le Duc de Bellême, suivant leurs instructions, sont | en marche depuis ce matin. Toutefois j'e vais leur envoyer des ordres | faites faire du pain le plus qu'il est possible, car nous serons | bientôt 200,000 hommes à Dresden. Le Roi de Naples qui | vous portera cette lettre arrivera avant minuit. En | supposant que le mouvement sur Dresden soit un grand | mouvement, il aurait fallu à l'ennemi la journée d'aujourd'hui pour se déployer et pour reconnaître.

Je ne doute pas
que vous n'ayez fait partir la plus grande partie de l'artillerie | de la place dans les redoutes et pris toutes les mesures pour faire | repartir les Russes s'ils voulaient enlever les faubourgs d'un | coup de main. — Je suppose que tous les bateaux qui étaient | sur la rive gauche auront été portés sur la rive droite, | et que la communication de Koenigstein avec Dresden sera | assurée pour la rive droite. — Si l'ennemi a effectivement | opéré un grand mouvement d'armée sur Dresden, je | le considère comme une chose extrêmement heureuse, et | cela me mettra à même d'avoir dans peu de jours une | grande bataille qui décidera bien des choses. Sur ce | je prie dieu qu'il vous ait en sa sainte et digne | garde.

Görlitz, le 23 aout 1813
a M^{al} S^r Cyr

N.

on account of the arrival of the dreaded adversary. After long debate, it was agreed to continue the assault, but not one special disposition for the purpose was even now adopted. At four o'clock in the afternoon, the columns of attack, without a plan to be executed, were put in motion for a bloody struggle. In vain Wittgenstein put forth all his strength to capture the Pirna suburb; in vain the Austrians contended to gain possession of the field at Dolina, Falken, and Freiberg; the right wing of the allies was completely overpowered, and Wittgenstein maintained his position only partially in the village of Striefen. Schwarzenberg's grand demonstration had a pitiful conclusion.

With pride and gratification could Napoleon look upon this day, on which he with 70,000 men had not only beaten off the assault of 150,000, but had gained an actual victory. He was convinced that the enemy would take advantage of the night to depart; and had it gone according to the desire of the Austrian generals, the allies would have acted thus, but on the protestation of the king of Prussia, they were disposed to await upon the heights Napoleon's further operations. But when Schwarzenberg, in order better to concentrate his force, withdrew his right wing entirely from the plain, he indicated his purpose to abandon the Teplitz road. His position was now extended up the high ridge as far as Leubnitz, and in a crescent shape to Torna.

When Napoleon on the 27th saw the enemy still before him he attacked at once. Their main body he held fast and inactive on the heights, while he set opposite to it in the centre half of the guards under Ney, as well as St. Cyr's and Marmont's divisions, placed on the outer margin of the suburbs, and ordered a vigorous cannonade to be sustained. By this fire Moreau, at the side of Alexander, was mortally wounded; he died at Laun on September 2. Simultaneously, although far inferior in number, he assaulted both wings with great impetuosity. On the right, Murat sealed the ridge to the plateau between Zschon and Plauen, and captured the entire division of Mezko, which was not engaged, taking 10,000 prisoners and twenty-six cannon. At the same time Mortier, upon the left, drove Wittgenstein completely back and up the height.

After this misfortune to both his wings, Schwarzenberg determined to retreat. Thus an enterprise of much promise resulted in a shameful overthrow, which, apart from the loss of 15,000 killed and

20,000 prisoners, of necessity deeply depressed the spirit of the troops. But at least the public knew not the whole truth; and the gazettes made mention, merely in an incidental manner, of a demonstration that was abandoned, and soon more favorable news from other theatres of action diverted the attention of all.

For the moment, however, the great question arose whither the retreat should be made. After the loss on the right of the Pirna, and on the left of the Freiberg road, nothing remained for this disjointed army multitude, with its numerous cavalry, artillery, and vehicles, but to clamber over the mountains into Bohemia. During the night the troops moved on as far as they were able, and rested perforce during the hours of darkness by the wayside wherever they were; and then, as the gloom lightened a little, unrefreshed and hungry, they dragged themselves farther on. But upon the leaders anxiety with regard to the Teplitz road now rested heavily. Barclay received the important charge to pursue that road, and, if necessary, to fight for it. But that general declared this to be impracticable. Had his views been followed, the pursuers would have come before them into the Teplitz valley to destroy the Bohemian army, and had nothing to do but to make prisoners of the detached divisions as they came struggling through the steep defiles of the declivities of the mountains (Fig. 56).

That this immeasurable misfortune was averted, was in the first instance owing to Duke Eugene of Würtemberg. Filled with the importance of his position at Pirna, he had repeatedly asked for reinforcements, instead of which came only General Ostermann. Unable, on account of Vandamme's pressure, to sustain himself at Pirna, the prince withdrew in the night over the stony ground of the Gottleuba. Fortunately the rain, the thick fog, and the firm bearing of the Russians prevented Vandamme from learning the weakness of his opponent, so that he hesitated to attack him in earnest. Not until, at the same time with news of the battle gained by the emperor, he had received the promise that Mortier and the young guard with St. Cyr would follow to his support, did he again take up his line of march. At Berggiesshubel the Russians were already in danger of being cut off, but fortunately for them Vandamme was kept back by the misleading language of a forester from Langhennersdorf. On the ascent of the Dürrenberg, beyond the country about Gottleuba, the guard were obliged to clear the way with the bayonet, Eugene covering the retreat, and joining them




Fig. 56.—Map showing the routes in the Erzgebirge.

again in the evening at Peterswalde; but nearly two entire regiments were made prisoners. At Hellendorf the order reached Vandamme to do all in his power to overthrow the duke and to press into Bohemia. With the first gray of morning, on August 29, he assailed the Russians at Peterswalde, and at seven o'clock he reached the heights of Nollendorf. From this point on, when the view opened into the Teplitz valley, he now saw for the first time as the mist parted against what a small force he had to contend. At nine o'clock he set foot at Kuhn, and immediately ordered cannon to be planted on the Horkaberg in order to fire upon the Russians stationed at Priessen.

Ostermann in the night sent word to Teplitz that he found himself compelled, in presence of a superior force, to retire behind the Eger. Fortunately the King of Prussia had just arrived there. He immediately sent back the urgent request to maintain his position as far as practicable, as it involved the safety of the army, even the person of the Emperor Alexander, who was still in the mountains. Soon he came personally to Priessen for the purpose of taking, in conjunction with Ostermann, final steps for stationing the guards at that place. Adjutants flew to all the issues of the mountain range, in order to collect the troops as they came up, and to direct them by the nearest paths to the place of combat. Alexander, too, who from the crest of the mountain at Graupen had observed the engagement at Kulm, did everything to hasten the advance of the troops as they left the mountains. There was strong hope, therefore, on the 30th of having a considerable force on the spot; but for the 29th Ostermann and Eugene remained almost entirely left to their own resources. After a fierce struggle the village of Straden fell into the hands of the French: and although Eugene himself, in the thickest of the fight, managed it with consummate prudence and persistence, the Russians were driven also out of Priessen. General Ostermann's arm was torn away by a ball, and the situation was very critical. Then Diebitsch brought intelligence that Barclay would very soon reach the field of battle with re-enforcements; and a splendid charge of cavalry brought some relief to the hard-pressed little corps. At five o'clock Vandamme ceased fighting, and deferred the close of the affair to another day.

The most pressing danger was now over; but a very oppressed feeling still prevailed at Dux, where Alexander, Metternich, and Schwarzenberg were during that night. The troops arriving in the

valley, the Austrians especially, presented a deplorable appearance; and yet Alexander was more and more strengthened in the purpose to advance to the attack on the following day. Indeed, Schwarzenberg, who had taken no special part in the events of the 29th, promised himself, from the foreing back of Vandamme, that the retreat to Prague would be facilitated. All were now in great anxiety with regard to Kleist's corps, which, still fast in the recesses of the mountain, after a march painful beyond all description, had come as far as Liebenau and Fürstenwalde, as the darkness was beginning to set in. With the king's order, that reached him on the march, to descend as quickly as possible into the valley to support Ostermann it was absolutely impracticable to comply. Information of these facts suggested the thought of getting Kleist to direct his course to Nollendorf, to Vandamme's rear. The king sent Colonel von Schöler to him to engage him to make this movement, "if at all possible." The affair was one to occasion much hesitation, for Kleist at Nollendorf was in danger of running into the hands of re-enforcements arriving to the support of Vandamme: but he determined upon the venture. At five o'clock in the morning of August 30, after destroying all vehicles not indispensable, he commenced the march so decisive in its results.

This intelligence, when received at Teplitz, revived despondent minds. The attack was now definitely appointed for the 30th; but since it was anticipated by Vandamme, who confidently depended on the speedy arrival of the promised re-enforcements, Barclay, to whom Schwarzenberg had committed the management, was satisfied with simply holding back the engagement until Kleist's assault should be made upon the enemy's rear. Vandamme had no success in gaining ground: and his left was already thrown into confusion by the Austrians, when Kleist (Fig. 57), in order to announce his coming as speedily as possible, ordered his first guns to be discharged in the valley below, opposite Vorder-Tellnitz. At first the French breathed more freely, for they were confident that it must be the emperor who was appearing to support them. The disappointment was fearful. As soon as Barclay was made aware of Kleist's arrival he also pressed forward with energy upon Kulm and Arbesau. Vandamme, who was conducting the battle from the Horkaberg, suddenly seized with decision the sole outlet remaining. He sacrificed all his artillery, and threw himself, sword in hand, upon the Prussians, to open a passage for his men before the enemy had time

to develop his forces. Wild confusion ensued,—an inextricable intermingling of friend and foe. The French cavalry trod under foot everything that came in their way, cut down the men at their guns, and rushed up the heights of Nollendorf; and Kleist himself at one time was almost a prisoner. But behind Nollendorf the fugitives




FIG. 57.—Kleist von Nollendorf. From a lithograph by Loeillot de Mars.

fell into the hands of Zieten; and those who, climbing the steepest declivities, sought to throw themselves into the mountain range, were cut down in numbers, or shot from below, surrounded and captured. About upper and lower Arbesau a fierce struggle had raged, in which the Silesian Landwehr stood its fiery trial pretty badly,

but when, with the fall of the two villages, the last outlet was blocked, one division after another surrendered. Dejection now gave way suddenly to the most joyful feeling; and the Emperor Alexander and the king of Prussia hastened up from the Schlossberg at Teplitz to examine the rich trophies; eighty-two cannon, all the army material and baggage, two eagles, three standards, 5900 killed or wounded, and 10,000 prisoners, among them Vandamme himself. The capture of this tyrant, who by his unmerciful violence toward North Germany had become an object of universal abhorrence, excited peculiar rejoicing. That which was lost before Dresden by the want of mutual adhesion was made good again by the harmonious co-operation of all the three armies.

In truth, the proper author of Vandamme's defeat was none other than Napoleon. It is a matter beyond all doubt that by a vigorous use of the victory at Dresden, Napoleon could have effected the destruction of the Bohemian army. Why he neglected this, wholly contrary to his custom, is not fully explained. Undoubtedly, the pursuit was retarded by the excessive fatigue of his troops after a two days' forced march and a hot fight for two days, by the soaked soil, and the constant rains; but notwithstanding these obstacles, Murat, Marmont, and Vietor, who followed the beaten forces into the mountains, gathered up so many stragglers that in the course of the 28th prisoners to the number of 20,000, almost entirely Austrians, were brought into Dresden. It is beyond question that Napoleon repaired to Pirna with the design of penetrating into Bohemia; but then he suddenly left it, sent St. Cyr after the Prussians by way of Maxen, ordered Mortier to remain in Pirna, and returned to Dresden with the old guard. Doubtless, the principal cause was that his eye was turned, not to Bohemia, but to the north, whence bad news had reached him, and that, consequently, transactions in the Erzgebirge were secondary matters. He imagined that after fourteen days he would have still sufficient time to turn himself against the Bohemian army and destroy it. That danger could threaten Vandamme, and that Kleist would execute a flank-march, lay so far out of all calculation that no one could conceive of it on weighing in advance the possible vicissitudes of the retreat.

When Napoleon hastened back from Silesia to Dresden, he had given over the army that remained stationed there to Marshal Maedonald, with the order to push Blücher as far as Jauer, and then to occupy a defensive position, which should bar the road to Dresden

against the enemy, and at the same time prevent him from turning either toward Berlin to join with the northern army, or toward Zittau to unite with the Bohemian army. Blücher again pushed forward to attack. At Goldberg a hot conflict occurred on August 23; and he would willingly have delivered a great battle had not his instructions from headquarters obliged him to retire as far as Jauer.

This apparently aimless pushing hither and thither continued for ten days, the advance and the retreat of an army of 100,000 men amid continued fighting, impaired the vigor of the troops in an unprecedented manner. Furthermore, the feeling of the army thus became lowered, and confidence in the supreme direction was shaken. Even the corps-commanders revolted against the demands which Blücher and Gneisenau made upon the troops. Langeron directly renounced obedience; and it was necessary for Blücher to go to him in person to enforce compliance, but in conclusion the rebellious general still declared that under the circumstances he felt himself bound to follow his own views. It was still worse that the relations took the form of a rude opposition between the Blücher and York headquarters. York, who from the first had counted upon having an independent command, felt himself put down and wronged by being under Blücher, whom he did not regard as competent for his position. Above all, it galled him that he should dance to Gneisenau's pipe; for he hated Gneisenau as a Jacobin, and undervalued him in military matters as being an unpractical and extravagant theorist. Yet, accustomed, with all his dreaded harshness, to take good care of the subsistence of his troops, and not being initiated into the general plan of the war, the demands, rising above that which was humanly possible, made upon the activity of his troops, angered York the more that supplies were not furnished to a satisfactory extent. When now the order came, again to march forward on the morning of the 24th, his wrath broke forth. He begged a little rest for the corps. Blücher, however, received his request ill, threatened him with arrest and a court-martial, and the order was continued. On the next day, at Jauer, there occurred such a violent scene between them that York begged the king to be relieved from his command. Blücher and Sacken, two kindred natures, learned to understand each other better when Blücher, while they were yet personally unacquainted, went to him, and thus was enabled, in the attack decided upon, to depend on one at least of his three corps leaders.

According to dispositions made in an order issued from his headquarters at Brechtelshof in the forenoon of August 26, at eleven o'clock, all the columns were to move at two o'clock precisely; Sacken to keep the enemy's front firmly at Liegnitz, York to advance directly north to Kroitsch and Dohnau, and Langeron to cross the Katzbach below Goldberg. The latter, quite beside himself, inveighed against such rashness, appealed to secret instructions, and declared that he could not put his corps into action. York also refused, and said that he would break his sword in pieces rather than cross the Katzbach. But it did not come to that point altogether; for, when in the act of attacking, Blücher was himself attacked. For the purpose of pushing Blücher yet farther back, Maedonald, not suspecting that he was advancing, was pressing forward upon Jauer in three columns, at considerable distances from one another, Maedonald himself and Sébastiani's cavalry by way of Kroitsch, Lauriston moving from Goldberg, and Ney's corps, now led by Souham, from Liegnitz. It happened thus that the two armies met each other on the march upon the undulating ground between the Katzbach and its tributary, the Wütende Neisse, but with the difference that the Silesian army was advancing closely formed and ready for battle, while the French were scattered and disconnected. When the French began to press back the Prussian vanguard across the Katzbach, and then also over the Wütende Neisse, Blücher was assured to his great delight that the battle, which he had sought beyond the Katzbach, he was about to have on this side. In order first to ascertain whether the enemy contemplated simply a reconnaissance or an actual assault, he waited until three o'clock before moving. His plan was to allow more of the enemy to ascend the plateau, and then hurl them down into the Katzbach and the Wütende Neisse. In company with Prince William and his general staff, the gray commander appeared in front of York's men to encourage them for the combat, and enjoined it on them not to meddle with shooting in the rain, but to drive at the enemy with the bayonet. A fearful discharge of artillery ushered in the fight. Maedonald's centre, composed of only two divisions and a corps of cavalry, saw the united corps of York and Sacken fall upon it. With drawn sabre Blücher led his cavalry on in person. The enemy's cavalry being repulsed, precipitated itself upon his own infantry, and threw it into disorder. Now followed York at the head of the infantry. It became a furious hand-to-hand fight, in which the landwehr vied with troops of the

ime. Macdonald's centre was broken through, the ranks could no longer be maintained, and all rushed in wild confusion for the paths through ravines. At the right moment Sacken wheeled in from the right, and pressed the French toward the Katzbach, whose rushing waters swallowed many victims. Meantime Langeron held a wretched position on the left bank of the Wütende Neisse. When he perceived the battle to be fully engaged on the farther side of the river, he was troubled, and sought to retrieve his error as much as possible; but only the coming up of the two Prussians brigades of Hünerbein and Steinmetz secured him against greater losses. Nevertheless, the defeat of the French centre decided that of the entire army. To the French was wanting the moral energy which enabled the Prussians to endure the most incredible bodily hardships. Although their left wing, the corps of Souham, did not come into action, the whole army turned backwards to the Bober.

Blücher named the battle after the Katzbach, to honor Sacken, whose brave troops, fighting without interruption, had reached that stream. For the victors also the night after the battle was fearful. The rain was pouring down incessantly, and they were without shelter and provisions; but joy for the victory took away all physical suffering. The pursuit set on foot by Gneisenau gave its full significance to the day with unsurpassed effect. Since Langeron was very deliberate, and Sacken also considered it necessary to choose the circuitous road by Liegnitz, the special burden of the pursuit devolved upon the same troops who principally had fought the battle, the corps of York. It was to have set out early, about two o'clock; but as it was necessary first to clear the ravines, they did not leave till six o'clock, and a fresh delay was caused by the waters of the Katzbach, which were continually rising. It was not till the 28th that the headquarters were able to cross the Wütende Neisse, the foot soldiers wading through with the water up to their breasts. From Goldberg on the troops were lying down in masses from exhaustion. The landwehr "melted like snow," and the horses perished more quickly. But so great was the demoralization of Macdonald that even the advanced troops of the pursuers sufficed to raise it to the highest pitch. The wildly rushing water formed an insurmountable obstacle in the path of the fugitives, and many above Löwenberg were obliged to yield themselves as prisoners to Langeron. Thus it came about that the most splendid trophies fell to the lot of men whose part in the battle had been the very least. The entire divis-

ion of Puthod was here destroyed; for in endeavoring to cross the stream by swimming, they were drowned. That part of the French who had turned toward Buzlan found a support in Souham, whose resistance checked the pursuit. On September 1 the Silesian army was at Quais, and here was granted to them the urgently needed day of rest. Blücher in a stirring order of the day thanked his brave troops: "Silesia is freed from the enemy . . . 103 cannon, 250 ammunition wagons, the hospital arrangements of the enemy, his travelling forge, his provision wagons, one general of division, two brigadier-generals, a great number of staff and other officers, 18,000 prisoners, two eagles, and other trophies are in our hands." His own loss amounted to 22,366 men, of whom only 2800 fell in the battle.

The reaction of this success upon his own army was of the greatest moment. While afterwards, as before, the old variance remained between corps leaders and headquarters, yet by it was established that high moral and intellectual ascendancy which the commander of the Silesian army cast into the balance in the forming of decisions. The conquered were profoundly discouraged. "The emperor himself," wrote Maedonald to Berthier, "must bring this army together again in order to give it a firmer attitude." The dispirited and scattered men, hungry, unarmed, ragged, and wounded, crept away by by-paths to Dresden.

Operating upon the short, inner lines, Napoleon himself had again won a great victory; but on the circumference, at Grossbeeren, at Kulm, and on the Katzbach, his subordinates had suffered three severe defeats, which had effaced the impression of that victory with friend and foe, and neutralized its significance. The emperor was prostrated, and his generals in perplexity. In the first alarm he ordered all troops to withdraw from the mountains to the immediate vicinity of Dresden, and did not leave them in their positions until it appeared that the enemy was not pursuing. He could now only arrange the fragments afresh. It had come to this already, that his defensive was rendered extremely difficult by the near approach of the enemy, and the advantage of his central position threatened to be overbalanced by the disadvantage of being surrounded. There was, consequently, nothing said of profiting by his victory at Dresden; and only in that neighborhood could he still hold fast his position effectually, since any one of the allied armies, by continually advancing, might strike upon his principal force. He decided to repeat the

movement upon Berlin, and to lead it in person. It was only Blücher's impetuous advance into Lusatia that forced him to turn his attention to the Prussian commander; and the affair against Berlin he committed to Ney, promising him, however, to advance as far as Hoyerswerda, in order to place himself in connection with Ney's army. But Maedonald's piteous representations, concerning the condition of his army, convinced Napoleon that it was necessary for him to intervene, and assist immediately. The bands of soldiers without arms whom he met on his ride to Bautzen, September 4, excited his passionate displeasure. He immediately ordered the advance against Blücher to be resumed, in the hope that on account of his increased self-confidence, Blücher might be induced to engage in battle with him. But as soon as Blücher learned that he had before him a superior force, he at once turned back. After an engagement at Reichenbach, on the 5th, the Silesian army retreated over the Neisse, and then also beyond the Queis. They had effectually slipped away from Napoleon. On the 5th the latter was again at Bautzen. Once more he considered the project of an inroad into the Mark of Brandenburg in order to join hands with Ney; but intelligence that now again the Bohemian army made signs of crossing the Erzgebirge induced him to hasten back to Dresden. Since Napoleon's advance against Blücher, Schwarzenberg had concluded to send 60,000 men across the Elbe, who should fall upon his right flank beyond Rumburg. The Russian troops, whom Barclay had sent forward on the 7th to make a demonstration in the mountains, Napoleon, on the 8th, pressed back beyond the Muglitz, and stormed the little town of Dohna. As soon as Wittgenstein learned that the enemy was turning to the Geiersberg, he got out of the way as speedily as possible. On the following day Napoleon continued his movement of attack, pressed the Russians up the Geiersberg, and took possession of the roads in the valley leading to a short distance in front of Mariaschein, one hour from Teplitz. But from the crest of the mountain he saw in the Teplitz valley below a powerful army, ready to receive him; and he saw the impossibility of bringing down his troops and artillery through the defile in their presence. Out of humor, irresolute, and full of anxiety, he let the day pass in inactivity. Then, dissatisfied, he began his return march, and on the 13th was again in Dresden. Already another message of evil had come. Ney had met the same fate as Oudinot.

Under "the bravest of the brave" the same army was appointed

to deal the blow at Berlin which had hitherto been commanded by Oudinot. With the exception of a few re-enforcements, the losses suffered were not made good; and the army was but 65,000 strong, with no hope of support from Davout. Napoleon had taken it into his head that this army was not to be regarded as beaten, that it had only met with an insignificant misadventure, and that Oudinot had fallen back unnecessarily. In truth, the utter inactivity to which the crown-prince of Sweden had returned since Grossbeeren confirmed him in this opinion. In vain had Bülow hoped that his superior would feel himself spurred on by that splendid success to greater exertions. He came to an understanding with Tauenzien to attack the enemy on the first favorable opportunity, should it be without, or even against, the will of the prince.

On September 4 Ney set out on his march from Wittenberg toward Jüterbog. At Zahna the landwehr under General Dobschütz were forced back by superior numbers, and finally the entire corps of Tauenzien retreated to Jüterbog. His attention aroused by the brisk cannonade, Bülow rode forward to high ground near Rahnsdorf; and as soon as he perceived the enemy's design, he immediately decided to accept battle. He desired Tauenzien to draw near to him, and promised if the enemy turned to Jüterbog to fall upon him in flank and rear with all his force. He had brought his troops together on the ground, and Borstell alone was at some distance from him, at Kropstädt. This general, who formerly, as governor of Pomerania, had held an independent position, did not willingly comply, and was Bülow's subordinate only in a conditional manner; and to Bülow's great indignation he now appealed to an express order of Bernadotte not to leave his position. Bülow repeated his order, at the same time made known his determination to the prince, and requested him to support the movement with the whole army. But the prince, always dominated by the fear that Napoleon might turn upon him a force greatly superior, and surround the army of the North on all sides, showed at first absolutely no inclination to act thus; but finally he so far yielded, that he gave Bülow an order to march to Kurz-Lippsdorf, which the latter, meanwhile, had already executed. In order, however, not to be discovered, he went back as quietly as possible as far as Erkmannsdorf, watching for the moment when he could fall suddenly upon the enemy, moving thence upon Jüterbog. On the other hand, the prince collected his Swedes and Russians at Lobessa, and removed two miles to the rear.

It would have been impossible for Bülow to remain undiscovered had not Ney, in his hazardous flank-march in view of the enemy, discarded the most ordinary prudence. On the left, upon the road by Gölsdorf and Dennewitz, Bertrand was marching: Reynier moved from Zahnsdorf by Gadegast and Scheune upon Rohrbeck; and on the right Oudinot from Seyda upon Öhna. It was in no sense the purpose of the marshal to give battle at Jüterbog; he only wished to push back the left wing of the army of the North far enough to open the way to Dahme and Luckau, where he expected to strike the emperor. But when Tauenzien, while engaged on his march to the right to join Bülow, became aware of his advancee, he immediately took a position for battle. For four full hours 8000 stood up against Bertrand's 20,000; and then the report of cannon on the flank announced the coming up of Bülow.

At the first Bülow made sure of Nieder-Göhrsdorf, where the Ahebach rises in a swampy meadow impassable for troops. He had only the brigade of Thümen with which to establish on the left shore his communication with Tauenzien. Now at last Ney discovered the danger that was threatening the left wing of his army. Since Bertrand was warmly engaged with Tauenzien, and Oudinot was not yet visible, he ordered up at the same time from Reynier's corps the division of Durutte against Nieder-Göhrsdorf, and the two Saxon divisions of Sahr and Lecoq against Gölsdorf. Thümen, notwithstanding the most incredible exertions, was completely repulsed; and the pursuit was averted only by the valor of the battalion of Puttitz. Bülow himself flew back to bring up a heavy battery; and with this aid he succeeded in driving back Durutte. He then went to the right bank of the Ahe, where the Prussians were making a stand against the Saxons, and were suffering fearfully from a heavy battery planted upon the Windmill Hill, until the Prince of Hesse-Homburg forced it to withdraw. Gölsdorf was finally seized by the Saxons. The battle at this point was in favor of the Prussians, but their last resources were spent. And now Oudinot, too, had arrived there; and with such superiority Gölsdorf could not be held, notwithstanding the admirable endurance of the men: the battle was irretrievably lost if no support arrived.

Already reminded of the battle for the last two hours by the loud reports of the artillery, Bernadotte could not help knowing that he was near the battlefield. However, he did not go in the direction from which the reports came, but went to Eckmannsdorf, distant

nearly five miles from the scene of conflict. There he remained standing quietly. It was fortunate that at Bülow's call at least Borstell had followed the sound of the cannonading. On the way he received the prince's order to join him at Eckmannsdorf; but Borstell refused obedience, and about four o'clock reached Gölsdorf. His coming revived the spirit of the men: the village was again taken, but was also lost again. All the heroic courage of the Prussians would have been in vain had not Ney, who had before his eyes only the unfortunate condition of the battle on his right wing, summoned Oudinot to leave Gölsdorf for Rohrbeek, for the purpose of there averting the defeat of Bertrand and Durutte. When these were startled by the first report of Bülow's cannon, Tauenzien had promptly availed himself of the moment to make a vigorous charge with his cavalry. Reynier, who had been struggling thus far with tenacious perseverance and great personal courage around Gölsdorf, saw that the battle was lost if Oudinot abandoned him; but the latter held himself bound by the order he had received, and moved off, leaving the Saxons to their fate, and had come only so far as Rohrbeek when he was involved in the wild flight of Bertrand's corps. For Tauenzien and Thümen, already masters of Dennewitz, were pressing farther on, rejoicing in their victory. Meanwhile at Gölsdorf the departure of Oudinot had relieved the pressure on the Prussians, and also at last there was the arrival of at least a small re-enforcement from the crown-prince. The exhausted and abandoned Saxons were no longer able to cope with a fresh assault. After holding their ground a while longer with great courage, they were driven out of the village, and, while wavering, attacked on all sides. Cut off from the Wittenberg road, Ney's whole army fled without stopping to Torgau, leaving behind them masses of prisoners, their artillery and wagons. Four standards, fifty-three cannon, four hundred vehicles, 13,500 prisoners, formed the trophies of this day; and they would have been more splendid if the prince had not refused the Swedish horse for the pursuit. On the next day General Wobeser, who hastened up from Luckau, made additional prisoners of the fugitives to the amount of 2800. Ney was soon compelled to abandon the attempt to restore order to his shattered army, for the troops refused to obey him. Not till he was on the other side of the Elbe, on the Mulde, near Eilenburg, was he able to gather together the fragments of his army. The entire corps of Oudinot was disbanded, and transferred to render the two others ready for the field.

Once more had the Prussians, almost entirely alone and with inferior numbers, gained a most splendid victory. Among all the marshals of France, the most famous, the prince of the Moskva, had been compelled to show his back to the despised landwehr. The slight hold which Bernadotte still had on the confidence of his subordinates vanished completely; but he carried home with him the fame of a conqueror, and the highest distinction for him was to be honored as the victor of Dennewitz. In truth, it was only Tauenzien's endurance, Bülow's boldness, steadfastness, and prudence, and Borstell's timely aid, with the heroic courage of the troops, that had any part in the honor of the day. The entire series of messages of victory, which experienced hardly any abatements on account of the defeat before Dresden, which was kept concealed, filled all patriotic hearts with indescribable rejoicing. Far the most important, however, of all gains achieved by the victories of the wings of the army was the change of opinion thereby effected on the part of the supreme direction of the war. Timidity and anxiety gave way to confidence; and after the battle of Kulin there was no one who thought of cautioning to retreat. In the first feeling of dismay occasioned by the defeat at Dresden, Schwarzenberg had sent to Blücher the demand to hasten into Bohemia in person with the greater part of his army, in order to support the main army of the allies. Now he received it calmly, when Blücher, declining to comply with the demand, suggested, in reference to it, that by keeping his forces together, and by an offensive movement toward the Elbe, he could aid the Bohemian army far more effectually. Metternich, too, now found it time to break off the negotiations which all along had been quietly spun out with Napoleon. Napoleon's repeated attempts to bring about intercourse by letter with his father-in-law, and in that way to separate Austria from the coalition, remained utterly fruitless. Now, finally, the Emperor Francis ratified the Treaty of Reichembach. At the same time it was enlarged, on September 9, by the Treaty of Teplitz, to which the treaty concluded there on October 3 between Austria and England was appended by way of supplement. To the conditions of this new treaty, which were designed for publicity, and which announced the closest fraternity in arms, was annexed a more important part, comprising a number of secret articles, in which were stipulated the re-establishment of Austria as before 1805, of Prussia as it was before 1806, the dissolving of the Confederation of the Rhine, the complete and unconditional indepen-

dence of all the states lying between Austria and Prussia on one side, and France on the other, the restoration of the house of Guelf in Hanover and Brunswick, and, finally, Napoleon's relinquishment of the thirty-second military division, of Westphalia, and of the grand duchy of Berg. Moderate as these conditions were, they nevertheless indicated an advance in comparison with those adopted at Reichenbach. In reference to Germany, the Treaty of Teplitz constituted a new triumph for Metternich. After the programme of the Prussian patriots had proved impracticable, in consequence of the failure of the spring campaign, the treaty contained the partial renunciation on the part of Prussia of the principles proclaimed with such defiant boldness in the Kalish appeal, while she gave her assent to the confidential adjustments relating to the future formation of Germany, already agreed upon between Alexander and Metternich. Undoubtedly, Hardenberg went always upon the supposition, that the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine should be compelled to restore the land which they had seized of late years, and that the districts thus made disposable should be devoted to the strengthening of Prussia and Austria. Entirely different, however, were the purposes of Metternich. The Prussian statesmen could not succeed at all, in the Teplitz conference, in carrying through their view, that in the treaty to be concluded with Bavaria the obligation should be acknowledged of becoming subordinated to the power of the future German Confederation.

The minister, Montgelas, who had succeeded, by the league with Napoleon, in enlarging Bavaria to a kingdom of about 45,000 square miles and 4,000,000 inhabitants, was now anxious to hold fast and secure this acquisition even without, and, if necessary, in opposition to, Napoleon. Thus the minister left unanswered the first demand from the headquarters of the allies, while he declared to the French ambassador, that it was a duty of self-preservation to hold back the Bavarian army for the purpose of covering the country, and to the army of the Protector he despatched no more than 3500 men. In vain did the crown-prince, supported by Wrede, urge him repeatedly not to delay accession to the allies on account of the Tyrol, which could not be retained. Not until Alexander (August 31) gave his pledge that the Bavarian possessions should be secured, and ample compensation be made in the event of a rectification of frontiers, was the prudent minister rendered accessible. Negotiations with him, as belonging to Austria's sphere, Hardenberg

had left entirely with Metternich; and on October 8 Montgelas signed the Treaty of Ried, in pursuance of which Bavaria, as a sovereign state, entered the coalition, restoring to Austria the Tyrol, Salzburg, and the Innviertel, but as indemnification receiving the promise of Würzburg, Aschaffenburg, and, in a secret article, "other well-situated German districts;" that is, the Hohenzollern region, formerly belonging to that house,—viz., Ansbach and Bayreuth. This unconditional recognition of Bavaria's sovereignty created a precedent for the other states of the Confederation of the Rhine, showed them where to find the defender of their sovereignty, which was menaced by Prussia, and withal secured to Austria the same influence in Germany which the emperor had enjoyed through the ecclesiastical states. It was thus already decided at this time, that Germany should not come into possession of a truly national constitution. When the secret articles of the Treaty of Ried, after having been kept concealed for a long time from the Prussian cabinet, came to light, it felt a lively dissatisfaction; but as long, however, as the common enemy was not utterly beaten down, Prussia could not refuse to give those articles its supplementary assent. But even now Montgelas consummated the breach with Napoleon reluctantly, and to his ambassador softened the participation in the Treaty of Ried by the assurance that Bavaria was, indeed, compelled for the moment to bend to the storm; but as the clouds should lighten, he would remember where she had to seek her true friends. Unfortunately for Montgelas, the report of the French envoy relating this interview fell into the hands of the Austrians: and from that hour Metternich considered the "incorrigible friend of the French" as his enemy, and sought to effect his removal.

The cessation of great military operations had again allowed ample space for these negotiations. On the side of the allies, notwithstanding the advantages gained, a decisive conclusion was not yet reached. The effect produced upon Napoleon by the blows which had struck his periphery, was that his principal force at the centre of the circle was also crippled. He spent himself in a restless, dispirited, and discouraging turning this way and that, which sprang from the hope that one or another of his enemies would finally give him some opening by which to profit. The victory at Dennewitz had certainly infused the spirit into Schwarzenberg to cross the mountains again in order to join Blücher, who was believed to be

already near the Elbe. At Nollendorf an advanced division of the enemy was surprised; and the Bohemian army was preparing to march again into Saxony, when Napoleon in person came out against it. On the blood-stained soil of Kulm and Nollendorf an engagement was about to occur with the Austrians under Colloredo, the Russians under Wittgenstein, and the Prussian brigade of Zieten, that would have been numbered among the hottest of the whole war. Already preparations were being made for a decisive battle in the valley, but for the second time Napoleon refused it.

Blücher was now only two days' march from Dresden. For scarcely was he informed that Napoleon had left Lusatia when he, too, again wheeled to the right. Macdonald had barely time, by engaging in a fight at Löbau with St. Priest, to secure his retreat, and not to be pressed back altogether from the Elbe. Blücher's headquarters were established at Herrnhut, his left wing resting on the Elbe at Schandau, and his right stationed at Bautzen.

With the loss of Lusatia, Napoleon's position at Dresden had ceased to be important. But with the stubbornness of a man spoiled by fortune, he still clung to it, although his marshals entreated him to give it up, and withdraw behind the Saale. During this obstinate persistence in his opinion, even the mutual relation of the parties as to numbers had become changed to his disadvantage. For while he was making arrangements to draw to himself the reserve corps under Augereau, 17,000 strong, Bennigsen was on the march to join the Russians with 50,000 men. But it was not merely in number that his troops had lost; they had become inferior in intrinsic value. In Saxony, now utterly exhausted, he was encompassed by the most serious difficulties with regard to subsistence. In the villages and in the ransacked potato-fields there was nothing more to be found, and the young conscripts were suffering from disease.

To all this it was added that partisans started up with growing insolence on his rear and his left flank, and more and more caused him severe losses. Between the Erzgebirge and the Saale, Thielmann and 1500 horse swarmed abroad daringly; took at Weissenfels 29 officers and 1254 men prisoners. Many Austrian and Russian captives were freed, and 10,000 prisoners were taken within fourteen days by these guerrillas. To put an end to the galling attacks, Napoleon sent out General Lefebvre-Desnouettes with 8000 men, who also found himself suddenly assailed by the Cossacks of Platoff at Altenburg, on September 28, although the assailants had neither

foot-soldiers nor cannon; and being pressed back to Zeitz, he there ran into the hands of Thielmann and Mensdorf, and was compelled to turn about. On the northern theatre of hostilities matters were assuming an aspect still more critical. On the 25th the Prussian Lieutenant-Colonel Marwitz, with 400 men of the landwehr, surprised Brunswick, made prisoners of the feeble garrison, and his horse followed up the Westphalians as they departed. To no one, however, of all these partisans was so splendid a success allotted as to the Russian Czernicheff. With 2000 men and 6 cannon, he marched into the enemy's country, till he reached Cassel. With difficulty Jerome escaped at the last moment from the Cossacks; and the inhabitants threatening to rise in revolt, General Alix was forced to capitulate on condition of being allowed to depart without molestation. On October 7 Czernicheff made his entry amid the rejoicing multitude, and declared the kingdom of Westphalia dissolved. But he was obliged to draw off at the end of three days, and Jerome returned once more to his capital. A yet more fortunate stroke occurred to Wallmoden. Having learned, by intercepted despatches, that Davont had sent the division of Pecheux to re-enforce the garrison of Magdeburg, he crossed the Elbe at Dömitz with 11,000 men, and overtook Pecheux, on the 16th, at the Görde. After a brave resistance, Pecheux got off in the darkness with only 2000 men. Such results excited emulation. On October 13 Tettenborn appeared altogether unexpectedly before Bremen, and two days afterwards the commandant here also capitulated on consideration of being allowed to leave unmolested.

Finally, however, the convulsive clinging to Dresden was compelled to yield to the force of events. Blücher was not a little surprised when he received at Herrnhut, on September 11, the renewed demand of the sovereigns to march to Bohemia, and re-enforce the main army. On the supposition that the news from Dennewitz would have reassured the general headquarters to some extent, he replied, by Gneisenau's advice, with the suggestion that, instead of the movement proposed, the Silesian army should approach the northern army, and then cross the Elbe. This movement would force Napoleon to abandon his advanced position: instead of the Silesian army, Bennigsen's reserve force, then on the march, could proceed to Bohemia. This proposal was principally grounded on considerations relating to the crown-prince of Sweden. For after the battle of Dennewitz, the prince had begun the same game as after the battle

of Grossbeeren. To go across the Elbe, and to advance against Leipsic, he declared to be impracticable as long as Wittenberg and Torgau were in French hands. Further, Blücher had already professed himself to the crown-prince for joint operation, so that their two armies should be united in the plains of Leipsic with the Bohemian army for the last great blow. Finally, for the purpose of representing his plan to the sovereigns with still greater energy, he sent to Teplitz Major Rühle von Lilienstern, who had often been despatched previously on important missions. Through him much could be said respecting the crown-prince by word of mouth which could not be communicated by letter; and Rühle so far at least succeeded in gaining the consent of the sovereigns that with Blücher it was left to decide which of the two plans he would execute, only the breaking up of the Bohemian army for Saxony was to be postponed until after the arrival of Bennigsen. Already had Blücher, in order to exert a pressure upon the prince, moved somewhat more to the north. In this position he delayed mainly in order to cover and conceal Bennigsen's march to Bohemia. Meanwhile the march to the right was prepared in the most profound secrecy. The way to the Elbe was to be opened by removal of the enemy stationed at Grossenhain, when Blücher was surprised by a new stroke of Napoleon.

Whether it was that Napoleon as yet only wished to convince himself personally of the state of matters, or desired to hinder Blücher from approaching too nearly to his central position, he forced the Prussians to leave the burning ruins of Bischofswerda, and to withdraw yet farther. At Rot-Nauslitz, Katzeler and General Rudzrvitch perceived the opportunity for a successful attack by their cavalry; and then Blücher marched back to the main position at Bautzen, resolved to fight a battle there for defence or even to attack. But Napoleon did not wait for this, for he had seen with his own eyes the forlorn condition of Macdonald's army of the Bober. After long hours of indecision, which he spent at Hartha, he reached the conclusion to give up entirely the right bank of the Elbe. But in order to make it impossible for the enemy to remain in this region which he abandoned, he issued the order to drive off all the cattle, to burn the woods, and to destroy fruit-trees and means of subsistence. On September 26 and 27, Marmont, as well as the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg and l'Héritier, who were stationed at Grossenhain, crossed at Meissen, Poniatowski and Lauriston at Dresden, and only

Southam and Macdonald still remained at their stations before this city.

With Bennigsen's arrival in the camp at Teplitz, the time had come for Blücher to begin his march to the right. Major Rühle, who had been sent in advance in order to discover a place for crossing, sought out Bülow and Tauenzien, to assure himself of the co-operation of both. Both generals gave assent. Bernadotte promised by energetic demonstrations against Roslau and Aken to support the passage. Beside Blücher and Gneisenau only Müßling and Rühle were in the secret at the Silesian headquarters. Great and universal, consequently, was the astonishment, when, on the 25th, the order was received to march to the right, and the Russian commissioner felt himself authorized to protest with all formality against so unwarrantable a sacrifice of the communication with Silesia. Leaving 10,000 Russians in Bautzen, Blücher broke camp on the 25th, marching in a northwesterly direction. Originally the point where the Black Elster empties into the Elbe was chosen as the place for crossing; but inasmuch as the crown-prince had again ordered the bridge built there to be broken up, Blücher took the direction of Mühlberg. A feint made by Sacken against Meissen drew an impenetrable veil over the movement of the main army, and was designed to mislead the French to believe that a passage was contemplated at that place. But at last consideration for the prince decided in favor of the Elster tributary, a place, moreover, which seemed peculiarly adapted for a forcible passage, for the reason that just here the Elbe describes a bend of considerable width, which allows the opposite shore to be placed under fire from two directions. On the morning of October 3 the bridges were ready.

When the building of bridges by the crown-prince was first noticed, Ney, who with not much over 34,000 men was keeping watch over this part of the river, ordered Bertrand to Wartenburg, opposite the Elster, and he himself turned toward Dessau to keep watch over the bridges at Roslau and Aken. Neither of the two had a suspicion that Blücher stood before them, as little as the emperor himself, who for several days did not understand what had become of the Silesian army that disappeared from his front. When at length, on October 3, he learned of its departure, he did, indeed, order Macdonald, who was stationed at Leipsie, to prevent, in conjunction with Ney, the enemy from crossing the Elbe between Wittenberg and Torgau; but it was already too late.

In order to keep the enemy deceived as long as possible, Blücher appointed the corps of York to the duty of first passing over the bridges and occupying the village of Wartenburg, which was but feebly garrisoned. The outposts of the enemy were assaulted and captured; but soon the Prussians struck upon unexpected obstacles. As it proved, the space between Wartenburg and the river was composed of a swampy peninsula, full of thickets, pierced by ditches filled with bushes, and cut off on the west by an embankment. Arrived at the embankment, the Prussian enthusiasts were received by the crossfire of an invisible and sheltered foe posted behind dikes and trees; and they suffered great losses. That an attack in front was impossible, York convinced himself in person: for he went forward with his staff as far as the line of skirmishers. Here, therefore, all that could be done was to keep the enemy in Wartenburg. The brigade of Steinmetz, on whom this duty devolved, held, for nearly six hours, an exceedingly difficult post: but only by Bertrand being obliged to turn his main strength against it was it rendered possible to go around him on the side of Bleddin. At half-past two the roads were so far prepared that the prince of Mecklenburg was enabled to advance. Now Bertrand was punished for his mistake in having left unoccupied the stagnant streams extending from Wartenburg almost to the Elbe; and, on the supposition that he had before him only a corps of the northern army, he had withdrawn his right wing as far as Bleddin, and garrisoned that place with only 1500 Würtembergers under General Franquemont. The village was taken after a short conflict, the Würtembergers completely dispersed, and the cavalry of the Westphalian guard, stationed in the village of Globig, overpowered by the hussars. The Prussians stood now in the rear of Wartenburg, but too weak to undertake anything from that place. Impatient over the long delay in reaching a decisive result, the headquarters thought it high time to extort it by exerting all their strength. The corps of Langeron was ordered up for this purpose. But the Russians came too late. On York's order to take Wartenburg by storm, General Horn, with his landwehr men, rushed through the morass up to the dike. They reached the village, and took it by storm. As if seized by terror, the enemy yielded and fled. Steinmetz, also, now crossed over from the right to attack; and the fugitives ran into the hands of the prince of Mecklenburg, and lost guns and prisoners. Followed by Horn, Bertrand descended the Elbe as quickly as possible.

On the evening of October 4 the whole Silesian army stood on the left bank of the Elbe, and a fortified camp was constructed near Wartenburg with the greatest rapidity. The army of the North, also, now crossed over at Aken and Roslau, and the union of the two armies was accomplished. But instead of pressing with his right in the direction of Leipsic and upon the communications of the enemy, Bernadotte again remained inactive as if rooted there. Blücher, on the contrary, immediately advanced as far as Düben, and thereby caused Ney, after destroying all the bridges over the Mulde, to withdraw to Delitzsch. Now the Bohemian army, also, was able to begin its march to the plains of Saxony: and only Bennigsen, strengthened by two Austrian divisions, remained behind to guard the mountain passes. At a snail's pace the unwieldy mass moved by Marienberg and Zschopau to Chemnitz. To the Emperor Napoleon, who had been watching long for an opportunity to give battle, this reappearance of the enemy was altogether desirable; for he thought to prepare for him a second defeat, as at Dresden. But this plan was rendered impracticable by the advance of the two other armies across the Elbe. He now resolved to leave Murat behind him with 45,000 men for the purpose of arresting, as far as possible, the march of the Bohemian army; then, with all his other forces, to turn upon Blücher, to beat him, and drive him back across the Elbe, and then wheel about and prepare a similar fate for the Bohemian army. He believed himself so sure of success, that, notwithstanding the change in the situation, he thought himself able to hold fast to Dresden; and there be left St. Cyr with 30,000 men, whose absence in the decisive hour he had cause bitterly to regret. All the other troops posted at Dresden were directed to march upon Wurzen, where he had made sure of crossing the Mulde. The emperor himself left Dresden at an early hour October 7. Weak of purpose, and without regarding the dissuasions of his people, King Frederick Augustus of Saxony followed the fate that bound him to his 'great ally.' On the ninth Napoleon reached his army not far from Eilenberg, and was received with the customary *Vive l'Empereur!* The Saxons remained silent. All exhortations had not been able to move the hearts of Saxons to heed the voice of the fatherland rather than the call to obey their feudal sovereign; but this Napoleon had accomplished by his bulletin concerning the battle of Dennewitz; for in this, being obliged either to cover up Ney's fault or otherwise to mortify the French, he ascribed the

cause of the defeat to the wretched conduct of the Saxons. In vain did Reynier and Ney himself protest against this audacious representation; the Saxons, who alone had saved the honor of the day for the French army, stood before the eyes of the world as guilty. The sight of their country outrageously abused by their allies increased their exasperation, and one Saxon battalion had already deserted at Oranienbaum. An address by the emperor, which Caulaincourt translated into rough German, and the distribution of crosses of the Legion of Honor, failed to produce any effect.

When Napoleon continued his march to Döben, he was astonished to discover no enemy whatever; out of consideration for the evident aversion of the crown-prince to any rapid advance, Blücher had gone forward, and remained posted near the Mulde. In a personal interview at Mühlbeck, on October 7, the two commanders then came to an understanding with respect to a joint advance to Leipsic; but the situation was changed by the intelligence that the largest part of the French army was moving thither under the personal command of Napoleon. The crown-prince desired to return at once across the Elbe. In that event, the army of Silesia would have been compelled to follow him, and there could be no more thought of its uniting with Schwarzenberg. At this moment Major Rühle, who was despatched to the prince to assure him that Blücher would by no means cross the Elbe, had the fortunate suggestion to add, that if need be he would cross the Saale, consequently incline westward, and there, apart from the army of the North, seek his junction with Schwarzenberg. The prince acceded to the proposal, since he certainly regarded it as not intended in earnest; but Blücher continued his march to the right on the same day, and hastened over the Mulde before Napoleon should come up with him. Saeken, who was farthest in the rear, saved himself only by slipping past the enemy in a bold night march. Blücher left the position at Zörbig to the army of the North, the crown-prince having openly expressed the desire to remain as near the Elbe as possible. At the same time he sent Colonel von Müffling to Bülow in order to make sure of his co-operation in all circumstances, which the latter, full of fresh recollections of his own experiences, promptly promised. Furthermore, Gneisenau placed himself in communication with General Charles Stewart, English commissioner to the northern army; whose menace of withholding the English subsidies caused the prince to yield so far that he promised to order a bridge built at

Wettin for the Silesian army; but no preparations were found to have been made for the purpose, and Blücher was consequently compelled to take the far road around by way of Halle. The army of the North crossed farther down, and both now stood on the west side of the Saale. But Napoleon had dealt a blow in the air. The thought shot through his head of moving to the farther shore at Magdeburg in order from that point, keeping up his connection with France through Wesel, to continue the war, but this scarcely feasible plan was abandoned as quickly as conceived. After relieving Wittenberg, and forcing the enemy to break up the bridges at Roslau and Aken, he wheeled about to Leipsic. There he now expected to fight the Bohemian army alone before its union with the army of Silesia.

Schwarzenberg, although he met on his march but small divisions of the enemy, had advanced only in a very dilatory manner. When Murat, as the sole means of holding back this force, threefold greater than his own, precipitated himself recklessly upon their advanced troops, on the 7th at Flöha and on the 8th at Penig, the Austrians met with disgraceful checks. Pursuant to the original plan, Napoleon was to be conquered only by a gradual compression of his forces; the allied armies, placed about Leipsic in a wide half-circle, were either to await the arrival of re-enforcements, or, if he should advance to the attack, to fall upon him from all sides. Since, however, danger was thus incurred of Napoleon concentrating without being perceived a great superiority of force upon a given point, or even, by breaking through toward the north, of withdrawing from the environment, it was decided, at the urgent request of Alexander, who in this followed Toll's advice, to make a joint and general assault. Undoubtedly it rested with Schwarzenberg, after Napoleon had retreated, to defeat Murat, and by the capture of Leipsic to render the junction of the two difficult, perhaps impossible: but such a daring deed did not correspond with his characteristics. Wittgenstein, with his vanguard, 60,000 strong, received instructions to undertake only a decided demonstration against Leipsic, but not to engage in a regular assault. This led, on October 14, to a spirited affair with cavalry, lasting till evening, in which Murat had the pleasure, while bringing into the fight old dragoon regiments that had come from Spain, to sacrifice uselessly material that could not be replaced. It ended to the advantage of the confederates.

After the Bohemian army, while continuing its march to the left,

had effected on the Saale its connection with the two armies of the north, Schwarzenberg was now in a situation to profit by his supreme command over the latter. Blücher advanced immediately as far as Schkeuditz; but the crown-prince fell back in consequence of Napoleon's last movements towards Köthen, and, positively desiring to return across the Elbe, he despatched to Blücher the request to follow him thither. Retreat across the Elbe, particularly under the supreme command of the crown-prince, was, in truth, the last thing thought of at the Silesian headquarters. In his reply, Blücher represented to the prince in what a perilous situation he would be placing himself by crossing the Elbe, which would compel the Silesian army to approach still nearer to the army of Bohemia. He also informed him that Napoleon had renounced his plan of crossing the Elbe, and was concentrating his entire force of combatants at Leipsic; and the prince concluded to give up his movement in retreat. But he was not disposed to go forward side by side with the Silesian army; and in order to keep his hand free, he kept behind that army, in the direction of Halle.

Thus, then, from all sides the armies moved on to the plains of Leipsic, to meet in the great decisive battle, in very truth, the "great battle of the nations," to which all the Christian peoples of Europe had sent their warriors.

Leipsic, the junction of four roads radiating in different directions, lies in the midst of a plain, divided into a western and an eastern half by the swampy and wooded low ground of the White Elster and the Pleisse, which extends westward as far as the Saale, and northward till it reaches the city. A position behind this low ground on the plain of Lützen would have procured for Napoleon the advantage of placing this natural obstacle between himself and his adversary, and, in the event of being defeated, would have secured a line of retreat. But, since in that case he would also have removed the last obstacle that prevented the junction of the allies, he chose the position east of it, with his rear resting on Leipsic, although there would then remain to him, as the sole line of retreat, the narrow road leading from the city to Lindenau. But with confidence in the dilatory character of his opponents, he relied upon finding the Bohemian army on one side of him, and the Silesian and northern armies on the other, still lying far apart from each other. While, therefore, believing the army of the North to be far distant, he left behind, on the north side of Leipsic, to observe Blücher, only 42,000 men

under Ney's command, he arranged his forces, on the 15th, in a great half-circle extending from the Pleisse, between Lössnig and Connewitz, by Probsttheida and Holzhausen to Paunsdorf, in order to attack the Bohemian army. The route to Lindenau was guarded by Bertrand with 10,000 men. But Napoleon's entire calculation rested upon a fundamental error, for his enemies were much nearer than he supposed. Blücher was not on the left of the Saale or Elster, but on the right; and he was on the march to unite with the Bohemian army, and on the following night the two confederate armies announced to each other their arrival by a mutual signalling with rockets. Instead of attacking, Napoleon was himself attacked.

But Schwarzenberg's arrangements for battle suffered from a mistake not less fundamental. According to the idea of the Saxon von Langenau, the attack should be made from the west, so that Napoleon, in case of their success, should be pressed back toward the Elbe. But to effect this the river-flats covered by thiekets must be forced; and that ground afforded no space for the development of great masses of troops, and since the last rains was more impassable than ever. Rightly, therefore, did Alexander reject this unwise plan; and Blücher also protested against the direction that a part of his army cross over to the Merseberg-Leipsic road, and there join the Austrian corps of Giulay from Markranstädt, to make an attack upon Lindenau. He alleged that in eonsequence of Bernadotte's march toward Halle, he must remain upon the right bank of the Elster, and advance upon the Halle-Leipsic road. Although his plan was a failure, Schwarzenberg could not abandon it altogether; and at least the passage at Connewitz must be forced by 30,000 Austrians under General Merveldt in order to fall upon Napoleon's right flank and roll it up. The allies had in all, on the day of the first battle, against Napoleon's 176,000 men, only a little more than 200,000 that could be used. But since Napoleon, with the exception of Reynier's 14,000 men, already had on the ground his entire body of combatants, while the allies, on the contrary, had yet to reckon upon the arrival of Bernadotte and Bennigsen with 125,000, he must necessarily on this day gain a decisive victory, if the numerical relations of the two parties were not to shift more and more to his disadvantage.

The battle of Leipsic, on October 16, is divided into three distinct engagements.—Napoleon's at Wachau, with the Bohemian army; Marmont's at Möckern, with Blücher; and the fight between Giulay and Bertrand at Lindenau.

The day broke dark and cold. Rain and mist concealed in part the onward march of the allies. A fearful contest of artillery, lasting for five hours, ushered in the battle. The village of Markkleeberg was four times taken and four times lost before it finally remained in the hands of the Prussians. Still more violently raged the struggle around Wachau, where Duke Eugene of Würtemberg at first encountered but slight resistance; but with the formidable onset of the troops which Napoleon here sent forward in person no heroic courage of Russians and Prussians was able to cope. The village was lost. Eugene was compelled to fall back to Gülden-gossa. Notwithstanding all the bravery of the troops the attacks of the allies were foiled universally, for Napoleon was enabled to meet them at every menaced point with superior forces. It was now eleven o'clock, and the battle had become extremely critical for the allies. Alexander sent his aide-de-camp von Wolzogen to Schwarzenberg to send over the troops uselessly bleeding on the other bank. There especially, in the labyrinth of thicket, swamp, and water, where all bridges and planks were torn up, Merveldt was not advancing a foot's breadth. After he had vainly attempted to press through at Lössnig he was obliged to force a passage, at any cost, at Döllitz. He did his utmost, waded with a battalion through a ford, but scarcely had reached dry ground when they were surrounded, and, with the wounded general, taken prisoners. Now at last Schwarzenberg yielded, and despatched the corps of the prince of Hesse-Homburg to the field of battle, and himself repaired to the sovereigns. The centre of the allies at Wachau wavered, and was in the greatest danger. For here Napoleon was aiming to decide the battle. He massed together 170 pieces of artillery, under whose iron storm the battalions of the prince of Würtemberg melted into small groups, separated by wide spaces. But suddenly, at three o'clock, the French artillery became silent, as if at a given signal; and then burst forth, under Murat's lead, a mass of 8000 horsemen, trampling down everything before them, and capturing the abandoned batteries. The head of the grenadier corps of Rajewski was overrun, its leaders slain; and a hundred steps farther only a marshy pool separated the rush from the station occupied by the allied sovereigns. Wittgenstein's centre was pierced through: Napoleon ordered all the bells in Leipsic to be rung for the victory.

But at this last moment the shock of Napoleon's onset lost force from the firmness of his adversary. Roughly as Kleist's men were

handled, the individual troops maintained themselves in the fearful vortex. Alexander's adjutant-general, Count Orloff-Denisoff, threw himself with the Cossack Life Guards, the personal defenders of the sovereign, against those who were farthest in advance; Schwarzenberg, with drawn sword, sprang into the line of battle; the horse hastened up, and whatever guns could be brought together played vigorously upon the mass of cavalry, whose efficiency was impaired by Latour-Manbourg being severely wounded, and by the rapid advance being prematurely ordered. It staggered, turned about, and at last was completely overpowered. Meanwhile the Austrians also, with the grenadiers and guards under the grand duke Constantine, had come up, so that now the entire strength of the army stood collected at this point when Napoleon attempted to effect with infantry what the cavalry had failed to do; but this force was not able to gain anything beyond past advantages, and all attacks were repulsed. At six o'clock in the evening the fearful struggle of nine hours' duration ended with a powerful cannonade.

In itself considered, Napoleon might claim the victory. He had beaten off the allied attack, put 20,000 of their men *hors de combat*, and had maintained his position. But such a result did not suffice in his situation: only a decisive victory could have saved him now, when the forces were, in a measure, equally balanced. And this, too, he would presumably have secured had Ney and Marmont been able to obey his summons to the battlefield. But in the act of attempting to break up for that purpose, suddenly Marmont found himself held fast by Blücher. Ney, who considered Marmont sufficiently strong to meet this fresh opponent, began his march, but then decided, on account of the endangered situation of Marmont, to wheel about. He came too late to help him, and consequently neither here nor there had any part in the battle. In this fact lies the decisive importance of the battle of Möckern.

Blücher, in the early morning, at eight o'clock, had left Halle, where his army had been enjoying unbroken rest for three days. The report of cannon that soon resounded from Wachau quickened his steps. But to a great degree his object was impeded by the obstinacy with which the crown-prince still persisted in holding back. Although Schwarzenberg's dispositions for the battle of the day were already imparted to him, he had suddenly halted in the vicinity of Petersberg, avowedly on account of the fatigue of the troops. Angry at this staying behind, the commissioners of the allied powers visited

his headquarters, and demanded energetically that he take part in an event which would decide the fate of Europe. He, however, came on the 16th no farther than Landsberg, fifteen miles from the field of battle. His remaining behind obliged Blücher to employ great circumspection lest his uncovered left wing should be exposed to attack from the enemy, who was in possession of the Düben road. He therefore moved Langeron far to the left, toward Klein- and Grosswidderitzsch, and for his reserve retained the entire corps of Saeken, together with St. Priest of Langeron's corps, at Radfeld. Hence it resulted that for the attack on the centre and left wing of the enemy only York's corps, numbering 21,500 men, remained disposable, which advanced upon the Halle-Leipsic road, and drove Marmont's weak vanguard out of Lindenthal and Wahren.

When the marshal saw so strong a body, about equal to his own force, advancing against him, with wounded prudence he immediately made all arrangements to bar against them the road to Leipsic. He placed his men upon the rising ground between Entritzsch and Möckern, and chose for his main supporting point the latter village, which from its situation directly upon the Elster could not be surrounded. Here also there arose a struggle, beginning at three o'clock in the afternoon, and carried on upon both sides with the utmost energy. To capture the place York devoted more than half his infantry. For the second time the Prussians stormed it, court after court, house after house; but Marmont brought forward fresh troops, and strengthened the battery posted behind the village till he had there fifty pieces. One-half of the village was won back by the French, but the other was maintained by the Prussians. York did not hesitate to bring up the last reserve of his right wing, the brigade of Steinmetz; but this, too, was compelled to retire exhausted, and with heavy losses. Only his cavalry remained; and he was about to come to that, when, without waiting for the order, Major von Sohr, at the head of three squadrons of Brandenburg hussars, dashed with loud hurrahs upon two advancing battalions of the enemy, scattered them, and, charging again, captured six cannon. Supported by the remainder of the cavalry, which had come up meantime, he fell a second time upon the enemy with still more important results, taking nine guns and five ammunition wagons. Now also the left wing, composed of the brigades of Horn and Hünerbein, attacked, and the onset of the cavalry and the bayonets of the infantry made the assault irresistible. Marmont himself was wounded, and

was obliged to quit the field. Dombrowski's Poles hastened up, and some of Ney's troops, did indeed press back the pursuers for the moment, but were unable longer to avert the defeat. Two thousand prisoners and more than half his artillery Marmont left in the hands of the victor. It is reported that Napoleon, when the whole momentous occurrence — the arrival of the Silesian army before Leipsic — was made known to him, committed to the king of Naples the direction of the battle at Wachau, and repaired in person to the north side, but arrived there only to be a witness of the utter discomfiture of his marshal.

Much more insufficient for the allies were the results at Lindenau on this day. Since Giulay was here at first in superior force, it rested with him to gain possession of a village so thoroughly important, to destroy the bridges over the different tributary streams, and thereby to cut through the only roads by which Napoleon could retreat; but, instead of this, he lost precious hours which Bertrand used to fortify the village, and after a useless attack upon it Giulay admitted the capture to be impossible.

The approaching darkness was lighted up by a wide circle of burning villages and many thousand watchfires. Innumerable wounded men lay helpless in the fields through the night. There were terrible scenes in Leipsic itself, whither, in addition to the great number of wounded from the last battle already lying there, constantly new cases were brought to every door or dragged themselves in. The sovereigns passed the night in Rötha, and on the morning of the 17th their troops stood expecting another assault. Since this did not follow, the supreme war-council of the allies decided to postpone the renewal of the battle till the following day, when the arrival of the army of the North and of Bennigsen would of necessity give them an important superiority.

The same considerations which led the allies to this delay ought to have decided Napoleon to enter upon a retreat without loss of time. For the expectations which had influenced him to give battle to the Bohemian army had not been fulfilled: and he had been obliged to cope, not with that alone, but at the same time to fight the Silesian army. But the proud mind that always imagined itself capable of foreing fortune could be persuaded to adopt this conclusion just as little now as the year before at Moscow. Against all rules of military prudence, only because he would not bow to fate, he remained standing upon the crater of the volcano. The whole

forenoon he consumed in restless indecision; and not till two hours after midday, after he had resolved upon retreating, did he direct that the prisoner, General Merveldt, be summoned. His purpose was to establish, by means of the general, negotiations with his father-in-law. Now, as formerly, he clung to the phantom that he could detach Austria from the coalition. He struck the chord of kindred, and looked for compliance, offered to renounce Warsaw, Italy, Spain, and northwestern Germany, and even with regard to Holland and the protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine he was willing to listen to reason. Finally he came to that which lay nearest his heart, to the armistice. With those commissions he despatched Merveldt to the Emperor Francis. The day passed by, and no answer came; and he was obliged to acknowledge to himself that this last hope also had deceived him. He now entered upon arrangements preliminary to a retreat. He sent Bertrand forward to Weissenfels, to secure the passage over the Saale at that place, while he assigned to Mortier, with the young guard, the position at Lindenau. The battle on the 18th could only have for its object to cover the retreat. He thought himself sufficiently strong to hold his ground against the allies, and thereby to secure the armistice of which he had need for an unmolested departure. Whether it was because the avowal of his necessity before his soldiers was too painful, or that his carelessness with respect to all measures to be adopted had become so great, the indispensable erection of bridges over the water-courses was utterly neglected.

Napoleon during the night had withdrawn his troops somewhat, and stationed them nearer the city. The principal part of his force he posted, under Murat's special command, opposite to the Bohemian army; on the left, Ney was appointed to defend the course of the Parthe; and the wide intermediate space between the two was filled up only by Reynier's weak corps, since he believed that nothing was to be apprehended from the northern army as soon as from the other forces. He himself directed the battle from the snuff-mill upon a height between Connewitz and Stötteritz.

That Napoleon was able to hold his ground throughout this entire day also, he owed mainly to the predominant want of harmony and of mutual co-operation among his adversaries. The principal cause of this, next to the general vacillation on the part of the supreme command, was the long delay of the crown-prince of Sweden. Not having moved his foot during the battle, he had advanced on

the 17th as far as Breitenfeld. Pursuant to the desire of his allies, he ought, by coming between the Silesian army and Bennigsen, who was moving forward on the right wing of the Bohemian army, to have closed up the circle, and completely cut off Napoleon from the Elbe. But in the conviction that, the way to the Saale being shut against him, Napoleon would necessarily be compelled to march to the Elbe, Bernadotte wished on no consideration to expose himself to the danger of being smitten by the main stroke.

At length, after a conference with Blücher, the prince declared himself prepared to cross the Parthe, and to execute the desired movement to the right; it being understood that Blücher made over to him the entire corps of Langeron and St. Priest's division. That would be 30,000 men, the larger part of the Silesian army, which if so reduced would be condemned to inactivity. However, simply for the purpose of bringing the northern army into action, Blücher acceded to the request. But when the prince, not venturing to cross the Parthe in sight of the enemy, demanded that Langeron should follow him to Taucha, five miles up the river, he checked him, while he ordered the general to cross at Mockau immediately, and said to the prince that the corps was awaiting his orders on the left bank of the Parthe.

During these negotiations the battle was already in full course. In three powerful columns Schwarzenberg advanced to the assault. The first, 50,000 Austrians under the prince of Hesse-Homburg, was to press from the Pleisse Napoleon's right wing, commanded by Prince Poniatowski. This column succeeded only in taking the villages of Döllitz and Dösen, and in retaining them after various conflicts; but Connewitz could not be taken from the French. Barclay found Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz abandoned by the enemy, who fell back upon Probstheida. There was of necessity delay in the main attack upon this place until Bennigsen came up, and that did not occur till two o'clock in the afternoon. This village, massively built and skilfully constructed for defence, was of the highest importance to Napoleon, as the point connecting the two parts of his dispositions for battle. The engagement here paused for a while, and the assault of the first two columns had thus far no favorable issue. At a late hour, when the approaching army of the North had already become visible, Bennigsen moved forward to attack. He ought really to have taken Probstheida on the left flank; but in order to establish a connection with the northern army, and to seize

what he regarded erroneously as the enemy's line of retreat, he had already drawn the greater part of his force to the right. After a fruitless attempt upon Stötteritz, he directed his efforts with the Prussians against Zuckelhausen and Holzhausen, and with the Russians against Baalsdorf. All three of the villages fell into their hands. Ney was forced to retreat to the line of Schönefeld-Sellerhausen-Stünz, for Napoleon had no longer men available to support him. In the vicinity of Paunsdorf, the Saxons were stationed, having still one division of foot-soldiers and a brigade of horse, under General von Zeschau. In addition to all else that made the French alliance repugnant to them, there was now in their minds great anxiety respecting the fate of their king and their country in the event of the downfall of Napoleon. Even Reynier perceived the unnatural features of this situation, and left it with the king to direct his soldiers in accordance with his own judgment; but in presence of such a responsibility the timid prince drew back, and a later command from him that they should proceed to Torgau could not be executed on account of the advance of the army of the North. The officers importuned their general now to desert; and when he positively refused to take such a step, without express orders, the horse-brigade went by themselves. Zeschau sent to the king the request that he would permit the division to devote itself to his personal protection at Leipsic. The answer of the king referred them only to the fulfilling of their duty, and this was construed by the officers as indirectly authorizing care for themselves. Without suffering themselves to be detained by Zeschau, by degrees 3000 men went over with nineteen cannon, and were received by the allies with rejoicing. The example of the Saxons was followed by two Würtemberg regiments under General Norman.

Four hours after midday Bülow's corps finally appeared upon the battlefield, and with it the crown-prince himself, who now seemed desirous of making up for his exceedingly protracted delay by energetic action. Before such a superiority of force Napoleon's left wing was broken in pieces. The villages of Paunsdorf, Mölkau, Stünz, and Sellerhausen were taken one after the other, while around Schönefeld raged till dark a conflict of unexampled violence. At the end of eight assaults it finally remained in Langeron's hands.

However incomplete the success on the 18th, purchased with so much blood, yet this was attained: for Napoleon to remain longer in position at Leipsic was rendered impossible. As darkness came on the several corps, unobserved by the allies, moved from the villages

into the suburbs, and during the whole night the retreat was continued through the city. The emperor at eight o'clock rode into the city, where he alighted at the Hotel de Prusse.

The battle was still raging when Schwarzenberg ordered his corps-commanders to meet him on the 'Monarch's Hill' for the purpose of receiving his directions for the continuation of the contest on the coming day. Blücher judged more correctly that Napoleon would not allow the slaughter to go on in front of Leipsic, and therefore proposed to send upon the flanks of the retreating men the corps of guards and grenadiers, which were almost untouched. To Blücher's request for 20,000 horsemen, with whom he would get in advance of French, no answer was given. But his king ordered him to send immediately all disposable cavalry and artillery after the enemy; and he accordingly directed York at seven o'clock in the evening to break up, and secure the passage over the Saale at Halle and Merseburg, and to inflict on the retreating enemy all possible injury.

Since the building of bridges had been neglected, there remained to Napoleon, for effecting the retreat, only the small Elster Bridge at the Ransädt Gate. Through this needle's eye he was obliged to thread the entire confused coil of his army. With beating drums the allies rushed onward to storm the city at dawn. The Königsberg battalion of Friccius was the first which pressed in. Napoleon did not leave the city without first deluding his ally, the king of Saxony, by the declaration that he removed only to manoeuvre in the open country, and would relieve the city in two or three days. It demanded indescribable efforts to make a way for the emperor through the disorderly mass of men streaming out of the city. He had scarcely left the Elster Bridge behind him when it was blown up, and for all who were on this side of it their only means of escape was cut off. Many, and among them Poniatowski, were drowned in attempting to cross the swollen river. Resistance was now at an end. Very prudently had Napoleon, intent only on saving his Frenchmen, committed the defence of the city to the Poles and soldiers of the Confederation of the Rhine. One division of them after another was disarmed. Shortly after one o'clock the Emperor Alexander and King Frederick William made their entry amid the huzzas of the rescued and liberated inhabitants. The king of Saxony was conveyed to Berlin as a prisoner; and his dominions passed under control of the central administrative bureau, in whose name Prince Repnin assumed the office of governor-general.

Since those days in October of world-wide historical moment, the name of Leipsic (Fig. 58), previously celebrated only as a rich




FIG. 58.—Battle of Leipsic, October 18–19, 1813.

commercial city, and as a flourishing seat of the sciences, has become ennobled for the German race by the remembrance of liberation from

Zu billige fröhliche Sonnen' Fußtritt', der mir mir nicht, conßt
König', bei Dir so oft angegriffen gescheitert seien. Ich bin ja sehr
sehr, und wüßt' der Herr zu mitleiden!

Heute, als das Graze der König erste commiss, aber wichtigste Briefe
reichte, und es hin erster Verhandlung' eine solche folgte, dass es die
Sonne Pflicht jahrs eingehend Dagegen offenkundig hießt die Preß-
nob wichtige König's Briefe öffentlich zu machen; da weiter nichts jahres
frei Lebe an die selben, was Daniels Wohl gefiel, so ganz und so gut
an alterer amiciss' hand, sich auszuhören, und so weit andern Vorkommen
auf der diesen Person; und er fand es ausgesetzt. Dieser Brief, und den ich bald
nach dem Empfang erhalten, war von dem König selbst geschrieben,
als ganz beständich. Sintklaas aber, gleich auf dem zweiten Tage, br.
sonderlich auf die Legten entgegengedrungen, so dass er nicht mehr an Holzen
als König's. Dieser Brief ist verschwunden, und das schlimmste Gescheff, welches
Sonne' und anderer haben in die Augenfallen legten, selma' gegeben.

PLATE XIII.—FACSIMILE OF A LETTER FROM JOHANN GOTTLIEB
FICHTE TO JULIUS EDUARD HITZIG (1780-1849). WRITTEN
TOWARD THE END OF THE YEAR 1813.

Großherz' Louys' riu Lionbraut, wie andern. Aber der Herr auf
Pferd im Lederhose meinte, auf die Feuerwagenfahrt aufzurückend und den
Kriegstag vor dem Jagdschloss zu verbringen, oder auf dem Jagd-Donauflug zu gehen,
wofür man das Schiff mit Leinen zu ziehen habe. Dazu wurde sich anderseits
unter den Horden auch Aufschiff fahren, nicht Donauflug zu machen, sondern
Jagd zu machen, oder, wenn es auf dem Schiff veranstaltet, obgleich
Leben, oder auf dem Lande.
Zuerst ist, dass man sich der Habsburgerin, und des Herrn ander Pferden zeigen
wollte, und alle jene ehrwürdigsten Leute zu bestimmen, so
weinlich trafen, dass man selbst und gefährliche Freunde gefangen ließen:
deren Vater ist der böse Teufel, und er kann geschnitten werden soll, bis sie sterben,
denn gleichem Leid. Dass man auf dem Land, so sehr es möchtet ander
Pferde, den S. Leopold, und Stephan, und Maximilian, und Josephus und
Sigismund. — Der König ist auf dem Pferd mit Brüderlich aufgerufen:
wolle Gott danken, dass es möglich! gewiss fertiggestellt werden; es sollte end
am Ende der jungen Pferde noch ein kleiner, aber bei jenseitig gleichwertiger
Länge und Stärke, Bilden, auf dem Bilden, und so weiter
auf dem Lande. Aber Kirche Pfarrer d. öffentlichen sagten

mir, und werden ich mich gegen niemanden gestellt haben, ob alle die
Fragen, die Sie so offenbaren, Ihnen abgedeckt, da man nun versteht, wenn
man solche, den anderen beziehungsweise. Dies ist dann nicht der Anhänger
der Religion ist der dasselbe Kind, auf dem es weniger Freude ist zu sein.
Durch das Lied von der Freiheit

Leben Sie wohl, und wenn Sie Schriftsteller, geben Sie sich
freiheitlich aus mir.

Ihr Offizier
Friedrich

the yoke of the foreigner (PLATE XIII).¹ Fearful was the spectacle in the city immediately after the battle. Their victory had cost the allies 53,000 dead and wounded; and of the latter many died of hunger, cold, want of care, or from infection. But on the other hand, for Napoleon the blow here received was a repetition of the overthrow in Russia. Besides 300 cannon and 900 transportation wagons, he lost 38,000 dead and wounded, 15,000 prisoners, and left behind more than 15,000 men in hospitals. Schwarzenberg received the highest orders of nobility, Metternich became a prince,

¹ EXPLANATION OF PLATE XIII.

Facsimile of a letter of the end of the year 1813, from Johann Gottlieb Fichte to Julius Eduard Hitzig (1780-1849). Original size. (In the collection of Herr Lessing, in Berlin.)

TRANSCRIPTION.

Ich billige höchstlich Fouqué's Entschluss, den Sie mir melden, werther Freund, bei seiner so sehr angegriffenen Gesundheit seinen Abschied zu nehmen u. sich der Welt zu erhalten.

Früher, als das Ganze den Krieg wohl wünschte, aber nicht eigentlich ihn wollte, weil es kein rechtes Vertrauen zu dem Erfolge hatte, war es die theure Pflicht jedes rechtlichen durch seinen öffentlichen Beitritt die Masse des wirklichen Kriegs-Entschlusses zu verstärken; damals musste jeder sein Leben an dieses Eine, was damals Noth that, setzen. u. Fouqué am allerwenigsten konnte sich ausschliessen u. etwas anderes bedenken ausser diesem Einen; u er that es auch nicht. Dieser Zustand dauerte fort in der Epoche vor dem Waffenstillstande, während des Waffenstillstandes ganz besonders. Seitdem aber, seit unseren glänzenden Siegen, besonders seit dem letzten entscheidenden, fehlt es nicht mehr am Wollen des Krieges: Dieses Ziel ist erreicht, u das sittliche Gewicht, welches Fouqué u andere dafür in die Wagschale legten, hat nun gezogen. Jetzt wird Fouqué ein Lieutenant wie andere. Aber dass er sein Leben im Lazarethe wage, auf die Hoffnung hin, noch einmal mit der Hand tapfer dreinschlagen, oder andere zum tapfer dreinschlagen zu ermahnen, dazu ist sein Leben zu thener. Dazu werden sich andere finden, welche entweder mehr Aussicht haben, dieses Dreinschlagen in guter Gesundheit zu erleben, oder. bei denen es auch nicht soviel verschlägt, ob sie eben leben oder nicht leben.

Erführe ich, dass man sich F. Rath bediente, u dass er an der Leitung irgend bedeutender u allgemein eingreifender Angelegenheiten stände, so würde ich rathe, dass er selbst mit Gefahr seiner Erhaltung bleibe. Denn dazu ist das Leben da, dass es dran gesetzt werden soll, für einen würdigen Zweck nämlich.

Ist dies nicht der Fall, so sehe ich sovieles andere besser, das F. thun kann, u thun wird, wenn er jenes Dienstes entledigt ist. —

Der Krieg ist mit der Schlacht bei Leipzig nicht zu Ende: wolle Gott nicht, dass er es sey! Er muss fortgesetzt werden: er sollte viel verständiger fortgesetzt werden, als er bis jetzt geführt worden, besonders sittlicher, bildend, nicht verbildend, u neuerdings tiefer verwildernd. Alles dieses sieht F. ohne Zweifel sehr gut ein, u er kann es sich zu einem eigenen Geschäft machen, über alle diese Gegenstände öffentlich seinen Rath abzugeben, da man privatim ihm denselben kaum adverlangen wird. Dient er dann nicht besser der öffentl. Angelegenheit des Deutschen Krieges, als ob er mit eigener Hand ein Dutzend Franzosen erlegte?

Leben Sie wohl u wenn Sie Fouqué schreiben, grüssen Sie ihn herzlich von mir

Der Ihrige
FICHTE.

Blücher was appointed field-marshall, and his men baptized him ‘Marshal Vorwärts.’

In the Austrian circles alone there existed but little of this proudly elated feeling. According to the plan of Schwarzenberg and Langenau, the battle of Leipsic was to have been pre-eminently an Austrian victory. Instead of this, it was Austrians that in this victorious battle had waged a fight that was predominately unfortunate; and even the final act, the storming of the city, was accomplished by the Prussians and Russians, and the Emperor Francis entirely neglected even the triumphant entrance into the city. There existed, plainly, sentiments of ill humor, with which were joined the old political interests; and it was this, together with the anxiety felt by Schwarzenberg, which impeded pursuit to such a degree that thereby a very considerable part of the fruit of this glorious victory was lost. In the confusion, bordering on dissolution, in which the beaten army pursued its march, 10,000 horsemen might have sufficed in the level country as far as Weissenfels, to disperse the entire body; and for this very reason Napoleon hastened as much as possible to put his army behind the Saale. The passage at Kösen being occupied by Giulay, he turned his course to Weissenfels. At Freiburg, instead of the bridges burnt by the Austrians, it was necessary to build a temporary structure, over which all hurried in the greatest disorder. York’s vanguard, under Count Henkel, which the day before had freed a column of 4000 prisoners, came too late to prevent the passage. Bertrand, also, crossed the Saale at Naumburg unmolested by Giulay; even Blücher reached Weissenfels too late; and after Napoleon had once struck the great road at Eckartsberg, his escape could no longer be prevented. As soon as, in order to secure for his troops necessary time for recovery, he assumed the appearance of making a stand at Erfurt, Schwarzenberg recoiled apprehensively; and Napoleon obtained an advantage such that he could not be overtaken. And the fact that Blücher on the 25th came suddenly on his rear guard at Hörselberg, and ordered it to be attacked immediately, could not prevent his escape; although it was effected with the loss of exhausted men and of a large quantity of army baggage.

Full of zeal to confirm the new alliance formed by Bavaria, and to introduce that country as a warlike power into the great alliance, General Wrede advanced with 27,000 Bavarians and 25,000 Austrians, for the purpose of barring the way against the fugitives.

But as regards the manner in which this was done, he did small honor to his teacher. He chose his position not in the Thermopylae pass of Gelnhausen, but in the plain of Hanau (October 30), where he found himself at a disadvantage against Napoleon's greatly superior force; for the emperor still had 60,000 men able to fight. Covered by the Lamboye wood, he made ready for the attack, then thrust the enemy in spite of a brave resistance upon the left shore of the Kinzig, and would have handled him still more roughly, if his haste had not been so great to pass over the Rhine. Napoleon escaped across the Rhine with 70,000 men, a great part of whom were diseased with typhus, and incapable of offering resistance. The Emperor Francis was preparing himself for a solemn entry into the city where anciently the emperors were crowned; but Alexander had scarcely observed his purpose when he made haste to go forward at the head of his cavalry, and thus it was that it was not the last Emperor of the German empire, but the czar of the East, who first entered Frankfort.

Seven years had passed, and now, for the first time during that period, Germany was again free as far as the Rhine; yet upon the walls of some fortresses in the rear of the allies the tricolor still waved. The soldiers now cut off in those fortresses amounted to no less than 120,000. To St. Cyr shut up in Dresden, Klenau had accorded, on November 11, a capitulation on the most favorable terms; but this was rejected by the sovereign, and the marshal was obliged to surrender unconditionally his 35,000 men as prisoners of war. In like manner Rapp yielded at Dantzig, after unspeakable hardships. Wittenberg was taken by storm, on January 13, 1814, by Tauenzien, after a severe cannonading. The other strongholds opened their gates one after another; Hamburg alone, Davout defended against Bennigsen with unshaken firmness. In order to cut off his retreat, the crown-prince of Sweden had gone at first to Hanover; but then, without further concerning himself respecting Hamburg, he had turned aside to Schleswig-Holstein, and compelled the Danes, in the peace of Kiel, January 14, 1814, to cede Norway to him. On the approach of winter Davout pitilessly drove 20,000 to 30,000 of the poorest inhabitants out of the city, maintained himself there until after the downfall of Napoleon, then raised the Bourbon flag, and marched unmolested, under its protection, with arms and equipments, to France.

While weeks passed away eventless in the provinces of the Rhine, the campaign had its diplomatic conclusion in the treaties formed

with the remaining princes of the Rhenish confederation. All princes forsaking Napoleon's eagle, with few exceptions, were secured by Metternich without delay in their present possessions, and in "full, unlimited sovereignty." Nevertheless, the greater part of them were not reserved in saying that they forsook Napoleon only unwillingly, and in order not to be involved in his downfall. This defiance was expressed most openly by the despotic King Frederick of Würtemberg, who did not accede to the coalition till the last moment, on November 2, by the treaty of Fulda. While all Germany was rising up against the foreign oppressors, he regarded it as necessary to disarm the population of his country, and to order citizen guards, shooting-companies, etc., to deliver up all the arms in their possession. General Norman and other officers, who had gone over, were cashiered; and by letter he assured the Emperor Napoleon that he had forsaken him only from compulsion, and he looked speedily for the time when he would be in a condition to render him effectual assistance. Even the princes who had been expelled by Napoleon and had now returned, manifested more zeal for the restoration of the old state of things than for the war; and in Hanover the Duke of Cumberland managed the preparations so sluggishly—"from compassion for the country"—that in this campaign the Hanoverians did not reach the scene of action.

This turn of events assigned still narrower bounds to the action of the Central Administration, which never had sought to come fully into operation. At Metternich's request, this authority, from the beginning suspicious in his eyes, had been divested of all political significance (October 21), and confined to the preparation and subsistence of the troops in the conquered districts. Since the returned princes suffered this intervention only when their approval was first obtained, and the Rhenish princes did not brook it at all, there were remaining, therefore, within the circle of its activity, only Erfurt, the grand-duchy of Berg, Frankfort, and Fulda; and to these were to be added, after the commencement of the year 1814, the provinces beyond the Rhine. In these narrowly drawn limits, the Central Administration labored according to its ability, and not without success, for the common welfare, since it rendered the military resources of the other German states serviceable to the general cause, and exacted of them the formation of eight army corps, with a total of 145,000 men, and as many landwehr.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814 IN FRANCE.

THE harmony of the powers had atoned for the evils that formerly resulted from their dissensions. But in proportion as the pressure of the Napoleonic despotism was diminishing, the diversity of interests among the members of the alliance made itself observable and potential. Dread of the growing confusion in the political situation anxiously arrested, even on the threshold of France, the armies that were pressing forward. With real apprehension had Gentz, even before the battle of Leipsic, watched the growth of that spirit which was aroused by the universal opposition to French domination in Germany, and which, especially in Prussia, had increased to such a degree that the war of liberation appeared not unlike a war of liberty, and occasioned in him the most lively apprehension that the downfall of a despotism built upon the Revolution might again lead back to the Revolution. With silent but deep vexation, the Emperor Francis saw himself everywhere thrown into the shade by the brilliant Alexander; and since Metternich was confident of the restoration of the lost Austrian territory, he desired neither too great a diminution of France nor even the fall of Napoleon. This strong desire for an accommodation with Napoleon clouded his vision, otherwise so keen, so that he regarded the proffers delivered by Merveldt as honestly meant. After a confidential interview with the prisoner Lauriston, he had sounded Alexander, on October 21, with regard to a preliminary negotiation, and was much displeased by his evasive reply. The Emperor Francis was much annoyed that he had in vain wished the imprisoned king of Saxony to be committed to his protection, and the remains of the Saxon army to his supreme direction; and the more plainly it was seen to be Alexander's purpose to retain all Poland, and perhaps even to acquire Galicia in addition, the more earnestly did Metternich press for a suspension of operations in order to gain time and space for negotiations and to become the master of events.

But in another place there also existed an influential peace-party.

To General Knesebeck, in recollecting the expedition in Champagne, an invasion of France appeared a foolhardy venture; and the king of Prussia was inclined to adopt his opinion in consideration of the sacrifices which his people had already made. Even the German people at the first had not gone further in their anticipations than the Rhine, and not till the last great victories had they dared to aim at higher objects. Among the Russians, now as formerly, there was a prevailing unwillingness to fight for ostensibly foreign interests; and the crown-prince of Sweden gave earnest warning, from a distance, that one must guard one's self carefully from speaking as a conqueror to France. The opposition to this general peace tendency proceeded from the Silesian headquarters. Blücher raged against the scoundrels who deserved the gallows; and, like him, Gneisenau urged the speediest passage of the Rhine, in order to allow the enemy no time for fresh preparations. The triple line of fortresses on the Belgian frontiers, the bugbear of the other military authorities, caused him no uneasiness; for he knew that to garrison them would weaken Napoleon's army in the field. Blücher was already moving from Giessen on his way to the Rhine. The great council of war, held at Frankfort on November 7, which was attended by Gneisenau, separated without result.

Under these circumstances Metternich thought the indications such that he turned directly to Napoleon with proposals of peace. Through a French diplomatist, St. Aignan, who had become a prisoner, he offered, as inducements for a general peace, to embrace England also, the natural boundaries of France, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; and for these he demanded the unrestricted independence of Germany, Holland, and Italy, and the restoration of the old dynasty in Spain. Should Napoleon accept this basis, then, without suspending military preparations, a congress would immediately be opened of plenipotentiaries from all the powers at war.

Thus occurred the unheard-of,—the conquerors bowed themselves before the conquered. Had Napoleon accepted it, a peace would have been established that would have been most humiliating. Aix-la-Chapelle and Cologne would remain French; the maintenance of Murat in Naples, of Eugene in Upper Italy, was not excluded. But, however strange the shortsightedness which could discern in such a peace anything more than a transient cessation of hostilities, yet it was not so surprising as that Napoleon should reject these conditions, and close his ears to the representations of

Talleyrand, that even a bad peace was still better than the continuation of a war which could not possibly end favorably. His pride deluded him into the opinion that he could impose on the enemy by his preparations, and obtain still better terms. Negotiation was acceptable to him, but only because it would assist in gaining time and in misleading the public opinion of his own country. He therefore accepted the proposed peace congress, appointed Mannheim as the place of meeting, named for his plenipotentiary Caulaincourt, for whom Metternich had especially asked : but with regard to the main question, the acceptance or the non-acceptance of the basis of peace, he took refuge in indefinite and unmeaning expressions.

But this haughty bearing of Napoleon, in connection with his noisy preparations, produced an effect altogether different from that which he contemplated. It strengthened the war-party among the allies. The influence of this party was increased by the arrival of two of the most implacable foes of Napoleon, Stein and Pozzo di Borgo, whose influence upon Alexander was decisive. At length it became well known that a strong peace-party, with Talleyrand and Fouché at its head, existed in France itself; and among its adherents were many who desired the return of the Bourbons. Schwarzenberg agreed with Blücher and Gneisenau in judging that, in view of the question of subsistence for the troops, so great a multitude could not remain for the entire winter on this side of the Rhine. In a great council on December 1, it was determined to wage a winter campaign; but at the same time, to encourage the friends of peace among the French, the allies, in a manifesto of December 2, once more declared and confirmed the terms offered to the Emperor Napoleon, with the explicit statement that they were not carrying on war against France, but only against the supremacy which, to the misfortune of Europe and of France, Napoleon had too long exercised beyond the boundaries of his realm. They desired that France should continue to be great and strong, that she should be prosperous, and therefore pledged to France an enlargement of territory, such as never existed under her kings. Now the supplementary information became current, that Napoleon accepted in general the proposals of the allies, but this was not sincerely meant. Caulaincourt's commission aimed at this only, to keep the allies in suspense, to gain time, to discover Austria's secret purposes, and to watch for an opportunity of kindling dissension among them. But it was too late ; Caulaincourt was turned back at the outposts.

Nevertheless, all December was spent before operations were again resumed; for so much time was required to provide the greatly exhausted troops with necessaries, and to fill up their diminished ranks. Holland, however, was in great part conquered by Bülow before the close of the year. The French fell back upon Nimwegen and Antwerp. Incensed at this, Napoleon recalled General Molitor, who commanded in Holland, and likewise Decaen, his not more fortunate successor. The deceptive quiet on the Rhine led him into the error of thinking that he still had time to throw the élite of his troops upon Holland. He commanded that Breda should be retaken, but Benkendorf defended it with the utmost bravery until he received support. Holland was lost, and the northern bulwark of France was torn from her. Bülow, however, prudently restrained himself, notwithstanding his successes so easily achieved, until the great armies should also be put in motion.

Upon the conclusions at headquarters, Bülow's success had a hastening effect. Out of excessive regard for the frontier of France, covered by strong and numerous fortresses, the army of Bohemia, according to a plan devised by Langenau and approved by Alexander, was to press forward, by way of Switzerland, over the Jura mountains as far as the commanding plateau of Langres. In that direction the army would not only avoid the Vosges, Argonnes, and Ardennes, as well as the difficulty of crossing the Saar, Moselle, and Meuse, but would also be able to form a connection with General Bellegarde, who was operating against the viceroy Eugene for the conquest of Italy, and even establish communication with Wellington, who was advancing across the Pyrenees. Blücher was to lie before Mayence, to watch that fortress, and to cover the Middle Rhine against any possible onset of Napoleon. To this plan Gneisenau made earnest opposition, and of the strategie importance of the plateau of Langres he spoke with the greatest contempt. On his counter-representation the plan met with at least one and a very important alteration, that the Silesian army simultaneously with the main army should pass over the Rhine, and should seek to draw the enemy upon itself, and to hold him fast until the other army should reach that plateau, the water-shed between the Rhine and the Seine, so that then the entrance into France could be effected upon a line extending over five hundred miles, from the Zuyder Zee to Geneva. Apart from the recruits that were following on, there were 275,000 men disposable for this expedition, and of these 84,000 were under Blücher as their general-in-chief.

On December 20 the army of Bohemia, leaving Wittgenstein behind in the plain of the Rhine, began its entrance into Switzerland at Basel, Laufenburg, and Schaffhausen. For the Silesian army Caub was selected as the place where York should cross; since here the island with the Pfalzburg facilitated the construction of bridges, and just here the enemy was not expecting him. For Sacken, on the Neckar, a bridge of boats was constructed, which then was thrown across the river at Mannheim, and after the intrenchments on the opposite side were taken under the eyes of the general and the king of Prussia, the passage was effected without molestation. St. Priest crossed the river at Lahnstein and below Coblenz. On the farther side the three corps of the Silesian army were reunited, and endeavored as rapidly as possible to gain ground; but the excessive fatigue of York's men facilitated the escape of the enemy, and especially foiled the attempt to press him back from the Saar. After restoring the destroyed bridges, the army crossed this river also, and followed on toward the Moselle. Although Blücher, after stationing Lang-eron against Mayence, and St. Priest against the fortresses on the Moselle, numbered only 50,000 men, he still ventured forward as far as Nancy.

To provide resistance to the invasion of an enemy who came to demand satisfaction for so many outrages and indignities, Napoleon had no longer an army. The escaped remnants of troops only filled the hospitals, and infected the conscripts to such a degree that nervous fever appeared to mock all efforts at raising a new army. Of little avail would that prove which Napoleon now did, too late, in order to free himself from the Spanish wars. Having recalled his brother Joseph shortly after the battle of Vittoria, and appointed Soult as governor, he then suffered himself, on December 11, to make a treaty at Valençay with the Prince of Asturias, in which Napoleon acknowledged him on certain conditions as King Ferdinand VII. of Spain, and promised to evacuate the country. The only resource now left to Napoleon was to unchain the nation itself for the conflict. But how could he summon the French people, he who had deprived them of all blessings with the single exception of glory, to fight against a foe who had solemnly declared that he was waging war, not with France, but only against the person of Napoleon? And the predominant majority of that people had only the one desire, for peace. The royalists perceived the coming of their time; and many were misled

by the white scarf, which the allies had adopted as a badge for their diversified bodies of troops, and imagined the reinstatement of the Bourbons to be already a settled matter. In order to deceive the nation, as if he bore no responsibility for the absence of peace, Napoleon opened in person the session of the legislative body on December 19, with the emphatic announcement of his love for peace, which, however, corresponded so little with his acts that he intrusted not to the body itself, but solely to a commission, the examination of transactions relating to the negotiations entertained. But even amid the hitherto slavish and mute state authorities an opposition was arising. On all sides was acknowledged, indeed, the necessity of offering all the resources of the nation for defence, but security was desired also that the war would be conducted only for the independence of the French people and the integrity of their territory. Even among the senators bitter accusations were heard; it were better to draw on themselves the disfavor and anger of the emperor than to sacrifice the welfare of the country. The printing of the report was ordered by a vote of two hundred and twenty-three to thirty-one, and the commission was charged with the preparation of an address to the emperor. But the report was destroyed in the printing-office, the hall of assembly was closed, the council of state was required to declare the report seditious, and the adjournment of the legislative body was decreed; before it separated, however, the emperor ordered it into his presence on January 1, in order to heap upon its members passionate invectives and reproaches. At the moment when the enemy was beginning to tread the soil of France, the separation of the nation from Napoleon had reached a public expression. But Talleyrand said: "This is the beginning of the end."

A few weeks later, and the emperor's own brother-in-law gave the signal for defection. The estrangement of the two dated from the year 1811, from the birth of the king of Rome; from that time Murat was afraid of being deprived of his power. On his unauthorized departure from the army, the dissension became flagrant. Murat already at that time was connecting himself secretly with Metternich and with England. Since returning to his kingdom after the battle of Leipsic, Murat's only purpose was to secure for himself, by adherence to the allies, the entire peninsula, at the least as far as the river Po. But since the allies no longer regarded him as so necessary, their tone was changed. He therefore proffered his co-operation to Napoleon, on the same condition; but the exasperated

emperor, who had small regard for his brother-in-law except on the battlefield, left him without reply — reason sufficient for his signing the treaty presented to him by Austria (January 11), which guaranteed to him not merely the possession of his states, but an addition to them at the expense of the States of the Church. Without waiting for the ratification of the treaty by the Emperor Francis, the Neapolitans advanced northward as far as Bologna. To accomplish the defection of the viceroy Eugene, many pains were taken by the Emperor Alexander and the king of Bavaria; but he only declared steadfastly that he owed everything to the emperor, and would never break faith with him. Threatened in two directions in consequence of Murat's desertion, he withdrew to the Mincio; and while he successfully defended himself there, he at the same time covered the southeastern frontiers of France.

As regards Napoleon's own preparations, they remained far behind his proud words and the numbers granted by the legislative body. After consuming two armies within eighteen months, he was obliged to have recourse to the second levy of the National Guards; that is, to the conscription of the year 1803. The exhausted arsenals supplied nothing more for the equipment of the troops: a large portion of the conscripts endeavored to escape the service by flight or desertion; and the authorities did not venture at all to intrust the National Guard with arms from the small supplies available. Napoleon, having made his first preparation to fight in expectation of an attack from the Lower Rhine, was now obliged to change it. Before this the allies might have had time to break through the thin line with which Maedonald, Marmont, and Victor were guarding the Rhine from Coblenz to the Jura Mountains, and to occupy a considerable part of the enemy's territory, and, furthermore, to interrupt or destroy his preparations. What rendered possible the prolongation of his death-struggle was wholly Schwarzenberg's management of the war, caused partly by timidity and partly by political considerations. The old superstition was still at work at his headquarters, that not the destruction of the hostile army is the main thing, but skilful manoeuvring to master certain strategic points. He was the less intent upon prosecuting a winter campaign with earnest military operations, inasmuch as he had imagined the invasion and the occupation of the plateau of Langres would suffice to force Napoleon to make peace. It was at the foot of the plateau itself that the Bohemian army first encountered

Mortier with 12,000 to 14,000 men, and this small band sufficed to cause fresh delays; and finally it withdrew unmolested from the foe that compassed it about in a manner to suffer no escape, after keeping that foe at bay for not less than five days. Thus a full month was spent in passing over the hundred and twenty miles between Basel and Langres with 40,000 men. These were joined on the right by the crown-prince of Würtemberg and General Wrede, who likewise had lost time by the useless investment of Hüningen and Belfort. Arrived at Langres, Schwarzenberg again allowed himself some days of rest, principally because the plans hitherto adopted extended no farther than this point. It ought to have become clear by this time that the allies had to do with only remnants of the French army, and also how the matter stood with regard to the dreaded war of the people. But when even Knesebeck still saw in a march to Paris only a foolhardy adventure, which must result in ruin, it is scarcely to be wondered at that Schwarzenberg and Langenau declared: "Every advance upon Paris is in the highest degree an unmilitary proceeding." Metternich, in his desire for a speedy peace, rejected everything that could render its attainment more difficult, and consequently received very coolly the urgent representatives of the royalists. Alexander, also, was averse to them. The only persons who regarded the restoration of the Bourbons as the best security for the peace of Europe were the English Tories; but even their representatives, Lords Castlereagh (the minister of foreign affairs, who likewise had come to France), and Castlereagh (the minister of foreign affairs, who likewise had come to France), allowed themselves to be easily turned about by the suggestion of the threatened preponderance of Russia in the future. Even Hardenberg was won over to favor the policy of peace.

That the war did not have this dishonorable issue was due to the Silesian headquarters and to three men — Stein, who, in the downfall of Napoleon, perceived simply the atonement for immeasurable sufferings and outrages and the sole pledge for the peace of Europe; Count Münster, who was controlled by his regard for legitimacy; and Pozzo di Borgo, influenced by family vengeance. They carried along with them the Emperor Alexander, who was furthermore largely impressed by Talleyrand's communications respecting the feeling in Paris. In these days he was particularly exasperated against Metternich, after Laharpe had opened his eyes to the fact that the Austrians, while avowedly controlled only by mil-

itary considerations with regard to the march through Switzerland, had concealed, behind these, secret pretensions and intrigue aiming at the restoration of the old Swiss oligarchy. The deliberations at Langres were spirited and angry : Alexander declared that, in the event of its becoming necessary, he would continue the war alone : and since the king of Prussia promised his assistance, Metternich and the British were compelled to come to the same conclusion. There began now a mutual modification of views, which finally led to the agreement that operations should, indeed, be immediately resumed, but, at the same time, peace negotiations should be opened, and be urged on with all earnestness. Respecting the Frankfort conditions, surely nothing was now to be said ; since for these neither could Alexander's assent be obtained, nor would Castlereagh venture to defend them in parliament. The 'natural' boundaries were no more to be thought of : and it would be necessary to recur to those of 1792. Germany's independence was to be secured by a league of her sovereign princes, and Holland was to be enlarged, and to be under the House of Orange.

Before, however, Schwarzenberg began his new enterprise Blücher ordered the capture of Toul, on January 20, and then took up his line of march for the Aube, being completely covered by the excellent Russian cavalry. On the 27th he was at Brienne.

Napoleon's hope of being able to hinder the enemy in his advance into the interior had proved vain, but he still believed firmly in his ability to defend himself. He committed the government to his consort, for whom he appointed a council. But it was not the allies alone who caused him anxiety. When on the day of his setting out for the army he gathered the members of the government about him, he closed his address to them with these words : "I know well that I have in Paris other enemies besides those against whom I go to fight, and that my absence may leave the field free to them." His wife and son he did not see again. On January 25 he reached Châlons. His preparation was still utterly incomplete. To the 162,000 of the allies he could oppose only 71,000 men. He began his operations by storming St. Dizier, situated at an angle of the river Marne. Here, however, he did not encounter Blücher, as he had expected, but only the weak Russian corps of General Lanskoi, and learned, to his great chagrin, that two days before Blücher had marched onward to Brienne to form a junction with the Bohemian army. At once his resolution was formed to follow

him. Leaving behind only a small detachment to deceive the enemy, he marched, with all his remaining forces, as rapidly as possible, directly through the pathless woods of Der to Brienne.

Schwarzenberg considered Blücher's march to the Aube an unpardonable blunder. In order to persuade him and Gneisenau of the superior merit of the Austrian plans, he sent to them Colonel Steigentesch; who, instead of converting them, was converted. Blücher urged an immediate advance on Paris, and that Napoleon was too weak to prevent this movement. But the fight at St. Dizier had made too deep an impression upon the principal headquarters at Chaumont. Not without a certain satisfaction Schwarzenberg perceived in this misfortune punishment following swiftly after over-haste, and hoped it would bring the war-party to their senses.

Having no suspicion of Napoleon's proximity or the direction he was pursuing (Fig. 59), Blücher was posted at Brienne with 30,000 men. An intercepted order of the emperor to Marshal Mortier gave him the first intimation of the enemy's advance. His situation was very serious, for the main body of the Bohemian army was still several days' march in the rear: but without hesitation he determined to hold his position, and changing front, facing toward Germany, to accept battle. Napoleon ordered Brienne, on January 30, to be attacked on three sides; but when the danger was greatest, Blücher's cavalry, as darkness was approaching, charged upon the enemy, and, overthrowing them, took eight pieces of artillery. Supposing the battle to be over, Blücher was at the château with his suite when suddenly they saw the enemy before them. Fortunately the horses were still standing in the court saddled, and upon them Blücher and Gneisenau escaped into the town below. The enemy was a second time driven from the town; but around the château, the hill, in the courts, and on the stairs, there was a furious fight, man to man: when Ney now repeated the attack, the Russians did, indeed, hold the burning town, but the French the château. Napoleon, who likewise had been twice in danger of being taken prisoner, intended on the next day to renew the action: but Blücher effected a retreat during the night. Napoleon, who had followed him to La Rothière, thought that he was unable to assault such a strong position. He remained there only two days, hoping thereby to make an impression upon the allies in regard to the negotiations about to be opened; but for this design he was destined to pay dearly. He had, indeed, opened the campaign with an apparent victory, but, in




FIG. 59.—Map to illustrate the campaign of 1814.

truth, with a failure, which would have been converted into a disaster, had Blücher been supported by the main army. Even after the battle of Brienne, Schwarzenberg held fast to the opinion that the main stroke was aimed at him, and not knowing what he ought to do, really did nothing. However, at the Emperor Alexander's positive desire, he consented, with the unselfishness which in another situation would have become him admirably, that Blücher, 'in conformity with his own arrangements,' should deliver battle, not, indeed, with the entire combined force, but re-enforced only by the two corps of the crown-prince of Würtemberg and of Giulay. In this manner it occurred that in the battle at La Rothière, Blücher commanded an army in which, besides his staff and guards and 900 horse, there was not a single Prussian.

Napoleon waited, doing nothing, until the storm finally gathered above his head. Since the enemy might attempt, along the Seine or the Marne, to pass forward to Paris, he held himself in readiness, with his 40,000 men, to hasten to the aid either of Mortier, who was at Troyes, or of Maedonald, who was at Châlons. But when Blücher, on the morning of February 1, gave no appearance of drawing off, it became clear to Napoleon that Schwarzenberg must be nearer than he supposed; and he concluded to turn aside by way of Lesmont, and take post behind the river Aube. He was already beginning to move in that direction when Blücher's assault followed, and compelled him to hold his ground. The weather was abominable; in the snow-drifts muskets and cannon were useless, sabres and bayonets had to do the work. In the centre Saeken stormed the village of La Rothière. It is true that on the left wing Giulay was unable to make any important progress; but on the right the crown-prince of Würtemberg took the village of La Gibrie, and defended it in a hot fight. The entire left wing of Napoleon was completely surrounded; yet he gained possession once more of at least half of La Rothière, and here, as the darkness was already coming on, the most furious struggle raged. Had Blücher now at hand the divisions appointed to support him, the French centre would have been completely shattered; but, unfortunately, these were despatched not to him, but to the crown-prince of Würtenberg at La Gibrie, where they came too late. However, the village was again torn from the enemy, who fled in the greatest confusion to Brienne, leaving behind them sixty cannon. On this occasion Napoleon was entirely defeated, and for this the third part of the combined force of the allies had sufficed.

Napoleon spent the night in the greatest anxiety at the château of Brienne. According to the assurance of Marmont, an eye-witness, the breaking up of the army reminded him of the defeats of the preceding campaign, and led him to apprehend the gravest disasters. The road to Paris was covered with soldiers, especially with those of the young guard, who left the army under the pretence of being sick or wounded; others, active and liable to punishment, disappeared from the military routes, and went to remote villages, where they made the inhabitants feed them. Out of one of Marmont's very weak regiments of infantry 267 deserted in one night. Napoleon's own mood was very gloomy, and showed itself in passionate discontent. Deliverance came to him, but it was from his enemies. When for them there was nothing more to do than to drive before them the disintegrated remnants of the beaten army, and at the same time with them to enter Paris, but eighty miles distant, they began to ponder what further should now occur. In a great council of war which was held at the château of Brienne, on the day after the battle, the peace-party raised its voice with redoubled power: just now, after a victory, would be the time in which Napoleon would be found sufficiently yielding to consider an advantageous peace with him. Blücher and Gneisenau, on the contrary, with whom the Emperor Alexander agreed, insisted, now as formerly, and now more than ever, upon the energetic prosecution of the war. In such a division of sentiments, the only solution of the question appeared to be the plan conceived on the part of the Austrians before the battle, and suggested principally by the difficulty of obtaining subsistence: that is, to order the two armies, the Bohemian and the Silesian, to operate separately, as in 1813. Thus would the former be free from the impetuosity of Blücher, and the latter from the hampering influence of the main headquarters: and in case of need the one part would hasten to the support of the other.

Glad to be able to act independently, and to come away out of the reach of the principal headquarters, Blücher marched to the right toward the Marne, where his force, by the addition of the corps of York, Kleist, and Kapzevitch's corps of Russian infantry, was to be re-enforced to number 39,000 men. York meanwhile had met Macdonald on February 3, as he was approaching from the north, had fought him at La Chaussée, and, by taking Vitry and Châlons on the 5th, had hindered the marshal on his march to join Napoleon. Too weak by himself to arrest Macdonald, he intended

to push him back on Blücher, who was advancing from the south; and it seemed possible to cross the road to Paris before him, and to force him with his 12,000 men away from the capital as well as from Napoleon. There resulted from this, however, a division of the Silesian army into three parts. York was following Maedonald on the right bank of the Marne with 18,000 men; Sacken, together with the division of infantry of Olsufjeff, was endeavoring near La Ferté-sous-Jouarre to block the route to Paris, at the junction of the two roads leading from Châlons to Paris, along the Marne; Kleist and Kapzevitch were following farther in the rear. There was no danger attending these operations, while the main army was occupying approximately parallel lines with the Silesian, and by constant pursuit held Napoleon fast. Besides, the left wing of the Silesian army appeared to be more than adequately protected by the wooded and swampy piece of land extending between the Seine and Marne. Blücher had no suspicion of the fact that Schwarzenberg had meantime entirely changed the disposition of his forces, had sent Wittgenstein to Troyes, but had ordered Seslawin to his left wing for the purpose of 'manoeuvring Napoleon away' by a movement upon Sens, so that now there was a wide gap opened between the two armies. Wholly dominated by the desire to secure time for the congress in session at Châtillon, and, with peace in view, more than ever convinced of the superfluous character of an advance upon Paris, Schwarzenberg sought not to bring on, but to avoid, a decision by arms. In order to pass over the thirty miles from Brienne to Troyes, he employed six days, confining himself all this time to reconnoitring in force, then ceased for two days all operations, having sent orders not to cross the Seine. When finally, on Alexander's urgent demand, he assaulted Troyes, he found it vacated, whereupon he put his troops in scattered cantonments.

Napoleon by junction with Mortier had re-established his disordered army to such an extent at Troyes that he was able at least to form plans for continuing his resistance. But in the army and among the people consternation and a feeling of hopelessness prevailed. He hastily continued his retreat to Nogent-sur-Seine, and gave Caulaincourt unrestricted powers to sign a treaty of peace. "I undertake a very difficult and a very useless mission," said the latter to a friend on his departure, "since, what ever we may do, the era of Napoleon is approaching its close, and that of the Bourbons is recommencing." Yet neither this gloomy anticipation, nor the cor-

responding state of affairs as he found them to be at Châtillon, lessened the zeal of this faithful servant. Since Metternich especially desired to protract the negotiations, and to keep the armies inactive, and, on the other hand, Alexander wished to continue the activity of the armies, and to bring negotiations to a close, they both failed of success. Caulaincourt could by no means obtain definite instructions for the negotiation. In vain, on receiving intelligence from La Rothière, did he conjure Napoleon to send them to him. Caulaincourt was required to learn only what special conditions were demanded; and, although he had received unrestricted powers to negotiate, he did not venture to accept conditions which would have rendered the continuance of Napoleon's rule in France impossible. On the contrary, Caulaincourt, on February 9, the very day on which the Emperor Alexander had previously forbidden his plenipotentiaries to take any further part in the deliberations, addressed to Metternich in confidence the inquiry, whether his master, in case the offered conditions were accepted, would immediately obtain a cessation of hostilities; in which event he was prepared to make such a sacrifice. Respecting this proposal a very heated discussion arose among the allies. The ambassadors of all the other powers communicated to the Emperor Alexander a very impressive demand to participate in the congress again; and, in order not to burden himself with the entire responsibility of dissolving the coalition, he so far yielded, on February 14, that on the engagement of certain military securities which France was to furnish, an agreement was reached with regard to a preliminary peace and an armistice; on the other hand, Metternich withdrew his opposition to the continuance of the march upon Paris. But meantime the situation upon the theatre of hostilities had undergone an unexpected transformation, which put an end to all the efforts of Caulaincourt.

At first Napoleon's hopes extended no farther than to detain the allies so long that peace could be meanwhile concluded; but the holding back, and the quiet maintained on the part of his enemy, soon allowed him to consider the possibility of new enterprises. His army, by the accession of 15,000 veterans from Spain, as well as by recruits and national guards, had been raised to 70,000 men. Since Blücher had approached nearest to the capital, Napoleon's first efforts had to be directed against him. But when Marmont, who was informed by reports of the inhabitants with regard to the disconnected character of the enemy's advance, proposed to Napoleon

to make an onset upon the disjointed detaehments of the Silesian army, he not only grasped the thought, but enlarged it into an enterprise as bold as it was skilful. Opposed to Schwarzenberg he left only Victor with 25,000 men; with 30,000 the emperor marched northward. When he learned (February 9) on his march that he was already in Saeken's rear, he changed his route, and, instead of toward Meaux, proceeded toward Sezanne and Champeaubert.

Although they were aware at Blücher's headquarters on the evening of the 8th, by the appearance of some hostile horse, of the threatening danger, yet this did not incline Gneisenau to deviate from the previous arrangement. It still seemed that an offensive movement in the rear by the enemy, who was menaced by the main army of the allies, was not to be imagined. It was not this conclusion which caused the calamity that followed, but the order of the Emperor Alexander, which brought the corps of Kleist to the river Aube, for the purpose of filling up the gap existing between the two armies, while the main army was discontinuing its operations for two days: to make good this loss Blücher was to draw Wintzingerode to his aid. It was also considered suitable to strengthen Kleist by the troops of Kapzevitch and Olsufjeff; in this way it was conceived that Marmont could be separated from Napoleon and perhaps completely cut off. Thus was the very perilous march upon Fère-Champenoise undertaken, which divided the Silesian army into two parts, separated from each other by a long day's march: Sacken and York were marching upon La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, against Maedonald, Kleist and Kapzevitch toward the south, between whom, and opposite Sezanne, only Olsufjeff was stationed with 4000 infantry and twenty-four cannon. The anxiety caused on the 8th with regard to a flank attack had disappeared in the course of the 9th, when suddenly, on the morning of the 10th, intelligence came that Napoleon was at Sezanne. The danger of the scattered army being beaten in detachments was before their eyes. Gneisenau advised to withdraw the entire corps forthwith across the Marne, and there to unite its parts: but the word retreat had an evil sound in the ears of these brave men, and the movement commenced was continued. A few hours afterwards the first blow fell. Although from Sezanne only a solitary cross-road, at this time of year well nigh impassable, led northward to Champeaubert, yet Napoleon made his way upon this. Suddenly Olsufjeff saw a force, which had crossed the Petit Morin, sixfold more numerous than his own, rushing upon his men; he

thought that he must maintain his position. Surrounded on all sides, he collected his troops at Champeaubert; he sought to force a passage with the bayonet, but was captured, and only 1600 men with fifteen cannon made their escape to Blücher.

Thus Napoleon stood with 30,000 men between the two divisions of the Silesian army. Sacken, who was absolutely confident of victory as he came on from La Rothière, immediately on learning of the gathering of the enemy in his rear wheeled about, and thus with his 16,000 men encountered at Montmirail Napoleon's 25,000 (February 11). When York perceived this, he at once comprehended Sacken's dangerous situation; and convinced that retreat across the Marne was unavoidable, he entered into the conflict for this purpose, and protected the retreat at Château-Thierry. Napoleon was even preparing to follow him over the river, when he received information from Marmont of his being attacked by Blücher; and this opened a prospect of a second victorious onset upon the other half of the Silesian army. In full belief that Napoleon was retreating towards Paris, while York and Sacken were still on this side of the Marne, Blücher continued his advance. But in the village of Vauchamps, Zieten, on February 14, met with a superior force of the enemy; his five battalions were made prisoners or cut down. This destruction of his entire vanguard, the simultaneous news of the fate of Sacken and York, and the assurance that he had before him Napoleon in person with his main force, compelled Blücher, though with a heavy heart, to begin a retreat. The immense superiority of the French cavalry, 8000 to 1400, rendered the retreat exceedingly difficult, and caused great loss of men. All depended upon the Prussians reaching in advance of the enemy the forest of Étoge, distant seven miles. Assailed on all sides by artillery and cavalry, they continued their march in admirable order. The cavalry of the enemy had already reached the woods before the Prussians. Then even Blücher despaired; but fortunately the enemy had been unable to bring up artillery over the soaked ground, and the sheltering wood was reached.

The losses, however, were extremely severe. These lasted four days, during which all casualties seem to have conspired with the criminal negligence of the principal headquarters for the destruction of the Silesian army; they lost 15,000 men and 27 cannon. Pursued no farther by the enemy, at Châlons Blücher, on the 16th, was reunited to Sacken and York.

These brilliant successes which the genius of Napoleon had gained

immediately after days that were utterly hopeless had not merely given new wings to his own hopes, but had also acted upon his army and the people with magical power. Wholly opposite was the impression at the principal headquarters. With the dissension prevailing there, which threatened the destruction of the coalition, Schwarzenberg did not discover, in the intelligence that Napoleon had turned with his main force against Blücher, a demand to effect something for the support of his associates, for he considered a few strokes dealt on him as being only a beneficent method of cooling the excessive heat of the war-party. Some more powerful blows, which certain leaders of non-Austrian troops dealt to Marshal Victor, were owing solely to their own impulses. On February 11 the crown-prince of Würtemberg took Sens by storm, the hetman Platoff soon occupied Fontainebleau, and Seslawin's Cossacks made incursions as far as the vicinity of Orleans, and destroyed the canal which brought supplies of provisions from that city to Paris. When Alexander, highly exasperated by the destruction of Olsufjeff, amid vehement reproaches urged an advance over the Seine in order to relieve Blücher, Schwarzenberg so far yielded that he ordered Wittgenstein, Wrede, and the crown-prince of Würtemberg to occupy the three crossings at Nogent, Bray, and Montereau, while the rest of his army remained scattered over an extent of eighty miles from Mery to Fontainebleau. But now came information of the whole extent of the losses suffered by the Silesian army, and this filled him with anxiety for his rear; and he began to retreat, and stationed his main army at Arcis-sur-Aube. There was nothing Napoleon desired more ardently than now to repeat on the Bohemian the manoeuvre which had succeeded with the Silesian army: but the appearance of Cossacks at Fontainebleau, and the withdrawal of the marshals Victor and Oudinot to Nangis, had caused such consternation in Paris, that he was disposed first of all to hasten to Meaux by two forced marches. But as soon as he was convinced that Paris had nothing to fear he began to act upon the offensive against the Bohemian army. After destroying at Nangis, on February 17, Wittgenstein's vanguard under Pahlen, on the 18th he ordered Marshal Victor to take Montereau; but the Würtembergers showed that they had learned something in the school of Napoleon, and made such a brave resistance, that, in anger, he deprived Victor for a time of his command: after the arrival of additional re-enforcements on the part of the French, defeat could not be longer averted.

Schwarzenberg in truth believed, after the congress at Châtillon was opened a second time, that the signing of a treaty of peace was so surely and quickly to come, that he even enjoined a cessation of hostilities on his own army. Reveling in the proudest hopes awakened in his breast by his succession of victories for the last fourteen days, Napoleon learned the conditions set before him with deepest resentment. What were the boundaries of 1792 for him whose power reposed in the universal sway as it sprang from the Revolution? He did not even receive Schwarzenberg's adjutants, and the attitude of the allies filled him with scorn. He withdrew from Caulaincourt full powers, and commanded him to accept no terms without his express approbation. By extravagant descriptions of his victories, and by fabricated outrages which the allies were said to have perpetrated, he sought to incite popular passion. But his calculation led to a great mistake. Military critics have always considered it Napoleon's greatest error that, although well informed as to the feeling at the principal headquarters, he turned away from the Silesian army after the fight at Étages, and directed his course to the Seine. But he now persuaded himself that the Silesian army no longer existed; and, with this opinion, there was a delusion in his mind, both as to the extent of his successes and the character of his adversaries, which sealed his fate. These were as remote as possible from discouragement. Blücher magnanimously avoided all reproaches on account of mistakes in the past. It is true that, in order to put his army again on a war footing, it was necessary to construct it entirely anew, but reinforcements that arrived brought it up again to 53,000 men; and from Schwarzenberg came the demand to join him, ostensibly for the purpose, in conjunction with him, of delivering battle, but in truth to protect himself against all contingencies, and to make an impression upon Napoleon in case of difficulties occurring. The Silesian army, on the 21st, arrived at Mery; and Gneisenau repaired to the principal headquarters at Troyes in order personally to conduct the necessary preparations. Schwarzenberg now had at his disposal over 153,000 men; and it would have been in his power, as it was after La Rothière, to crush his weak enemy; but the waiting for Napoleon's reply caused him painful disquiet, and not merely the Emperor Alexander, but also King Frederick William, assailed him with sharp reproaches. In this perplexity he clung to the bugbear of Augereau's little army, which had pressed back at Lyons the Aus-

trians stationed there to act against it. The thought of a battle was again relinquished, and the retreat was continued over the Seine and Aube.

Meanwhile Blücher, burning with eagerness like his men to make amends for the last defeat, waited for orders to attack. When now instead of this there came the command to retreat, scorn and indignation seized upon them all. Then Colonel von Grolman made the suggestion that Blücher should again separate from the main army, should march by the enemy's left flank to Meaux, draw to himself Bülow and Wintzingerode, and by threatening Paris compel Napoleon to give up his offensive. Blücher assented joyfully, and despatched Grolman himself to the headquarters of the commander-in-chief to obtain approval of the plan. The manoeuvre had its importance, the two sovereigns acceded to the proposal. Schwarzenberg also gave his consent, doubtless supposing that the only question related to the retreat of the Silesian army in another direction. Grolman had just ridden away (February 22), when at length Napoleon's reply to Schwarzenberg's proposal arrived in the shape of a letter to his father-in-law. He indignantly rejected the boundaries of 1792 as dishonorable to himself, and desired the terms of Frankfort, that is, the Rhine frontier, as a condition for granting an armistice. The despondency of those about him had infected the Emperor Alexander also: and it was therefore, in fact, concluded to enter into regular negotiations with reference to the armistice. Schwarzenberg recalled Blücher to the main army, and hastened his retreat to the Rhine, as if all he had to do was to remove, as soon as possible, out of sight of the enemy. The manner of conducting the war thus far had made the worst impression upon the spirit of the troops, and the bands of discipline began to be relaxed. Since Napoleon had refused the preliminary cessation of hostilities, he continued with great energy the pursuit of the army as it withdrew, and inflicted upon it many losses. The negotiations concerning an armistice, opened on the 24th at Lusigny, between Troyes and Vendoeuvre, failed on account of his exorbitant demands. Schwarzenberg now repeated his order to Blücher to direct his march upon Bar-sur-Aube: but this came too late.

For Grolman had scarcely delivered the permission for separate operations when in the mind of Gneisenau the decision was firmly established to withdraw now and forever the Silesian army from Austrian influence. Hence it came to pass that Schwarzenberg's

- 1) On ne trouvera plus la bataille près de Fleurus sans
ambes
- 2) Blücher soutient que son succès fut
dû à ses deux corps
combinés.
- 3) Blücher soutient que son succès fut
dû à ses deux corps combinés.
- 4) La 3^e Armée fut
seulement battue
Chapourelle par les
Allemands.
- 5) Le résultat de ce combat fut
dépendant des
circonstances.
- 6) Donner à Wrede et Bulow
des ordres en Guerre
générale.
- 7) Donner à Blücher
une liberté dans
ses mouvements,
pourvu qu'il fasse
quelque chose.
Les armées militaires
sont observées.

first order was not received until the 26th: and Blücher was able to reply with a show of reason, that he had advanced too far to comply with it. But already on the day before, a great council of war at Bar-sur-Aube (PLATE XIV.¹) had come to an agreement that Blücher's proposals should receive general assent, and the two corps of Bülow and Wintzingerode, and of necessity also that of the Duke of Weimar, were assigned to him. Schwarzenberg had directed the continuance of the retreat as far as the plateau of Langres. But Alexander considered it necessary expressly to add to this, that in case the retreat should be continued still farther, he should be compelled to recall his troops, and to order them to join the Silesian army. The king of Prussia also did all in his power to convince

1 EXPLANATION OF PLATE XIV.

Facsimile of Emperor Alexander I.'s autographic memorandum of the decisions of the council of war of the allies in Bar-sur-Aube, on February 25, 1814. Original size.

TRANSCRIPTION.

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1) On ne livrera pas la bataille pres de Bar sur Aube | qu'on a donnés à Wintz. et Bülow d'être sous son commandement. |
| 2) Blücher continuera son mouvement séparé | 6) Donner à Wintzingerode et à Bülow des ordres en conséquence. |
| 3) La Gr. Arm. continuera son mouvement par Chaumont sur Langres | 7) Donner à Blücher une latitude dans ses mouvements, pourvu tonte fois qu'une certaine prudence militaire soit observée. |
| 4) La continuation de ce mouvement dépendra des circonstances. | |
| 5) Avertir Blücher des mouvements décidés pour la Grande Armée et des ordres | |

TRANSLATION.

1. We will not give battle near Bar-sur-Aube.
2. Blücher shall continue his separate movement.
3. The main army will continue its movement by Chaumont on Langres.
4. The continuance of this movement will depend on circumstances.
5. To inform Blücher of the movements decided upon by the main army, and of the orders that have been given to Wintzingerode and Bülow to be under his command.
6. To give Wintzingerode and Bülow orders in accordance.
7. To give Blücher a latitude in his movements, provided always that a certain military prudence be observed.

Schwarzenberg that there was no cause for retreating farther, by the representation that Blücher was fully on the march toward the Marne, and that consequently the enemy could follow toward the Aube only with a small force. Wrede received command to hold his position at Bar-sur-Aube. Oudinot, to whom Napoleon had intrusted the pursuit of the main army whilst he himself should follow up Blücher, had time only to prepare for the conflict when



FIG. 60.—Prince William of Prussia, about 1813-15. Original painting by Karl Steuben (1788-1856). (Berlin, Hohenzollern Museum.)

Wittgenstein opened the attack. It was in this battle that the future German emperor, William (Fig. 60), as a prince sixteen years of age, came for the first time under fire. Oudinot defended himself with the greatest bravery, but nevertheless lost the battle. The victory of Wittgenstein would have been more complete and less costly had not Schwarzenberg, by a change of plan, withheld Wrede

and Pahlen from the attack. The victory had indeed no further effect; for the commander-in-chief was pleased to grant his troops immediately another eight days' rest, while he was waiting in inactivity the result of Blücher's operations.

The chief object which the Silesian headquarters were pursuing was this,—to draw off Napoleon from the main army by threatening Paris, and thereby to bring that army to a stand, and prevent its withdrawing, which might have continued until it should even cross the Rhine. This object would be reached most safely if Blücher were to move northward to unite himself with the corps assigned to him, and then with augmented force undertake the march to Paris. But Blücher and Gneisenau moved from the Aube, taking only such troops as they had with them, and confident that connection with those corps would be accomplished on the way. They were not ignorant that by this step, since it left Napoleon in their rear, they might lose their connections with the Rhine before they had opened any with the Netherlands; but success in the enterprise would be decisive. Driving before it the feeble detachments of Marmont and Mortier, the Silesian army approached to within thirty miles of the capital, which by the sudden appearance of Blücher, whom it had regarded as destroyed, was roughly startled out of its rejoicing over recent victories; and then his army proceeded to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, across the Marne, in order to put the river between it and Napoleon, and there await the coming of Bülow and Wintzingerode. Napoleon had profited by his stay in Troyes to re-establish order in his army. As was anticipated, on hearing of Blücher's movement, he immediately hastened, by forced marches, to meet him with one-half of his army, but was unable to overtake him this side of the Marne; and Blücher could consequently continue his march to Soissons, and unite with Bülow and Wintzingerode. On March 4 he stood on the right bank of the Aisne.

But here began a remarkable transformation in the method of conducting the war on the part of the Silesian army. It renounced the main principle of an incessant offensive, by which it had been hitherto so remarkably distinguished from the other allied armies, and now, in its sheltered position, began to await the operations of Napoleon.

This army was in a very critical condition since its recent terrible defeats, by reason of the excessive exertions it had made, and the

impossibility of obtaining regular subsistence in a region of country already completely exhausted, and among a population of hostile sentiments. Together with the physical degeneracy of the troops, such a confusion in morals was introduced, that York once in anger characterized his corps as a band of robbers and himself as their robber captain. The contrast with the well-nourished troops of Bülow was positively startling. But a second consideration was added. It was well known that the insignificant character of the operations of the main army up to this time was occasioned far more by political than by military causes, and men began with justice to reflect whether a consumption of the Prussian combatants were not a result absolutely desired on the part of the Austrians. When a successful peace should be won and the spoils of victory divided, not he who had accomplished the most, but he who at the end had the greatest force at his disposal, might count most securely on the carrying through of his demands. Prussia had hitherto sacrificed herself devotedly; but she had no interest to continue in that manner her sacrifices, merely to hasten the conclusion somewhat, and perhaps, at the conclusion of peace, to be put at a disadvantage in consequence of them. Now also, at the close of the Danish War, the crown-prince of Sweden had appeared on the Rhine, and declared frankly the giving up of the left bank of the Rhine to be inadmissible, and behaved so ambiguously that redoubled prudence seemed to be required. All this combined led to the determination not to act mainly in the way of attack, even to withdraw to Laon if need be, and thus draw Napoleon so much farther north, and open more completely the road to Paris for the main army.

Napoleon, on his side, had formed an utterly incorrect conception of the Silesian army. As he represented it to his own mind, it was in complete disorder, and on a retreat to Belgium, while in truth, Blücher, after effecting a junction with Bülow and Wintzingerode, was at the head of 110,000 of the best and most experienced soldiers. The fall of Soissons prevented Napoleon from following a direct route in pursuit; and in order to make it appear that it was this circumstance alone that enabled the Silesian army to escape utter destruction, he ordered the commandant of the fortress to be sentenced to death by a court-martial. In truth, a new idea was already controlling his plans. Since, in repulsing the first movement against Paris, he had had sufficient experience of the timidity of those conducting the war on the part of the enemy, the opinion be-

came gradually established in his mind that protection of the capital need not form the chief object of his operations, and that even were the way to the city open, his adversaries would not venture so far. The thought occurred to him of marching in an opposite direction from Paris, to obtain re-enforcements from the troops uselessly left behind in the fortresses on the frontier, and to force the allies to retreat by threatening to attack them in the rear. In order to be able to carry this into effect he must first, by dealing a great blow to the Silesian army, render it harmless: but the manner in which he endeavored to effect this object was at once influenced by the idea of marching eastward. While Gneisenau, especially, was expecting to be attacked in front or on his right, Napoleon passed the Aisne farther to the east, above Craonne, threatening Blücher's left wing, incurring the danger, if defeated, of losing his communication with Paris: but if victorious, he would force Blücher to leave the line of retreat towards Belgium, and drive him into the interior of France. Constantly laboring under the error that the enemy was seeking to fly from him, Napoleon thought to get in advance of him at Laon; but since Blücher set great value upon the possession of this place, he sent Bülow to it on March 6, and gave Wintzingerode 10,000 horse, with which he was directed to march at night, and take position at Fétieux, upon the road leading from Laon to Rheims. But this lazy and wilful general did not execute his commission, and thus Napoleon once more escaped destruction. In order to be able to draw the whole army into the position of Laon, Sacken received orders to withdraw, while fighting, from one position to another, while Woronzoff should stand firm at Craonne. After a murderous struggle which cost Napoleon 8000 men, among them Generals Victor and Grouchy who were severely wounded, Blücher retired with his whole army to the position at Laon.

On the evening of this day Napoleon received very unfavorable intelligence from Châtillon, where a decisive change had occurred. From the failure of the negotiations at Lusigny, the Austrian cabinet had learned that the supposition that it was possible to make peace with Napoleon was erroneous. From Austria then proceeded a proposal for the alliance, which the four powers, on March 1, concluded at Chaumont for twenty years: should Napoleon accept the boundaries of 1792, they were prepared to sustain him on his throne; otherwise, the contest against him was to be prosecuted with the utmost energy, and every power pledged itself

to maintain for this purpose an army of 150,000 men. At Châtillon a space of ten days was assigned to Caulaincourt; any further delay in answering their proposals must be treated as a refusal. Once more Caulaincourt conjured his emperor not to thrust from him this final opportunity; but the recent successes obtained over Blücher had made him deaf to the suggestions of reason and moderation. Constantly intrenching himself in the belief that Blücher was flying to Belgium, after a night surprise of Laon had failed he led out his army to attack Blücher. The town, lying upon steep rocks, and encompassed by a crenellated wall, constituted the centre of the position chosen by Blücher. Before the town was a marsh that divided the French army into two parts, so that these were not able to support each other. Running blindly upon so strong a position, occupied by an army of more than double his strength, Napoleon seemed wantonly plucking down ruin upon himself. The emperor commanded the left wing in person, but did not effect much, and besides was awaiting the approach of Marmont on the right wing from the other side of the marsh. In the following night, however, York and Kleist fell upon the marshal at the village of Athis, and scattered his division of the army: all his artillery, valuable army stores, and 2500 prisoners remained in their hands. Were Napoleon now to retreat, after the defeat of his right wing, and the allies attack him, he could not escape very great losses; and should he remain, he must expect to be surrounded and destroyed. He ventured upon the latter course, and endeavored to make good what he lacked in strength by audacity. With astonishment Bülow on the morning of the 10th saw the enemy, not merely prepared to resist, but even proceeding to attack. York and Kleist, who, less than ten miles distant, were already posted obliquely in his rear, received orders to cease pursuing Marmont. If now these two generals, instead of simply returning to the old position, should march, as Grolman proposed, directly into the rear of Napoleon, the emperor with his whole army would be lost and the war ended. York eagerly approved the idea, only he did not venture to take the bold step without permission from the commander-in-chief. But precisely at this moment an obstacle wholly unforeseen intervened. Blücher fell ill. For a substitute no arrangement was made. Langeron, the ranking general, declined, with the suggestion that in Russia the chief of the general staff was in such a case invited to fill the vacancy; but Gneisenau, younger

than all the corps commanders and at bitter enmity with York, did not venture to expect a voluntary acknowledgment of his authority. Therefore Blücher's command was nominally continued, but a great offensive battle could not be fought without a commander-in-chief. For this reason Gneisenau declined the proposal of York, and thereby put it in the power of Napoleon to draw off, unmolested, across the river Aisne. York boiled with rage. The only explanation of this sudden circumspection on the part of Gneisenau, he found in this, that Gneisenau was not willing that he should have the fame of a great success. He laid down his command, declared his wish to leave the army, and took his place in a travelling-carriage. Only this was wanting to make the confusion complete. With smarting eyes Blücher sat down and wrote soothingly to the enraged man. Prince William, the king's brother, addressed a cordial letter to him; and to the universal joy they succeeded in inducing York to come back. The Silesian army did not follow the enemy across the Aisne, but prepared extensive quarters in order to enjoy at last the long desired rest.

Napoleon did not march to Paris, but took advantage of the inactivity of the Silesian army to make a sudden onset towards the east. On March 13 he fell upon the corps of St. Priest, which was giving itself up to careless repose in Rheims, dispersed it, and took from it twenty-two guns. The final decision, however, no longer depended on him, but solely on the conclusions and measures of the allies. On the north of the Aisne the Silesian army lay encamped, on the south of the Seine the army of Bohemia, each more than 100,000 strong: and between them was Napoleon, having all in all some 80,000 men. The review which he held at Rheims of his wearied and badly equipped troops presented anything but an encouraging spectacle. Notwithstanding all this, he was very far removed from acknowledging to himself the helplessness of the situation. A proclamation announced to the French that the emperor was in the act of driving the enemy over the Rhine; in order to enkindle among the people a warfare wilder, more passionate, and vaster than ever, he ordered, under severe penalties for laggards, a levy *en masse* of the National Guard. Caulaincourt, now as formerly without definite instructions, accomplished at Châtillon all that was possible for man, in order, on the termination of the prescribed interval of time, to avert at least the complete rupture of the negotiations, and succeeded in having granted to him on the 13th thirty-six

hours additional for presenting a counter-proposal; but since he had no desire, by offering concessions which Napoleon looked upon as dishonorable, to make a scapegoat of himself, his demands were pitched so high that they were unceremoniously rejected. On the 19th the plenipotentiaries declared their powers to have expired, and the congress came to an end on the very day when Napoleon authorized Caulaincourt to assent to the frontier of 1792. But his duplicity no longer availed; it was too late.

And in this manner the circle within which the imperial sway existed was narrowing, and with it the extent of his resources, almost from one day to another. On the side of Spain the conqueror of Vittoria had gained a footing in France itself; and Soult, reduced in strength by the detachments sent to the main army, could no longer cope with him. The action at Orthez, on February 27, compelled him to hasten his retreat; all Guienne was given up to Wellington. In Italy Eugene maintained himself at Verona with difficulty; in the Netherlands Carnot was still defending Antwerp alone. In view of the great timidity of the Austrian headquarters, Angereau, although he had only 27,000 men, might have rendered important service by marching from the Rhone and pressing vigorously upon the communications of the allies; but notwithstanding the most urgent summons, he left his emperor to his fate, and his later conduct justified the suspicion that this low-minded and avaricious warrior was already at that time meditating defection.

After Napoleon had put his army at Rheims in effective condition as far as practicable, he ordered Marmont and Mortier back to meet Blücher, and broke up toward the Aube in order to unite with Macdonald, and take Schwarzenberg in the rear. When he arrived at Méry, he made the disagreeable discovery that he had utterly mistaken the position of the Bohemian army, and had dealt a blow in the air. He now counted upon this, at least,—that the army in question would again retreat before him; and such was, indeed, Alexander's purpose, for the affair of St. Priest at Rheims had wholly deprived the sickle-minded czar of his self-command. But at this time Schwarzenberg had completely exchanged parts with him. The political considerations which hitherto had been the cause of his backwardness no longer existed; and he had decided, since the dissolution of the congress at Châtillon without result, that no peace whatever was possible with Napoleon. Consequently Austria also was now desirous of expediting the final decision; and this led

Schwarzenberg to assail the approaching enemy. But an attack by this general was so inconceivable to Napoleon, that he was disposed to see in the movements of the enemy nothing but preparations to protect his continued retreat; and although Sébastien assured him of the contrary, he persisted in this same delusion, which had just now blinded him with regard to the army of Silesia, and boldly dashed at an adversary of far superior force. The engagement at Arcis-sur-Aube, which thus occurred on March 20, took a course altogether similar to the recent actions with the latter army. Since Schwarzenberg feared to put in his full force, Napoleon on this day had to contend only with Wrede, against whom he fought with the greatest valor, but without decisive result. His resistance so impressed Schwarzenberg that he decided not to be the attacking party on the next day, but to await attack. Napoleon was the more confident in his error until, with his own eyes, he saw the whole hostile army prepared for his reception, and now was obliged to think of retiring speedily; and this Schwarzenberg suffered him to effect without molestation. He then resolved to execute the plan which even previously to the battle of Craonne had been hovering before him, to march into the rear of the allies, to throw himself upon their communications, to draw to himself the garrisons of the different fortresses, and to stir up a war of the people in the eastern departments. The marshals received orders to join his movement; but only Macdonald succeeded in participating, and in the attempt he lost twenty-three guns.

For, although he continued to be ill and unable to mount his horse, Blücher, as soon as Napoleon's march had commenced, also broke camp, and moved southward in order to fall upon his rear in the event of his making an attempt upon Schwarzenberg. On the 23d their advanced troops came together; both armies had therefore completed their union once more, but in this instance in Napoleon's rear. It was a fortunate circumstance that Tettenborn's Cossacks intercepted a letter from Napoleon to his consort, which contained information concerning his most recent plans. The first impression of this surprising information was alarming to those at headquarters; but they were soon persuaded that it was no longer possible to overtake Napoleon; that consequently they must sacrifice the roads connecting them with the Rhine, with all their supplies on those roads; but in order to have a line of retreat upon Belgium, they determined first of all to complete their junction with the army of

Silesia. Since, fortunately, the Emperor Francis for his safety betook himself to Dijon, the paralyzing influence of diplomacy upon the conduct of the war was thus terminated, and bolder counsels gained the upper hand. Now the plan of marching promptly upon Paris, stripped of its defenders, was urged with success. In order to lead Napoleon to believe that, as he wished, the allies were following him, Wintzingerode was sent after him with some horse; and to him it was intrusted to make as much noise as possible, and everywhere to prepare quarters for the sovereigns. The certainty that they were now marching towards Paris aroused among the troops, from the highest to the lowest, the greatest enthusiasm.

When Marmont and Mortier saw the Silesian army before them, they turned toward the south in order, if possible still, to reach the emperor; but here the Bohemian army forced them to turn about. At the same time two divisions recently levied, about eight thousand men, under General Paethod, who were escorting to the emperor an important train of ammunition and provisions, met the line of march of the Silesian army. Paethod endeavored by sacrificing his train to press through Fère-Champenoise; but here he ran into the hands of Russian horsemen. As he had refused the capitulation offered by the king of Prussia, a terrible slaughter ensued, until at last the remnant that survived surrendered. The marshals, whom the proximity of the cannonading had led to hope that the emperor was near, were compelled to begin a retreat upon Sezanne, and were glad to have escaped absolute destruction. Surrounded by Zieten and Katzeler on one side, on the other by York and Kleist, they again escaped toward the south, but lost nearly all their artillery.

The way to Paris (Fig. 61) lay open before the victors. As the city was destitute of all preparations for defence, the advanced troops of the Silesian army might still have easily entered on the 29th. But the involved relations of the coalition demanded a delay, which created for the foe the possibility of a final famous resistance. The Prussians, who stood nearest to the city, seemed to be at least legitimately qualified to act as the first in accomplishing the solemn transaction of occupying the place. This brilliant conclusion Alexander desired to reserve for himself. Even King Frederick William was not willing that his army should be represented before the elegant Parisians by the ragged and wild-looking troops of Blücher. When York led his corps before him, the king suddenly turned away, with the words: "They seem to be very wretched, dirty folk!"

But while the Silesian army were directed to turn to the right, in order to leave the way to the solemnity of the entrance open to the Russo-Prussian guards and grenadiers, Marmont and Mortier gained time, by hurrying on with forced marches, to take possession of the heights on the north and east of the city. Although their force was no more than 24,000 men, the defenders offered a stubborn resistance (March 30). The Prussian guards were obliged to suffer fearfully under the enemy's fire until other troops attacked on the




FIG. 61.—Paris.

right and left. Following the example of the Empress Maria Louisa and her son, King Joseph also, with the greater part of the ministers and high functionaries, now took to flight. As the only means of saving the remainder of the troops, Marmont offered to negotiate with reference to a surrender. A truce was granted, but Langeron did not allow it to prevent his storming Montmartre. A deep emotion seized the hearts of the victors. As it were, a halo shone about the face of Gneisenau when, from Montmartre, in the evening light, he surveyed the vanquished city at his feet, the prize of such measureless efforts.

It was far in the night when the articles of capitulation were settled, in pursuance of which Paris was to be evacuated at seven o'clock in the morning, all munitions of war given up, the National Guard disarmed, and the city committed to the magnanimity of the victors.

On the morning of March 31 Alexander and Frederick William made their entry into Paris. A proclamation addressed to the population by the sovereign breathed nothing but reconciliation and mildness. In the better quarters of the city they were received with loud rejoicings. White insignia were displayed by many, and the rabble prepared to haul down the statue of the emperor from the column of Vendôme. (PLATE XV.)

Meantime Napoleon, operating in the rear of the allied armies, made a rich prize of every kind of war material. But the ease with which on the 26th, at St. Dizier, he drove back and across the Marne Wintzingerode's swarms of horse, and the evidence of prisoners, disabused him of the opinion that by his surprising manoeuvre he was drawing after him the enemy's main army. Consternation at this sudden destruction of all his plans paralyzed his power of decision, ordinarily so ready and rapid. Irrevocable hours were lost in a council of war, which he called together, entirely contrary to his custom. He decided finally to go round the enemy in a wide circuit in order to reach Paris on the left bank of the Seine; and by this route a timely arrival was not possible. He announced to the capital by a courier his arrival as at hand; he sent to the Emperor Francis at Dijon the declaration that he accepted all the conditions; the marshals should endeavor by making known this fact to arrest the march of Schwarzenberg. After a few hours' rest at Troyes, he proceeded with the utmost haste; but it was all over, and he was obliged to turn about, nothing having been accomplished.

Notwithstanding all expostulations of his confidants, Napoleon had believed that, in a case of necessity, he might venture to give up Paris; and now the utter hollowness of this error was shown. The attachment of the French people he had never possessed; and when the humbled capital heartlessly turned its back upon him, the country, thirsting for peace, without a will of its own, followed, as was its wont, the example of Paris. It was Talleyrand who gave the decisive turn to the circumstances now occurring in France. Ever since the battle of Leipsic he had regarded the cause of Napoleon as lost, and he was not the man to suffer himself to be buried

PLATE XV.



Entrance of the Allies into Paris, March 31, 1814.

History of All Nations, Vol. XVII., page 325

From a copper-plate engraving by F. Jugel; original drawing by L. Wolf (1772-1832).

amid the ruins of a government that was breaking in pieces. Foreseeing the necessity of giving a new head to the country, he desired to be the one to decide who should be the ruler, and under what form of government. Consequently, after the battle of Montereau, he had privately sent de Vitrolles to Châtillon, and to the headquarters at Troyes, in order to ascertain positively the purposes of the allies, and to commend to them the cause of the Bourbons. On the very day of the entrance of the allies into Paris he was present at a council of the sovereigns and their statesmen, in which he had little difficulty in persuading them that the succession of Napoleon II. under a regency was a matter of impossibility, and that the only thing then remaining was the Bourbons. On his advice the allies issued the declaration, that neither with Napoleon nor with any member of his family would they negotiate, while they promised at the same time to respect the integrity of old France as it existed under her legitimate kings. This was decisive for the restoration of the Bourbons.

Crafty as Talleyrand was, he knew how to select out of the existing system itself the instruments of its destruction, without delivering the country over unconditionally to a dynasty which might easily have been impelled into the paths of a fatal reaction. He took care, therefore, that the proclamation should have this supplement: the allies would recognize and guarantee the constitution which the French nation should give to itself, and invite the senate for this purpose to indicate a provisional government which should conduct the administration of affairs, and elaborate a constitution adapted to the French people. Napoleon Bonaparte and his family were deprived of the French throne, and the people and the army released from their oaths of allegiance to the same. The legislative body and the other functionaries of state gave their assent, and the provisional government commended to the people a return under the paternal government of the Bourbons. Four days had passed, and the people were as if separated by years from the imperial government. Stocks went up rapidly; and the most furious democrats, not excluding the murderers of the king, vied in zeal with the warmest adherents of the empire to secure a place in the favor of the new potentates. Indeed the next day witnessed the outburst of royalist enthusiasm, and everywhere the name of Henry IV. was heard. The Royalists saw in Alexander the restorer of legitimacy; the constitutionalists the pledge of a limited monarchy; the ad-

herents of the sovereignty of the people were astonished at the powerful sovereign, who proclaimed the right of nations to choose a government for themselves: philosophers and philanthropists with rapture heard from his mouth the principles of humanity, toleration, and moderation, the commonplaces of 1789; and flatterers were delighted with his susceptibility to even the most fulsome adulations. The only power that might have checked this current was the army; but the formidable instrument with which Napoleon had subjugated half Europe broke in his hand. The first example of defection was Marmont. The brave defender of Paris did not long withstand the representations of Talleyrand, the appeal to his love of country, to the bugbear of a civil war, and the promise of personal advantages. He only made the condition, that the 10,000 men whom he still had with him should be treated as friends, and that to the emperor, should he fall into the hands of the allies, life and a certain measure of freedom should be granted. Around Napoleon at Fontainebleau 50,000 men had gathered by degrees, but completely exhausted and unfit for action. The younger officers would have been inclined to continue the struggle; but the marshals and older generals were opposed, and were unwilling to sacrifice the welfare of the country to the obstinacy of an individual. On April 4 Napoleon executed his abdication in favor of his son, and despatched Maedonald, Ney, and Caulaincourt with it to the allies in Paris. At Essonne they met with Marmont, who was thrown into great perplexity, after what had happened, by the emperor's proposal that he should join them; but he gave over the command of his troops to Souham, and accompanied the commissioners. He took great pains to win over Alexander to the maintenance of the dynasty of Napoleon; and the czar was wavering, when it happened that Souham and his co-generals, from fear of Napoleon's anger, evacuated their position, and led their troops across the Seine to Versailles. This defection deprived Napoleon of his only possibility of offering armed resistance. His individual abdication was pronounced insufficient. On April 6 the senate had prepared a constitution, which created a monarchy with two chambers, and delivered the throne to Louis XVIII., on condition of his acceptance of the constitution.

Without dignity the death-struggle of the empire occurred at Fontainebleau. Napoleon was obliged to yield the second time. Every one felt himself released from duty to him, and hastened to quit the sinking ship. The emperor's brothers, also, left the country.




FIG. 62.—Parting of Napoleon from his Guard in Fontainebleau. (Versailles, Historical Gallery.)

Maria Louisa, who had refused to go with them, allowed herself to be conducted with her son to her father.

By the Treaty of Fontainebleau, April 11, Napoleon relinquished for himself and his family all the thrones that he possessed, but retained for life the title of emperor and the island of Elba, as a sovereign principality, with a yearly income of 2,000,000 francs, to be paid to him by France. Of his guard he was allowed to take with him 400 volunteers. To his consort and her direct descendants were assigned the duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla. The princes of the imperial family likewise received appanages, and remained in possession of their private property. The Viceroy Eugene, who had dismissed his French soldiers, and had given up to Austria the Italian army and the fortresses, obtained a suitable provision outside of Italy. Not till the 13th did Napoleon prevail upon himself to subscribe to these conditions. Accompanied by the commissioners of the four powers, as well as by General Bertrand, one of the few that were true to him, he left Fontainebleau on the 20th (Fig. 62). Beyond Lyons, and especially from Avignon to Fréjus, the place of embarkation, the bearing of the royalist population became so threatening that the emperor, filled with pitiable fear of death, disguised himself first as a courier with a great white cockade in his hat, and afterwards in an Austrian uniform.

Still without knowledge of that which was occurring at Fontainebleau, Marshal Soult decided to make a stand against Wellington's vastly superior army, but was defeated at Toulouse on April 10, after a twelve hours' battle, and forced to evacuate the city. Augereau, who had retreated behind the Rhone, and then concluded a truce, raised 'the true French banner.'

Upon Talleyrand's invitation, the Count of Artois came to Paris to assume the provisional government in the place of the king, his brother, who was detained by sickness in England. But he did not condescend to acknowledge the constitution till after very positive pressure on the part of Alexander, whereupon he was appointed lieutenant-general of the kingdom. The white cockade, notwithstanding all remonstrances, came into the place of the tricolor. The assiduity with which adherents flocked to the royal cause from all sides authorized the government to exercise a comprehensive toleration. In the eyes of all, the return of the Bourbons was equivalent to a pledge of peace, the lightening of taxes, and the revival of com-

merce, industry, and agriculture. But the number of *émigrés* also increased; and they came back with the ideas, and even the outward appearance, of men of the ancient régime, and thought that the condition of things previous to 1789 was to be restored. It is true that Louis XVIII. himself did not share the disinclination of his brother and his adherents to a free constitution, but his unbounded Bourbon pride could not suffer that his sovereignty should be impaired by the institutions recently introduced. On his recovery he repaired to France, and issued a declaration in which he declined to accept the constitution, simply because it bore the marks of haste; but stipulated that, in conformity with its principles, he would prepare a new compact in conjunction with the senate and the legislative body. On May 3 the paralytic old man made his public entry into Paris; on June 4 the new constitution was brought to life.

Consideration for the re-established dynasty aided in obtaining the mild conditions of peace prescribed in the Treaty of Paris, signed on May 30. In this Talleyrand was able, with extraordinary skill, to protect the interests of his country. France obtained, not merely the boundaries of 1792, but several pieces of territory on the north-eastern frontier, with Saarbrücken and Givet; and in addition Mülhausen, and Montbéliard, formerly belonging to Würtemberg, Avignon and Venaissin, Chambéry, and a part of Savoy. It is true this was not the increase to the amount of a million of souls which the French were bold enough to demand. Still, it was a space of 3700 square miles, and contained 450,000 inhabitants. While these arrangements went far beyond that which the victors had at the beginning ventured to ask, yet the hopes of the German patriots to regain Strasburg and Alsace were buried; and in return for all the misery which revolutionary and Napoleonic France had brought upon Europe, and especially upon Germany, the latter experienced nothing but misplaced generosity. A Germany which could lay down demands did not exist; and Prussia was neither in a situation to present them for Germany, nor to sustain those presented against the opposition of others. It was decided to put aside wholly the imposition of a war-tax, not even to obtain indemnity for the frightful exactions of 1808, or for the war-expenditure of 1812. Of remaining regulations which were necessary in order to readjust the disorganized world, the Treaty of Paris contained only the little respecting which the powers were able to come to an agreement: for example, the freedom of navigating the Rhine to its mouth for all

the states bordering upon that river. England obtained as compensation for twenty years of warfare her maritime conquests, Malta, Tobago, St. Lucia, Isle of France (Mauritius), and Rodriguez. Upon the Continent her success was twofold,—an enlargement of Hanover, and the erection of a state on the northern boundary of France strong enough to raise a dam against the inundations of the power of France. For the latter purpose Holland was placed under the sovereignty of the house of Orange, and to it an increase of territory was assured. Switzerland retained its independence, and received the bishopric of Basel, together with the valley of the Friek, formerly belonging to Austria. Italy was to consist of sovereign states, with the exception of the Austrian portion extending to the Ticino and Lago Maggiore. Genoa was united to the kingdom of Sardinia; the States of the Church, by the pope's return to Rome, were already re-established. When, on the other hand, territorial indemnifications for Prussia were to be brought forward, as the territorial and treaty relations of the rest of Germany were to undergo arrangement, these questions were still in complete suspension. After Hardenberg had in a paper laid the demands of Prussia before her allies, Metternich, who was not disposed to consent either to the extension of Prussian territory over the Moselle, or to the annexation of Saxony to Prussia, concluded a treaty with Wrede, on June 3, as quietly as possible, which promised to Bavaria Mayence, the utmost amount of territory that could be obtained on the left bank of the Rhine, the Baden Palatinate, and land enough to unite this with the main body of Bavaria. Hardenberg having neglected to make the acknowledgment of the Prussian claims a condition of his agreeing to arrangements with regard to territory desired by England in the Netherlands, and by Austria in Italy, it soon appeared that they had not come to a settlement at Paris. These questions consequently were postponed till the general congress, which was to be convened within two months.

Before the sovereigns left Paris they fulfilled an obligation of gratitude by bestowing rewards and marks of distinction upon the men who chiefly had aided in bringing the war to a happy termination. Blücher, who, recovered from his illness, had enjoyed with youthful freshness the frivolous ways of Paris, was made prince of Wahlstatt. Hardenberg also received the title of prince. On York, Kleist, Bülow, and Tauenzien was conferred the rank of counts. Stein remained without reward. The favors which Alexander prof-

ferred were declined, and none were offered by Prussia. Then followed an invitation from the prince-regent of England to Alexander and Frederick William to visit that country, accompanied by their princes, marshals, and statesmen. By a succession of splendid festivities and acts of popular homage, the English nation plainly demonstrated their joy that the victory on the Continent had conquered for them the most advantageous peace ever concluded by England. More than all others, Blücher was overwhelmed with marks of distinction, with honors and popular rejoicings. Very soon, however, the host regretted having invited these illustrious guests. The narrow-hearted and thoroughly immoral prince, whose only attraction was a superficial and empty elegance of manner, felt himself deeply injured by the public sympathy expressed on the part of his subjects toward the brilliant czar; while he himself, from fear of being insulted by the populace, dared not venture to show himself in the streets. The antipathy between him and Alexander was reciprocal. But Metternich and Talleyrand saw this rising estrangement with heartfelt delight, for in consequence of it England could the more easily be induced to join with Austria and France.

CHAPTER VII.

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA AND THE HUNDRED DAYS.

IT agreed with the leadership which Austria had held during the war that Vienna should be chosen as the seat of the congress. Those who had participated in the war gradually assembled there after September. Alexander and Frederick William appeared personally, attended by their statesmen. Russia was represented by Nesselrode, Prince Rasumowski, and Count Stakelberg; Prussia by Hardenberg and Wilhelm von Humboldt; England by Lord Castlereagh and his brother, Lord Stewart; Austria by Metternich, supported by Wessenberg; France by Talleyrand and a German renegade, von Dalberg. Besides these high personages there were also the kings of Denmark, Bavaria, and Würtemberg, and a vast swarm of other German princees, mediatised and secularized, representatives of knights of the empire and of various corporations, solicitors, and complainants, who all were present to urge their reinstatement in rights. It would have required the most indefatigable diligence and the most candid disposition, in order rightly to arrange this immense mass of great and small affairs, and to do exact justice to the interests of all concerned. Instead of this, earnestness and calmness seemed utterly banished from this assembly. As if the question were solely to make up for enjoyments of which they had been deprived, the congress presented the external aspect only of an uninterrupted course of noisy and glittering festivities, which formed the strongest conceivable contrast to the sentiments as well as to the still existing sorrows of the war just ended. The Emperor Francis practised a hospitality which cost his bankrupt dominions 22,000,000 florins. The frivolity of these proceedings was naturally transferred to the negotiations of the diplomatists. "It is now," grumbled Stein, "the day of small things, of mediocre men."

The want of all preceding agreement on the part of the Great Powers with respect to the chief questions to be settled had a yet more perplexing influence upon the course of the negotiations. In the soul of Alexander the glorious termination of the war had

ripened soaring projects. Now should the ancient plans of Peter the Great and Catharine be again taken up, and be brought to a fulfilment. Russia, by pushing her frontier westward until it crossed the Vistula and the Warthe, should be raised to the position of the dominant power in Europe. For the incorporation of the entire duchy of Warsaw with Russia was regarded as settled by the czar himself as well as by his two newest confidants, Prince Adam Czartoryski and Capo d'Istria. Little as these plans were in agreement with the obligations entered into at Reichenbach, according to which a considerable part of the Duchy of Warsaw was to be apportioned to Prussia, yet to this very object Russian machinations had been directed throughout the entire war. Against them, however, there arose on the part of England and Austria a very determined opposition. For while the British Tories regarded themselves as defenders of the ancient rights of the states against the subversive liberalism of the czar, and might not suffer the two German powers to fall into a condition of dependence upon Russia, to Metternich himself it was of vastly greater importance to keep the pressure of Russia at a distance. Still another consideration was added to this in his mind. Were Warsaw to become wholly Russian, the portion to be allotted to Prussia, such that she should again be equal in extent of territory to her possessions in 1805, could only be supplied on German soil; and in this view it was considered settled between Hardenberg and Alexander, that as Russia should have Poland, so Prussia should obtain Saxony. But, on the other hand, it was not for the interest of Austria that at her side there should arise a constitutional kingdom of Poland; nor again, that Prussia, by the incorporation of Saxony, should acquire a decided preponderance in North Germany. Should it be arranged to suit Metternich, Prussia was to be satisfied by the restoration of her Polish territory, and thereby be removed from the frontier of Bohemia and as far as possible thrust out of Germany. This was also entirely in accordance with the view of Count Münster, who by this means would gain in northwestern Germany the necessary space for the expansion of the Guelf kingdom. Thus there arose already in the preliminary conferences at Paris that connection between the Polish and the Saxon question which was to be followed by such momentous consequences. It being impossible to arrive at an understanding with regard to this question, the decision was devolved upon the congress: and thus it happened that representatives met at Vienna, without

having come to an agreement upon one single point. There was no agreement, even as to those who should participate in the deliberations. After the order of business prepared by Wilhelm von Humboldt, which, in accordance with the Treaty of Paris, excluded France, had met with vigorous opposition, a middle course was adopted by general consent which assigned German affairs to a commission composed of the five German royal courts, and all European questions to a second body comprising the representatives of the four allies and the two Bourbon powers, France and Spain.

No one rejoiced more sincerely at the dissension thus manifested than Talleyrand; for it afforded him the best support for the purpose with which he had come to Vienna, of conquering again for his country that equality with the other Great Powers which she had lost by reason of the recent defeats, to deliver her from her isolated situation, and to do away with every stipulation prejudicial to her interests. Talleyrand's instructions, prepared by himself, directed him to prevent Austria from extending her dominion over Italy, and Prussia hers over Germany. Since the incorporation of Saxony with Prussia would have been a step toward the latter result, he was its opponent. On the one hand, safety ought to be obtained for Saxony, and the rights of King Frederick Augustus, a near relative of King Louis XVIII., and the most faithful ally of France; and on the other hand, the Bourbons should be reinstated upon the throne of Naples. The manifold anxieties and wishes of the princes formerly constituting the Confederation of the Rhine put upon him virtually the traditional rôle of France, as protector of the small German principalities against the Prussian or the Austrian endeavor to rule over them. While passing through Munich on his journey, the king of Bavaria had feelingly protested his dependence upon France, saying to him, "I have served France for twenty years, and that is not something to be forgotten." At Vienna, Talleyrand exhibited a confidence that staggered opposers; and thereupon he made it his object to increase the perplexities of others, and he played his part with masterly adroitness. For he regarded himself as being in fact an actor upon the stage, in which performance Count Labrador, the Spanish envoy, figured as his faithful squire. He contested the right of the Great Powers to substitute themselves in the place of all Europe, and desired consequently the participation of all the states in all the negotiations. If France had recognized in advance all the territorial allotments designated by the other powers, this had

referencée only to positive agreements and not to eventual arrangements, and to those with regard to which there was no joint consent before the meeting of the congress, and which in this point of view must be considered as not existing. When the expression "allies" occurred, he made an indignant protest, because peace had put an end to the alliance directed against France. Metternich, who presumably had already a private understanding with him, accepted, with the highest satisfaction, his assurance that France would neither suffer Russia to cross the Vistula nor Prussia to obtain Mayence and Luxemburg. Since Alexander invited him repeatedly to private conferences respecting the Polish question, he himself gave Talleyrand the right to intermeddle also with these matters. Very soon it was found that in the general dissension nothing could be done without France, unless the allies were willing to incur the danger of seeing all the states of the second and third rank flocking to France, and a hegemony becoming again established, like that from which she had been thrown down with such great difficulty. But finally this conclusion was reached of necessity. It was settled that the eight signers of the treaty of Paris should constitute, under Metternich as president, a central committee for the management of the negotiations in general, and that individual questions should be prepared by special committees consisting of representatives of the states particularly concerned. Emboldened by this first result, Talleyrand (Fig. 63) now came forward with the additional demand, easily understood, that all those be received into the congress who before the war were in possession of sovereignty, and were not yet deprived of it. There appeared to be no other means of extrication; while the opening of the congress was deferred till the first of November, in the hope that the issue would be in consonance with the principles of international law, the stipulations of treaties, and the just expectations of contemporaries. The insertion of the words, "principles of international law," had been carried by Talleyrand against the most vehement opposition on the part of the Prussians, who at once perceived that with this there must be declared a recognition of the king of Saxony and a condemnation of Murat.

Thus the question of Saxony continued to be the hinge on which the general perplexity turned. The representatives of England, guided by the wish to see a strong central power established on the Continent, manifested their assent to the cession of Saxony to Prussia, but opposed only the more decidedly the union of Poland



FIG. 63.—Talleyrand, Prince of Benevento. From a copper-plate engraving by Auguste Gaspard Louis Boucher Desnoyers (1779–1857); original painting by François Pascal Gérard (1770–1837).

to Russia. With this view, Castlereagh, on October 11, made to Chancellor Hardenberg the formal declaration that England felt no hesitation, on political or moral grounds, with regard to the annexation of Saxony to Prussia; for Saxony was a conquered country, the king had forfeited his rights through his own fault, and it was necessary to make an example of one of the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine.

Metternich, however, was fixed in the purpose, which was seconded by Talleyrand, that Prussia should neither obtain Saxony nor increase her influence in South Germany. But if both objects could not be reached at the same time, if the choice between two evils were unavoidable, the increase of Russia by means of Poland constantly appeared to him the less of the two, and that of Prussia by the addition of Saxony the greater. With regard to the latter, there could not exist the least doubt that Saxony belonged to the allies by right of conquest, the king, notwithstanding all their invitations, having persisted in continuing to be Napoleon's ally, and finally becoming a prisoner of war. But the fate menacing him was compared with the course pursued toward the other princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, to whom, although their guilt was not less than his, their sovereignty was left without delay. The court of the imprisoned king displayed great activity in enlisting diplomacy and public opinion in favor of his reinstatement in the unimpaired possession of his country, and thus called forth a paper war. Furthermore, from the other second-rate states of Germany, whose dynasties despaired, in the deposition of one of the oldest princely houses, a highly dangerous precedent for themselves, there were lifted up loud voices in defence of innocence, ostensibly menaced by Prussian lust for territory. The long delay in coming to decision gave new zeal to the opponents of annexation, and the people, who had already resigned themselves to the loss of their ancient princely house, were solicited to subscribe petitions for the king's restoration. The Saxon officers at Thielmann's headquarters at Marburg for the same purpose prepared an address to the allied sovereigns. In August the cabinet of Vienna considered the sacrifice of Saxony as regrettable, but for the sake of union with Prussia to be endured as an unavoidable necessity. Now the Emperor Francis, in conversation, lamented the hard act of dashing a prince from his throne.

Hardenberg was beginning to feel more and more the consequences of having neglected in Paris to obtain binding promises

with regard to Prussia's apportionment. One thing conduced to his tranquillity, that the Emperor Alexander had consented, on September 25, to make over to Prussia the administration of Saxony; but King Frederick William had too little confidence in the affair to allow him to venture upon placing his brother William at the head of the Saxon government. Consequently, Prince Repnin, on November 8, placed his functions in the hands of a Prussian government-general consisting of General von Gaudi and the Minister von der Reck, while he gave notice to the authorities and the provinces that the connection of the two peoples would presently be made known in a more solemn manner. Consoling as this sounded, there still remained the weak point in Hardenberg's position, that he held himself to be bound in the interest of Prussia's safety, as truly as were Metternich and Castlereagh, to prevent the absorption of Poland by Russia; and yet he was thrown solely upon the aid of Russia in order to acquire possession of Saxony. He lulled himself in the utterly idle hope that, since he supported England and Austria in their opposition to the Russian desire for aggrandizement, they would, out of gratitude for such aid, assist him in gaining possession of Saxony. Willingly would Metternich yield assent to such co-operation in resisting the menace of a Russian kingdom in Poland, but he was not on that account remotely inclined to allow Saxony to fall into the hands of Prussia. First of all, he strengthened the opposition to Alexander's plans; the emperor openly displayed his bitterness and his contempt for the Austrian minister. Castlereagh, by the unskillfulness with which he offered and undertook to mediate, only poured oil upon the flame. Nevertheless, Metternich had the audacity to seek to tempt Alexander by promising that, if Alexander would aid in preventing Prussia from obtaining Saxony, he would yield in reference to Poland; but his offer was indignantly rejected.

Hardenberg could not hide from himself the discomfort of his situation. He desired from Metternich a plain statement of the purposes of Austria. Amid the most bountiful assurances of Austria's interest in the enlargement of Prussia, Metternich held out the prospect of the formation of a German league, in which each of the two should have the same influence. But this object would be imperilled alike by the claims of Russia upon Poland and by the fate of Saxony. The annexation of Saxony the Emperor Francis would see with regret, and would desire that at least a part of the country lying

upon the Bohemian frontier should be secured to the king of Saxony. If, however, that annexation was inevitable, the emperor would be constrained to condition his consent upon the giving up by Prussia of South Germany as far as the Main, including Mayence, to the influence of Austria.

In this manner were the words "Partition of Saxony" expressed for the first time, and in truth as indicating the wishes of Austria. Yet Hardenberg always failed to perceive that, behind all assurances of friendship on the part of Metternich, there was lurking the struggle against everything that constituted the vital interests of Prussia. To so small a degree had the situation become clear when November 1 was at hand, for which day the solemn opening of the congress was appointed. Yet this, too, continued to be merely a form. The congress as a whole was never called together; the committee assembled only to consider some general questions; negotiations were conducted now as previously by the representatives of the great powers. Among these Talleyrand now lifted up his voice more loudly than ever on behalf of Saxony. Of the secret article in the Treaty of Paris, designed to exclude France from this transaction, nothing more was said. The king of Saxony transmitted to the members of the congress a declaration of his rights, previously approved by Talleyrand and Metternich. As in the times of her deepest shame, Germany, victorious Germany, saw her princes courting the favor of the French minister. But Prussia was in extreme peril of gaining nothing as the fruit of her glorious exertions but confusion, disappointment, and derision.

For a long time had King Frederick William condemned the infatuated policy of his chancellor of state, and foreseen the miserable result, and yet, in his far too considerate way, allowed him to proceed. Now he took hold of the matter. On November 6 he came to an understanding confidentially with the Emperor Alexander: in return for the renewed guaranty of the possession of Saxony, he gave up opposition to the czar's plans respecting Poland. Hardenberg, being summoned, was obliged to record the agreement of the two sovereigns, and received from the king the prohibition to negotiate any further in this matter in connection with Austria and England. When he informed the ministers of these two states of the change which had occurred, they advised him, for the sake of his honor, to take his dismissal; but he did not comply, as he wished to retain in his hand the direction of the business then in progress.

This 'defection' of Prussia from the general resistance to the Russian plans brought distinctly to view the existing latent opposition between the former allies, to Talleyrand's great delight. The British ministry, which saw that the condition in view of which it had consented to the incorporation of Saxony had become inoperative, now changed its tactics. Metternich also, who saw that he was foiled in his hope of playing off Russia and Prussia, the one against the other, and of being able to delude both, felt himself compelled to speak. On November 11, appealing to the general opposition to the annexation of Saxony, he recalled the promise given to Prussia, with the declaration, that a part at least of his territory must remain to the king of Saxony, together with Dresden, the capital, and 500,000 inhabitants. Hardenberg declined the partition, but proffered for the king of Saxony a compensation in Westphalia with 350,000 Catholic subjects.


It was utterly lost labor when Stein, in a paper of this date, undertook to prove that a partition of Saxony would be prejudicial to Prussia as well as to Saxony, and would be without advantage to Austria. For even by means of the partition, by breaking up relations which had grown together firmly, Metternich hoped to plant a thorn in the flesh of Prussia, to create an untenable condition, which sooner or later must of necessity be done away with. In his reply to Hardenberg's cry of distress, he declared the union of all Saxony to Prussia to be simply inadmissible, because that would form an insuperable obstacle to the establishment of a German league of states, the principal states having announced that in such an event they would not co-operate in the attempt. He referred Prussia for her main indemnification to Poland and the Rhine, and to complete it offered only one-fifth part of Saxony. But even this was only a blind. To this new conception Talleyrand gave the highest applause. To speak of that which Prussia was willing to leave to the king of Saxony was an inversion of all ideas of justice and reason. The only question could be, What will the king of Saxony cede to Prussia? With displeasure Hardenberg sent back this illiberal offer, which ran counter to all the declarations hitherto interchanged, and on the part of Prussia made the proffer of an indemnification for the king of Saxony twice as great as the former, upon the left bank of the Rhine, including Coblenz, Bonn, and Treves, so situated that Prussia and France should not touch each other. But Metternich immediately explained that he was decidedly opposed to such an

exposure of the left bank of the Rhine. He now came forward suddenly with the demand that the question should be determined only with the consent of all the great powers, and of the king of Saxony himself,—that is to say, that by adding Talleyrand and a representative of Saxony the majority would be secured for Austria, and the claims of Prussia defeated in advance. Indignant at such violation of promises, Alexander assured the king of Prussia of his most energetic aid, and to the Emperor Francis he declared that with such an untrustworthy man as Metternich he would have no further transactions. A peaceful understanding respecting Saxony grew more doubtful every day. The Grand Duke Constantine now repaired to Poland, in order to place the army upon a war footing. Nevertheless, Talleyrand was quietly convinced that war would not result, since, in truth, no one seriously desired it: but he urged upon King Louis to assume a warlike bearing, which would win allies to France, and intimidate her adversaries. The Bourbons were not disinclined to actual warfare: for the more insecure they felt themselves upon their throne, the more gladly, in order to establish it, would they have brought to France a dower in glory and enlargement of territory. Talleyrand easily won over Castlereagh, after news had arrived that the war of England with the United States of America had been terminated on December 24, by the Treaty of Ghent. From the British minister first there came the formal proposal of a secret alliance between England, Austria, and France; it was subscribed on January 3, 1815. The three parties pledged themselves, in the event of one of them being assailed or menaced in consequence of their just and reasonable overtures, to render mutual support with no less than 150,000 men, and to execute the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, as far as possible, according to their true object and spirit. A secret article declared that Bavaria, Hanover, and the Netherlands, in the case of their not co-operating, should forfeit all right to the benefits which they might claim in virtue of the present treaty.

This treaty, according to its tenor established only for defense, and acceded to by the Netherlands, Sardinia, Bavaria, Hanover, and Hesse-Darmstadt, had, however, war as its aim. The Austrian plan of hostilities was prepared: Schwarzenberg was to advance through Galicia and Moravia toward the Vistula: Wrede against Prussia, through Bohemia and Saxony, which was expected to rise in revolt: in the west co-operation was expected with 100,000 Frenchmen, as

well as soldiers from the Netherlands and England; already troops were beginning to move. Only one step more and the world would have beheld the spectacle of two parties to the great alliance, which had just rescued Europe from subjection to France, falling upon the two others under the leadership of that same France. Nevertheless, to this enormity they were not yet to come. Castlereagh, who was the first to yield to Talleyrand's lures, was also the first to draw back when he remembered that England was expecting from him the restoration of peace, and not the enkindling of a war that was equivalent to the continuation of the Napoleonic policy of conquest. His withdrawal compelled Metternich also to renounce bolder projects, and to strike a gentler chord. Talleyrand was obliged to concede that the war would not take place. He had, however, attained his main object; for now Prussia and Russia so far made advances as to favor his admission into the council of the Great Powers. The five Great Powers at this time composed the real Congress (PLATE XVI.), which thus had required precisely four months to constitute itself. After the Emperor Alexander had already declared himself ready to make some sacrifices in Poland, and Prussia had consented to retaining the king of Saxony, the principal question now related only to the discovery of a suitable boundary-line between Prussia and Saxony. For since the affair of Poland could be regarded as settled, Alexander had become evidently more lukewarm in the support of Prussian claims. The chief difficulty was occasioned by Torgau and Leipsie. The former was finally conceded to Prussia; the latter was saved for Saxony by the commercial jealousy of the English. The boundary-line, as finally drawn, gave to Prussia 9000 square miles of Saxon territory, with 861,400 souls. The king of Saxony still continued to attempt opposition; but the sudden intelligence of Napoleon's escape from Elba spurred the Powers on to adjust the Saxon question without further delay. He was obliged to comply; and the result received on May 18 the form of a treaty of peace between Saxony, Prussia, and Russia. Austria secured the maintenance of an intermediate state, which, while far too weak for a bulwark, yet promised to become a pliable tool in any projects directed against Prussia. The remaining territorial questions were now quickly despatched. The Moselle frontier Metternich suffered to drop; Prussia obtained, on the left bank of the Rhine, Cologne, Coblenz, and the country between the Saar and the Nahe; on the right, the district of Orange,

PLATE XVI.



The Congress of Vienna: a sitting of the Plenipotentiaries of the Eight Powers that participated in the making of the Treaty of Paris.

From a copper-plate engraving by Jean Godefroy; original painting (1819) by J. Isabey 1767-1855.

the duchy of Berg, the small enclosed territory of Königswinter, the duchy of Westphalia, Corvei, Dortmund, and half of Fulda; in the east, West Prussia, the Netze district, Thorn, and a part of Great Poland. A very important acquisition Hardenberg succeeded in making in Pomerania by availing himself of the Scandinavian complications. By the Peace of Kiel, Bernadotte had relinquished Swedish Pomerania to Denmark as compensation for Norway. The Norwegians, however, were opposed to this peace, and had given themselves an independent constitution, and their governor, Prince Christian, as king; but Bernadotte compelled him by force of arms to resign his claims in the treaty made at Moss on August 14. The Norwegians submitted to the personal union with Sweden, pleased to be able to retain at least their democratic constitution. Now, however, Bernadotte refused to surrender Hither Pomerania to Denmark; and by this circumstance Hardenberg profited to cause the Swedish claims to that country to be ceded for a sum of money. Denmark, hard pressed, was obliged to be satisfied with Lautenburg as a settlement, receiving 457 square miles for 1800.

Prussia had been able to obtain only a part of that which she claimed. In comparison with her possessions in 1806 the area was diminished by about 15,000 square miles, and the amount of population by half a million. Instead of the promised rounding off of her territory, it was cut into two large portions, separated from each other by evil-disposed neighbors. But precisely the unfinished shape which foreign jealousy had forced upon this state compelled Prussia, first of all, by blending her interests with those of the remainder of Germany, and also by removal of the intervening states, to obtain the rounded form without which she could not long endure. The severance of the remote Slav districts at the east, the addition of part of Saxony on the south, and her subsequent appointment, against her will, as guardian of the river Rhine, first rendered Prussia, in the proper sense, a German, in truth, the sole German state.

Incomparably better had Austria succeeded with regard to compactness of territory. Relieved of all burdensome outer possessions, she formed with her new or regained acquisitions, — Salzburg, the Tyrol, Vorarlberg, the Inn- and Hausruck-*viertel*, Venetia, and Lombardy, — a body of land having a geographical position compact and strong. But inasmuch as Austria relinquished her territory that projected westward, she relaxed still further her old connection with

Germany. To the kingdom of Bavaria Austria had promised, in compensation for the return of her former possessions, not merely indemnity, but an important enlargement; but this second-rate state, which was so willing to act the part of a great one, had so forfeited the good will of the other powers by her assuming demeanor that they refused to approve the arrangement, and adjudged to Bavaria only Würzburg and Aschaffenburg. Yet at the last moment Austria caused all the districts on both banks of the Rhine, which were still disposable, to be assigned to her. In order that Mayence should not be given either to Prussia or Bavaria, the unlucky alternative was adopted of committing the key of Germany as a confederate fortress to the grand duchy of Hesse. Of less moment were the remaining territorial arrangements of the German states. Weimar, raised to the rank of a grand duchy, received from Prussia the lordship of Blankenhain, Kranichfeld, and several other domains. Especially splendid was the endowment that fell to the house of Orange! It owed this originally to the favor of England, which regarded the enlarged kingdom of the Netherlands as a strong defensive frontier against France. Already an agreement of the allies, made on February 15, 1814, had designated, not merely Belgium, but the old imperial domains on the right of the Meuse, together with Maestricht, Cologne, and Aix-la-Chapelle, for union with the new state. These cessions were, however, not ratified in their full extent. In what related to Italy, the wishes of Metternich were only fulfilled in part. He did not obtain the papal legations for Austria, and only a small part of the Ferrara districts on the left bank of the Po, and also the right of placing garrisons in the castles of Comaechio and Ferrara. He secured a league of Italian princes under the presidency of Austria, and also the exclusion of the Carignan line from the succession to the throne of Sardinia, which was to be turned to good account by the marriage of an Austrian archduke with the king's eldest daughter. On the other hand, Tuscany and Modena came to be again in the collateral line of the House of Austria: Lucca served as a satisfaction for the Bourbons of Parma; Genoa was incorporated into Sardinia; and a free state under British protection was constituted out of the Ionian Isles. Switzerland received back, with an acknowledgment of her permanent neutrality, Valais, Geneva, and Neuchâtel, the latter as a Prussian principality. The fate of Poland was decided by three treaties between the three partition powers signed on April 5. The grand duchy of Warsaw,

with the exception of the part ceded to Prussia, remained Russian. Austria obtained some rectifications of frontiers, as well as the restoration of the circle of Tarnopol. Cracow, which no power envied to the others, became a free state. Russia made a territorial acquisition of 56,000 square miles, with 3,000,000 inhabitants.

The peculiar characteristic of all these territorial arrangements is the disregard of national relationships. Never did this show itself more plainly than as impressed on the shape in which Germany came forth from the deliberations of the Congress of Vienna. Wholly apart from the strips of frontier territory lost on the Meuse, there was more than one German country bound up with foreign states: Schleswig-Holstein with Denmark, while Hanover stood personally united to England, and Luxemburg to the Netherlands. In this perplexity as to what belonged to Germany, and what did not, was to be found indicated one of the hindrances which were opposed to a national development. The War of Liberation had at first, from necessity and from shame of foreign domination, brought out with surprising vigor the up-springing thought of German unity. The Prussian army, when it went into the war, felt itself to be a German army; and in the soldiers returning home there lived the proud consciousness of having gained a German fatherland. The same aim was present to the souls of the best patriots. At the time of the treaties of Teplitz Stein had already addressed a paper to the sovereigns in which he demonstrated the necessity of a national reorganization.—Anström's hegemony over the south, Prussia's over the north, a German parliament, and in the individual states chambers of deputies; thoughts, however, which while scarcely expressed were already rendered impracticable by the treaties concluded with the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine. Moreover, even without the boldness with which these princes defended their unlimited sovereignty, the complete absence of a thoroughly formed public opinion, and the indefinite nature of the urgency for union, would have sufficed to make the creation of a German national state impossible at that time. Powerful as was the rapture of enthusiasm on behalf of German unity, not less marked was the indistinctness of view that prevailed with regard to the form in which it should come into life, and with which the still existing individual states were to be brought into harmony with it. That which was alone attainable under the relations then existing was contained in the stipulation of the Peace of Paris: "Germany shall consist of inde-

pendent states, united by a federal bond." But this language also underwent very different interpretations. The Prussian statesmen, in concurrence with the hopes and wishes of the people, explained the treaty to mean that the different parts of Germany were to be subordinated by means of a constitutional bond to a common central power, and in this manner a true federation of states be established; on the part of Austria no such interpretation found favor. Apart altogether from the restoration of the dignity of emperor, it appeared to the interest of Austria to prevent all connection that should go beyond a purely diplomatic union. The German states, being left in the full possession of their independence and sovereignty, were to be knit to one another, and thus be formed into a kind of body politic merely through mutual treaties for objects of common interest. The uniting of the members of the German nation should consequently take place only in the form in which foreign peoples are united with one another. Metternich was confident that in that event the petty kings of Germany would gladly seek protection from Austria against Prussia. The tendency to nationality was, however, too strong to come forward with such views at the very beginning. To the commission, consisting of the five principal German States, a joint project of a constitution, prepared by Hardenberg, was presented, in which very considerable concessions were made on the part of Prussia to the Austrian point of view; but the deliberation did not advance, principally because Bavaria and Würtemberg endeavored to postpone the decision upon the question of a constitution until the satisfactory adjustment of their claims for territory. The entire work of the constitution seemed to have stopped short. But the smaller states were unwilling to be excluded entirely from the decision. On November 16 twenty-nine petty princes and free cities, to which were subsequently added Baden and the two Hohenzollern states, transmitted a collective note to the two principal powers, in which, in defence of their right to be heard on this occasion, they asked for the proposal of a new plan of a constitution for all the German states, on the basis of equal rights, and a complete representation of all members of the league, and with an emperor at its head. Once more Wilhelm von Humboldt undertook the task of devising a constitution adapted to the national needs, and yet not touching too closely separate dynastic interests. Stein disdained, now as formerly, to set in motion the Russian lever in behalf of his imperial idea. But Metternich found in the assumed importance of

the second-rate states the best means of weakening these proposals more and more, while the imperial idea was finally buried in consequence of the opposition of Prussia. In order not to separate with the business wholly unaccomplished, Austria and Prussia, at the last hour, when all, under the impression of Napoleon's landing, were impatiently urgent for the close of the congress, succeeded in presenting a joint project on the basis of an outline contained in Metternich's instructions, and elaborated by Wessenberg: but this plan, too, found favor neither with the great states nor with the small. And now suddenly Metternich, although, like Prussia, he had hitherto abandoned this view, came forward with the declaration that all German states should be pledged to accede: in no case, however, should compulsion be applied, even indirectly, to German sovereigns. He furthermore rejected the Prussian proposal to settle immediately with those accepting the plan, and with regard to others to leave accession still open to them.

The unanimity proposed by Saxony with regard to all conclusions of the plenum of the general assembly of the league was accepted, at least to the extent that all conclusions respecting fundamental principles, organic regulations, *jura singulorum*, and religious affairs, were to be adopted only by unanimous consent. To each individual state its own diplomacy remained, and the right of contracting alliances except against the league and its members. The question with regard to the form of church relationship was still unsolved. One article only was inserted, which promised to the Catholic church of Germany a general constitution, and to the Evangelicals the maintenance of their rights. Now, on June 5, Metternich announced the accession of Austria to the German Confederation; but only Prussia, Hanover, Luxemburg, and some smaller states complied with his demand to follow this example. Bavaria reserved her decision, to the amazement of those adhering: Luxemburg, like Nassau, subsequently made her accession dependent on the action of the entire body of the German states. The whole league threatened at the last moment to become once more a nonentity. On June 8 Count Rechberg declared Bavaria's willingness to accede on the presumption that the court of justice of the league and the article relating to the Catholic church be laid aside; and in order to bring something to a decision, the former provision was dropped, and the latter article received the enfeebled construction, that the diversity of Christian religious parties should constitute no

ground for a difference in the enjoyment of civil and political rights. In this mutilated shape the act constituting the league was subscribed on June 10, but it was dated back to the eighth.¹ Such still continued to be the effect of the view in pursuance of which the Peace of Westphalia formerly placed the constitution of the realm under the guaranty of France and Sweden, and the Peace of Teschen placed Russia in a similar relation, that now again the closing action of the Congress incorporated the first eleven articles of the Act of Confederation, and thereby they were placed under the collective guaranty of the European powers. Baden and Württemberg did not adhere until after long hesitation, the former on July 26, the latter on the first of September. The completion of this extremely defective work was referred to the diet of the Confederation.

Incomplete and infinitely removed from the desire and longing of the patriots as was this league, which was concluded solely between the governments, and left the German people almost without any mark of union, yet under the given relationships it was all that was attainable; and notwithstanding its incompetency to promote further organic development, it was still a step in advance toward the attainment of a national existence. For so utterly had this become lost during the last centuries that the restored use of the name of Germany in a political sense, and the restriction, even though not the displacement, of foreign influence, must be regarded as an advance and a gain.

Other weighty decisions, by which the Congress of Vienna became the transition point of a new era in international law, relate to the etiquette to be observed between nations, the rank of diplomatic agents, to treaties with respect to commerce, to agreements regarding rivers that belong to several states in common, to the

¹ There were thirty-nine states, members of the league: Austria; the five kingdoms of Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, Württemberg; the electorate of Hesse-Cassel; the grand duchies of Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Saxe-Weimar, Luxemburg, Oldenburg; the duchies of Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Coburg, Saxe-Gotha, Saxe-Hildburghausen, Anhalt-Dessau, Anhalt-Köthen, Anhalt-Bernburg, Nassau, Brunswick, Holstein; the principalities of Hohenzollern-Hechingen, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Reuss of the elder and Reuss of the younger line, Lippe-Detmold and Lippe-Schaumburg-Bückeburg, Waldeck, Liechtenstein; four free cities, Frankfort, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen. Subsequently (in 1817) the landgraviate of Hesse-Homburg was admitted into the league, in acknowledgment of the services performed by the prince in the War of Liberation.

PLATE XVII.



Louis XVIII., King of France.

From a steel engraving (1818) by P. Audonin; original painting (1815) by A. J. Gros.

History of All Nations, Vol. XVII., page 553.

principle, at least, of the abolition of the slave-trade, to measures against the piracy of the Barbary States, etc.

It was the misfortune of the Bourbons, that, having returned in the suite of foreign conquerors, they were by them again placed upon the throne. For however mild the conditions of peace imposed upon France, there was yet no Frenchman who would not look upon the confinement of his country within the old boundaries as an act of crying injustice. This was a formidable weapon for everyone who aimed to bring the dynasty into discredit. But the dynasty was its own worst enemy, in consequence of the prejudices with which it returned home and the mistakes which it committed.

So completely and fundamentally had the Revolution subverted the condition of France, its political and ecclesiastical organization, its legislation and its manner of thinking, its social and its proprietary relations, that only extreme infatuation could have conceived the thought of restoring the ancient régime that preceded 1789. The absolute unacquaintance with the situation, and the utter want of comprehension of the new era, was everywhere combined with the effort to return to the old regulations and usages, even to the court offices, and the etiquette of Versailles. Not the opposition of the other political parties, but its own friends, the emigrés and royalists, who brought back with them from their long exile a passionate eagerness for satisfaction on account of the hardships and losses which they had suffered, were the fate and the ruin of the monarchy. The king, Louis XVIII. (PLATE XVII.), a cold egotist, devoid of elevation of soul, thought too much of his position, restored to him by a decree of fate almost despaired of, to commit himself to the foolish animosity of a party whose weakness he perceived, and through which he saw imperilled the quiet indispensable for him, with his enormous corpulence and his bodily infirmity. He intended to be a constitutional king, and therefore he desired harmony and oblivion. In other respects, he was content; for the delicate attentions with which his favorite, Count de Blaëas, surrounded him, compensated him for the irksome life of a childless widower. Wholly opposite in character was his brother, two years younger, the Count of Artois. As in externals he still continued to be the graceful *élégant* of the court of Versailles, so in his political opinions he still stood back of the year 1789. The new ideas of freedom were regarded by him only as outworn follies. During the emigra-

tion, constantly surrounded solely by extreme royalists, and the centre of all intrigues and plots against the French government, he had adopted a feeling of indifference as to the choice of means; and since he had been appointed lieutenant-general of the kingdom, he had become accustomed to separate his method of action from the king's. He became the head of the ultra-royalist party, pushed forward his favorites everywhere, and intermeddled personally with the government, which in this manner, instead of identifying itself with the nation, continued to be only the representative of an unpopular minority, and exposed itself to the suspicion of having in view the revival of old abuses. Yet there was no systematic opposition; the government created opposition by its own imprudence. The law which it proposed, to restore to the original proprietors such of the national domains as were still unsold, would have been approved without delay by the chamber of deputies, which possessed much of the submissive spirit of the legislative body under Napoleon, had not the reasons assigned for this measure, in glorifying the body of émigrés, excited a storm of indignation, and brought on an angry discussion, which injured the government. The dissolution of the university; the displacement of unacceptable officers, who increased the number of malecontents; the proposed expulsion from the Institute, the sanctuary of the arts and sciences, of all persons compromised under the Revolution or the Empire; the pompous transfer of the supposed remains of the royal pair who had suffered execution, which was made use of to anathematize the Revolution; all this appeared as if designed to stir up hatred and inflame passions. The army, whose position under the emperor had been always and everywhere the first, felt itself most deeply wronged by the parsimonious treatment, by the thrusting into places of command people who had never smelted powder, and by the profusion with which worthless favorites were enrolled in the Legion of Honor. The assiduous endeavor of the government to win over to the royal cause the marshals and generals by the bestowal of the most desirable marks of distinction was frustrated by the haughtiness with which the old hereditary nobility treated the military upstarts. Marshal Soult, indeed, accepted the appointment of minister of war; but the preference which he extended to the émigrés and Vendéans was a badly chosen method of healing the estrangement of his comrades of the army from the reigning dynasty. Wellington recommended his government to hold itself in readiness for a catastrophe any night.

In truth, the elements of a military conspiracy were at work in the highest ranks, aiming at the dethronement of Louis XVIII., and his replacement by the Duke of Orleans; for the duke was, in a measure, the representative of modern ideas within the royal family.

The Bonapartists also lifted up their heads again, without, however, knowing as yet what hope they might have. The salon of Queen Hortense, now Countess of St. Leu, was a centre of disquieting rumors, of systematic calumnies, and of biting sarcasms; the old conspirator Fouché engaged in intrigues. A coalition began to be formed of all who were hostile to the throne. The sultriness of an approaching thunderstorm was resting upon the country, but as yet subversive purposes had no definite object. Assuredly they did not aim at the re-establishment of the empire; for the nation, exhausted by war, was longing for peace.

These proceedings and sentiments were communicated by faithful friends to the exiled emperor, who was fretting upon his island in enforced inactivity. "They have learned nothing and forgotten nothing," he remarked contemptuously of the Bourbons. His burning ambition, his thirst for power and supremacy, hastened his determination to withdraw from a situation intolerable to him, and to stretch forth his hand once more after the sceptre of France. The French government neglected treaty stipulations, and did not make the payments due the dethroned sovereign and his relatives. Moreover, as Napoleon well knew, it was endeavoring to remove him from dangerous proximity. Finally the intelligence received caused him to rely upon the rupture of the European alliance as very soon to occur.

Preparations for the desperate adventure were made with the utmost secrecy. A fortuitous absence of the English commissioner and of the English man-of-war facilitated the execution. On February 26, accompanied by 900 guards, the emperor left the port of Ferrajo, and landed, on March 1, at Cannes, in the Gulf of Juan. The tricolor was immediately unfurled, and proclamations to the nation and to the army were distributed. The beginning promised nothing favorable. An attempt upon Antibes failed. The advance, however, was continued, and March 7 was the decisive day, at Vizille, near Grenoble. Napoleon came upon a battalion sent against him. Entirely alone he stepped toward it. "Soldiers," he exclaimed, "if there is one among you who would kill his general, his emperor, he can do it; here I am." A moment of dead silence; then

an immense outcry, “*Vive l’Empereur!*” and both parties rushed into each other’s arms. With this began the defection of the army, which now increased like an avalanche. The soldiers produced the tricolor cockades which they had carefully preserved and concealed. Colonel Labedoyère led his regiment from Grenoble to the emperor; the remainder of the garrison compelled the surrender of the fortress. The absolute confidence of success manifested by Napoleon as soon as he set foot on French soil was shared also by others. The report that he was in agreement with Murat, with England and Austria, found easy credence with the multitude; and the temperate language to which he gave expression quieted the thoughtful.

The government was completely taken by surprise; the measures adopted displayed its perplexity. Accompanied by the Duke of Orleans and Marshal Macdonald, Artois hastened to Lyons, in order to arrest the advance of the enemy. The chambers were convened, a proclamation declared Napoleon and all adhering to him outlaws, ordered all the authorities to apprehend him, and in the event of his capture to bring him to trial before a court-martial. But while the eyes of the government were wholly directed toward the south, there suddenly broke out at the opposite extremity a conspiracy which was not of a Bonapartist character. On March 8 a messenger from Fouché had brought to Lille instructions to begin operations. On pretense of being summoned to Paris by the minister of war to suppress a rising, the commanding general, Erlon, began to march with the garrison; but on the road he encountered Marshal Mortier, who arrested him, and ordered the troops to turn about. The *Moniteur*, which described his situation as desperate, styled Napoleon the brigand of Elba, the ogre of Corsica, the dastardly murderer of the Duke of Enghien. Moreover, there came to the government from all sides evidences of fidelity, loyal addresses from both chambers and from the most remote parts of the country. These manifestations were by no means merely simulated. But the delusion in which the royalists were thereby lulled was soon, in the presence of a terrible reality, to dwindle away to nothing.

Artois and the Duke of Orleans had met with no friendly reception in Lyons; and the workmen opposed the removal of the bridge over the Rhone, the only one by which Napoleon could penetrate into the interior of France. Upon the first appearance of the emperor’s advance-guard, on March 10, the workmen, together with the soldiers of the garrison, rushed upon the barricades that were constructed

just before, took them away, and in a few moments the two parties formed but one. The princes and Macdonald fled in haste. On the same evening Napoleon made his entry, received by the laboring population with expressions of frantic joy. While the troops continued the march to Paris, he himself remained for three days in Lyons. From Lyons he ordered by fresh decrees the dissolution of the two chambers, the banishment of all emigrés, and the sequestration of the family possessions of the Bourbons. From Lyons to Paris Napoleon's march was but a triumphal procession. Wherever he came, city and country rose, defection of the troops continued, among whom the impulse almost universally proceeded from the men and under-officers. The superior officers suffered themselves to be carried along, and very few attempted resistance. The court placed its hope entirely in Marshal Ney, to whom was intrusted the chief command of the forces drawn together in Franche-Comté. Recollection of the manner in which at Fontainebleau he had forced the emperor to abdicate seemed to raise between the two an insuperable barrier. Ney certainly cherished no thought of treachery; but while incomparable on the battlefield for cool and dauntless valor, in other respects his was an absolutely mediocre character. When he became aware of the excited feeling of his troops, when Napoleon wrote him in a spirit of confidence and affection, inviting the 'Bravest of the Brave' to join again the standard under which he had won so great renown, the weak man did not resist. At Auxerre he placed himself and his army at the emperor's disposal. On March 18, at Troyes, the old guard mutinied, as Oudinot was leading them by forced marches to the defence of the king. The troops of Victor, who was advancing from Mezières, also raised the imperial colors. The great military revolution was accomplished.

In the Tuilleries the return of the princes from Lyons caused dejection and confusion. But the warm protestations of fidelity with which the Chamber of Deputies replied to the discourse of Louis XVIII. at the royal session of the 16th were honorable and sincere; and the friends of civil liberty now gathered about the royal cause, which seemed closely connected with their own. All, however, was frustrated by the exasperation which the follies of the royalists had engendered, by the praetorian spirit of the old imperial army, by the Jacobinism still smouldering in the peasant and working classes, and finally, and not least, by the fact that the French people were habituated to overthrowing the government by violence. Without hav-

ing had time simply for reflection, the country saw itself thrown as by a whirlwind into a state of unwonted anxiety and alarm. And when the troops assembled before Paris also gave indications of following the example of their comrades, Louis XVIII. abandoned the Tuileries on the night of March 20, in such haste that his minister, Blacas, even forgot to take with him different important papers, of a nature to compromise many persons.

At the moment when the troops were breaking out into open mutiny, the populace also rose up with the cry 'Long live the emperor,' and over the Tuileries floated the tricolor again. The multitude that poured forth to meet the emperor impeded the rapidity of his march; but at eight o'clock in the evening he reached the capital, and repaired to the Tuileries. The royal court had hoped at first to remain at Lille, but the revolt of the garrison compelled it to continue its flight across the Belgian frontier. As in the north, so also in the west and south, the royal authority disappeared within a few days. In Bordeaux the Duchess of Angoulême, of whom Napoleon said that she was the only man in the family, vainly sought to maintain the cause of the king.

The triumphal march of Napoleon to Paris appeared to restore its old splendor to the star of his fortune, so long overcast. After he regained possession of the Tuileries changes among officers and generals were multiplied. But this first effect was not of long duration. It was of special moment to change the situation with respect to foreign powers, which was altogether different from that which he at first sought to make men believe. On March 7, through the Austrian consul-general at Genoa, Metternich received the first intelligence of Napoleon's departure. At first it was conjectured that he had some design upon Italy, but on the 11th it was ascertained that he had disembarked in France. Orders were immediately issued to collect the English forces still in the vicinity of the Rhine, and also the Prussian and Austrian troops, and to call a halt on the Russian soldiers who were on their way home. Blücher, instead of the desired discharge, received again the post of commander-in-chief of the Prussian army; Gneisenau made the sacrifice of again becoming the chief of his general staff.

On the 13th the eight powers promulgated an act of outlawry against Napoleon. In consequence of his appearance in France, they declared that Napoleon Bonaparte had placed himself outside the pale of civil and social relations, and, as the foe and destroyer of the

peace of the world, had delivered himself over to public vengeance. At the same time they declared that they would combine all their efforts to protect Europe against an attempt which threatened to plunge the nations again into the distractions and sufferings of the Revolution. On March 25 the four great powers renewed the alliance of Chaumont for the maintenance of the Treaty of Paris against any attempt of Napoleon to destroy the same; each of the powers pledged itself to put 150,000 men into the field and to lay down



FIG. 64. — Seal of Napoleon during the Hundred Days, 1815. From an impression in the British Museum.

arms only after a joint decision, and after attainment of the object. All other powers, and especially the king of France, were invited to co-operate.

The prospect of a new and fearful war against all Europe subdued very perceptibly, on the part of the large peace-loving body of the French nation, the inclination to be pleased with the return of the emperor's sway. But Napoleon (Fig. 64) also contributed his part toward enabling the sentiment of dissatisfaction to prevail more and more. While to outward seeming he only resumed his interrupted rule, yet in truth he found himself occupying a position

altogether changed, and under the pressure of demands that were utterly opposed to his character, his habits, and his recollections. When he first took the reins of government, in the year of 1799, the whole nation, especially the higher classes, sustained him in the mission of reconstructing authority and civil society; but now it was precisely these classes that he inspired with fear and dread, and even those, who, on account of hatred of the Bourbons, had adhered to him, were in favor of his rule only with the condition that he should maintain peace, and govern in a constitutional manner.

The former was made impossible by the declaration of outlawry announced by the powers, and the latter was not in agreement with his nature. He comprehended the necessity of making some concessions; but his delay in giving any security for his change of purpose necessarily confirmed the apprehension of the return of despotism as soon as foreign foes should be once subdued.

Napoleon believed that he was offering a great sacrifice, when, on April 23, he issued an additional act (*acte additionel*) supplementary to the constitution of the empire, by which two chambers were erected; but the effect of this meagre grant was disappointment and indignation. It was by no means his design to give immediate effect to this new measure, and it was only after a vehement resistance that the consent to order the elections forthwith was wrung from him.

But this also did not occur as desired. The 'Champ de Mai' was convened on June 1, at which time the result of the popular vote upon the additional act was to be declared, and Napoleon to be solemnly acknowledged before the nation and before Europe as lawful ruler. It passed off with the customary pomp, coldly, and amid an oppressive feeling. The situation since March 20 had changed greatly to Napoleon's disadvantage. The royalists, with whom the fugitive court at Ghent kept up uninterrupted communication, took courage again; in the Vendée a fresh rising was threatened.

Meantime the thunder-storm which was threatening from without grew darker and was drawing near. A conciliatory letter, addressed on April 4 to the sovereigns, was not received. For a conflict the country was not prepared. The consideration which Napoleon was obliged to observe on all sides deprived him of the dictatorial power of former days; and the necessity of keeping up as long as possible the appearance of maintaining peace prevented him from beginning preparations for war at once. Everything must be

created anew; but the exhausted country, split into parties, and thrown solely upon its own resources, soon touched the limits of its ability. Of the 140,000 conscripts of the year 1815, only 80,000 men were obtained for service; so that it became necessary to have recourse to the national guards, and to form, for garrison duty, as well as for the defence of the frontier, a *garde mobile*, composed of men between twenty and forty years of age. The core of the army was made up from the veterans, returned prisoners of war; but of these 200,000 men, only 60,000 were found under the standards.

On March 31 the four Great Powers had provided for the formation of three immense armies: 340,000 Austrians, Bavarians, and other German contingents, to be commanded by Schwarzenberg on the upper Rhine; under Wellington and Blücher 250,000 Englishmen, Netherlanders, Hanoverians, Prussians, and Saxons were stationed in the Low Countries; and into the intervening space 200,000 Russians were to advance, while by the accession of all the states of the second rank, the number of combatants was raised to nearly one million.

Menaced by such a formidable alliance, Napoleon counted upon a solitary ally; and this one disappeared before the conflict had yet opened. Scarcely had he arrived at the Tuileries, when he gave his brother-in-law of Naples to understand that he relied upon him; and to him he promised, on his own part, powerful assistance. Count Neipperg was on his way from Vienna to pledge to Murat, in the name of the allies, his throne and kingdom, provided he would join them unconditionally. In vain his prudent consort entreated him by a firm adherence to Austria to save his throne. He thought he must anticipate by a sudden and rapid stroke the evil designs of the cabinet, on the one hand, and on the other, the re-establishment of French dominion over Italy. On March 22 he moved, at the head of his army, into the States of the Church, then took possession of Tuscany, and called upon the Italians to fight for the unity and independence of their fatherland. Middle and Upper Italy were greatly excited; but on the whole he failed to find the support upon which he had counted. In the engagements at Tolentino and Macerata, on May 2 and 3, the Italians were utterly defeated by the Austrians under Bianchi. The victors pressed in upon Naples; and Murat, after a vain effort to arouse the people in his behalf by proclaiming the constitution which he had

promised them long before, fled to France. In an adventurous endeavor to reconquer his lost kingdom, Murat, when scarcely landed (October 8) at Pizzo, on the Calabrian coast, was seized, and shot on the 13th by order of a court-martial.

On the other hand, Napoleon was indebted for the advantage of still having more than two months' time for preparation to the deliberation of the Austrian cabinet. Blücher, in the highest degree dissatisfied with the course of diplomatic negotiations at Vienna, had exclaimed, on receiving news of Napoleon's return, "That is the greatest good fortune that could befall Prussia! Now will war begin afresh, and the army will retrieve all the political blunders committed in Vienna!"

Gneisenau hastened before him to the Rhine, in order to make all preparations for the speediest possible commencement of operations. The troops stationed there under Kleist's command were quickly re-enforced, and, in order to unite with Wellington, were pushed forward to occupy Belgian territory, while the Rhine province remained covered only by a weak German corps, just then in the process of formation.

Wellington also was anxious to assume the offensive by May 1, with all his available forces; but Metternich and Schwarzenberg, with Austrian policy and Austrian strategy, dissented. The beginning of the advance was appointed for June 1, that is, after the expected arrival of the Russians, which would render it possible to spare the Austrian combatants. But even this date was afterward still further postponed. Although this plan exposed the Anglo-Prussian army to the danger, at first, of being crushed by Napoleon while the mass of the allied forces were still standing on the right bank of the Rhine, Wellington acquiesced in it with his usual coolness. The higher rose the impatience of Blücher, particularly after Schwarzenberg, in his headquarters at Heidelberg, had come to the conclusion not to open military operations before June 27.

On April 18 Blücher arrived at Liège. Then occurred one of the most afflictive incidents of the war. The Saxon troops, exasperated by the partition of their territory, which caused some of them to remain Saxon, and others to become Prussian, broke out into open mutiny. In vain did Blücher seek to win their confidence by committing his headquarters to their exclusive custody; he escaped their wrath only by a precipitate flight. Such an offence,

a Bruxelles ce 23^{me} bruit
1815

Mon cher Prince Marshal

J'ai reçu hier la Lettre que votre Excellence m'a
enviée le 20^{me} et je me réjouis de faire de ce
que vous y êtes arrivé, et que je dois avoir des
relations à proches avec vous. Les Etats que j'ai
déjà écrit au General Gneisenau vous auront
démontré combien mes sentiments sont d'accord
avec les vôtres; et combien j'apprécie l'honneur
de être en rapport avec la brave et noble
aison votre commandement.

Je n'ai rien de nouveau à vous dire. L'Amende
sur la frontière est toujours à peu près dans le
même état et ces mêmes nombres. Je vous envoie
à Monseigneur le Marshal Prince Blücher

est préférable, dont je vous jure le vœu est
l'infériorité des habitans du pays qui sont dansant
l'opposition à l'insuffisance leurs opinions politiques. Il
y a dans ces derniers jours une augmentation
d'affaires genevoise et de l'état Major à
l'heure actuelle; mais je ne vous pas jués ont
l'intention de rien faire.

On parle au Sénat de République, et a jugé
de ce que c'est que le Peuple et le Pays &
le Peuple ne peuvent se prêter à la partie
se trouvant réunie pour quelque temps. Mais
bien l'assurance suivante un jour ou l'autre; et
je vous affirme mon cher General que rien ne
se sera en tout moment plus agréable que
d'être en l'effort immédiat avec vous.

croix aux troupes de la révolution et
un peu de Wellington

Dans mes dernières lettres de ma part
le blanc Kondrag que je recommande à
vos frères.

on the eve of a campaign, demanded the severest punishment. The Saxons were disarmed and sent home. Seven ringleaders were shot, the dishonored standards of the battalion of guards were burnt.

On May 3 Blücher had an interview with Wellington (PLATE XVIII.¹), at Tirlemont. Since Wellington was positively of the opinion that he was to be attacked first, and since he felt himself constrained, in view of this exigency, both to protect the Bourbon court at Ghent, and not to leave the sea, his base, the support of his army by the Prussians was the only arrangement preconcerted.

As a result of this conference, Blücher brought his army together in closer cantonments on the Meuse. Not until July 1, and then in conjunction with other allies, did the British general propose to move forward to the assault. For, since the reports concerning Napoleon's offensive became more and more silent, he continued altogether in the belief that the emperor, on the whole, was meditating nothing of the kind, but would rather await the attack of the allies on the Aisne. From the total of his army, composed of 40,000 Englishmen, 30,000 Germans, and 25,000 Netherlanders, he detached troops in order to have all points in hand. His advance

¹ EXPLANATION OF PLATE XVII.

Facsimile of a Letter from the Duke of Wellington to Prince Blücher from Brussels, April 23, 1815. Original size. In the collection of Herr Lessing in Berlin.

a Bruxelles le 23 Avril
1815

Mon cher Prince Marechal

J'ai recu hier la lettre que votre Excellence m'a écrit de Liège le 21^{me} et je me rejouis tres fort de ce que vous y êtes arrivé, et que je dois avoir des relations si proches avec vous. Les lettres que j'ai déjà écrit au General Gneisenau vous auront démontre combien mes sentiments sont d'accord avec le vostres, et combien j'apprécie l'honneur d'être en rapport avec la brave Armée Prussienne sous votre commandement.

Je n'ai rien de nouveau à vous écrire. L'ennemi sur la frontière est toujours à peu près dans le même état et les mêmes nombres. Leur mouvement est perpétuel; dont je crois que le but est d'empêcher les Habitants du Pays qui sont généralement Royalistes d'influer leurs opinions politiques. Il y a eu dans les derniers jours une augmentation d'Officiers Généraux et de l'état major à Valenciennes; mais je ne crois pas qu'ils ont l'intention de rien faire.

On parle en haine de République, et à juger de ce que j'entends de Vienne et de Paris je ne serais pas beaucoup surpris si la partie se tenait remise pour quelque temps. Mais nous l'auront sûrement au jour ou l'autre; et je vous assure mon cher General que rien ne me sera en toute occasion plus agréable que d'être en rapport immédiat avec vous.

Croyez moi toujours votre très fidèle et sincère

WELLINGTON.

Vous aurez auprès de vous de ma part le Colonel Harding que je recommande à vos bontés.

posts extended from the sea by Ypres, Tournai, and Mons, as far as Biehe, where he joined on to the Prussians. The latter numbered 117,000 men.

This action on the part of his opponents rendered it possible for Napoleon, being covered by his numerous frontier fortresses, to prepare an attack against any point that might be preferred. If peace could not be maintained, he must anticipate the enemy by an offensive blow, which, when given, might have an incalculable effect in respect to the alliance, whose members had been just now on the point of even assailing one another. Hardly would the Austrians in this event have sought to come to an engagement with the victorious Napoleon in the heart of France. And the far too greatly detached encampments of the Anglo-Prussian army held out to him the probability of victory. His field army consisted of 212,000 men and 344 cannon. The emperor sadly missed Berthier, the old chief of his general staff. Already mentally disordered, Berthier, upon seeing at Bamberg the Russian troops on their march against France, had killed himself by falling from the balcony of the castle. Soult took his place. The emperor was no longer capable of his former bodily exertions; but the plan of his campaign, notwithstanding, showed the great master of the art of war as in his best years. As regards the mode of attack, he chose the same as that with which he had so brilliantly opened his first campaign. As he had then acted toward the Austrians and Sardinians, so he now desired to divide the English and Prussians, and beat them separately. He did not venture, therefore, to assail Wellington's right; for thereby he would have thrown him upon Blücher, and effected the junction which it was his object to prevent; but with all his force he would fall upon the dividing line of both,—the road leading from Brussels to Charleroi. With the loss of this latter point was involved the loss of the only possible place within Belgium where their forces could be united; and nothing would remain but for Wellington to withdraw northward toward Brussels and Antwerp, and Blücher in the direction of Aix-la-Chapelle and Cologne.

For this onset Napoleon collected his army as rapidly as possible at Beaumont, close upon the frontier. The feeling of the soldiers and inferior officers was enthusiastic for the emperor. Toward the leaders of high rank, who within a year had gone over from the emperor to the king, and again from the king to the emperor, general distrust prevailed.

Wellington did not remain in ignorance of the assembling of the French forces on the other side of the frontier, nevertheless he did not consider it desirable to make a counter movement. Should an attack follow, he expected it only on his right wing; and thither, and consequently away from the Prussians, he directed his whole attention. He considered it to be his chief business to secure his communication with England by the way of Antwerp and Ostend, to protect William I. and Louis XVIII., and believed that in any event he had time to collect his army at any menaced point. But still on the morning of June 15, when Napoleon's columns were already in full advance, he held firmly to the opinion that the emperor would remain on the defensive.

In three densely formed columns the French army began its forward movement early on June 15. A Prussian battalion stationed at Thuin was overpowered and dispersed. The Sambre, where no sufficient arrangements had been made to destroy the bridges, was crossed, Charleroi occupied, and by the affairs at Gosselies and Gilly, the Prussian advance guard, composed of Zieten's corps, was pressed back upon Fleurus, from which it retreated behind the Ligne.

The assailants would have gained still greater advantages, if Vandamme had not delayed about three hours in breaking camp. To Marshal Ney, who had just arrived on his summons, the emperor intrusted the command of the left wing, with explicit orders, on the 15th, to take Quatrebras, the point of intersection of the roads from Charleroi to Brussels, and from Namur to Nivelles. But Ney, after forcing the enemy out of Frasnes, contented himself with bivouacking his troops there until further orders.

Although advised that the enemy were pressing on against the Prussians, Wellington ordered no concentration, because he desired first to await intelligence from Mons, from which quarter he continued to expect the principal attack. His army was still scattered from Nivelles to Oudenarde, from Ath to Brussels. Not till the belated intelligence came, which arrived at ten o'clock in the evening, that there was nothing to be apprehended at Mons, and that, on the contrary, the Prussians were probably to be attacked, did he order a somewhat closer concentration of his troops. For the purpose of quieting the inhabitants of Brussels, he repaired to the ball given by the duchess of Richmond, where he remained in excellent spirits, and without showing apprehension of danger, until three o'clock in the morning. Fortunately his orders were in part unexecuted,

and in truth precisely at points which were decisive, since his sub-commanders acted on their own initiative, in accordance with the circumstances. Especially was it of great importance that Prince Bernhard of Weimar, instead of drawing off with his brigade, as ordered, to Nivelles, concluded to defend Quatrebras: and General Perponcher re-enforced him by sending a second brigade from Nivelles. The Prussian headquarters were not disconcerted by the vehement onset. In order not to see his ally, perchance, marching away in the direction of Antwerp, Blücher gave information of his purpose to collect his army at the crossing of the roads at Sombreffe, adding the request to be apprised of Wellington's plans.

Wellington informed Blücher, by General Müffling, who was attached to his headquarters, that on the 16th he would be at Nivelles with his entire force, prepared to support the Prussian army. Blücher could not know that this was a promise which the position of his troops rendered it utterly impossible for the duke to perform. On the other hand, there came late in the evening the bad news, that he could not depend on Bülow's co-operation the following day. An explanation of the true situation of affairs did not reach Bülow, in consequence of a misunderstanding, until early in the morning of the 16th. In the greatest consternation he broke up with all possible haste; but it was no longer in his power, especially in the burning heat, to reach the field of battle.

The task of presenting an entirely accurate description of the events occurring on June 16 and 17 is made very difficult by the fact that Napoleon subsequently misrepresented different circumstances of decisive importance, for the purpose of making it appear that everything, as it came to pass, had been exactly foreseen by him, and that errors were committed by his subordinates alone. In truth, occurrences took place in a manner altogether different from his previously formed intention.

While still at Charleroi, Napoleon was not clear in his own mind against which one of his two adversaries he should turn. This indecision is reflected also in the division of his forces into two unequal parts. Ney, who went in quest of him at night, was dismissed with the reply, that as yet he could receive no orders; they would be sent after him. Brussels was certainly the objective point of his operations; and for that reason he sent thither by the shortest route the most approved of his commanders. He promised to support him with the guard. That he himself, with the larger part of his army,

took the circuitous road by way of Sombreffe, occurred because he could not suffer Blücher to remain disregarded on his right flank, but was obliged at least to press him back. But that he should consequently engage in battle, he did not anticipate. On the contrary, he proceeded upon the supposition that he had surprised the Prussians in their former scattered situation, and that neither Blücher nor Wellington would separately accept battle, but would move northward, in order to accomplish the junction which it was no longer in their power to effect on the line of Namur and Quatrebras. Zieten's retreat confirmed him in this opinion.

This erroneous conception was the cause of his resuming his march, not early in the morning of the 16th, but only in the course of the forenoon. For believing that he had surprised the enemy, and expecting serious resistance neither at Sombreffe nor at Quatrebras, he imagined that he had ample time, and could spare his troops. This delay possibly cost him the campaign. He put no faith even in the supposition which Vandamme communicated to him at Fleurus, that they really had the entire Prussian army before them; and not until after a reconnaissance, undertaken in person, was he convinced that the enemy intended making a stand. He at once decided to attack. However, he still gave himself up to the delusion that the body opposing him was only a weak corps, whose resistance would quickly be overcome. For this reason he directed the main attack to be made by Grouchy upon the left wing of the Prussians, and sent against them also the greater part of his cavalry.

Blücher's right wing occupied the village of Brye, his left, Ligny. The village of St.-Amand, situated on his front, served as a kind of outwork; and the third army corps was posted at Point du Jonr. The field-marshall himself took up his position at the highest point in the vicinity, the windmill on the hill of Bussy, whence he watched the advance of the enemy, and subsequently directed the battle. Here Wellington arrived at one o'clock, accompanied by Müffling, to concert final arrangements with his brother-in-arms. The duke had convinced himself at Quatrebras of the danger of his situation. Only if the Prussians should hold their ground at Sombreffe would he obtain the time requisite for concentrating his widely disposed army. He is not to be cleared of the reproach of having knowingly given Blücher too favorable an account of the position of his army, and of having promised an assistance that he was utterly incapable of bringing. Pursuant to this representation, the only concern of the

Prussians was to maintain their ground until their allies should come up.

As soon as the battle had commenced, at half past two, by Vandamme's assault upon St.-Amand, Napoleon became aware that he had to do, not with a corps, but with an army. This discovery led him to despatch to Ney second instructions very different from the first. Ney was not to receive support; but, on the contrary, it was to be supplied by him. On the Prussian side also, in this battle, purpose and execution were nowhere in complete harmony. The hope had been entertained of uniting the entire Prussian army at Sombreffe on the 16th, but Bülow's whole corps failed to come. Support from Wellington was hoped for till late in the evening, and it did not come. Furthermore, a defensive battle did not suit the character of either Blücher or Gneisenau.

The combatants on each side were nearly equal in number; there were, actually participating in the engagement, 60,500 Prussians, and 61,500 Frenchmen; and inasmuch as Napoleon succeeded in holding Thielmann's entire corps in check with a single division, he thus obtained a numerical superiority. In individual qualities the veterans, who by their defection had devoted themselves life and limb to the emperor, were doubtless superior to the Prussians, especially to those from the recently acquired territories, who shortly before had fought under the French flag. In no other battle had national hatred been so exhibited as now: quarter was given on neither side.

The strife had already fluctuated fearfully for five hours, with as yet no decision. Should Blücher be successful till night in preventing the enemy from breaking through the lines, his object would have been attained by merely holding the battlefield. He had only eight battalions still in reserve, but he did not hesitate to put them also into the fight. He even placed himself at the head of the charging column, which once more wrested St.-Amand from the French. Just as Napoleon ordered the guard, his last reserve, to advance against Ligny, Vandamme suddenly informed him that on his left wing a column of the enemy was advancing out of wood, three miles distant, and appeared to be moving around the French army. The guard instantly received orders to halt. That column, however, was Erlon's corps, from the army of Ney, which had been directed to St.-Amand apparently because of a misunderstanding of orders. Erlon, upon arriving at Villers-Perwin, on the Roman road, received from

Napoleon the most precise order to return to Ney, but in spite of all the eagerness with which he conducted his return march, he was again too late in reaching Quatrebras.

This incident delayed for about an hour the assault of the guard upon Ligny. After the sultry day, a violent storm with pouring rain burst upon the battlefield. In the darkness that came on immediately, the Prussian headquarters regarded the battle as over, when Blücher, as the sky cleared for a moment, suddenly perceived that his line was in danger of being pierced by the enemy. Lützow was wounded and made prisoner, Blücher's horse was wounded and fell, carrying Blücher under him; but his adjutant, von Nostitz, succeeded in lifting the field-marshall upon a horse, and withdrawing him from danger. But as there was no infantry at hand, all attempts of the cavalry to keep back the enemy were ineffectual. The Prussian centre was broken, and all streamed back from Ligny to Brye: but there an end was put to the pursuit.

As Blücher, who, badly bruised and suffering painfully, had been brought to Mellery, could not be found, several officers hastened to Gneisenau for the purpose of receiving orders with regard to the direction to be taken. They found him north of Brye, in the vicinity of the road. Casting an eye upon the map, he decided to "retreat upon Tilly and Wavre." Thus did he break down the bridges behind him, giving up all communication with the Rhine, in order to unite with the English once more, for a joint battle. Without this order there would have been no battle at Waterloo.

That which rendered this heroic determination of Gneisenau possible, was the certainty that Wellington had been able to hold the ground against the assailant at Quatrebras. Ney there realized as little the necessity for haste as had Napoleon at Fleurus. He waited till two o'clock, when he was able to open the attack with 11,600 men against 7000; but the re-enforcements hastening up from the rear and the flanks inclined the preponderance of numbers more and more to the opposite side, until at last, Erlon's corps having failed him, there stood 17,300 French opposed to 34,000 of the troops of Wellington, who at three o'clock came upon the field of battle, and in person assumed the command. Twice did the impetuous charge of the French cavalry fail before the unshaken firmness of the English battalions. Although he had become decidedly inferior in numbers, Ney led the fight during the entire day, and at evening began an orderly retreat. The execution of the order to fall

upon Blücher's rear had become impossible: but, notwithstanding the smallness of his force, Ney had prevented Wellington from sending the least assistance to Blücher, and thus had done all that was demanded of him. Yet Napoleon at St. Helena did not scruple to heap reproaches upon his brave marshal on account of a pretended failure to execute his orders,— but only for the purpose of making another than himself answerable for the miscarriage of the campaign.

The hour of lost time, caused by the appearance of Erlon, was followed by the most disastrous results for Napoleon; had it not been for that, the battle would have been decided before dark, and the direction of the Prussian retreat would not have remained unknown to him. He fell into the error of believing that the Prussians were retreating toward the Rhine. He considered them to be so completely beaten that he was sure nothing further was to be apprehended from them for the present. At last he despatched Grouchy, with 33,000 men, in pursuit of the Prussians, and directed him to proceed toward Gembloux. Napoleon himself now turned to assault Wellington. The duke, upon the notification from Gneisenau of the proposed concentration of the Prussian army, had, upon receiving the inquiry whether he was prepared to attack if Blücher should unite with him, replied that he was going back to encamp at Mont-St.-Jean; and if he should there be supported by one or two Prussian army corps, he would accept battle in the morning. Returning upon the Brussels road, Wellington established his headquarters at Waterloo. His army and Napoleon's were posted at a distance of less than three miles from each other; since it had rained incessantly since two o'clock, they were compelled to pass the night in very wet bivouacs. On the same evening the entire Prussian army stood united at Wavre; and the gray-headed field-marshall gave to Wellington's message the memorable answer: "I will come, not with two army corps, but with my whole army."

Upon a rise of ground (Fig. 65), cut at right angles by the road to Brussels, on the south side of the plateau of Mont-St.-Jean, his rear resting upon the forest of Soigne, Wellington posted his army, consisting of 72,560 men. In front of the right wing, commanded by the Prince of Orange, lay the massive château of Hougomont; in front of the left wing, of which General Picton held command, were the villages of Papelotte and Smohain. His second line was stationed in a depression entirely out of sight of the enemy. The general-in-chief took his position near a tree that stood apart, north

of La Haye-Sainte, from which he could overlook the entire battle-field. A second range of heights, separated from the former by a valley with a flat surface and destitute of bushes and trees, constituted the position occupied by the French army, of equal strength as regards numbers, and formed in three lines; the right wing extended from Frichermont to the farm-house, La Belle-Alliance, on the Brussels road; the left, thence as far as the road to Nivelles. Napoleon was highly delighted when he was convinced in the morning that the enemy was ready to meet him, as he confidently hoped to beat him. At half-past eleven the battle was opened by General Reille with an assault upon the château of Hongomont; he persisted in a long and obstinate struggle, which gradually wasted his entire corps without result. At one o'clock Napoleon was on the point of giving the signal for the main attack when his attention was turned to a dark point on the horizon in the direction of St. Lambert, which, as far as the thick atmosphere suffered an object to be distinguished, appeared to be troops. An adjutant sent out to examine, brought the report that it was Bülow's Prussian corps. "It is well," Napoleon remarked to his suite; "Grouchy is coming there!" But, although he was aware of the danger threatening his right flank, he did nothing further than to direct two divisions of cavalry to take up a position there in the form of a crescent. On the presumption that the three other Prussian corps need not be considered, he sent instructions to Grouchy to destroy Bülow at St. Lambert. Not till three hours later, about four o'clock, did he send Lobau, with two divisions of infantry, to oppose the new enemy. For it was important for him to conceal the arrival of the latter from his troops as long as possible. His calculation turned upon this: to defeat Wellington before the Prussians were able to attack. Should this succeed, the Prussians then, with Napoleon in front and Grouchy in their rear, would be between two fires, and in the most perilous situation.

In consequence of this incident, the main attack did not begin till half-past one o'clock. It was made by Ney with Erlon's corps, upon the centre and left wing of the enemy's position; but it was broken by the fire of the English, delivered at close quarters. Here General Picton fell, and likewise Lord Ponsonby. The attempt to wrest La Haye-Sainte from the Hanoverians met with no greater success. Ney had to repeat, with cavalry, the attempt to force the British centre between La Haye-Sainte and Hongomont. Regardless

of the storm of balls and grape-shot that beat upon them, the horsemen reached the crest of the hill, and threw themselves upon the enemy; but they encountered two lines of the English, Hanoverian, and Brunswick infantry, drawn up in squares. The charge broke upon these powerful columns. Convinced that with cavalry alone nothing could be accomplished, the marshal sent to Napoleon for infantry. "Infantry?" replied the emperor; "where shall I find it? Must I create it?" For the second time Ney had to charge with cavalry upon the English line of artillery; but behind it again stood the battalions, their thinned ranks closed up, firm as a wall. After repeated and finally irregular attacks, the French cavalry fell back exhausted and beaten, down the declivity. However, at this moment the battle was exceedingly unfavorable for Wellington. La Haye-Sainte, after a heroic defence, had fallen at last; and thus the British centre was opened. The duke hastened up with several battalions, and succeeded in closing the gap.

The appearance of the Prussians was already producing its effect; it prevented Napoleon from supporting his columns as they charged with sufficient reserves, which would have transformed the advantages gained into decisive results. But if the Prussians did not reach the battle-field speedily, Wellington's resources threatened to be exhausted in the fearful struggle, and the battle would be lost.

Since the distance from Wavre to the field of battle was only ten miles, it seemed quite possible to appear there in time. But as Bülow was leaving the town delay was caused by a conflagration which broke out in the principal street, and the circuitous march proved to be very difficult. Bottomless roads, intersected by deep ravines, must be traversed; and as the country on both sides of the way was wooded almost everywhere, and furnished no places where it was possible to turn out, the march proceeded very slowly, and in many places men and horses could pass only singly. Cannon were brought through with the greatest difficulty, and the men in advance had often to halt till the detachments could be collected again. About eleven Blücher set out with his staff; and as he expressed it, he would rather be bound upon his horse than miss the battle, notwithstanding all his sufferings. Thielmann's corps remained behind provisionally, either to defend Wavre, or, if this were not necessary, to follow as a rear guard. But although previous difficulties were great, yet the highest point was reached in crossing the Lasne water-course, the rain having changed the valley

of that stream into a complete morass. The cannon sank in it up to the axles of the carriages; and the wearied soldiers were obliged to assist in dragging them out, while the cannonading sounding above their heads, and adviees from Wellington spurred them to make all possible haste. It was a wholly unexpected piece of good fortune, that the wood of Frichermont, which lay directly on the right flank of the French, was found to be unoccupied. In noiseless silence the Prussians were massed behind this wood. Willingly would Blücher have awaited the other troops, but the pressure upon Wellington moved him to give the order at half-past





FIG. 65.—Battlefield of La Belle-Alliance and Wavre.

four to dash forth. At the same time, in his rear, from the direction of Wavre, a cannonading was heard; and intelligence came from Thielmann that he was attacked by a superior force, and was unable to hold the crossing of the river Dyle. Grouchy had discovered, particularly at Gembloux, traces of the Prussians, and endeavored to prevent the march of the Prussians towards Waterloo. He at least held fast their rear-guard. But Gneisenau knew that the decision of the matter lay before and not behind him. He dictated the answer to Thielmann: he should, as far as possible, dispute with the enemy every step of his advance. The general direction indicated to the troops on leaving the wood was the red tile roof of the farm-house, La Belle-Alliance (Fig. 65). Meanwhile Zieten's corps struck out toward Obain.

Napoleon was now already beaten, since almost his whole cavalry, after a second failure to pierce the enemy's line, were practically destroyed; the village of Plancenoit was on the eve of being taken by Bülow, and therewith his line of retreat would fall into the hands of the enemy. It was still in his power, covered by his guards, to commence an orderly retreat; but the maintenance of his throne depended on a victory. Accustomed to decide battles with his guards, he held it as still possible to claim victory to his banners. It was the last throw of a desperate gamester. He decided to turn one half of his guards against Wellington, the other half against Blücher. The situation of the British commander was in the highest degree critical, his losses alarming, and a large part of his artillery unserviceable. Yet he maintained his unshaken calmness. He awaited the columns, which, with Ney at their head, were ascending the height, amid the incessant sounding of the charge. Having reached the top, they saw no enemy at first. Only through the smoke of the battlefield, in dim outline, a group of officers, the duke and his staff, were visible. Then suddenly the English guards, who were lying on the ground, rose up like a red wall, and delivered at close quarters a withering fire. In a moment 300 men were struck down; and Ney, whose fifth horse had been shot under him, sought on foot, sword in hand, to steady the wavering column, but in vain; it succumbed to the bayonet, and its precipitate flight could not be checked. Already Zieten had made his attack by way of Papelotte and Smohain, and when the Prussians advanced farther upon La Belle-Alliance everything gave way before them. Meantime a decisive result was also reached at Plancenoit. A final desperate conflict occurred around the village, and after three charges the Prussians took it by storm under the eyes of Gneisenau. A panic seized upon the defeated enemy. In confused, disorderly crowds they fled precipitately and wildly, and even Napoleon's presence and appeals were no longer able to arrest them. Then he, too, turned his horse to flee. Only one battalion of the guards, commanded by General Cambronne, left the field with closed ranks. That Wellington gathered together the broken members of his army, and led their advance to La Belle-Alliance without actual fighting, was a well merited honor, due to the valor of his troops; but the allegation in his report, that this, his final offensive movement, brought about the result of the great struggle, is as groundless as the naming of the battle after Waterloo (PLATE XIX.) To take part in the immediate pursuit was ab-



licher
Jahr 1812);

PLATE XIX.



Meeting of Blücher and Wellington after the Battle of Waterloo

From a copper-plate engraving by Lumb Stocks (born 1812); original, a fresco-painting in the Palace of Westminster at London by Daniel Maclise (1811-1870).

solutely impossible for Wellington's exhausted troops, and it was therefore left for the Prussians. Now began that unparalleled pursuit under Gneisenau's lead, which taxed the last breath of horse and man.

Thus had all this come to pass in a campaign begun without a declaration of war, within four days from the first shot to the conclusion. It is true that Napoleon deluded himself with the opinion that he might still regain everything, particularly as Grouchy, against whom Tietmann had heroically maintained his position until the morning of the 19th, had fortunately escaped with his corps, returning to France by way of Namur. He appointed Laon as the rallying-point, but army and people turned their backs upon the vanquished man. Urged by those about him, he was obliged to renounce his purpose of remaining at the head of the army; and he repaired to Paris, and wished the Chamber to appoint him dictator. But the Chamber of Deputies, which had declared itself in permanent session, and any attempt to dissolve it high treason, showed a decidedly hostile feeling toward him. Here also he was beset on all sides; and Napoleon abdicated in favor of his son. The Chamber, however, did not recognize Napoleon II., but a provisional government, at whose head stood the old intriguer, Fouché. Napoleon retired to Malmaison: and there, after his offer to the government of serving simply as general had been rejected, he received the advice to make use at Rochefort of two frigates which would take him to America. But incapable of freeing himself from the vision of his past greatness, he hesitated with regard to his departure from day to day until the English blockaded the harbor. To avoid falling into the hands of the Prussians, who threatened to put him to death, or of the Bourbons, he gave himself up, on July 15, to Captain Maitland of the *Bellerophon*, after appealing, in a letter to the Prince Regent, to the magnanimity of his most embittered foes, to be allowed, "like Themistocles, to sit down on the hearth of the British people, and place himself under the protection of their laws." Charged by the sovereigns assembled at Paris with the selection of his place of exile, the English government fixed upon the island of St. Helena, whose soil he trod on October 17.

Neither Napoleon's abdication nor the offer of an armistice checked the uneasing advance of the Prussians. "No delay, no intermission," wrote Gneisenau, on June 24, to Müffling, by Blücher's command. "Paris itself must be given to us as security."

In order not to be detained by conflicts with regard to the crossing of rivers, he conceived the utmost effort to be demanded. By a night march Compiègne was reached on the 27th in advance of the French. At Paris the approach of the Prussians (PLATE XX.) created the greatest consternation. The dissolution of the French army had already gone so far as to render any proper control of it impossible. Every one implored the authorities to prevent the second entry of the allies into the capital; the price which they were prepared to pay for this was the acknowledgment of Louis XVIII. Wellington, on whose invitation the king had already removed his residence to French soil, at Cambrai, met their wishes very willingly. Little sympathy did the Bourbons find at Blücher's headquarters, since they had exhibited, at the Congress of Vienna, the greatest malignity toward Prussia. Blücher was doubly enraged, at the detention of his two flags of truce by the disorderly French soldiery, as well as by the intelligence, very annoying to him, of an armistice ostensibly concluded between the Austrian General Frimont and Marshal Soult at Geneva. Since the works of defence constructed by Napoleon on the north side of the city presented obstacles to the assault, it was decided to cross the Seine, and to attack the city on the unprotected south side; and for this reason Wellington was to move into the position occupied by the Prussians. Though the advance guard, under Lieutenant-Colonel von Sohr, had the misfortune to be assailed, and almost entirely cut to pieces, by Exelmans at Versailles, yet the proposed operation, which was not without danger, was in other respects successfully executed, and Issy was captured and occupied. After Vandamme's attempt to wrest this place from the Prussians had miscarried, Davout offered to surrender Paris. On July 3 a military convention was concluded at St. Cloud, in pursuance of which the French army were to evacuate the city within three days, and withdraw behind the Loire.

The great object was attained. Within fifteen days the Prussian army had passed over a space of two hundred and twenty miles from the battlefield of Waterloo till they came under the southern walls of Paris. Zieten enjoyed the distinction of being the first to enter Paris with his corps, on July 7. Of Wellington's army, only a part moved into the Bois de Boulogne. On the next day Louis XVIII. made his entry into the city, where he was received with mingled feelings, and Fouché dissolved the provisional government. Blücher and Gneisenau took no notice of him; both of them

PLATE XX



March of the Prussians to Paris.

Bronze relief on the Blücher Monument in Berlin, erected in 1821. By Christian Rauch (1777-1857).

History of All Nations, Vol. XVII., page 496.

thirsted to make the French at last feel for once that they were conquered. The plundered treasures of art were ferreted out, and whatever was found was without delay sent home; the bridge of Jena escaped from being blown up only by the failure of the attempt. In fact, it was to appear only too soon that a second disappointment was awaiting the expectations of German patriots; although at this time they found an energetic defender in the state chancellor, Hardenberg. After Louis XVIII., who was acknowledged as lawful king by all the powers, had once, under Wellington's protection, actually assumed possession of the government, and the allies once more repeated the fiction that they had carried on war, not against France, but, as allies of Louis, only against Napoleon, neither king nor country could be made responsible for the recent disturbance of peace, or be punished for it by imposing hard conditions. The Emperor Alexander, although in no way attached to the Bourbons, was the more prepared to act the part of a magnanimous protector, since to weaken France would promote no Russian interest; and, moreover, Louis XVIII., on his recommendation, had called to be the head of the new ministry the Duke of Richelieu, an emigré, who as governor of the Crimea had won the emperor's full confidencee. To the Austrian cabinet German interests were remote; and Prussia, being abandoned by her ally, was obliged to yield to such an extent that the Second Treaty of Paris, signed on November 20, amounted substantially to a renewal of the first, and did not grant to Germany her natural frontier on the Vosges. Only that which France was in the first treaty allowed to retain beyond her ancient boundaries, she was now obliged to surrender in great part,—Saarlouis and Saarbrücken to Prussia, Landau to Bavaria, Philippeville and Marienburg to the Netherlands, and the remainder of Savoy and Nice to Sardinia. Furthermore, France was obliged to pay a war contribution of 700,000,000 of francs, and consent that there be stationed in the northeast, for the space of five years, an allied army under the supreme command of the Duke of Wellington, as security for the future good behavior of the kingdom. On the same day the Four Powers renewed their alliance, and they pledged themselves to the maintenance of peace and of the legitimate royal house in France. They further solemnly promised one another to watch over the safety of Europe by means of repeated assemblages of sovereigns and statesmen.

Thus ended the wars of the Revolution, an era that had lasted

twenty-three years. During this period there had been a complete overturning of old Europe. Knowledge of the extent to which the generosity practised toward France had been misplaced was an experience reserved to the next generation.

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